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ABSTRACT 
 
The literature on the roles of management accountants (MAs) indicates a poor understanding of 
these roles. There is limited, and fragmented evidence of the factors shaping these roles, 
contradictory findings on MAs providing meaningful information, and on adopting the model of 
the ‗business partner‘. There is a dearth of research on the consequences of these roles. Some of 
the literature is of a normative, professional bent and lacks theoretical import. From a theoretical 
perspective, this study employs the theories of management control, contingency, and role 
theory as devices through which to understand these roles.  
 
The aim of the study is to investigate the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences 
associated with the roles of MAs, and to analyse the extent that antecedents and characteristics 
associated with the roles of MAs have consequences for assisting operating managers (OMs) in 
the performance of their roles. The setting for the study is medium and large manufacturing 
firms. The first phase of data collection involved an inductive set of interviews with 18 finance 
managers (FMs) and 18 OMs. The second phase of data collection involved an in-depth 
investigation of 12 MAs as ‗cases‘ linked to specific OMs, drawing on 36 interviews and the 
analysis of over 50 management accounting reports. 
 
The phase one findings provide evidence of a range of antecedents, characteristics, and 
consequences associated with the roles of MAs. The antecedents of management and the 
individual MAs themselves emerge as strong influences on the roles of MAs. MAs are 
perceived as requiring a range of skills, as being involved in a broad set of activities, and as 
playing an important role in information provision and analysis. The consequences of the roles 
of MAs show that interaction between MAs and OMs can lead to positive outcomes for 
performance, information, and for functional relationships, but a number of uncertainties and 
conflicts are associated with this. Collectively, these findings identify a number of challenges 
facing the MA in providing support to OMs. 
 
In phase two, the analysis of the control and decision support expectations of each OM, with 
respect to the MA linked to that OM, identifies the extent that MAs assist OMs in relation to 
performance impact, information provision, and their interaction. The findings link specific 
characteristics of MAs (e.g., routine and non-routine reports, individual traits) and antecedents 
(e.g., OMs‘ expectations, head office, regulation, FMs, OM‘s understanding of MAs) with the 
extent that MAs assist OMs in their roles.  
 
The study adds to the existing literature on the roles of MAs in a number of ways. The study 
provides a comprehensive picture of the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences 
associated with the roles of MAs. Through the management control theoretical lens, the findings 
indicate that more involvement of MAs with OMs may lead to more effective control in 
particular contexts, and highlights the extent that control reports are useful, and how they are 
used. A number of contingencies are identified that relate antecedents of the roles to assisting 
OMs in their roles. The use of the role theory lens in analysing the extent that MAs are not 
meeting OMs‘ expectations has helped explain contradictions in the literature, and identifies 
role conflicts and ambiguities for MAs that are new to the literature. The study extends the 
‗business partner‘ and ‗bean counter‘ dichotomy to include two additional depictions of the 
roles of MAs. The research design makes a contribution in its use of qualitative enquiry, a two-
phase approach, the inclusion of OMs as well as MAs, the adaption of role theory methodology, 
and in the analysis of qualitative data. The study is novel in its employment of three theoretical 
lenses. The study contributes to practice, and theory on the roles of MAs, in showing that MAs 
moving to the model of the business partner is one that is not straightforward, but one that has 
conditions, ambiguities, and conflicts associated with it.  
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1.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces the study by providing a summary of the major themes in the 
academic and professional literature relating to the roles of management accountants 
(MAs). This is followed by a statement of the study‘s overall purpose and the research 
objectives of phase one and two of the research supporting this purpose. Next, the 
chapter outlines the theoretical framework that underpins the study, followed by an 
overview of the research design generating the findings. The section following this 
presents a summary of the contribution of the study. Finally, a chapter structure of the 
dissertation is outlined. 
 
1.2 Background to the study: research on the roles of MAs 
The study is motivated by a personal interest in roles of MAs from previous 
experience of such roles, by a desire to better understand how MAs can perform their 
roles in contemporary contexts, and by a number of apparent gaps in the literature. 
Despite a growing body of academic research on the roles of MAs in organisations in 
the latter half of the last century, there is as yet a poor understanding of the roles of 
MAs in organisations (Anthony, 1989; Young, 1996). This has created a somewhat 
fragmented body of knowledge (Chapman, 1997; Chenhall 2003, 2007) producing an 
incomplete picture of many of the individual and collective dimensions of the roles of 
MAs.  
 
There is an emerging model of the roles of MAs in the recent literature that tends to 
emphasise the roles of MAs as being involved in management decision making 
processes. This model is often conveyed with titles including the ‗Business Partner‘ 
(Gibson, 2002; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003; Siegel et al., 2003a, 2003b), ‗Hybrid 
Accountants‘ (Burns et al., 1999; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 
2005, 2007), and the ‗Business Advocate‘ (Jablonsky et al., 1993; Jablonsky and 
Keating, 1998) amongst others. There has not been much added to our understanding 
of the contemporary roles of MAs, particularly around the involvement of MAs with 
operating managers (OMs), since the pioneering work of Simon et al. (1954), Sathe 
(1982) and Hopper (1980). Moreover, it can be argued that in the current intensely 
competitive environment that OMs require flexibility and quality information from 
the MAs that support them in their decision making processes. The research to date on 
the roles of MAs supporting managerial decision making has produced inconclusive 
3 
 
results. Some studies have found that MAs are occupying meaningful roles in this 
area (Ahrens, 1997; Caglio, 2003; Vaivio, 2004), while some studies have found that 
MAs are not doing so (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998b; Johnston et al., 2002a; 
Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). 
 
It has been generally recognised that a central aspect of the roles of MAs in 
supporting managers‘ decision making is the information that is provided towards this 
end (Belkaoui, 1980; Emmanuel et al., 1990; Horngren et al., 2000; Atkinson et al., 
2001). Notwithstanding this, there has been much criticism of the usefulness of this 
information (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; McKinnon and Bruns, 1992) and evidence of 
a user-preparer gap (Mendoza and Bescos, 2001; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). Finally, 
there has been a dearth of research on the roles of MAs in an Irish context, although 
this study does not focus on distinguishing any cultural observations in this context. 
 
1.3 Background to the study: accounting roles in practice 
A number of professional publications have indicated that the roles of accountants in 
finance functions have not adhered to the espoused model of business partnering 
(Siegel et al., 2003a, 2003b) with business managers in commercial decision making 
processes. In a global survey of senior financial and non-financial executives (a 
sample of 286 comprising 123 chief financial officers (CFOs)) in high performing 
firms, EIU and KPMG (2006) found that 45% of CFOs acknowledged a deficiency in 
the finance function‘s knowledge of the business. Over 30% of all respondents noted 
that the interactions between the finance function and other organisational functions 
could be better, specifically with sales and marketing, research and development, and 
manufacturing operations and supply chain functions. EIU and KPMG (2006) note 
that as a result, ‗finance is often excluded from important negotiations with suppliers 
and business partners‘ (p. 19). IBM (2005), in a global survey of 889 CFOs, note that 
the top three critical areas of concern as: performance management (69%), business 
partnership for expansion (61%), and ongoing enhancement of the business and 
processes (61%). In contrast to these ‗highly important‘ scores, the corresponding 
respondent scores for ‗highly effective‘ were respectively, 42%, 31%, and 28% for 
the same three areas, revealing a considerable gap.  
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In a survey of over 1,200 CFOs, IBM (2008, p. 3) note that integrating the global 
finance function is of primary concern: 
 
Enabling such consistency shifts the conversation from ―Are the 
numbers right?‖ to ―How do we use these numbers to better our 
business?‖ It is the shift from the transactional to the analytical. With 
data turned into information then turned into insight, Finance moves 
beyond ―taillights‖ – historical reporting – to a keener sense of 
―headlights‖ with which to illuminate the future direction of the 
enterprise. 
 
Thus, there is a very strong mandate in the professional literature for accountants to 
develop roles that incorporate a partnership approach in commercial decision making 
processes. The professional management accounting literature suggests that many 
MAs may find their careers at a crossroads, having to take perhaps very challenging 
new career directions, while recognising that some typical traditional management 
accounting roles may imminently disappear (Cooper, 1996; Ezzamel et al., 1997; 
Burns et al., 1999; Pierce, 2001; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2007). 
 
1.4 Substantive motivation for research 
Commercial organisations and not-for-profit organisations are established with the 
purpose of achieving particular goals relating for example to development, growth, 
profitability (for commercial organisations), but ultimately aim to sustain the 
organisation in the future. Fundamental to the achievement of this aim, are the many 
and varied decisions that managers of these organisations make in the enacting of 
their roles and these decisions relate, amongst other factors, to the information that is 
available to these managers. In this regard, accounting as a discipline has long 
recorded, validated and reported organisations‘ transactions, providing a pool of 
information from which managers can report, plan, evaluate, and project 
organisational performance. 
 
Since the development of management accounting practice in Western societies in the 
late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, there has been much concern with if, and how, 
accountants, as traditional custodians of firms‘ accounting and control systems, can 
better support managerial decision making in organisations (Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987). Reflecting the organisational demands for accountants, many professional 
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management accounting institutions have been founded (e.g., the UK currently named 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) and the US currently named 
Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), both formed in the year 1919), and in 
parallel, management accounting has also been a substantial component of the third-
level accounting curriculum.  
 
What has made the challenge of meeting managers‘ decision making and control 
needs more difficult has been the contemporary environment in which managers now 
operate. It has frequently been observed that today‘s business environment is in 
general intensely competitive, dynamic, deregulated, global in its threats and 
opportunities, and influenced by rapid technological advancements. Thus, the task 
facing MAs in supporting managerial decision making has even greater urgency in 
these contexts. Within the manufacturing sector, the sectoral focus of this study, it is 
generally accepted that many firms are attracted, and move, to low cost and/or 
incentivised locations and that product life cycles are shrinking making manufacturing 
an extremely competitive enterprise. 
 
1.5 Purpose of the study 
The overall purpose of this study is to advance our understanding of the roles of MAs 
operating within a manufacturing environment through two phases of investigation. 
The first phase of the research aims to inductively understand the factors associated 
with the roles of MAs, while phase two aims to develop this understanding further 
through focusing on a limited number of these factors and making an in-depth enquiry 
of these. 
 
Phase one of the study investigates the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences 
associated with the roles of MAs (see section 4.4) and what follows is a brief 
summary of the key literature, reviewed in detail in chapters two and three, 
underpinning the establishment of each of the objectives. The objectives for phase 
two, summarised in section 1.5.4, follow on from the statement of phase one 
objectives. These are presented in more detail at the commencement of the phase two 
findings chapter (see section 6.2), having at that stage presented the findings from 
phase one.  
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1.5.1 Antecedents associated with the roles of MAs 
There is limited theoretical or empirical literature on what factors impact on 
management accounting systems (MASs) and the roles of MAs, as Libby and 
Waterhouse (1996) observe: ‗surprisingly little is known about the actual rate of 
adoption of changes to accounting systems…even less is known about the forces that 
induce or act to impede change in accounting systems‘ (p. 137). Burns and Scapens 
(2000) note that ‗little research attention has been given to understanding the 
processes through which these new management accounting systems and practices 
have emerged (or failed to emerge) through time‘ (p. 4). The literature identifies some 
variables that may impact on the roles of MAs including: the business environment 
(Sathe, 1982, Burns et al., 1999; CIMA, 2007), technological developments (Ezzamel 
et al., 1997; Granlund and Malmi, 2002; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003), cross-
functional interaction (Nulty, 1992; Mouritsen, 1996; Johnston et al. 2002a), 
structural arrangements and physical location (Hopper, 1980; Granlund and Lukka, 
1998a; IMA, 1999), accounting innovations (Bhimani and Pigott, 1992; Norris, 1995; 
Friedman and Lyne, 1997), and individual qualities (IMA, 1996, 1999; Burns and 
Yazdifar, 2001; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2007). Theoretically, there is a poor and 
fragmented understanding of the contingencies that might relate to MASs and the 
roles of MAs (Chenhall, 2003, 2007). Management has been found to influence the 
roles of MAs (Hopper, 1980) and controllers (Sathe, 1982) using role theory‘s 
prediction of the influence of management‘s expectations but this work needs 
revisiting in contemporary contexts. Further, there appears to be a dearth of research 
regarding understanding the roles of MAs, as traditional custodians of organisational 
control systems, in the context of the deployment of management control systems 
(MCSs) in contemporary settings (Otley, 1994; Scapens et al., 2003; Berry et al., 
2008). These gaps in the literature lead to the research objective: 
 
To investigate antecedents associated with the roles of MAs. 
 
1.5.2 Characteristics associated with the roles of MAs 
Since the mid-eighties there has been considerable criticism, particularly from US 
academia, suggesting that MAs have been slow to respond to changing environments 
and do not provide relevant information to managers (Kaplan, 1984; Johnson and 
Kaplan, 1987; McKinnon and Bruns, 1992). Research in the UK has in general 
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suggested that the ‗crisis‘ in management accounting may be less acute and instead 
ought to be understood in a broader organisational context (Bromwich and Bhimani, 
1989; Burns et al., 1999). The limited evidence to date in an Irish context suggests 
that MAs are in danger of being ‗marginalised‘ (Clarke et al., 1999), with managers 
perceiving a need for broader and more timely information, coupled with flexibility 
for change (Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003).  
 
Partly in response to the questioning of the relevance of management accounting 
practices, a plethora of survey research over the last two decades on these practices 
has indicated some adoption of accounting innovations but perhaps less wholesale 
than expected (Drury et al., 1993; Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994). In an Irish context, 
the findings have shown some adoption (see Clarke, 1992; O‘Dea and Clarke, 1994; 
Pierce and O‘Dea, 1998), but less than in other countries (Clarke et al., 1999). More 
recent research in Ireland has suggested a potential levelling off of adoption levels 
(Pierce and Brown, 2003). The survey research has prompted a need for a more in-
depth understanding of the operation of the management accounting function. 
 
The model of the ‗business partner‘ has received increasing attention recently in the 
literature. The business partner is typically depicted in terms of MAs providing 
management with strong decision making support. There is a growing body of 
literature suggesting that the extent of decision support is somewhat lacking in terms 
of how the role is espoused and in terms of managerial expectations (Hopper, 1980; 
Sathe, 1982; Jablonsky et al., 1993; Sheridan, 1997; Johnston et al., 2002a; Pierce and 
O‘Dea, 2003), despite the continued strong promotion of the partnership principle in 
the professional accounting press (Burns et al., 1996; Siegel et al., 2003a, 2003b, 
Gould and Fahy, 2005, 2005/2006). Theoretically, there is scope to explore the 
existence of contingencies that might relate to characteristics of the roles of MAs and 
role theory predicts that characteristics of the roles of MAs may have implications for 
others‘ expectations of those roles (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978). From a 
management control theoretical perspective, there appears to be scope to build more 
understanding of role characteristics pertaining to the effectiveness of control. This 
leads to the research objective: 
 
To investigate the characteristics associated with the roles of MAs. 
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1.5.3 Consequences associated with the roles of MAs 
Relative to the antecedents and characteristics associated with the roles of MAs, there 
has been very little research on the consequences of such roles.  
 
Horngren et al. (2000) define management accounting as a function that ‗measures 
and reports financial and non-financial information that helps managers make 
decisions to fulfil the goals of an organisation‘ (p. 888). This suggests that there are 
likely consequences of the roles of MAs with respect to the information they gather, 
analyse and provide in support of internal managerial decision making which 
ultimately would have implications for organisational performance. However, as 
noted in the previous section 1.5.2, there has been much criticism of management 
accounting information provision and the roles of MAs not adopting the model of the 
‗business partner‘ which therefore underpins a need to better understand what are the 
actual consequences of the contemporary roles of MAs. 
 
Recent environmental, management and technological initiatives and developments 
have suggested that the management accounting landscape may be altering as a 
consequence (Burns et al., 1996; Ezzamel et al., 1997; Granlund and Malmi, 2002; 
Granlund and Mouritsen, 2003; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003; Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2007). There have been a number of calls in the literature to 
investigate the contemporary consequences of these developments for management 
accounting and control (Otley, 1994; Shields, 1997; Scapens and Bromwich, 2001). 
There is thus, a theoretical need to investigate the roles of MAs with respect to the 
outcomes from a management control perspective. Role theory, which includes the 
concepts of role conflict and role ambiguity, suggests that there might be 
consequences for the roles of MAs in adopting the model of business partnership, 
while simultaneously maintaining a somewhat removed and objective positioning for 
control purposes. This has received little attention from accounting researchers since 
the pioneering work of Simon et al. (1954) followed by Hopper (1980) and Sathe 
(1982, 1983). This leads to the research objective:  
 
To investigate the consequences associated with the roles of MAs. 
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1.5.4 Phase two objectives 
As phase one entails an investigation of antecedents, characteristics, and 
consequences associated with the roles of MAs, phase two narrows the focus to a 
subset of these variables. Phase two objectives follow on from the outcome of the 
analysis of phase one findings (see section 6.2 on the linking of phase one and two), 
and are directed towards gaining an understanding of the relationships between the 
antecedents and characteristics from phase one, and the consequences of these for 
assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
 
In the interest of providing some indicative basis for this focus on assisting OMs in 
the performance of their roles – and without prematurely presenting phase one 
findings – some of the guiding themes are presented here. Phase one findings 
indicated strong shared perceptions of the roles of MAs as providing support to 
managers but with mixed evidence on their effectiveness in doing so. A range of 
strong, and less strong, antecedents to the roles of MAs were observed with some 
indicating uncertainties about MAs interacting with managers and some suggesting 
negative influences on MAs‘ capacity to support managers. The findings on 
consequences in phase one directed attention to this interaction, with positive and 
negative outcomes for managers, and for MAs being perceived. With these factors in 
mind, and an orientation towards focusing on an outcome variable, and still mindful 
of the consequences gap in the academic literature, phase two narrows to focus on 
understanding how the phase one antecedents and characteristics linked to the roles of 
MAs might be associated with assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. The 
objectives of phase two can be stated as: 
 
1. To analyse the extent that antecedents associated with the roles of MAs have 
consequences for assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
 
2. To analyse the extent that characteristics associated with the roles of MAs have 
consequences for assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
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Addressing the objectives of the study entailed the use of three theoretical lenses 
which are outlined in the next section, and the research design is outlined in the 
section following. 
 
1.6 Theoretical perspectives 
The conceptual lenses of management control, contingency, and role theory permeate 
many elements of this research on the roles of MAs. Firstly, they form part of the 
literature review (see chapter two), as relevant theoretical perspectives on the roles of 
MAs. Secondly, they frame the interpretation and analysis of the research findings. 
Thirdly, they have an impact on the research design by drawing on role theory 
methodology (see sections 4.4.2 and 4.6.4), and by departing from the quantitative 
methodological bent of contingency research (see section 2.3.3).  
 
The selection of the management control perspective is based on the central role of 
the management accounting function in the deployment of management control in 
organisations (Anthony, 1965; Macintosh, 1985; Emmanuel et al., 1990; Otley, 1994; 
Otley et al., 1995). Scapens et al. (2003) and Otley (1994) call for development in the 
theory of control that takes into account recent changes in accounting practices e.g., 
developments including MAs working in cross-functional teams, on business 
processes, partnering in decision making and integrating financial and non-financial 
information on operational and strategic levels. 
 
The selection of contingency theory is based on the idea that, in investigating the roles 
of MAs in particular organisational contexts, some evidence might point to the 
existence of a matching, or mismatching, between the roles of MAs and 
characteristics of these contexts (Otley, 1980; Fisher, 1995; Chenhall, 2003, 2007). It 
is being used in this study as there is not an established contingency literature 
specifically on the roles of MAs. While this theory has been much employed in 
previous management accounting research, it tends to have been in studies primarily 
of a quantitative nature. In contrast, this study adopts a qualitative design, an approach 
used in the very early contingency studies by organisational theorists.  
 
The selection of ‗role‘ theory in a study that focuses on the ‗roles‘ of MAs has 
intuitive merit. The theory relates roles and the expectations of those roles in 
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organisational settings (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978). The literature (see 
section 1.2) documents changing roles for MAs that suggest an increasing orientation 
towards supporting managerial decision making, which calls for understanding the 
expectations of managers, a central tenet of role theory.  
 
The relative importance of each theory in the study relates to the objectives of the 
study. For example, the contingency lens underpins analysis of perceived conditional 
alignments (as antecedents and characteristics), the role lens underpins analysis of 
managers‘ expectations (as antecedents), characteristics of those occupying roles (i.e., 
MAs), and role conflicts (as consequences), and the management control lens as a 
central aspect of the roles of MAs (as antecedents, characteristics and consequences). 
Furthermore, the selection of these theories is supported by their previous 
employment in management accounting research and the rationale for a multi-
theoretical perspective, as opposed to a singular one, is that their integration in a 
single study facilitates the drawing out of their relative strengths and limitations. The 
theoretical stance is therefore not one of a-priori testing but using interpretive devices 
deployed in previous management accounting studies (Berry et al., 1991; Marginson, 
1999; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Granlund and Taipaleenmäki, 2005). The 
outcomes of the study point to further use of these theoretical lenses in investigating 
the roles of MAs e.g., a larger sample investigation of contingent relationships, the 
consequences of the MA‘s interaction with managers from a management control 
perspective, and the role conflicts and ambiguities for MAs vis-à-vis the expectations 
of managers. 
 
1.7 Methodological perspectives 
The overarching methodological approach of this study is qualitative. Within such a 
framework the researcher seeks to build an in-depth understanding of the perceptions 
of MAs and OMs in the specific contexts in which they are located. This perspective 
is generally aligned with research methods that facilitate the building of such 
knowledge. The data collection involved a process of in-depth interviews in phase one 
followed by the examination of 12 ‗case‘ roles of MAs in phase two using in-depth 
interviews and documentation analysis, with both phases concentrating on medium 
and large manufacturing firms. The case analysis in phase two was at the individual 
level (i.e., the MA) and not the company level (i.e., the five manufacturing firms in 
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which the 12 MAs were based) because the analysis of phase one data pointed to this 
level of analysis for further research (see section 5.5 and section 6.2). A summary of 
the data collection process is depicted in figure 1.1. 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – Overview of the data collection process 
 
Leading on from the phase two research objectives as stated above, phase two is 
methodologically distinct from phase one in many respects. Firstly it draws on role 
theory methodology (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978) in pairing specific roles 
of MAs with specific OMs based on the theory‘s prediction of role behaviours from 
management expectations. Secondly, it uses the case approach where each MA is a 
particular case, and therefore gives depth and numerous perspectives for each case. 
Thirdly, it focuses on very specific MAs interacting with specific OMs, as opposed to 
phase one which sometimes focuses on the more normative perceptions of senior 
MAs, or finance managers (FMs), on the roles of MAs. 
 
The manufacturing setting is chosen as the context for the study because this has 
traditionally been the dominant sector of employment for MAs, and in an Irish 
context, this sector has been particularly relevant as a contributor to economic 
performance (Scarpetta et al., 2000). As a small open economy, Ireland‘s recent 
economic success has been partly attributed to the arrival of many foreign, 
manufacturing-based, multi-national enterprises (MNEs).  
 
In-depth interviews  
18 Finance Managers 
18 Operating Managers 
in 16 medium and large  
manufacturing firms 
Case studies  
Investigation of 12 roles of MAs 
 in five medium and large  
manufacturing firms  
[comprising 36 interviews and over 50 
management accounting reports] 
 
PHASE ONE 
 
PHASE TWO 
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1.8 Contribution  
Any contribution claims made in this research must be taken in the context of 
boundaries imposed by the particular focus on the subject matter (i.e., roles of MAs) 
and the methodological constraints associated with qualitative research including the 
using of small sample sizes (see section 8.6.2). The contribution is detailed in the 
conclusion chapter in section 8.9 but is summarised below: 
 
1) The study makes a contribution to our understanding of the roles of MAs in 
presenting a more comprehensive picture of the antecedents, characteristics, and 
consequences associated with these roles, than that provided in the literature to 
date.  
 
2) A contribution is made through the contingency lens in the establishment of a 
number of propositions relating to the antecedents to the roles of MAs.  
 
3) Through role theory, the study analyses the extent that MAs meet the control and 
decision expectations of OMs, and assist OMs in the performance of their roles. 
This analysis helps to explain contradictions in the existing literature in relation to 
MAs moving towards the model of the business partner. 
 
4) From a management control theoretical perspective the findings bring attention to 
the extent that the involvement of MAs, and control reports, may lead to more 
effective control in particular contexts. Contrary to most previous research, this 
study finds evidence that more involvement can lead to more control. 
 
5) Use of the role theory lens also reveals a number of role conflicts and ambiguities 
for the roles of MAs, which relates to assisting OMs in their roles, and to adopting 
the model of the business partner. 
 
6) Other contributions include: extending the bean-counter-business partner 
dichotomy of the roles of MAs, the qualitative approach, research design and data 
analysis, recommendations for practitioners, and the combined use of three 
theoretical lenses.  
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1.9 Structure of the dissertation 
Following the overview of the dissertation in this chapter, chapter two reviews the 
literature on management control, contingency, and role theory. It presents the 
conceptual foundations for the study, which are subsequently employed as the 
theoretical lenses through which the findings are analysed. Chapter three reviews the 
relevant empirical literature on the roles of MAs, covering many dimensions of the 
roles, including their characteristics and factors shaping them. Within these roles, the 
nature and perceptions of management accounting information is also reviewed. 
Chapter four is the methodology chapter and this includes the: philosophical 
perspectives of the research, research problem, research objectives, research design 
and data collection and analysis.  
 
Chapter five presents the findings from the 36 interviews with finance managers and 
OMs in 16 medium and large manufacturing firms. In line with phase one objectives 
of the study this chapter analyses the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences 
associated with the roles of MAs. Chapter six presents the findings from the 
investigation of the roles of 12 MAs in five manufacturing firms. This chapter 
commences with the phase one to phase two linking mechanism before presenting the 
findings in line with phase two objectives. Chapter seven reviews the findings from 
phases one and two of the research, as presented in chapters five and six. This review 
entails a critical examination of the findings in the context of previous empirical 
research and the three theoretical lenses. Chapter eight is the conclusion chapter and 
this summarises the contribution of the study, its implications for management 
accounting practice, recommendations for further research, and the limitations that 
pertain to the research. Figure 1.2 provides an illustrative map of the dissertation 
chapter structure. 
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Figure 1.2 – Outline of dissertation chapter sequence 
 
The diagram presents the sequence of chapters including two literature review 
chapters and two findings chapters with the theoretical and empirical literature review 
feeding into the discussion chapter. This chapter is followed by the conclusion chapter 
which asserts the contribution made to the gaps in the literature. Figure 1.2 also shows 
the linking of phase one and two at the commencement of the second phase findings 
chapter. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical foundations for the study. It commences with a 
review of management control theory, followed by a review of contingency theory, 
and then a review of role theory. Each theoretical perspective is defined and explained 
and located in its historical and contemporary context. Each section closes with a 
rationale for the selection of each particular theoretical frame for this study. 
 
2.2 Management control 
Anthony‘s (1965) landmark framework on MCSs, as distinct from strategic planning 
systems above them and operational control systems beneath them, underpins much of 
the subsequent research on the subject. Anthony (1965) describes management 
control as ‗the process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used 
effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organisation‘s objectives‘ (p. 
17), which thus precludes the consideration of higher-level strategic and lower-level 
operational control. Effectiveness can be understood in terms of achieving pre-defined 
objectives, while efficiency relates to how economically those objectives are 
achieved. It is widely recognised that management control is essentially concerned 
with influencing organisational behaviour towards the achievement of organisational 
goals (Flamholtz et al., 1985).  
 
More recent definitions tend to broaden this definition to include environmental 
adaptation in the fulfilment of organisational objectives (Otley and Berry, 1980). 
Berry et al. (1995) define management control as ‗the process of guiding 
organisations into viable patterns of activity in a changing environment‘ (p. 4). This 
involves influencing behaviour towards the sustainable achievement of organisational 
goals. Lowe (1971) comprehensively defines a MCS as: 
 
A system of information seeking and gathering, accountability, and 
feedback designed to ensure that the enterprise adapts to changes in 
its substantive environment and that the work behaviour of its 
employees is measured by reference to a set of operational sub-goals 
(which conform with overall objectives) so that the discrepancy 
between the two can be reconciled and corrected for (p. 5). 
 
This definition draws attention to a number of aspects of management control 
including the role of information flows, goals, behaviours, measurements and 
18 
 
addressing variances to targets. Simons (1987) defines control systems in formal 
terms as ‗formalised procedures and systems that use information to maintain or alter 
patterns in organisational activity‘ (p. 358). Collectively, these definitions of 
management control suggest that important dimensions include: organisational 
strategies and multi-level objectives, optimal management of resources, information 
feedback loops and corrective action, environmental linkages and organisational 
adaptation, and behavioural impacts. 
 
2.2.1 Management control: classifications 
Control mechanisms may take on many forms in organisations and a number of 
attempts have been made to classify these. Hopwood (1974) analyses organisational 
controls into administrative controls, social controls and self-controls. Ouchi (1979) 
classifies organisational controls into market mechanisms, bureaucratic mechanisms, 
and clan mechanisms. Hofstede (1981) proposes a typology of management control 
around four key questions (p. 194): 
 
1. Are the objectives of the activity unambiguous or ambiguous? 
2. Are its outputs measurable or non-measurable? 
3. Are effects of management interventions in it known or unknown? 
4. Is the activity repetitive or non-repetitive? 
 
Based on the answers to these questions Hofstede (1981) categorises controls as 
routine control, expert control, trial and error control, intuitive control, judgmental 
control, and political control. Routine control is appropriate in situations with clear 
objectives, measurable outputs, and known effects of interventions, and activities of a 
repetitive nature. Political control conversely, is appropriate in situations 
characterised by ambiguity, uncertainty and conflicting interests. The application of 
these controls and the intermediate controls are presented in table 2.1. 
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CONTROL TYPE Criteria for control type 
POLITICAL Ambiguous objectives 
Unambiguous objectives 
JUDGMENTAL Outputs not measurable but 
surrogates available 
Outputs measureable 
INTUITIVE Intervention impacts unknown 
and activity is non-repetitive 
TRIAL AND ERROR Intervention impacts unknown 
and activity is repetitive 
Intervention impacts known 
EXPERT Activity is not repetitive 
ROUTINE Activity is repetitive 
 
Table 2.1 – Determining appropriate control types 
   Source: Adapted from Hofstede (1981, p. 196) 
 
Macintosh (1994) recognises five general organisational control mechanisms as 
bureaucratic, charismatic, market, tradition, and collegial. Bureaucratic control 
emphasises hierarchy, procedures, rules and record keeping and are suitable to 
situations characterised by certainty and non-ambiguity. Conversely, charismatic 
control is appropriate where objectives are unambiguous but the process of achieving 
them is uncertain. Typically associated with revolutionary change, this control 
mechanism also suggests the importance of a charismatic leader. Market controls act 
as the ‗disciplinary glove of the invisible hand‘ (p. 136) through the organisation‘s 
performance in the market e.g., market response to prices, share of market. Control by 
tradition suggests that beliefs, rights, and norms are handed down and generally 
unquestionably followed in the interest of the greater good. Collegial control refers to 
specific groups possessing privileged authority (e.g., college academics), and where 
the administrators are themselves subject to control by the collegiums.   
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Following on from these Merchant (1998) classifies controls as action controls, 
personnel controls, cultural controls, and results controls. Table 2.2 illustrates the 
variety of controls available in relation to the overall purpose of the controls. 
 
Object of Control 
Specific Actions Results Personnel 
Behavioural Constraints: 
- Physical (e.g., locks, 
security guards) 
- Administrative (e.g., 
separation of duties) 
Results Accountability: 
- Standards 
- Budgets 
- Management by 
Objective (MBO) 
Upgrade Capabilities: 
- Selection 
- Training 
- Assignment 
Action Accountability: 
- Work rules 
- Policies and Procedures 
- Codes of Conduct 
Improve Communications: 
- Clarify expectations 
- Provide information for 
coordination 
Preaction Review: 
- Direct Supervision 
- Approval Limits 
- Budget Reviews 
Encourage Peer Control: 
- Work Groups 
- Shared Goals 
 
Table 2.2 - A control tool classification framework 
Source: Merchant (1998, p. 45) 
 
What these different groupings and templates suggest is that there is a very broad 
range of controls that might be employed to effect management control in 
organisations. Such classifications have strong similarities and the control types are 
often discussed synonymously (Drury, 2000).  
 
2.2.2 Cybernetic model of control  
Drawing on the work of cyberneticians, Otley and Berry (1980) identify four essential 
criteria for a process to be under control: (1) the system must have an objective, (2) it 
must be possible to measure the results in relation to the objective, (3) the system 
must have a predictive model, and (4) a number of different actions must be available 
to choose from. Figure 2.1 presents the four required conditions for control in 
diagrammatic form. The cybernetic model incorporates both feedback and 
feedforward control. Feedback control involves detecting deviations or errors when 
actual outcomes are compared to planned outcomes and instigating any required 
corrective action as a result, while feedforward control involves detecting deviations 
or errors when anticipated or predicted outcomes are compared to planned outcomes 
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and instigating any required corrective action as a result (Otley and Berry, 1980; 
Berry et al., 1995). Thus, feedback is retrospective and feedforward is prospective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Change inputs 
    (first-order control) 
 
                     (2) Amend model  
               of process    Interrogation of model   Reality  
       (internal learning)    (reality judgements)    judgement 
 
                 Mismatch 
         
                  signal 
 
                              Value    
                          judgement 
          (4) Change process (systematic learning)      
 
          (3) Amend objectives (second-order control)  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Model of control incorporating four essential components 
      Source: Otley and Berry (1980, p. 236) 
 
This model contains the essential building blocks of a traditional MCS; that is the 
setting of objectives, preparation of budgets, performance measurement, feedback and 
feedforward, calculation of variances and the consideration of alternative courses of 
action. Feedback relates to the communication process following the actual 
measurement of performance to facilitate its comparison to expected performance, 
while feedforward relates to the communication process where anticipated 
performance is compared to what performance is wished for (Emmanuel et al., 1990). 
Despite Boulding (1956)‘s classification of cybernetic systems at level three on a 
scale from one to nine of systems – reflecting an ascending level of sophistication and 
complexity – Emmanuel et al. (1990) argue that the model ‗can be used to analyse the 
design and operation of MCSs and the role of accounting information within them‘ (p. 
13). 
 
Inputs 
Process 
i.e., combination of input factors 
into organisational outputs 
 
 
Outputs 
Measures Measures Measures 
Predictive model of process 
Generation and evaluation of 
alternative course of action 
Implementation 
of chosen action 
Objectives of 
process 
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2.2.3 Expanding the cybernetic model of control 
Some argue that the cybernetic model needs re-examining as social dimensions are 
inadequately considered. Dermer and Lucas (1986) argue that power dimensions are 
neglected and the uni-directional exercise of power (the controller as opposed to the 
controlled) has contributed to an ‗illusion‘ of management control in organisations. 
Dermer and Lucas (1986) suggest that:  
 
…control systems be designed to sustain co-existing, yet divergent, 
rationalities and resulting control models used by self-regulating 
interest groups. The relationships between controller and controllee 
is not a one-way exercise of authority in order to extract compliance 
(p. 480). 
 
Ansari (1977) argues that the structural (or cybernetic) and behavioural approaches to 
control system design are often used in isolation of each other by researchers. Thus, 
control system design is less than optimal as one approach dominates. Ansari 
integrates these two dimensions of control system design into one framework (see 
figure 2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Components of a control system 
Source: Ansari (1977, p.108) 
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A number of other management control frameworks exist in the literature that 
incorporate the basic elements of the cybernetic model of control but also go further 
and address other aspects of control that are incompatible with the cybernetic model. 
Hofstede (1981) argues that the cybernetic model partially applies to expert and trial 
and error control but only fully applies to routine control (see section 2.2.1). 
 
Flamholtz (1983) places the cybernetic model in an organisational context and argues 
that budgeting and accounting systems, while often described as control systems, may 
not in fact be so. Figure 2.3 places the cybernetic control model (‗core control 
system‘) in the context of influential organisational variables i.e., environment, 
culture, and structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Schematic representation of an organisational control system 
Source: Flamholtz (1983, p. 155) 
 
Flamholtz (1983) argues that the four cybernetic control dimensions (planning, 
operations, measurement and evaluation/reward) may not always be present in 
organisational settings, giving rise to what he terms ‗degrees of control‘. Further, even 
the presence of all components does not guarantee control, as in the case of a real 
estate company where ‗branch managers paid very little attention to budgets‘ (p. 163). 
Integrating the budgeting and accounting systems with the wider organisational 
Organisational environment 
Organisational 
culture 
Organisational 
structure 
Core 
control 
system 
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control system is viewed as critical to their effectiveness. In the three organisational 
settings examined by Flamholtz, culture is noted as a crucial element of an 
organisational control system. 
 
2.2.4 Control and strategy 
More recently, the management control theoretical perspective is broadening to 
accommodate strategic perspectives and the ways in which control systems are 
deployed (Simons, 1995; Langfield-Smith, 1997). Simons (1987) found that firms 
pursuing alternative strategies use MCSs in different ways. Following Miles and 
Snow‘s (1978) classification of Prospector and Defender firms, Simons (1987) found 
that Prospectors (higher performers) tend to emphasise forecasting, tight targets but 
less cost control and close monitoring of output, with the larger companies attaching 
importance to regular reporting and standardised control systems with flexibility if 
required. Defenders, in contrast, emphasise rewarding budget achievement, placing 
less focus on control systems and are less likely to change. 
 
Simons (1995) suggests the use of four levers for the control of strategy: beliefs 
systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and interactive control 
systems. Diagnostic control systems represent traditional management control devices 
such as profit plans and budgets, and are widely in use, even if managers ‗pay little 
attention to them‘ (p. 59). Simons (1995) integrates diagnostic systems with other 
systems of control as ‗virtually all writing on management control systems refer to 
diagnostic control systems‘ (p. 60). Beliefs systems relate to the formal mission, 
purpose, values and general direction of the firm. Interactive control systems are used 
to promote innovation, learning and facilitate emergent ideas and strategies. 
Interactive control systems ‗focus attention and force dialogue throughout the 
organisation‘ (Simons, 1995, p. 96), and thus drive new strategy formulation from the 
bottom up. Boundary systems are used to set standards or constraints on behaviour 
within which innovation and creativity can thrive. Each of these systems, or levers, 
exerts counteracting forces on the strategy implementation process and each are 
associated with a secondary level variable as illustrated in figure 2.4. 
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SYSTEMS        SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERACTIVE        DIAGNOSTIC 
CONTROL        CONTROL 
SYSTEMS        SYSTEMS 
 
Figure 2.4 – Variables to be managed in controlling business strategy 
Source: Simons (1995, p. 7) 
 
Following Simons, in a case study of the emergence of non-financial indicators 
(NFIs) in a British chemicals firm, Vaivio (1999) recognises that NFIs could be used 
in either a diagnostic or interactive sense. In the field study, top management were 
observed deploying interactive control through the development of strategically 
important NFIs:  
 
Instead of monitoring the non-financial measures merely as 
diagnostic ‗strategic controls‘, the enactment of the measures 
involved top management personally with key operational processes. 
The measures maintained a structured dialogue between top 
management and the organisation‘ (p. 430). 
 
Thus, in contrast to the criticisms of budgeting systems as restrictive devices, they 
may also facilitate organisational innovation and learning in management processes. 
More recent studies have examined how these levers are used, and are inter-related, in 
the investigation of the operation of strategic management systems in organisations 
(Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Tuomela, 2005; Widener, 2007). The next section examines 
budgeting practices as a part of organisational control systems because their use in 
organisations has continued to attract much interest in the literature. 
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2.2.5 Budgets 
Budgeting has been a central device in many organisational MCSs (see table 2.3). 
This seems all the more surprising with the extensive criticisms of budgets in the 
literature, which includes: psychological and behavioural consequences, short-term 
orientation, budgetary slack and gaming amongst other undesired outcomes (Gerold, 
1952; Argyris, 1952; Schiff and Lewin, 1968, 1970; Hofestede, 1968; Birnberg et al., 
1983; Merchant, 1990; Otley, 1990; Bunce et al., 1995; Hope and Fraser, 1997; 1998; 
1999; 2003). Table 2.3 identifies a number of management accounting surveys around 
the world and presents the principal finding regarding the use of budgeting in the 
sampled organisations. 
 
Survey Country Useable  
responses 
Use of budgeting 
Shastri (2008) US 720 Majority perceive that budgeting is ‗useful‘ or very 
‗useful‘ across many functions including strategy, 
resourcing, reviews, rewards, targets, and collaboration. 
Libby and 
Lindsay (2007) 
US 212 4.22 mean score (1 = strongly disagree and 6 = strongly 
agree) for statement ‗Budgets are indispensible; we 
could not manage without them‘ (p. 48). 
Richardson et al. 
(2001) 
Canada 85 3.46 mean score (with variance analysis at 4.41) on a 
scale (1 = never and 5 = very frequently). 
Wijewardena and 
De Zoysa (1999) 
Australia  
and  
Japan 
225 
 
209 
Importance of management accounting tools: budgets, on 
a five-point Likert scale is a mean of 4.22 (Australia) and 
4.13 (Japan). 
Pierce and O‘Dea 
(1998) 
Ireland 106 4.54 mean score (1 = never and 5 = very frequently). 
 
Chenhall and 
Langfield-Smith 
(1998a) 
Australia 78 Relative benefit (1 = no benefit and 7 = high benefit) of 
budgeting for controlling costs: past 3 years: 5.25 and 
future emphasis: 5.85 (mean scores). 
Mouritsen (1996) Denmark 370 % of replies ‗important‘ or ‗very important‘ in 
accounting department: highest scores were budgeting 
75% and variance analysis 74%. 
Drury et al. 
(1993) 
UK 303 Over 95% of respondents complete budgeting section. 
Conclusion: ‗virtually all the responding organisations 
operate a budgeting system‘ (p. 27). 
Bailes and Assada 
(1991) 
US  
and 
Japan 
 80 
 
 256 
No budget – US: 0.0%. 
 
No budget – Japan: 0.6%. 
Puxty and  Lyall 
(1989) 
UK 453 94% of companies. 
 
 
Table 2.3 – Use of budgets as indicated by management accounting surveys  
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Table 2.3 clearly illustrates a strong emphasis on budgeting. Kendall and Sheridan 
(1991), in their pan-European study of CEOs (chief executive officers) and CFOs in 
sixty companies, found that ‗with very few exceptions, budgetary control is at the 
heart of companies‘ management systems‘ (p. 113). Control was found to be mostly 
exercised in these companies through a monthly management reporting pack that 
compares budgeted and actual performance with some limited non-financial 
measures. Budgets are also perceived differently: 75% of British firms see budgets as 
a contract, while only 40% of German firms and only 20% of other continental firms 
see them as such. In a survey of 168 Swedish companies, Bo-Goran and Wallin 
(2000) found that 25% of firms see no need to significantly change the budgeting 
system, while 60.7% are prepared to develop the existing budgetary system on an 
ongoing basis and to include new approaches such as rolling forecasts and scorecards. 
An internal role is still perceived for the traditional annual budget in terms of 
effectiveness and communication. Only 7.8% abandoned (or are in the process of 
abandoning) the annual budget. Thus, the literature indicates that budgeting systems 
are deeply embedded in many organisational control systems. The next section 
examines the management control literature in the context of understanding the nature 
of control in contemporary organisations. 
 
2.2.6 Control in contemporary organisations 
While Anthony (1965)‘s framework of management control made a seminal 
contribution to the knowledge of MCSs, and influenced decades of research, the 
appropriateness of this framework to contemporary organisations can be questioned.  
It has been argued that the organisations on which Anthony‘s work is based are large, 
hierarchical in nature and perhaps not in need of rapid and continuous change in 
response to internal and external forces. Johnson and Kaplan (1987) in Relevance Lost 
argue that management accounting and control systems are out of date with the 
environment they operate in, and are excessively dominated by external financial 
reporting. Otley (1994) notes that the traditional control model is out of context with 
modern business structures (which are typically leaner and flatter) and also 
management processes (that typically take a horizontal organisational perspective e.g., 
business process reengineering). Otley (1994) states that:  
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…contemporary business organisations no longer conform to the 
pattern assumed in traditional management control literature. In 
particular, they are smaller, less diversified, less hierarchical and 
have more internal mutual interdependencies than the theory admits 
(Otley, 1994, p. 290). 
 
Otley (1994) suggests that there is a need to broaden the traditional, accounting-
oriented and hierarchical model of control. More sophisticated, group as well as self-
controls may be required. Some of the other contemporary changes that challenge the 
traditional control model include: 
 
1) Knowledge Management - Increasing corporate interest in knowledge 
management (and its reporting as intellectual capital) generates problems for 
the traditional control model that is characterised by ‗hard‘ financials which it 
can be argued are easier to measure. Research has begun to explore 
relationships between management control and knowledge management 
(Bhimani, 2003; Mouritsen and Larsen, 2005).    
 
2) Non-financial measures - There has been rapid growth in the use of non-
financial measures in organisations (e.g., measures on quality, satisfaction, 
delivery time) and numerous studies support this (Drury et al., 1993; Pierce 
and O‘Dea, 1998; Hoque and Alam, 1999; Jazayeri and Hopper, 1999; Vaivio, 
1999) and these are discussed further in section 3.13.5 and 3.13.6. This marks 
a significant change from the exclusive focus on pure financials in the 
traditional control model.  
 
3) Growth of service firms - The traditional control model is primarily based on 
the manufacturing firms prevalent at the time but over the decades since there 
has been an explosive growth in service firms. As these firms are 
fundamentally different, the nature of management control needs to be 
investigated in this particular context (see Fitzgerald and Moon, 1996).  
 
4) Control and learning – in dynamic environments organisations must adapt 
accordingly to ensure their long-term survival. Although MCSs have been 
credited with the potential for encumbering change, they can also play an 
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instrumental role in facilitating and implementing required change. In a study 
of two firms, Klott (1997) observed that one had greater learning capabilities 
supported by an appropriate MCS.  
 
Emmanuel et al. (1990) remark that control in organisations ‗is a complex and ill-
understood activity‘ (p. 12). Otley (1994) and Scapens et al. (2003) identify a need for 
new management control theories in view of recent changes in the practices of 
management accounting. Examples of these changes include MAs working in cross-
functional teams and on business processes, involvement in decision making and 
integrating financial and non-financial information on operational and strategic levels. 
Langfield-Smith (1997) argues that strategic control considerations can no longer be 
isolated and neglected – as per Anthony‘s (1965) analysis and much of the 
management control research that followed – and that the dominant focus on 
accounting systems as being central to control is too narrow. More recently, Berry et 
al. (2008) observe the broadening of management control research to new areas 
including strategy, performance management, change processes, information 
technology (IT), and alternative organisational structures, but note that ‗there is very 
little evidence of active involvement of management accountants in the process of 
design, operation, adaptation and abandonment of new organisational forms‘ (p. 10). 
 
Malmi and Brown (2008) argue that MCSs research has been fragmented in its efforts 
to understand the collective nature of organisational-wide control systems and invite 
more research based on MCSs as a ‗package‘ (Otley, 1980), as illustrated in table 2.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 – Conceptualisation of MCSs as a ‗package‘ 
Source: Malmi and Brown (2008, p. 291) 
Cultural Controls 
 
Clans    Values    Symbols 
 
       Planning         Cybernetic Controls    
      Reward and 
Long     Action             Financial            Non-financial     Hybrid      Compensation 
Range     Planning    Budgets      Measurement    Measurement      Measurement 
Planning              Systems          Systems         Systems 
 
Administrative Controls 
 
Governance Structure  Organisation Structure  Policies and Procedures 
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It is suggested that future research might be directed towards understanding the shape 
or arrangement of these packages within organisations and how the components of 
these packages inter-relate. Supporting the dominance of a non-holistic approach to 
MCSs research, Stringer (2007) found only 15 out of 120 field studies (published in 
Management Accounting Research and Accounting, Organizations and Society 
covering the period 1990 to 2004) attempted to apply all five questions underpinning 
Otley‘s (1999) performance management framework. 
 
2.2.7 Management control theory and the roles of MAs 
This study has selected management control theory as a theoretical lens through 
which to examine the empirical findings because MASs, and therefore implicitly the 
roles of MAs, have been viewed as central to the enactment of management control in 
organisations (Anthony, 1965; Macintosh, 1985; Emmanuel et al., 1990). Emmanuel 
et al. (1990) comment that ‗the accounting system is often the only source of 
quantitative information that combines the results of the activities of all the different 
parts of an enterprise‘ (p. 6). Otley et al. (1995) note the central role of accounting in 
management control from a review of management control research. 
 
The management control literature notes an extension of the management control 
concept both vertically, in widening to consider operational and strategic control, and 
horizontally, in widening the concentration of the control function beyond the 
accounting function. In contemporary organisational settings, it can thus be argued 
that the roles of MAs may or may not be instrumental, or not even involved, in the 
deployment of these other forms of control and the literature mandates more research 
in these contexts. 
 
2.3 Contingency theory 
Since its introduction to the accounting literature in the late 1970s (Otley, 1980), a 
body of contingency literature has developed that relates specific features of 
management accounting and control systems to the particular context in which they 
are found (Fisher, 1995; Fisher, 1998; Chapman, 1997; Chenhall, 2003, 2007). 
Chenhall (2003, 2007) provides a comprehensive analysis of studies that have 
investigated contingent dimensions of management control. The use of contingency 
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theory is also linked to management control theory as organisational structure plays a 
significant role in both (Otley, 1980). The following sections trace the background to 
contingency theory and its use within accounting research.  
 
2.3.1 Development of contingency theory 
Contingency theory has its roots in the organisational literature. Donaldson (2001) 
traces these roots and observes that the theory has been illuminating, and has amassed 
a substantial empirical base. Early proponents of contingency theory examine the 
effect of a number of different contingencies on the organisation and the 
appropriateness of their matching or ‗fit‘ with particular characteristics of the firm. 
Burns and Stalker (1961) stress the importance of an appropriate match between an 
organisation‘s structure and its environment; that is, whether an organisation has a 
mechanistic or organic structure is contingent upon the extent of environmental 
change. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) examine organisational differentiation and 
integration as contingent upon the rate of environmental change. Other landmark 
contingency studies include Thompson‘s (1967) study of interdependencies and 
Woodward‘s (1965) study of technology. Other organisational attributes have been 
investigated in contingency studies such as strategy (Chandler, 1962) and size (Child, 
1975).  
 
2.3.2 Contingency theory and management accounting research 
Commenting on the emergence of contingency theory in accounting literature Otley 
(1980) recognises the potential of the theory to contribute to the body of management 
accounting and control knowledge:  
 
…particular features of an appropriate accounting system will 
depend upon the specific circumstances in which an organisation 
finds itself. Thus a contingency theory must identify specific aspects 
of an accounting system which are associated with certain defined 
circumstances and demonstrate an appropriate matching (p. 413) 
 
Chenhall (2003) concisely explains that the ‗term contingency means that something 
is true only under specific conditions‘ (p. 157). In reviewing prior accounting 
contingency studies, Otley (1980) presents a framework that, it is suggested, should 
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represent the starting point for the evaluation of contingency theories in management 
accounting and control (see figure 2.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Intervening variables 
                       Other factors 
 Organisational effectiveness        
  (measured in relation to objectives) 
[*Accounting Information System / 
   Management Information System] 
 
Figure 2.5 – The minimum necessary contingency framework 
          Source: Otley (1980, p. 421) 
 
The contingency variables are those being investigated with regard to how the 
organisation‘s control system is appropriately aligned with them (e.g., technology, 
structure, environment, and strategy). The control system is described in terms of a 
‗package‘, in recognition of the breadth of organisational controls systems beyond 
purely the accounting information system. The difficulty of measuring organisational 
effectiveness is addressed by incorporating intervening variables which are ‗thought 
to pre-dispose an organisation towards effective rather than ineffective operation‘ 
(Otley, 1980, p. 421). Finally, the framework recognises the presence of other factors 
that may impact performance besides the control strategy. Emmanuel et al. (1990) 
categorise the major contingency studies by environment, structure, technology, size, 
strategy, and culture and note that ‗little substantive evidence has been obtained of 
their effect on management accounting system design‘ (p. 58).    
 
Macy and Arunachalam (1995) present a summary of these major strands of 
contingency-based research from 17 studies of MASs with a listing of the frequently 
used measurement bases (see figure 2.6). 
 
Contingent variables 
Variables that cannot be   Organisational objectives 
influenced by the organisation 
Organisational control package 
 AIS*  Other MIS* Organisational        Other control 
design  design   design         arrangements 
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[*Decision Support System] 
 
Figure 2.6 – Map of previous strands of contingency-based studies of MASs 
     Source: Macy and Arunachalam (1995, p. 67) 
 
This provides a picture of the range of organisational variables examined in previous 
studies as well as how these variables have been measured. It has also been observed 
that reviews conducted of previous contingency studies in accounting have sometimes 
omitted certain variables, thus hampering the building of a more robust contingency 
theory of accounting (Chapman, 1997). Chenhall (2003, 2007) reviews two decades 
of individual contingency studies that align MCS design with particular contingent 
variables such as the environment, technology, size, structure, strategy, and culture. 
 
ENVIRONMENT: 
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Objective 
Subjective 
User Preferences 
 
 
DECISION STYLE 
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2.3.3 Challenges to contingency theory 
There has been a growing body of contingency-based studies that have investigated 
the effectiveness of MCSs across many contingent dimensions, as noted above. A 
number of challenges have been identified regarding this enlarging body of research. 
 
Fisher (1995) categorises contingency theory in management control research by level 
of complexity. Fisher (1995) observes that much of the research in management 
control using contingency theory is dominated by a fragmented and simplistic 
approach; that is studies typically examine only one contingent variable and one 
dimension of management control. The need for research addressing multiple 
variables, management control dimensions and outcome factors is advanced, while 
recognising that there may be other contingent variables to identify (see also Fisher, 
1998). Fisher (1995) concludes that ‗a theory of management control systems, that 
explains not only how control operated but also how it relates to other firm 
mechanisms and contingent variables, is clearly needed and awaits further 
development‘ (p. 48). 
 
Chapman (1997) notes how contingency research is viewed as being synonymous 
with quantitative methodologies (e.g., large mailed surveys) that incorporate only a 
small number of variables. The nature of prior contingency studies, particularly those 
on reliance on accounting performance measures (RAPM), is criticised for 
simplifying accounting as a control mechanism. Otley and Pollanen (2000) observe 
the dearth of replication, particularly in management accounting studies. 
 
Abernethy and Brownell (1997) acknowledge the dominance of management control 
research occurring in manufacturing contexts. Supporting this, Chenhall (2003, 2007) 
notes the need for contingency studies of accounting innovations in contemporary 
settings. Examples of innovations cited include balanced scorecards, target costing, 
life cycle costing, NFIs and human resource management developments. 
Contemporary organisations of interest to MCSs contingency research include 
service, non-profit, and knowledge-based firms.  
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Otley and Pollanen (2000) recommend ‗more intensive studies of single organisations 
aimed at elucidating the impact of different accounting control practices within their 
wider context‘ (p. 495) performed over a period of time. 
 
Bisbe et al. (2007) advocate a strengthening of the conceptual definitions of 
management accounting constructs, while others have re-evaluated the 
appropriateness of specific analytical techniques in contingency research (Hartmann 
and Moers, 1999). Similarly, Otley and Pollanen (2000) advocate the continued use of 
contingency-based research but it needs ‗more careful specification and measurement 
of variables‘ (p. 495). In contingency studies, Chenhall (2003, 2007) observes the lack 
of time devoted to the development of measures of features of MCSs, resulting in 
unclear constructs, and that previously established contingencies are less relevant in 
contemporary settings with the passing of time. 
 
Hopper (1980) notes the limitations of contingency theory in that ‗it treats 
organisational members as passive reactors‘ in not recognising that ‗the behaviour of 
accountants and thus their systems can also be determined by their aspirations and the 
demands of the clients served‘ (p. 401). Thus, one weakness of the theory is its 
assumption of inaction or lack of self-determination on the part of the organisation or 
individual to which the contingencies relate e.g., it does not account for how an 
organisation itself may impact on the environmental conditions where contingent 
relationships have been determined between organisational and environmental 
characteristics. Thus, where organisations with particular features of A are matched 
with an environment with particular features of B and other organisations with 
different features of X are better matched with an environment with particular features 
of Y, contingency theory assumes that the organisation is inert as regards influencing 
the environmental conditions making up the contingency relationships. Chenhall 
(2007) states that research on MCSs ‗implicitly assumes unidirectional relationships‘ 
(p. 190). 
 
In attempting to reach conclusions from contingency studies, Macy and Arunachalam 
(1995) observe numerous challenges in the emerging body of research including: 1) 
the use of a broad range of measures where ‗some measures have been selectively 
ignored, and others inconsistently measured‘ (p. 71), 2) variables not being examined 
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(e.g., decision style) and inconsistent operationalisation of other variables (e.g., 
structure and technology), 3) the absence of an effectiveness outcome variable in 
many studies and where it is used, there are difficulties with operationalisation, and 4) 
challenges in the methodology with respect to the quantitative analysis techniques 
used (e.g., correlation, regression) and the chosen level of analysis (e.g., individual, 
unit, organisation). 
 
2.3.4 Contingency theory and fit 
The notion of fit is central to contingency theory and it is complex and open to a 
number of definitions (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Gerdin and Greve, 2004). For 
example, Gerdin and Greve (2004) analyse fit in management accounting contingency 
studies as a hierarchy that descends from a classification of two overarching 
approaches to fit, descending to classifications of fit that are outcome or non-outcome 
related to alternative modelling of relationships. In its simplest form however, the 
theory suggests the presence of conditions that match particular MAS designs. Thus, 
employing the notion of fit leads to the identification of situations where matches or 
fits, or alternatively, mismatches or misfits, occur between some dimension of 
management accounting and some contingent variable(s). 
 
The potential of contingency theory to identify an appropriate fit between control 
system design and contingent variables may lead to enhanced organisational 
performance (Hayes, 1977; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985). Notwithstanding this, it 
has been noted that some research on the contingencies associated with management 
control have not selected performance as the outcome variable (Chenhall, 2003, 
2007). Fisher (1998) also notes this omission in studies and adds that ‗when it is 
included, in many cases, performance is ill-defined‘ (p. 61).   
 
2.3.5 Contingency theory and qualitative research 
Over the last three decades, contingency theory, as noted above, has seen a strong 
orientation towards its use in quantitative studies, entailing the definition of 
constructs, their measurement through large-scale surveys, and hypotheses testing 
through statistical analysis. This has generated a burgeoning canon of contingency-
based management accounting and control studies which has contributed much to our 
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understanding of management accounting and control, but primarily so from a 
quantitative perspective with the limitations as noted above. 
 
The notion of employing qualitative research in contingency-based studies returns the 
cycle to its origins where much of the early research by organisational researchers 
was based on a limited number of case studies (e.g., Burns and Stalker, 1961; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). What these early contingency studies show is that a 
qualitative approach, with its emphasis on depth, exploration and induction, can 
usefully detect contingent factors and indicate where relationships may exist with 
respect to establishing an appropriate matching between contexts and these factors. 
Chenhall (2003) notes that: 
 
The generation of propositions concerning novel relationships, 
processes and their contextual setting are often best identified and 
elaborated by using case study methods (p. 159). 
 
Contingency studies, in a qualitative sense, have the potential to better explain how 
particular variables impact upon specific outcomes. Chenhall (2003) states that: 
‗contingency-based research has, in the main, been survey based and tends to limit the 
scope of the studies to consider situations involving uni-directional relationships‘ (p. 
156). While quantitative-based contingency studies may establish statistically 
significant variables and their relationships, such studies are measure-dependent and 
are limited in their output in comparison to qualitative studies. Woods (2009) is a very 
recent example of contingency theory being employed in a qualitative study of MCSs. 
 
2.3.6 Contingency theory and the roles of MAs 
Since its inception in the management accounting literature about 30 years ago, 
originating in organisational theory, a number of contingent factors have been 
examined. The theory of contingency predicts that it is possible to align particular 
elements of MASs with particular elements of internal or external environments thus 
implying that it is possible to identify conditional alignments and misalignments, the 
notion of ‗fit‘.  
 
Donaldson (2001) notes that: ‗the contingency factor determines which characteristic 
produces high levels of effectiveness of the organisation (or some part of it, such as a 
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department or individual member)‘ (p. 6). While much contingency research in 
management accounting has focused on management control and its association with 
outcomes for performance in organisational or managerial terms (Chenhall, 2003, 
2007) this study seeks to explore contingencies relating to the roles of MAs. In this 
study, the roles of MAs, or dimensions of these roles, are investigated as being 
potentially contingent upon the specific organisational context within which they are 
located; that is contingency theory may explain differences in the roles of MAs in 
different organisational contexts. Thus, the roles of MAs are investigated as being 
contingent upon particular role influences and role characteristics in organisational 
settings. This is with a view to identifying where appropriate fits or misfits occur.  
 
2.4 Role theory 
Kahn et al. (1964) and Katz and Kahn (1978) present a role theory to explain the 
nature and behaviour of the roles that organisational members occupy. It attempts to 
explain how members of organisations take on and enact particular roles and the 
consequences of doing so. The theory seeks to address many aspects to the enacting 
of roles by individuals in organisations e.g., the influences on individuals in taking on 
particular roles, how individuals understand what their expected roles are, if there are 
differences between the roles which individuals enact and those roles which others 
expect them to enact, and how individuals, through their own characteristics and 
relationships with others in the organisation, may influence what others expect of 
them. 
 
In the vernacular of role theory, role expectations influence and determine the roles 
that organisational members enact. When one organisational member (e.g., a senior 
manager) has expectations of another organisational member (e.g., a junior manager) 
they are respectively referred to as the role sender and the focal role, where the former 
sends expectations to the latter with respect to the performance of his/her roles. Any 
one organisational member may be subject to the expectations of a number of role 
senders (e.g., line manager, support functions, line manager‘s manager, managing 
director, own staff) and these are collectively referred to as the role set (Merton, 1957) 
in relation to the focal role. 
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Role theory (see figure 2.7) suggests that the expectations of the role set are 
communicated (i.e., role sent) to the focal role occupant (arrow 1 in figure 2.7) who 
then interprets that communication (i.e., received role) and initiates a particular 
response to it (i.e., role behaviour). For example a manager may outline role 
expectations through documentation, such as job descriptions, objectives and annual 
appraisals, or verbally through formal and informal meetings. The theory 
distinguishes between what the role sender is expecting of the focal role (A), the 
communication of that expectation to the focal role (B), the understanding that the 
focal role takes on receipt of that expectation (C), and how the focal role in turn 
enacts the actual role (D), which in turn impacts upon the expectations of the role 
sender as he/she observes the actual enacted role in comparison to the role that the 
role sender has expected (arrow 2 in figure 2.7). Collectively, Katz and Kahn (1978) 
refer to the process between the concepts of role expectations, role sent, received role, 
role behaviour and its feedback to the role sender as a role episode and this can be 
visually observed in figure 2.7 in the lettering sequence A, B, C, and D. For example 
a manager has expectations of a MA and communicates these to the MA (role sent), 
the MA interprets these expectations (received role), enacts a role behaviour based on 
this interpretation, and the manager who observes this behaviour takes these 
observations into account in the communication of subsequent expectations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
         
 
 
 
      4            6 
              5 
 
 
                                    3                                                       1 
                                                                                   
 
    A         B          8  C    D 
                                                                                            2 
 
 
       7             9 
 
 
Figure 2.7 – Theoretical model of factors in the taking of organisational roles 
     Source: Katz and Kahn (1978, p. 196) 
 
Keys for arrows in figure 2.7: 
1 = sent role 
2 = role sender evaluation of behaviour before next cycle 
3 = impact of organisational factors on role expectations 
4 = influence of individual‘s characteristics on role expectations 
5 = identical sent role does not result in the same experience 
6 = influence of role behaviour on the characteristics of the individual 
7 = impact of current inter-relating on role expectations 
8 = focal role interpretation of expectations vary depending on inter-relating 
9 = behaviour feeds back and affects interpersonal relations with role set members 
 
 
Role theory predicts that certain organisational characteristics (E) such as size, 
structure or culture (arrow 3 in figure 2.7) influence the expectations that role senders 
have of focal roles e.g., an organisation with a strong team-oriented culture might 
mean that role senders have high expectations of focal roles to interact frequently in 
different team processes. For the attributes (F) of the focal role (e.g., approachable, 
helpful), role theory would predict that these characteristics might result in role 
senders‘ expectations actually being influenced by reason of the focal role having 
these characteristics (arrow 4 in figure 2.7). Similarly, for interpersonal factors (G), 
role theory would predict that the nature of the relationship between the role sender 
and the focal role in turn impacts upon the expectations of the role sender (arrow 7 in 
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figure 2.7) e.g., a very good/poor working relationship between the role sender and 
the focal role could lead to the role sender having different expectations. As can be 
seen from figure 2.7, role theory postulates that organisational, personal and 
relationship variables impact upon the role expectations that roles senders have of the 
focal role. It is also predicted that the personal and relationship variables are 
influenced by the actual role behaviour of the focal role (respectively arrows 6 and 9 
in figure 2.7). Finally, the identical sent role can be interpreted differently due to the 
effect of personal variables (arrow 5 in figure 2.7) or the nature of continuing 
relationships (arrow 8 in figure 2.7).  
 
Role theory (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978) thus proposes that 
organisational roles (the focal roles) are determined by the expectations of other 
members of the organisation (the role senders). Role senders are influenced by 
organisational factors (e.g., size, structure), the attributes of the focal role occupant 
and the nature of the relationship between the individual in the focal role and the role 
sender. In summary, role theory relates role sending, role receiving and role behaviour 
in the context of the individual, interrelationships, and organisational variables.  
 
The notion of role expectations is central to role theory and Biddle (1979) defines 
expectations as ‗subject-held or emitted statements that express a modal reaction 
about characteristics of object persons‘ (p. 132). Biddle (1979) distinguishes 
expectations according to their source, ‗the subjects who hold (or emit) them‘, their 
destination or whom they are in relation to, their substance or nature, and their 
‗modality‘ and ‗form‘ (p. 132). The latter respectively relate to the role sender‘s 
response to attributes of the receiver and how expectations manifest themselves e.g., 
documented, articulated, held privately. 
 
2.4.1 Role conflict and role ambiguity  
In role theory, the non-fulfilment of role sender‘s expectations leads to role conflict, 
and uncertainty about these expectations leads to role ambiguity. Role conflict may be 
defined as the ‗simultaneous occurrence of two (or more) sets of pressures such that 
compliance with one would make difficult or impossible compliance with the other‘ 
(Wolfe and Snoek, 1962, p. 103). Biddle (1979) defines role conflict as ‗any condition 
of common or attributed polarised dissensus that poses (usually unspecified) problems 
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for the object person‘ (p. 196). Thus, in an organisational setting role theory would 
predict that in certain situations the completion of one task for a manager, by the focal 
role occupant, may challenge or render unfeasible the completion of another task, by 
the same focal role occupant for another member of the organisation. In the context of 
accounting roles, one example of a conflict would be where an accountant is 
responsible for the integrity of accounting and control systems and is also responsible 
for working closely with managers to support their decision making processes. In this 
scenario, if managers pursue some decisions that might not comply with the existing 
accounting and control systems, the accountant will experience role conflict in trying 
to comply with control requirements, while also trying to appease the manager‘s 
decision support requirements. This conflict has been recognised in the literature for 
some time (Simon et al., 1954; Sathe, 1982). 
 
Role theory also advances the idea that ambiguity can be experienced by those 
occupying organisational roles. Kahn et al. (1964) distinguish ambiguity between that 
which is perceived or felt by a person, and that which is a feature external to the 
individual. In both cases ambiguity may relate to an absence of information. Katz and 
Kahn (1978) note that ‗role ambiguity simply means uncertainty about what the 
occupant of a particular office is supposed to do‘ (p. 206). Role ambiguity is defined 
by Biddle (1979) as occurring ‗when shared specifications set for an expected role are 
incomplete or insufficient to tell the incumbent what is desired or how to do it‘ (p. 
323). Kahn et al. (1964) explain the importance of dealing with ambiguity to ensure 
role expectations are met: 
 
Certain information is required for adequate role performance, that 
is, in order for a person to conform to the role expectations held by 
members of his role set (p. 22). 
 
This information includes the focal role occupant understanding the expectations, 
understanding how he/she might meet these expectations, and the implications of 
meeting or not meeting these expectations (Kahn et al., 1964). 
 
2.4.2 Role theory and accounting research 
Central concepts of role theory such as role conflict and role ambiguity have been 
previously employed in accounting research. Some studies have examined the role 
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conflicts of auditors (Morgan, 1979; Senatra, 1980; Bamber et al., 1989; Koo and 
Sim, 1999), while others have investigated the nature of the role conflict inherent in 
the simultaneous adoption of roles influenced by the organisation and the accounting 
profession (McGregor et al., 1989). 
 
Surprisingly, role theory has been little used in previous management accounting 
research. Notable exceptions are Hopper (1980), Sathe (1982), and Maas and Matějka 
(2009). Sathe‘s investigation of controller involvement notes a strong relationship 
between management expectations and controller (the focal role) involvement:  
 
Behaviour of the individual in the focal role-the controller-is 
consistently and positively related to the expectations of the role 
senders-the management (p. 117-118). 
 
In applying Katz and Kahn‘s (1978) framework, Sathe‘s (1982) findings suggests a 
modification of the original model that recognises that role behaviour can be impacted 
upon directly by organisational factors, as well as being impacted upon directly by 
management expectations as per role theory‘s prediction. Sathe‘s (1982) situational 
factors are the equivalent of organisational factors (E) in Katz and Kahn‘s model in 
figure 2.7. Thus, drawing on figure 2.7, this revised model creates a requirement for 
role behaviour coming from both role sender‘s expectations (A) and organisational 
factors (E). Figure 2.8 illustrates Sathe‘s revised model of role theory drawing on his 
findings and role theory (Katz and Kahn, 1978). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 – Sathe‘s (1982) adaptation of role theory  
        Source: Sathe (1982, p. 119) 
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In conclusion, Sathe (1982) argues that the relationship between situational factors 
and their impact on role behaviour have not been researched, and ‗this is a rich arena 
for future research‘ (p. 119). Hopper (1980) examined the role behaviour of 12 MAs 
in six companies in the context of alternative organisational structures. Hopper (1980) 
found that MAs were generally not meeting the expectations of the four most 
important role senders (nor their own expectations) regarding providing a support role 
to managerial decision making, giving rise to role conflict, ambiguity, and stress. 
Collins (1982) observes the dearth of accounting research using role theory and 
argues that MASs may stipulate certain role behaviour e.g., budgets communicating 
cost management expectations to managers. Maas and Matějka (2009) found a 
positive relationship between controllers focused on head office control (as opposed 
to divisional decision making) and role conflict and ambiguity. In summary, use of 
role theory in accounting research is very limited and it tends to have been mostly 
examined in the context of auditing and role conflict. As this study primarily focuses 
on the roles of MAs, it would seem very appropriate to use role theory as a lens 
through which to view the findings from the study. 
 
2.4.3 Role theory and the roles of MAs 
Role theory, in comparison to the other two theoretical perspectives that frequently 
appear in management accounting studies, has had little if any use in management 
accounting research. The decision to employ role theory in the study is intuitively 
appealing given its central focus on roles in organisations and this study‘s focus on 
the roles of MAs in organisations. It was not however for these reasons in the first 
instance that that role theory was selected as a relevant theoretical perspective. 
 
There are many aspects to role theory that specifically relate to understanding the 
roles of MAs. Expectations, as explained above, influence the roles that are enacted 
by those in focal roles and thus relating expectations to the roles of MAs has the 
potential to bring clarification to the previously noted poor understanding of the roles 
of MAs (Anthony, 1989; Young, 1996), and the apparent contradictions around the 
actual roles enacted by MAs where some appear to be aligning with the model of the 
business partner, while others do not do so (see section 3.7). The focus on 
expectations in the context of the roles of MAs brings into focus the expectations that 
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managers might have of MAs (e.g., relevant information for management control and 
decision making purposes) and if and how MAs are meeting these expectations.  
 
Role theory also includes the attributes of the focal role and that role‘s relationship to 
role senders. In the context of the roles of MAs this permits the opportunity to relate 
the characteristics of MAs, and MAs‘ inter-personal relationships, to the expectations 
that managers have of MAs. The theory considers organisational factors shaping 
expectations and this would potentially offer insights into those forces that might be 
shaping the roles of MAs. Role theory, in the context of the roles of MAs, examines 
how managers influence MAs through their expectations of them and how MAs may 
in turn influence those expectations through their behaviour, their characteristics, and 
their inter-personal relationships. This potentially offers an opportunity to gain an 
understanding of the roles of MAs from a number of perspectives. 
 
Role theory includes the concepts of role conflict and role ambiguity, and in the 
context of the roles of MAs these are particularly pertinent. As noted in section 2.4.1 
there are potential role conflicts for MAs in the model of the business partner which 
presupposes the maintenance of independent and objective control with closely 
supporting managerial decision making. Role theory, through understanding the role 
senders‘ expectations, leads to an understanding of the outcomes for those in focal 
roles e.g., role conflict, ambiguity, stress which have only rarely and belatedly been 
observed (Hopper, 1980; Sathe, 1982). 
 
In summary, the potential of role theory to advance our understanding of the roles of 
MAs is significant in its scope and this is further supported in its direct linking to the 
research objectives, namely investigating the antecedents (e.g., expectations), 
characteristics (e.g., attributes), and consequences (e.g., conflicts, ambiguities) 
associated with the roles of MAs.  
 
2.5 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter introduced the three theoretical lenses that underpin the interpretation of 
the findings of the study. While the basic tenets of each theory have been summarised 
individually, this study aims to analyse data using all three theories in a less disparate 
fashion than presented here. Three theoretical lenses have been employed because 
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each of the theories have particular relevance to the roles of MAs and thus provide the 
potential for theoretical insights to be attained in their use. The use of these lenses 
highlights the relative merits and weaknesses of each theory and provides the benefit 
of having three alternative theoretical perspectives on the roles of MAs as opposed to 
just one. In common with Marginson (1999) and Berry et al. (1991), the theoretical 
perspectives are used as ‗guiding perspectives‘ as opposed to, a priori, identifying and 
testing a single theory. Similarly, Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005) employ theory as 
‗a sensitising mechanism that assists interpretations‘ (p. 727) (see also Granlund and 
Taipaleenmäki, 2005). Keating (1995) analyses the use of theory in management 
accounting case studies as being for the purposes of ‗discovery‘ (e.g., emerging 
theory), ‗refinement‘ of existing theory, and ‗refutation‘ of existing theory. This 
study, in employing the three lenses of existing theory, is open to theoretical 
engagement in the latter two categories. Berry et al. (2008) also note that ‗by 
grounding research in organisational practices, it becomes legitimate to use a wide 
range of theoretical approaches in helping explain such activities‘ (p. 15) and this 
study through the adoption of qualitative enquiry facilitates this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter Three   
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of literature on the roles of MAs. It commences with a 
description of the environmental context and the various depicted roles of the finance 
function in the contemporary business environment. Many dimensions of the roles of 
MAs are examined, including alternative role conceptualisations, empirical research, 
influences on the roles, their characteristics, and some outcomes of the roles. The 
latter part of the review examines a number of characteristics of management 
accounting information provided by MAs. 
 
3.2 The business environment 
It is generally agreed that contemporary business environments are characterised as 
intensively competitive, increasingly global, uncertain and subject to continuous 
change. Simons (1995), who advanced understanding of the strategic use of MCSs 
(see section 2.2.4), notes how the corporate landscape has changed and how a new 
theory of control is needed to manage the tension between older and newer 
approaches to management and control, as illustrated in Table 3.1. 
 
 
OLD  
Management control approach 
NEW 
Management control approach 
Top-down strategy Customer/market-driven strategy 
Standardisation Customisation  
According to plan Continuous innovation 
Keeping things on track Meeting customers‘ needs 
No surprises Empowerment 
 
Table 3.1 - Tensions between basic philosophies of control and management  
           Source: Adapted from Simons (1995, p. 4) 
 
Simons‘s work addresses how top management use control systems as ‗levers‘ in this 
new environmental context, but pays less attention to their use lower down in the 
organisation. A number of factors have been noted as impacting on the management 
accounting function which have generally emanated from outside organisations. 
These include the increasingly competitive and internationalising environment (Burns 
et al., 1999; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, 2007); manufacturing technologies 
(Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994); technological developments (Ezzamel et al., 1997; 
Burns and Yazdifar, 2001; Granlund and Malmi, 2002; Hunton, 2002; Scapens and 
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Jazayeri, 2003), structural arrangements (Granlund and Lukka, 1998a; IMA, 1999), 
and the introduction of accounting innovations (Friedman and Lyne, 1997).  
 
In examining the forces promoting the homogenisation of global management 
accounting practices, Granlund and Lukka (1998b) classify some as economic forces 
and others as institutional forces, drawing on DiMaggio and Powell‘s (1983) 
institutional theory. Examples of economic forces include global competition, 
technologies, and economic cycles, while examples of institutional forces include 
harmonisation of regulation, the management accounting profession, and 
benchmarking. This classification provides a useful framework when investigating the 
factors influencing the management accounting function. The next section presents a 
review of the shape of contemporary finance functions following on from these 
environmental influences. 
 
3.3 The finance function in organisations 
The role of the finance function in organisations can be analysed using a number of 
frameworks in the literature. Keating and Jablonsky (1990) note changes in the 
orientation of the finance function in a study of six major US corporations based 
primarily on interviews with financial executives responsible for implementing 
change. Three finance function orientations were observed:  
 
1) Command-and-control orientation - this was found in firms with a functional 
hierarchical structure. Emphasis was placed on corporate control and 
managing resources efficiently with the finance function acting in an 
independent capacity.  
 
2) Conformance orientation - this tended to exist if there was significant business 
with the government or the firm was required to comply with statutory or 
other external regulations. The finance function was bureaucratic, procedural 
and technical in nature.  
 
3) Competitive-team orientation - a firm with this orientation was market-driven 
and financial work was integrated into the business in a matrix type structure. 
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It was characterised by customer focus, financial excellence, value-added 
participation with management and an in-depth awareness of the business. 
 
Keating and Jablonsky (1990) argue that firms typically have all three orientations in 
their finance function but there may be differences in the degrees of emphasis placed 
on them or in the trajectories for change set for the future. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
three orientations of the finance function.  
 
 
   Orientation of Financial Management 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - Finance function orientations   
   Source: Keating and Jablonsky (1990, p. 43) 
 
Keating and Jablonsky (1990) found that four of the six companies were shifting 
towards a competitive-team orientation from either a conformance or command-and-
control orientation. This shift required a re-thinking of the role of the finance 
function: 
 
This means they move away from being an independent third party 
or custodian of the accounts and become a client-oriented 
professional (both internal and external clients) with an in-depth 
knowledge of the business (p. 7).  
 
In a survey of 805 managers (508 non-financial managers and 297 FMs) by Jablonsky 
et al. (1993), the move towards a competitive orientation was not clearly discernable; 
perceptions differed between the FMs who generally perceived that they had a 
competitive-team orientation to the non-financial managers who frequently perceived 
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the FMs to be mainly command-and-control or conformance oriented. A significant 
number of FMs and non-financial managers were found to agree that the financial 
organisation is characterised as: 1) providing top management with an independent 
review of operating plans and performance, 2) directing financial information flows 
up and down the chain of command, 3) having developed sophisticated operating and 
capital budgeting models, and 4) being oriented to ‗making the quarterly numbers‘ (p. 
11). Further, the categorisation of financial work into the categories of the earlier 
study (command-and-control, conformance orientation and competitive-team 
orientation) did not emerge, but rather combinations of all three falling into either a 
Business Advocate profile or a Corporate Policeman profile. Jablonsky et al. (1993) 
describe the core values of these profiles as presented in Table 3.2. 
 
 
Business Advocate Profile Corporate Policeman Profile 
Service and involvement Oversight and surveillance 
Knowledge of the business 
Administration of rules and 
regulations 
Internal customer service Impersonal procedures 
Finance and analytical skills Accounting and auditing skills 
Monitoring the operating and 
capital budget 
Accurate financial reporting 
Improving the bottom line Budget/variance reporting 
 
Table 3.2 - Core values of business advocate and corporate policeman profiles  
           Source: Adapted from Jablonsky et al. (1993, p. 17) 
 
Being a business advocate is associated with providing support to the business and 
involvement in business strategy, while being a policeman is associated with 
accountability from both an internal (control) and external (compliance) perspective. 
In a follow up study, Jablonsky and Keating (1998) capture the perceptions of 1,569 
non-financial managers which reveals a classification of their respective firm‘s 
finance functions as 43.6% Business Advocate and 56.4% Corporate Policeman. 
Sheridan (1997) notes the changing role of the finance function and asserts that 
controllers ‗are no longer commentators on the past, they are now expected to play 
their part as members of the team in building the company‘s future‘ (p. 2). Sheridan 
(1997) observes how many of the rudimentary accounting tasks have been automated, 
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resulting in a ‗deskilling‘ of accountants with financial information now residing in 
the wider organisational domain where financially-literate managers use their own 
computers for financial purposes. Supporting this, Burns et al. (1996, 1999), Scapens 
et al. (2003), and Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2007) observe the wider technology-
enabled dissemination, or ‗decentring‘, of accounting information. May (2002) 
effectively observes this as part of an illustration of how the finance function has 
streamlined its activities, as depicted in figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 – Change occurring in the function of finance 
Source: May (2002, p. 11) 
 
In response to recent accounting scandals Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2007) observe 
the criticality of the roles of accountants as stewards and controllers but:  
 
…due to advances in information technology and the decentring of 
accounting knowledge, such roles now occupy less of the 
management accountant‘s time (p. 124). 
 
Although there is little research to date, there is some anecdotal evidence that the 
conformance orientation (Keating and Jablonsky, 1990) from regulatory compliance 
might be impacting on the role of the finance function. This somewhat contradicts 
Burns and Baldvinsdottir‘s (2007) and May‘s (2002) indications of a reduced 
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financing and stewardship function. EIU and KPMG (2006) comment in their global 
survey of leading finance functions that: 
 
Regulatory compliance and corporate governance initiatives have 
placed a major burden on finance functions in recent years and, in 
some ways, have distracted finance from achieving its wider 
aspirations to become a strategic business partner. New regulatory 
requirements and accounting standards such as Sarbanes-Oxley, 
Basel II and IFRS have required finance to devote significant 
resources to improving controls, procedures and processes to ensure 
compliance (p. 5-6). 
 
Similarly, Sharman (2007) observes the US management accounting profession as 
increasingly being oriented to regulatory (e.g., Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) legislation) 
concerns as opposed to supporting managers‘ decision making processes. 
 
One of the challenges with the studies above is their lack of engagement with 
theoretical perspectives on the roles of the finance function. While these pieces of 
research have empirical merit there could have been an opportunity to relate these 
empirical findings to the previous theoretical lenses reviewed in the last chapter e.g., 
contingencies are not identified with respect to the alternative depictions of the roles 
of finance, and there are no theoretical explanations as to how or why these roles have 
occurred. The findings seem contradictory in that financial personnel perceive 
themselves moving towards more business and market-oriented roles away from 
control-oriented roles, while non-financial managers perceive the opposite with very 
recent observations also concurring with this. There is an indication in this work that 
regulation, technology, market forces and control may be shaping the finance 
function.  
 
Moving from the wider roles of the finance function that include some dimensions 
identified above that are beyond the remit of this study (e.g., payroll, accounts 
payable and receivable, treasury functions), the remaining review of literature focuses 
specifically on the roles of MAs noting that it is within the context of the finance 
functions discussed above that MAs enact their roles. The next section presents 
definitions of the roles of MAs and management accounting. 
  
54 
 
3.4 Definitions: management accountants and management accounting 
Horngren et al. (2000) define management accounting as an organisational function 
that ‗measures and reports financial and non-financial information that helps 
managers make decisions to fulfil the goals of an organisation‘ (p. 888). Atkinson et 
al. (2001) define management accounting as ‗a value added improvement process of 
planning, designing, measuring, and operating non-financial and financial information 
systems that guides management action, motivates behaviour, and supports and 
creates the cultural values necessary to achieve an organisation‘s strategic, tactical, 
and operating objectives‘ (p. 577). Belkaoui (1980) defines a MAS as ‗the set of 
human and capital resources within an organisation which is responsible for the 
production and dissemination of information deemed relevant for internal decision 
making (p. 21). All these definitions very strongly emphasise the provision of 
management accounting information that supports managerial decision making and 
control with the more recent definitions drawing more attention to organisational 
goals, non-financial information, and a process orientation in broader organisational 
contexts. Similarly, a comparison of CIMA (1996)‘s definition of management 
accounting and CIMA (2005)‘s definition of the roles of MAs reveals a broadening in 
many dimensions e.g., strategic orientation, supporting decision making, NFIs, 
systems design and enhancement, emphasis on management as well as measurement, 
and all strongly positioned within a management cross-functional team context. 
 
3.5 Descriptors of accountants in organisations 
The roles of MAs in organisations can be classified in different ways and many 
alternate descriptors have been employed in this regard. Table 3.3 illustrates various 
titles that draw attention to different dimensions of the accountants‘ roles and shows 
the study, or studies, that used such a title.  
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Role label or classification Study 
‗Business Partner‘ IMA (1996, 1999) 
Siegel (2000) 
Gibson (2002) 
Siegel et al. (2003a, 2003b) 
Pierce and O‘Dea (2003) 
Byrne and Maher (2003) 
Gould  and Fahy  (2005, 2005/2006) 
Byrne and Pierce (2007) 
Järvenpää (2007) 
Sorensen (2009) 
‗Business Unit Orientation‘ vs.  
‗Functional Orientation‘ 
Emsley (2005) 
‗Police Officer‘ vs. ‗Consultant‘ vs. 
‗Spy/Watchdog‘ 
Gibson (2002) 
 
‗Involved Controller‘ vs. ‗Independent Controller‘ 
vs. ‗Split Controller‘ vs. ‗Strong Controller‘ 
Sathe (1982, 1983) 
‗Bean-counter‘ vs. ‗Controller‘ Granlund and Lukka (1998a) 
‗Beancounter‘ Friedman and Lyne (1997) 
‗Business-oriented‘  Granlund and Lukka (1998a) 
‗Service Aids‘ vs. ‗Bookkeepers‘ Hopper (1980) 
‗Business Advocate‘ vs. ‗Corporate Policeman‘ Jablonsky et al.  (1993) 
Jablonsky and Keating (1998) 
‗Consulting‘, ‗Bookkeeping‘, ‗Banking‘, 
‗Controlling‘, and ‗Administrator‘ 
Mouritsen (1996) 
‗Hybrid Accountants‘ Burns et al. (1999) 
Burns and Scapens (2000) 
Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005, 2007) 
‗Business Analysts‘ Burns et al. (1999) 
‗Problem Solving‘, ‗Scorekeeping‘,  and 
‗Attention Directing‘ 
Simon et al. (1954) 
‗Local responsibility‘ vs. ‗Functional 
responsibility‘ 
Maas and Matějka (2009) 
 
Table 3.3 - Summary of role titles for MAs  
 
Many of the studies in table 3.3 present an analysis of the roles of MAs as a simplified 
dichotomy. At one end, roles are characterised as largely involving the production of 
detailed, financial and historic information with minimum interaction with managers. 
At the other end, the roles are characterised as largely involving the production of 
tailored, often non-financial and futuristic performance information with high levels 
of support to managers‘ decision making processes. The extent that MAs are oriented 
towards either end of these depicted role spectrums is examined in section 3.7. 
 
It is apparent that the title of ‗business partner‘ has considerable use in the literature 
and this will be the primary designation for this particular depiction of the roles of 
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MAs in the remaining literature review. IMA (1999) provide a useful definition of the 
business partner role:  
 
A business partner is an equal member of the decision making team. 
As a business partner, a management accountant has the authority 
and responsibility to tell an operating executive why particular types 
of information may or may not be relevant to the business decision at 
hand, and is expected to suggest ways to improve the quality of the 
decision (p. 5). 
 
Drawing from a professional affiliation of senior financial members of large 
organisations, CIMA (2009) explain the business partnering model as widening roles 
for MAs that go beyond information provision to enhancing decision making as it: 
 
…takes the management information provided by accounting 
operations as its starting point. It is about understanding relevance, 
sharing insights, influencing decisions in the best interests of 
shareholders and helping to manage performance and risk through to 
the achievement of impact (p. 11). 
  
In a review of research on the roles of MAs in the US, Sorensen (2009) concludes that 
the roles are ascending to senior levels in organisations ‗where they are becoming 
business partners–valued partners in top level decision making‘ (p. 1291). For MAs, 
the business partner role model generally denotes an increasing emphasis on a more 
strategic, forward-looking and collaborative role orientation with respect to 
supporting managers‘ decision making and control functions (King et al., 1991; 
Friedman and Lyne, 1997; Granlund and Lukka, 1998a; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). It 
could be argued that there are differences in degrees with the titles in the literature. 
For example, is a MA that is only involved to a limited degree also a business 
partner? It is suggested, following the definition above that being a business partner 
goes beyond occasional involvement and represents greater involvement in supporting 
managerial decision making and control. Thus, there is a continuum of roles that 
range from high levels (or low levels) of support for managerial decision making and 
control provided by MAs, which Sathe (1982) contrasts as the ‗independence‘ and 
‗involvement‘ of the controller (see section 3.7 on variation in the roles of MAs). 
There are also recent professional observations by senior financial officers of leading 
organisations that ‗there are as yet no established best practice models or processes‘ 
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for the model of the business partner (CIMA, 2007, p. 28). This thus recognises the 
model of the business partner as one that is evolving (see also CIMA, 2009). 
 
There is also some debate as to whether the designation ‗management accountant‘ 
will be sustained into the future (Otley, 2008) and commentators observe that new 
role titles are emerging e.g., ‗Global Expense Manager or Strategic Financial Analyst‘ 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2005, p. 330). It can also be noted that mirroring this is the 
professional management accounting institutes in the US and UK that have changed 
their publication titles from ‗Management Accounting‘ in both instances to ‗Strategic 
Finance’ in the US and ‗Financial Management‘ in the UK. CIMA (2007) note that 
the ‗Business Partner‘ title is used in practice but also titles such as ‗Financial or 
Business Analyst, Business or Finance Manager or simply Management Accountant‘ 
(p. 28). 
 
It is also important to draw more attention to the role models as opposed to the role 
titles in the literature, as the latter may have different meanings. Granlund and Lukka 
(1998a) note for example that controllers in the US ‗are usually rather senior people‘ 
(p. 197), while Finnish controllers tend to operate more in profit centres and less so in 
centralised capacities. It can also be observed that in dichotomising roles that the 
meanings attached to the control function can be ambiguous e.g., controllers can be 
seen to be positively the polar opposite of ‗bean-counters‘ (Granlund and Lukka, 
1998a), while others suggest a somewhat negative depiction of the control function 
e.g., ‗Police Officer‘ and ‗Spy/Watchdog‘ (Gibson, 2002), ‗Corporate Policeman‘ 
(Jablonsky et al., 1993; Jablonsky and Keating, 1998) and ‗Controlling‘ (Mouritsen, 
1996). In investigating the emergence of the ‗hybrid accountants‘, Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir (2007) contrast these roles with the traditional roles of the MA who is 
described ‗as being a monitor and controller of others‘ performance‘ and ‗producing 
financial reports to be transmitted up the organisational hierarchy‘ (p. 118). This 
emphasises a need for clearer specification of role definitions and a deeper 
understanding of variation of definitions across countries. Notwithstanding this the 
control function is an integral component of the roles of MAs, as explicated in 
sections 3.3 and 3.4, and the next section examines this control function. 
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While the studies identified in table 3.3 examine closely the classifications of roles of 
MAs, many ignore role theory in explaining the roles of MAs and also do not consider 
contingency theory in attempting to identify what contingencies might attach to the 
roles of MAs when attributed with a particular designation. Many of the studies 
outlined in table 3.3 have a strong empirical orientation but are weaker on theoretical 
engagement. Some studies on the roles of MAs have considered theories in a more 
isolated sense e.g., Hopper (1980) draws primarily on role theory with very limited 
reference to contingency theory or management control theory and Burns and Scapens 
(2000) and Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005) draw exclusively on institutional theory 
in longitudinal research. While somewhat dated, Sathe (1982) does draw on 
contingency and role theory, but this is an exception. Thus, there is some scope to 
bring multiple theoretical perspectives to bear on understanding the roles of MAs. 
 
3.6 Controllership 
The preceding chapter reviewed the theory of management control (see section 2.2) 
and this section builds on that by identifying the nature of the control function from 
the perspective of the roles of MAs. Sutthiwan and Clinton (2008) note that 
‗controllership is fundamentally a function of management accounting‘ (p. 44) and 
accounting roles have long been observed as central to this function (Anthony, 1965; 
Macintosh, 1985; Emmanuel et al., 1990; Otley et al., 1995). The management 
control theoretical perspective, as per section 2.2, has tended to place a strong 
emphasis on classifying control systems, developing theories of control, and 
contingencies in control system designs but has paid less attention to how control is 
achieved in organisations through the enactment of roles, particularly the roles of 
MAs. Thus, while the literature has placed accounting as the functional mechanism of 
control in organisations, less has been observed of how this operates. 
 
A summary of the key dimensions of the roles of MAs as controller include (Willson 
and Colford, 1991; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992): 
 
1. Responsibility for financial accounting and statutory reporting; 
2. Coordination, compilation and management of planning processes; 
3. Management of information, control and performance systems; and 
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4. Preparation and communication of appropriate information to support 
managerial decision processes. 
 
Simon et al. (1954) relate the effectiveness of the controller function to the provision 
of high quality information, at the lowest cost and the long term competency 
development of accounting and non-accounting managers. The information quality 
dimension is examined in section 3.13. The literature thus places a high degree of 
emphasis on the enactment of management control through the roles of MAs. 
Accepting the centrality of the control function to the roles of MAs but also 
recognising the roles of MAs in management decision-support, or the business partner 
model noted earlier, the following section examines these collectively and provides 
some empirical evidence of how the roles of MAs discharge these functions. 
 
3.7 Balance between hierarchical reporting and supporting managers 
Table 3.3 above presents many descriptors of the roles of MAs that frequently 
contrast very traditional, historic and overly financial, hierarchical, reporting-oriented 
roles (e.g., the ‗bean-counter‘) with the model of the business partner depicted as 
MAs providing high levels of support to managerial decision making and control 
functions, often on senior and cross-functional teams. This section examines some of 
the empirical evidence to date that gives some sense of where MAs are on this 
continuum, or as to the balance that they achieve in their roles. 
 
Simon et al. (1954) note that the most promising area for enhancing the controllership 
function is involvement with managers to address performance issues, but found that 
most accountants indicated little emphasis on this area. In a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of the expectations of OMs and the roles of MAs, Hopper (1980) 
found that managers desired accountants to act in a ‗service role‘ as opposed to being 
in a ‗bookkeeper‘ role but this desire remained unsatisfied and ‗no managers sought 
less influence for their accountant‘ (p. 408). Likewise the accountants themselves 
mostly desired to act more in the service role. Two explanations are advanced for 
these unfulfilled wishes. Firstly, the bookkeeping role is highly specified in nature, 
while the service role is ambiguous in nature and left to the accountants to define for 
themselves. Secondly, considerable stress could be linked to the non-fulfilment of 
bookkeeping duties. Hopper (1980) found that the ‗service activities had to be 
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performed in the troughs between stressful cycle end peaks, but instead this period 
was frequently used for recovery from stress‘ (p. 409). Further, it is more obvious if 
bookkeeping duties, as opposed to service role duties, are not performed. Thus, 
Hopper (1980), drawing on role theory, highlights managers‘ expectations of MAs 
and, in finding that these were not being met, there were role conflicts and stress for 
MAs. This links to the earlier review of role theory and accounting research (see 
section 2.4.2). 
 
From a survey of 129 firms (1,977 questionnaires) and 180 interviews of FMs and 
OMs in 12 large firms, Sathe (1978) observes that the balance between hierarchical 
reporting and supporting local managers is affected by the extent of decentralisation 
of reporting lines. Thus, where the divisional controller reports to the local divisional 
general manager, and therefore not directly to the corporate controller, the local 
operational information requirements and analyses take precedence, but where the 
divisional controller reports directly to the corporate controller then ‗adherence to 
corporate policy recommendations and furnishing of information requested by the 
corporate controller tends to get first priority‘ (p. 100). From a survey of 134 Dutch 
controllers in business divisions, Maas and Matějka (2009) found a negative 
relationship between an increased orientation of controllers of business units to a 
corporate (‗functional‘) role and supporting management decision processes, as 
opposed to an orientation of controllers to a divisional (‗local‘) role. The controllers‘ 
managers, both locally and at head office, perceived the controllers‘ priority roles to 
be in regard to assisting decision making at the local level, a perception shared by the 
controllers as well. Maas and Matějka (2009) argue that locally involved divisional 
controllers may result in more control at the divisional level. Any serious control 
breaches at the local level were perceived as necessitating reporting up the corporate 
hierarchy, but these were perceived as infrequent and mitigated through the 
involvement of the controller. These findings thus run counter to the mainstream 
perception in the literature that effective control mandates independence and not 
involvement (Simon et al, 1954; Sathe, 1982, Keating and Jablonsky, 1991; 
Sutthiwan and Clinton, 2008). 
 
King et al. (1991) note a shift in the orientation of MAs, in their UK longitudinal case 
studies. Over a five-year period, MAs were observed as moving away from ‗historian‘ 
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and ‗watch-dog‘ roles to roles that embrace teamwork and providing advice. 
McKinnon and Bruns (1992) found that accountants could be busy ‗interacting‘ with 
OMs and addressing their information needs, but there is a tendency for reporting to 
dominate: 
 
Preparing reports requires the application of their [accountants‘] 
specialised professional training, and many accountants see formal 
report production as one of their most important jobs (p. 218). 
 
Some accountants were observed participating in meetings, understanding the 
business and providing advice, which suggests moving towards the model of the 
‗business partner‘. In a survey of accountants with respect to strategic planning, 
Simon (1992) notes that accountants perceive a weakness in ‗market knowledge‘ and 
a ‗lack of marketing skills‘ (p. 18), thus suggesting scope for accountants to 
strengthen their commercial understanding of businesses.   
 
In a survey of 370 Danish chief MAs, Mouritsen (1996) found that work activity 
variation in the accounting function is much greater than conventionally portrayed 
and notes how the accounting function‘s enacting of controlling or consulting roles 
reflects different forms of involvement. In accounting functions that emphasised 
consulting, there was a horizontal orientation; that is working with inputs and outputs, 
production and sales functions and there was an organisational alignment with 
products and customers. In accounting functions that emphasised controlling, 
involvement was achieved through the deployment of hierarchical budgetary control; 
this encompassed rewarding or punishing appropriate or inappropriate behaviour. In a 
discourse analysis from interviews with four hotel controllers, Gibson (2002) found a 
strong orientation towards a ‗company cop‘ role. The study found that the controller‘s 
behavioural pattern fitted neither the ‗bean-counter‘ nor the ‗valued business partner‘ 
role but a ‗company cop‘ role that involved acting in different capacities at different 
times e.g., sometimes ‗police officer‘, sometimes ‗consultant‘, and sometimes 
‗spy/watchdog‘. The ‗company cop‘ role is defined in terms of ‗the taking of some 
kind of action over the performance of line managers‘ (p. 21). 
 
The emergence of accounting roles characterised as ‗hybrids‘, in the sense of broader 
roles for MAs, has been noted in the literature (Burns et al., 1999; Burns and Scapens, 
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2000; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, 2007). Burns and Scapens (2000) note the rise 
of ‗hybrid‘ accountants – a term used by managers to describe accountants who are 
aligned with, and supporting, business processes. They describe a hybrid accountant 
as one ‗who has both accounting knowledge and an in-depth understanding of the 
operating functions or commercial processes of the business‘ (p. 6-7) and they are 
typically located next to the process leaders. The extent to which, and the point at 
which, MAs intermingle and relate their expertise with other functional expertise in 
organisational dialogue has been observed (Ahrens, 1997). Notable contrasts were 
found between accountants in German and British breweries regarding the 
marshalling of accounting knowledge and the purpose and stage of decision 
involvement (Ahrens, 1997). The accountants in German breweries were found to be 
playing a more independent post hoc analysis role than the accountants in the British 
breweries who tended to contribute their expertise during the unfolding decision 
process. The study also attaches more significance to ‗the management information 
which is actively used, as opposed to formally produced‘ (p. 636). Ahrens and 
Chapman (2000) document the self-role perceptions of 30 British MAs and 34 
German MAs who portrayed their roles as key to the running of firms suggesting 
management accounting was ‗far from an occupation on the verge of dissolution in 
novelty‘ (p. 497). A field study of eight FMs in a Finnish context notes the accountant 
as having a ‗management-oriented broad mind‘ and being ‗concerned by the bigger 
financial picture‘ (Vaivio and Kokko, 2006, p. 70). Further, the findings show the 
accountant to be ‗pragmatic‘, aware of business priorities and market trends, and a 
‗socially active, articulate and engaged agent who was relying on multiple informal 
networks‘. Caglio (2003) found an enlarged role for MAs on the introduction of 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems which legitimised wider cross-
functional roles as ‗service providers‘ with a weakening role in report production due 
to the automation. MAs in these studies were thus found to play important roles in 
participating in management decision making processes. 
 
Granlund and Lukka (1998a) present expanded roles (or desired roles) of MAs as 
outlined in figure 3.3. The key point is that the roles of MAs are expanding; that is, 
new roles are not displacing old roles but are in addition to them. 
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Figure 3.3 – The expansion of the MA‘s job description 
      Source: Granlund and Lukka (1998a, p. 187) 
 
In a case study of a MNE subsidiary in an Irish context, Byrne and Maher (2003) 
observe a widening of the roles of MAs whilst still retaining traditional roles such as 
producing management reports and cost management practices. Granlund and Lukka 
(1998a) argue that the depicted ‗bean-counter‘ role is still necessary in corporate 
financial departments responsible for financial reporting and related procedures.  
Granlund and Lukka (1998a) note that accountants are ‗not ready to abandon the role 
of financial monitor‘ and ‗the traditional management accountant‘s role of being the 
‗watchdog‘ of the organisation is still there‘ (p. 198). These findings on an 
enlargement of roles imply that the balancing of the roles of MAs could be even more 
challenging in the future. The enlargement argument also runs contrary to the 
dichotomising of the roles of MAs into the positions of bean-counter versus business 
partner models which implies a positioning somewhere on a continuum.   
 
In a study of change programmes in 40 service organisations Brignall et al. (1999) 
and Johnston et al., (2002a) found that MAs were not involved in 40% of continuous 
change programmes and 50% of radical change programmes. Moreover, MAs were 
only fully involved with less than 25% of the continuous change programmes. These 
results contrast with the almost exclusive reliance on financial performance measures 
found in the change programmes. Managerial scepticism, reluctance to participate and 
a lack of sound business knowledge were reasons put forward by some managers for 
the low levels of change programme involvement. Brignall et al. (1999, p. 28) 
conclude: 
 
Member of the management team 
Change Agent 
Advisor 
Consultant 
Watchdog 
Historian 
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It would appear that….management accountants are little used to 
drive or even support process improvements in organisations. Worse 
still, they appear to be much maligned and their potential 
misunderstood and under-utilised. 
 
More recently, CIMA (2009) remark that: 
 
…some members of the forum [professional affiliation] have found 
that accountants‘ enthusiasm for providing business partnering is not 
always matched by their colleagues‘ [in other functions] willingness 
to have them do much more than they already do (p. 28).  
 
Senior management backing and establishing and nurturing relationships over time is 
suggested as means of addressing this. 
 
Clarke et al. (1999) posit that MAs in Ireland function more as book-keepers than 
innovative business partners in observing the comparatively low adoption rates of 
activity-based techniques in Ireland.  They suggest that some of the barriers include 
the narrow accounting curriculum and little demand for change from either industry or 
academia. Also in an Irish context, Pierce and O‘Dea (2003) note that ‗in some 
organisations, the MA is seen as little more than a financial accountant who extends 
the mentality of auditor, rule-book and procedures manual to monthly and quarterly 
accounts‘ (p. 280). In a US context Sorensen (2009) observes that the ‗gap between 
practice and education is well established and awaits bold practitioner-based 
educational programmes to close it‘ (p. 1291). 
 
CIMA (2007) note variability in the model of the business partner in organisations 
and suggest that ‗tactical support‘ would be adequate in firms with developed markets 
while MAs would need to ‗challenge strategically‘ in rapidly changing markets (p. 
28) e.g., one member of the CIMA panel of senior CFOs described the MA as 
primarily a ‗constructive irritant‘ while another member described the MA as decision 
and control support with recourse to the ‗irritant‘ as required. This suggests a potential 
contingency for the roles of MAs and the environment (see section 2.3.2). CIMA 
(2007) identify four classifications of business partners as follows: 
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1) Shared service centres including outsourced centres – in this arrangement the 
business support roles of MAs are provided from a centralised support 
perspective, and as a substitute for decentralised support ‗but ordinarily this is not 
considered to be finance business partnering‘ (p. 29). It lacks strategic orientation.
  
2) Financial support – the roles of MAs as financial support are typically based in 
the business but as part of the financial hierarchy with alignment to supporting 
managers in their planning, analysis processes, and the resolution of operational 
problems. This model is more decentralised or ‗embedded‘.  
 
3) Expert services – MAs with expertise report to the senior financial hierarchy and 
although part of a more centralised arrangement these MAs participate in strategic 
business decision support (e.g., risk assessments, acquisitions). It is noted that 
these MAs may lack business knowledge but being somewhat detached from the 
business ‗can make it easier for them to challenge the business‘ (p. 29).  
 
4) Finance leadership – the roles of MAs in this depiction are considered most 
aligned with the model of the business partner in combining business knowledge, 
financial acumen, interacting closely with senior managers in the business 
(decentralised roles), and having a strategic orientation. The breath of their roles 
are summarised as follows: 
 
The can challenge line managers as sparring partners. They do not 
produce financial or management information but they promote the 
application of finance disciplines to decision making, challenging the 
business to generate more value and having a significant influence on 
the business‘s direction. They provide as much leadership as support. 
They can be embedded in the business or have a matrix reporting 
relationship (p. 29). 
 
CIMA (2009) observe that the level at which business partnering occurs in 
organisations may vary both in respect of the individual (e.g., manager versus a top 
executive) and the extent of influence (e.g., providing information versus confronting 
and instructing) as illustrated in figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4 – Alternative levels of business partnering 
                    Source: CIMA (2009, p. 28) 
 
Based on structured and unstructured interviews with approximately 400 corporate 
and divisional managers in 24 major US companies, Sathe (1982) found a positive 
relationship between the expectations of divisional management and the involvement 
of the controller and a positive relationship between controller involvement and the 
financial performance of the company (e.g., control of debtors, stocks, expenses and 
capital expenditures). By being involved, it is possible to instigate proactive control – 
‗to put an early stop to ill-conceived, ill-advised, or illegal courses of action being 
contemplated, that is, before-the-fact or anticipatory control‘ (Sathe, 1982, p. 19). 
However, countering this is a potential negative impact on creativity in suppressing 
managers‘ enterprising initiatives and the risk of the controller being less independent 
for control purposes (Sathe, 1982). The next section discusses role conflict in this 
context and the sections following examine some of the factors that may be associated 
with the roles of MAs moving towards business partnership which also build on this 
section. 
 
3.8 Role conflict 
Regarding the controller‘s role, Henning and Moseley (1970) note that it is ‗fraught 
with potential conflict‘ (p. 488). Role conflict is defined and reviewed in section 2.4.1 
in the context of role theory. This section examines some of the empirical research on 
role conflicts and accounting roles. A pivotal point of focus for conflicting demands 
for MAs has been the role of controller, in maintaining the integrity and accuracy of 
financial reporting and internal control systems, and secondly, the role of actively 
supporting management in decision-making processes as a business partner (Sathe, 
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1982). Simon et al‘s. (1954) study of controller‘s departments suggests splitting these 
roles as ‗combining the functions leads to a potential conflict between the 
accountant‘s function of providing service to operating departments, and his function 
of analysing operations to provide valid and objective data for higher levels of 
management‘ (p. 5). Supporting this, Keating and Jablonsky (1991) state that:  
 
...a financial person aspiring to be a business advisor or business-unit 
CFO cannot function as a corporate policeman, independent 
commentator, or custodian of accounts. These roles, consistent with 
traditional concepts of workplace specialisation and internal control, 
extend back to mass production management practices that promote 
highly specialised, hierarchical patterns of work organisation (p. 46-
47). 
 
In viewing the increasing regulatory burdens, Sutthiwan and Clinton (2008) also 
argue that the roles of controllers be divided into two separate roles. Sathe (1978) 
found that there was no consensus on whether divisional controllers ought to have a 
direct line into the local divisional manager and a dotted line into the corporate 
controller or vice versa. Sathe (1982) suggests that it depends, as although many 
(controllers and OMs) believe the roles are ‗more or less mutually exclusive‘ (p. xvii), 
there are situations where roles can be combined. Sathe (1983) presents a framework 
that analyses the roles of controllers into the involved, independent, split and strong 
controller in light of the potentially conflicting roles of controllership and 
management decision-making support. The split controller, following Simon‘s 
suggestions, assigns the roles to separate individuals.  
 
Only the strong controller combines the dual responsibilities, and this is the most 
demanding role. Which role is appropriate, Sathe (1983) argues, depends on whether 
greater emphasis is needed on controllership (independent) or on decision-making 
support (involved) or both equally (split or strong). Sathe (1982) argues that strong 
controllers are able to manage this simultaneous demand for independence and 
involvement due to a prerequisite set of personal characteristics and skills that include 
motivation, integrity, interpersonal skills and business knowledge. Siegel (2000) 
argues that conflict is not inevitable for accountants acting in the dual roles of 
controllers and business partners and suggests: providing more responsibility to the 
business (e.g., authorisation approval limits), interfering less, educating the business, 
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engaging as a partner, not as an ‗overseer‘ and senior management endorsement of the 
dual roles. Hopper (1980) highlights some role conflicts for MAs as ‗book-keepers‘ 
and ‗service-aids‘ in relation to alternative structural arrangements as follows: 
 
1) Decentralised – the MA reporting to the OM and physically adjacent to the OM; 
2) Partially decentralised – the MA reporting to the FM but physically adjacent to the 
OM; and 
3) Centralised – the MA reporting to the FM and physically adjacent to the FM. 
 
The specific role conflicts relate to the extent that MAs met OMs‘ expectations on:  
 
1) the MAs‘ performance of the most highly ranked activities important and common 
to most OMs (i.e., preparation of budgets, issuing budgets, ad hoc projects and 
informal interacting); 
2) the time devoted by MAs to these activities; 
3) the attributes of the MA; and  
4) the MAs‘ interpersonal relationships.  
 
Hopper (1980) found that some conflicts were lower in decentralised organisation 
structures, where accountants were closer to OMs: 
 
The major effect of decentralisation appeared to be that managers‘ 
expectations concerning formal information, i.e., budgets and 
projects, were more likely to be met, but conflicts over liaison 
persisted whatever the structure (p. 405). 
 
Hopper (1980) notes that role conflicts in respect of relationships between MAs and 
OMs and role conflicts in respect of the characteristics of the MAs were largely not 
significant, whatever the structural arrangement. Drawing on role theory, Maas and 
Matějka (2009) found increased controller role conflict and ambiguity resulting from 
increased expectations from their line corporate structure and no lessening of 
expectations from managers in the business units. This conflict and ambiguity was 
found to limit the controller‘s capacity to address undesired accounting practices in 
the business unit.  
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3.9 Factors associated with MAs moving towards business partnership  
Sathe (1982) groups the factors affecting the extent of controller involvement into 
three categories, namely: the individual‘s attributes such as personal drive, personality 
and relationships with management; the management approach including their 
expectations and orientation; and organisational and environmental attributes. Sathe‘s 
work concentrates on researching the latter two factors and primarily focuses on the 
involvement of the corporate, or head office, controller. 
 
For controllers within different business divisions (26 divisions) of the same company 
(13 companies), Sathe (1982) found that the involvement of these controllers was 
positively related to the expectations of managers in the divisions, following role 
theory‘s predictions: 
 
…expectations of local management regarding controller 
involvement are consistently and positively related to the degree of 
actual involvement (p. 104). 
 
Sathe (1982) found a positive but ‗negligible‘ relationship between the degree of 
change in the division‘s environment and the involvement of the controller and no 
relationship was found between the time spent on external reporting and controller 
involvement; that is the more time spent on reporting was not found to reduce the 
time available for decision support. This finding suggests that perhaps the availability 
of time to accountants is not a major variable in determining the extent of 
involvement in business decisions. 
 
For divisional controllers in different companies, seven company or head office 
factors that affect the ‗typical‘ involvement (i.e., involvement most common for the 
overall company) are identified by Sathe (1982): 
 
1) Working asset intensity – a substitute measure of the extent to which control and 
financial analysis are essential to the success of the business (the actual measure is 
stocks plus debtors divided by net sales).  
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2) Financial orientation – the extent that corporate management depend on financial 
data, analysis and control in their management system.  
 
3) Expectations regarding typical divisional controller involvement – corporate 
management‘s expectations of involvement of controllers in operating and 
strategic business decisions.  
 
4) Emphasis placed on planning, budgeting, and capital expenditure review – the 
extent of corporate management‘s focus on its MCS in managing the relationship 
between head office and the divisions.  
 
5) Emphasis on controllership to line transfers – the focus placed by corporate 
management on the transfer of divisional controllers to line positions such as 
marketing, operations, and general management. Mendoza and Bescos (2001) 
found that the career structure of managers and MAs lacked essential exposure to 
responsibilities in their opposite roles; that is their respective career paths rarely 
crossed over.  
 
6) Emphasis on service role in dealing with management – extent of corporate 
controller‘s involvement in head office business decisions and the amount of time 
devoted to divisional reports and queries. 
 
7) Duration of sustained emphasis on development of controllership personnel – the 
length of time spent on developing controllers in terms of career plans, job 
rotations or other development initiatives. 
 
The first factor assessed attributes of the organisation, the next four (2-5) assessed 
attributes of head office and the last two (6 and 7) assessed attributes of the controller 
in head office, all in the context of their relationship to the ‗typical‘ involvement of 
controllers in divisions. Sathe (1982) found that statistical relationships between the 
involvement of controllers in local decision processes were ‗strong‘ for factors 2, 4 
and 7 above, and ‗moderate‘ for the remaining factors. It was found that the head 
office controllers‘ expectations of the controllers‘ involvement in the divisions was 
weaker than that of head office management. These findings, while not providing 
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much insight into the involvement of the controller from a divisional perspective 
(what Sathe refers to as a ‗top-down‘ view), do indicate that a number of head office 
factors are related to how involved the controller is in divisions within the company. 
 
In a survey of 17 large Italian industrial firms, Zoni and Merchant (2007) found that 
controllers were at a minimum ‗somewhat involved‘ in decision making by 
management. Drawing on Sathe‘s (1982) company-level measurements of the 
involvement of the controller, the study notes a positive relationship between the 
involvement of the controller and capital intensity, operating interdependency, and the 
extent of formalisation of planning systems (strategic, budget). In analysing decision 
making into its strategic and operating elements, greater capital intensity, managerial 
financial expertise and planning system formalisation are linked to the involvement of 
the controller in strategic decision making, while greater operating interdependency is 
linked more to the involvement of the controller in operating decision making. A 
negative relationship was found between controller decision making involvement and 
the employment of controller roles as training for general management roles. An 
unexpected positive relationship was found between the financial expertise of 
managers and the involvement of controllers in decision making of a strategic nature. 
Zoni and Merchant (2007) note that ‗instead of having controllers more involved to 
compensate for the line managers‘ weaknesses (as propositioned), apparently 
financially competent line managers encourage greater controller involvement‘ (p. 
40). The study also found a significant relationship between company performance 
and the involvement of the controller. 
 
In a field study of five organisational change programmes, Chenhall and Langfield-
Smith (1998b) identify five factors that could affect the extent of influence of MAs in 
developing performance indicators for change initiatives: 
 
1) A shared view – managers and accountants possess similar views of the role that 
accountants can play in change programmes (only found in two of the five cases) 
i.e., MAs ‗must want to participate, and managers must actively seek their 
contribution‘ (p. 374). It was observed in one case that ‗the accountants claimed 
that they were under pressure to prepare conventional financial accounts and saw 
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this as their main priority‘ (p. 375).  
 
2) Management support for accounting innovations – accountants may be more 
reluctant to get involved in change programmes if senior management are not 
backing the introduction of accounting innovations.  
 
3) ‘Accounting champion’ – a champion could raise the profile of accountants in 
change programmes, especially where management backing is poor.  
 
4) Skills – skills of both a technical and social nature were sought in the cases for an 
accountant‘s involvement in change programmes. Trust was also found to be 
significant in gaining acceptance from managers on the contributions that 
accountants could make. Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2007) note that MAs require 
sound communication and interpersonal skills in their roles ‗to interact and build 
trustworthy relationships‘ across organisational functions and levels (p. 127).  
 
5) Formal hierarchical structure and authority – dependence on the formal 
organisation structure as a source of authority became a barrier for accountants‘ 
involvement in change initiatives that typically were team-driven. 
 
The impact of technological developments on the roles of MAs has attracted some 
interest in the literature. From interviews with UK accountants and managers, 
Ezzamel et al. (1997) observe that ‗the automation of accounting functions has 
enabled the size of accounting departments to be slashed‘ (p. 447). Technology has 
facilitated the wide-scale dissemination of accounting and control information in 
organisations, enabling constant monitoring by non-financial managers (Ezzamel et 
al., 1997). Scapens and Jazayeri (2003), in a longitudinal study of ERP systems, note 
a broadening of the roles of MAs as well as the OMs acquiring increased 
understanding of accounting (see also Caglio (2003)). Dempsey and Vance (2006) 
found in their case study that the analytical roles of MAs had expanded on the back of 
developments in IT. CIMA (2008) argue that business intelligence software (end-user 
performance management software that typically extracts key decision data from 
underlying transactional systems) may provide scope for MAs to be more effective in 
decision support and adopting the model of business partnership. Jack and Kholeif 
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(2008) found that the MA still occupied a role oriented towards report production 
following the introduction of an ERP system. Granlund and Malmi (2002) found 
minor impacts on management accounting practices from the adoption of ERP 
systems as such practices operated outside the system. While all MAs anticipated that 
ERP would release them to attend more to supporting managers‘ decision making, 
this was observed as occurring in only five of the ten case firms. A change in the roles 
of MAs, from a narrow accounting focus to a broader partnership model was also 
found. Granlund and Malmi (2002) note that: 
 
...the roles of accountants has expanded towards more active, 
business-oriented roles. For the rest of the companies ERPS is still 
used mainly for improved processing of the document mass (p. 311). 
 
Thus, the literature is inconclusive on the impact of these systems advancements on 
the roles of MAs as these findings indicate.  
 
Ezzamel et al. (1997) note that accounting as an activity is possibly in greater use, 
despite the technology-driven reduction in accounting staff. Hence, other functions 
deploy accounting to support their organisational efforts. In conclusion, Ezzamel et al. 
(1997) argue that the identity of the finance function may be challenged by its 
increasing orientation towards non-financial information and the increasing financial 
acumen of other functions. Other commentators in the literature similarly observe 
increased management accounting activities (i.e., more managers taking on these 
activities), while there may be less management accounting for accountants (Cooper, 
1996; Pierce, 2001). 
 
Johnston et al. (2002a) conducted interviews with the most senior financial officer in 
six organisations regarding MAs‘ involvement in change programmes. The case 
analysis suggests that six key requirements determine the ‗successful‘ involvement of 
MAs in change programmes. These are: team participation, having solid and well-
developed systems, understanding of the business and its processes, flexibility, 
interpersonal and communication capabilities, and an organisational context that 
facilitates MAs‘ involvement (e.g., nature of the business, life cycle, speed of 
growth). MAs were found to free up time for involvement with OMs in different ways 
e.g., having computerised systems, being specifically recruited for involvement with 
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OMs, being in a small company where spreadsheets resulted in time efficiencies, and 
in taking an approach which Johnston et al. (2002b) term ‗good enough accounting‘.  
 
Drawing on the work of educational psychologists and human theories of information 
processing a survey by Coad (1999) found that MAs with a ‗learning orientation‘ 
were more likely to be involved in business decision making than those with a 
‗performance orientation‘. A performance orientation suggests concern with 
affirmative reviews by others, a notion of success in terms of individual ability, and 
an aversion to new ways of working just in case they result in adverse reviews. A 
learning orientation on the other hand denotes individuals who are inquisitive, seek 
learning and ability enhancing opportunities, and do not particularly fear mistakes. 
Coad (1999) suggests that ‗management accountants can indeed live up to demands 
for more proactive involvement and role innovation if they possess or can develop a 
learning goal orientation‘ (p. 109). In regard to orientations and the roles of MAs 
Hopper (1980) found that nine MAs (out of a total of 12) sought to fulfil a 
management ‗service role‘, while three sought to fulfil a ‗bookkeeper‘ role, which 
was related to ‗career aspirations‘ and ‗sources of satisfaction‘. Hopper (1980) 
suggests that the latter ‗desired promotion to financial positions and derived 
considerable satisfaction from bookkeeping activities‘, while the former ‗sought 
moves to non-accounting positions linked to production‘ (p. 409) and took reward 
from engaging with and assisting managers with their decisions. 
 
From a theoretical perspective most of the studies on factors impacting upon the roles 
of MAs have not been subject to formal hypotheses testing; even Sathe‘s work was 
limited to exploratory statistical analysis. As can be seen much of the research here 
has being generated from field-based research which usefully points towards 
important involvement factors for the roles of MAs. However, a limitation in these 
exploratory approaches, with some exceptions, is that theoretical perspectives are not 
always considered. 
 
3.10 The impact of accounting innovations on the roles of MAs 
Following the questioning of the relevance of management accounting from the mid-
eighties (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987) a number of new accounting techniques have 
emerged e.g., Activity-Based Costing (ABC), Strategic Management Accounting 
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(SMA), Balanced Scorecards (BSCs), Target Costing (TC), and Life-Cycle Costing 
(LCC). There is some evidence that the implementation of new management 
accounting techniques impacts upon the roles of MAs. Vaivio (2004) notes the impact 
of the adoption of non-financial measurement and an expanding controller‘s role 
precipitated by the stimulating and knowledge-creating introduction of non-financial 
measures. This follows a stream of research on the implementation of ABC and its 
association with the roles of MAs e.g., enhanced legitimacy (Bhimani and Pigott, 
1992), a shared accounting understanding (Norris, 1995), improved MAs‘ relations 
with managers (Gietzmann, 1991; Friedman and Lyne, 1997) and controllers who 
‗stepped outside of the traditional role‘ by engaging more cross-functionally than 
hierarchically (Anderson, 1995). Theoretically, this literature has tended to draw on 
the implementation literature (e.g., information systems and operations literatures) 
with respect to understanding the introduction of management accounting 
innovations, or worked towards theory development, and therefore has tended to 
neglect the theoretical implications for the roles of MAs from the perspectives of 
control, contingency, and role theory. 
 
In the operations implementation literature, Schultz and Slevin (1975) distinguish 
between what they term technical validity and organisational validity. The former 
relates to a system achieving its purpose from the designer‘s perspective, while the 
latter relates to a system achieving its purpose from the user‘s perspective. In an 
implementation of ABC, McGowan (1998) distinguishes between two user-groups; 
that is (1) users i.e., those for whom the system has been designed, and (2) preparers 
who include ‗systems analysts, accountants, programmers, managers and others 
assigned the task of developing, modifying and maintaining the system‘ (p. 36). 
McGowan (1998) observes the users‘ potentially greater focus on organisational 
validity and the preparers‘ potentially greater focus on technical validity.  
 
Bjornenak and Olson (1999) deconstruct management accounting innovations using a 
framework that separates out scope and system dimensions. The former represents 
what is accounted for and in respect of what period, while the latter incorporates the 
notion of linkages between system users, systems design and temporal aspects of the 
systems. Table 3.4 summarises the distinguishing features of these dimensions. 
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Scope dimension System dimension 
Descriptive objects, i.e., the objects for 
which we are accounting 
The number and lifetime of the systems 
Causal variability factors, i.e., the causes of 
variation in the descriptive objectives 
The integration of user aspects in 
management accounting  
Time, i.e., the period of time for which we 
are accounting  
 
 
Table 3.4 – Summary of scope and system dimensions 
       Source: Bjornenak and Olson (1999, p. 328) 
 
Bjornenak and Olson (1999) note that much of what has been documented on 
management accounting practice is concerned with the scope dimension and therefore 
the system dimension has been neglected.  
 
3.11 Impact of firm ownership  
In a longitudinal study, Yazdifar et al. (2008) note that ‗the role of the management 
accountant in the subsidiary company was also affected by its parent companies‘ (p. 
426). A recent cross-industry survey of UK MAs by Yazdifar and Tsamenyi (2005) 
found weak support for hypothesised differences in the perceptions of MAs between 
subsidiaries and independent enterprises regarding management accounting practices, 
change drivers, and the roles of MAs. The impact of head office was thus not found to 
be a statistically significant factor differentiating the perceptions of MAs but one of a 
number of institutional factors that might shape these perceptions. Although not 
statistically significant, the survey found some evidence that MAs viewed themselves 
as more control-oriented in subsidiaries and more business-oriented in independent 
enterprises. In examining the forces promoting the homogenisation of global 
management accounting practices, Granlund and Lukka (1998b) note that one 
‗coercive pressure‘ that is recognised is the influence of corporate head office: ‗it is 
common for the headquarters/parent company of a trans-national enterprise to force 
its foreign divisions/subsidiaries to adopt similar reporting systems or performance 
measurement frameworks‘ (p. 163). Granlund and Lukka (1998a) observe, in a 
Finnish context, that the accountant operates horizontally as the ‗business oriented 
member of the managerial team and a financial advisor‘ and operates vertically as the 
‗local guardian, ensuring that the corporate interests are not forgotten‘ (p. 199). This 
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also relates to the earlier discussion of the balance in the roles of MAs and role 
conflicts (see sections 3.7 and 3.8). 
 
3.12 Individual characteristics of MAs 
This section presents a number of themes on attributes that relate to the roles of MAs 
in the management accounting literature. 
 
3.12.1 Multi-skilled team members with business knowledge 
Kaplan (1995) highlights new management accounting roles in operating controls 
systems, activity-based cost management and the BSC where the MA, as management 
team member, has ‗intimate knowledge of the underlying technologies, capabilities, 
markets and strategy of the organisation‘ (p. 8). Scapens et al. (1996) suggest that 
MAs need a sound commercial awareness of the business that they operate in and they 
should be able to relate this to their accounting measurements. They emphasise that 
the MA should be a very active member of management, or other managers may take 
over some of these roles (see also Burns et al. 1996, 1999; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 
2007). From interviews with over 100 accountants in the US, Siegel et al. (2003a) 
note that adopting the model of the business partner requires MAs to have strong 
skills in communicating, team working, analysis, and a particularly strong 
understanding of the business. Brignall et al. (1999) found some accountants to be 
important members of senior management committees with some discharging 
strategic responsibilities.  
 
Johnston et al. (2002a) note that interpersonal and communications skills were 
perceived by the accountants interviewed as critical to their involvement with other 
organisational members at all levels to ‗be an efficient conduit for appropriate 
information flows‘ (p. 1334). In three of the six cases, these skills were perceived to 
impact on annual appraisals and the potential promotion of junior accountants. Feeney 
and Pierce (2007) found that managers rated the business knowledge, team skills, and 
interpersonal skills of the MA higher for decision making than for control purposes. 
Precision was rated higher for control as opposed to decision making purposes. 
 
Vaivio and Kokko (2006) found the controller using ‗personal multipliers‘ on 
different official platforms, tailored around key individuals. These multipliers were in 
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effect how controllers discerned past and projected performance evaluation in 
interacting with managers by being inquisitive, putting everything in the situational 
context, and recognising that managers have different styles (e.g., some more reticent 
than others). CIMA (2007) note that creating business partners requires MAs to be ‗T 
shaped‘ meaning that the core financial skills beneath the top of the ‗T‘ are capped by 
a wider set of business-based skills (see also CIMA, 2009).  
 
Pierce and O‘Dea (2003), in a field study of 12 manufacturing firms in Ireland, found 
that understanding the business and team work was perceived, by both managers and 
accountants, as critical for the effective involvement of MAs in the business. Most 
managers however perceived MAs as deficient in essential characteristics that are 
important to them, such as being flexible and more broadly focused. Flexibility relates 
to the speed with which changes can be made and a broader focus could be achieved 
by incorporating external benchmarking information. Brignall et al. (1999) found 
from the cases where the involvement of MAs appeared critical to the change 
programme outcomes, flexibility was recognised as essential. Flexibility in this study 
related to their role boundaries, decision making approach and the purpose of 
accounting information ‗even to the point of being willing to support ideas that 
seemed financially unjustifiable‘ (p. 42).  
 
Johnston et al. (2002a) identify five roles of MAs in the context of their involvement 
in operational process change: 
 
1) The generalist – the responsibilities of MAs for most of the cases stretched 
beyond the numbers to include commercial decision making, supported by MAs 
having sound business knowledge and effective MASs.  
  
2) The non-traditional accountant – MAs were visibly ‗hands on‘ in the business, 
away from their desks. One MA was given a non-accounting title ‗Customer 
Operations Manager‘.  
 
3) The linchpin – the MAs seem to have acted as organisational integrators (on all 
levels), armed with financial and non-financial information with key ‗ownership‘ 
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responsibilities on cross-functional teams.    
 
4) The facilitator – as members of cross-functional teams, the MAs facilitated the 
collation and distribution of timely and relevant information and promoted its use 
in a flexible manner.  
 
5) The interpreter – the MAs in four of the six cases went beyond the basic technical 
skills of accounting. 
 
CIMA (2009) present a combination of specific accounting and business skills to be 
balanced in the model of the business partner and note that ‗some people who choose 
to become accountants may not necessarily be the right kind of people to become 
finance business partners‘ (p. 30). Table 3.5 illustrates these competencies. 
 
Finance competencies                                                                Business capabilities 
Reports past performance                                            Provides insights into the future 
Inquisitive and analytical                                                           Creative and articulate 
Risk averse (mitigates)                                           Handles ambiguity and uncertainty 
Practical attention to detail                                                              Sees the big picture 
Pragmatic                                                                                                           Flexible 
Supportive                                                                                                   Challenging 
Likes to consider all options                                                            Keen to take action 
Inclined to control                                                                               Able to influence 
Responds reactively                                                            Takes initiative proactively  
Technical accounting expertise                                                     Commercial acumen 
Identifies issues                                                                                  Tackles problems 
Scorekeepers               Players on the 
on the sideline                             team 
 
Table 3.5 – Range of accounting and business skills for the business partner 
         Source: CIMA (2009, p. 31) 
 
Collectively the literature presents a profile of MAs as requiring a solid understanding 
of the business, having strong communication, team and interpersonal skills, being 
flexible, and being able to relate these characteristics in the context of meaningful 
management accounting information. 
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3.12.2 Organisational structure and physical location 
From 300 telephone interviews of MAs in the US, IMA (1999) found that 20% of 
respondents noted that at least 50% of their company‘s MAs had decentralised to the 
operating functions that they work with, and the trend was stronger in larger 
companies. Pierce and O‘Dea (2003) found that OMs perceived the physical location 
of MAs as important; that is those in close proximity could better enhance their 
business understanding, increase legitimacy in the eyes of managers, and it reflected a 
positive attitude towards building a partnership ethos. Similarly, from eight interviews 
in six Finnish firms, Granlund and Lukka (1998a) observe a role shift for MAs from 
‗bean-counter‘ to a ‗controller‘ involved in business decision-making that appeared to 
be linked to the decentralised structure; that is being physically closer to the business 
activity. In a longitudinal case study of over five years, Järvenpää (2007) found that 
the decentralising, and process orienting, of the management accounting function was 
instrumental in moving MAs toward the model of business partnership. 
 
Hopper (1980) found that managers expressed more satisfaction with management 
accounting information in a decentralised accounting structure than in a centralised 
structure and also ‗there was tentative evidence that they studied it more‘ (p. 405). 
Decentralisation-centralisation was assessed with regard to the physical location of 
MAs and whether their line manager was an accountant or an OM. In contrast, 
Mouritsen (1996) found that the accounting department‘s work had more of a 
relationship with the interaction between accountants and other managers than 
decentralisation or centralisation per se. The provision of more accurate information 
and being more knowledgeable about operations was attributed to the accountant‘s 
proximity to managers. Chia (1995) found support for the hypothesised moderating 
effect of decentralisation on the relationship between the MAS‘s information 
sophistication level (in terms of broad scope, aggregation, integration and timeliness) 
and managerial performance.  
 
Thus, the physical location of accountants, in terms of their proximity to the managers 
that they work with, may have an impact on the nature of the information they 
provide, the relationships they have with those managers, and ultimately the 
satisfaction those managers experience with the accounting service provided to them. 
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3.12.3 Survey evidence of characteristics of MAs 
In a survey of the cost management techniques in 168 firms in Ireland, Nulty (1992) 
notes that the lack of dialogue between accountants and manufacturing departments 
contributed to weak cost management systems: 
 
Many participants – accountants and non-accountants – expressed  
serious concern about the ―remoteness‖ of accounting in their own  
particular organisations. Lack of good communications and  
interchange gives rise to confusion and misunderstanding in the  
effective use of cost management information (p. 3). 
 
The IMA (1996) survey of 4,080 MAs in the US (795 returned) found that from a list 
of 162 items of knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs), certain KSAs were perceived 
as very important to the work of MAs. Table 3.6 extracts a list of the top 10 KSAs 
ranked by the mean importance (1 = not at all important and 5 = very important).  
 
Ranking Knowledge, Skill and Ability Mean 
Importance 
1 Work ethic 4.67 
2 Analytical/problem-solving skills 4.66 
3 Interpersonal skills 4.64 
4 Listening skills 4.58 
5 Use of computerised spreadsheets 4.51 
6 Understanding the business 4.48 
7 Understanding bottom line implications of day-to-
day business and accounting decisions 
4.44 
8 Writing skills 4.32 
9 Familiarity with business processes 4.32 
10 Relationship between balance sheet, income 
statement and cash flow statement 
4.31 
  
Table 3.6 - Listing of top 10 KSAs ranked by mean  
                      Source: Adapted from IMA (1996)  
 
It is apparent from the table that there are skills that relate to the accountant 
performing financial accounting tasks (e.g., item 10) but most point towards the 
model of the business partner. Burns and Yazdifar (2001) conducted a UK survey of 
MAs‘ tasks, tools, techniques, and skills in the five years prior to the survey and 
expectations by the year 2005. Table 3.7 shows the number of MAs and what that 
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percentage of the sample (1,000 MAs surveyed, 279 returned) that number represents 
in relation to the top 10 skills for MAs expected to be most important by 2005. 
 
Skill Number % of sample 
Analytical/interpretative 156 61 
IT/system knowledge 119 47 
Broad business knowledge 223 55 
Integrating financial and non-financial information 105 41 
Teamwork 84 33 
Change management 81 32 
Strategic thinking 81 32 
Commercial 73 29 
Decision-making 66 26 
Presentational 55 22 
 
Table 3.7 – Top 10 skills expected to be most important for MAs by 2005 
           Source: Burns and Yazdifar  (2001, p. 35)
  
With the exception of business knowledge, these findings reveal characteristics that 
could be linked to the model of the business partner as being those in the bottom five 
of the top ten, which perhaps raises questions about MAs future perceptions of their 
own roles. In comparison to the results for the previous five years, Burns and Yazdifar 
(2001) note that ‗oral communication‘ and ‗interpersonal‘ (both on the top 10 list of 
skills for the previous five years) were no longer deemed as important, despite the 
continued inclusion of teamwork. Technology (intranets and e-mail) is suggested as 
the alternative medium. This finding seems out of line with the surveys by IMA 
(1996) and IMA (1999) and intuitively contradictory to the espoused characteristics of 
the model of the business partner. That apart, the top 10 skills suggest a widening of 
the MA‘s skill base and an implied shift from producing figures to analysing them, 
and integrating them into the wider organisational realm.  
 
3.12.4 Image of accountants 
The image of accountants has received some interest in the literature and it draws 
attention to the perceptions that others have of the roles of accountants. DeCoster and 
Rhode (1971) note: 
 
The literature provides evidence that accountants are negatively 
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stereotyped as cold, aloof, nonsociable, submissive, shallow, weak, 
passive and lacking sensitivity (p. 661). 
 
Friedman and Lyne (2001) identify the use of the stereotype label ‗bean-counter‘ in 
138 newspapers and magazines published between January 1970 and June 1995. 
Moreover, 106 of these occur from 1990 suggesting the stereotype is not waning, but 
in fact growing in the public view.  Six different ‗nuances‘ are associated with the 
bean-counter image and are classified as negative or positive. However, the negative 
nuances far outweigh the positive ones (only 13 incidents) and further there are 
proportionally more negative nuances associated with accountants in business as 
opposed to in practice (52% vs. 30% respectively).  
 
Sathe (1983) recognises that those entering the controllership profession may have a 
stronger disposition towards working with numbers rather than with people with 
commonly associated depictions such as the ‗―bean counter‖, ―number cruncher‖, and 
―green eyeshade‖‘ (p. 45). It is argued these depictions, and accountants‘ roles in 
analysing and reporting poor performance (e.g., adverse variances) to managers, could 
impact on interpersonal relationships with managers. 
 
In a study of 11 medium and large companies that had implemented some ABC 
methods, Friedman and Lyne (1997) found support for the ‗bean-counter‘ view of 
accountants by OMs and the accountants themselves, whilst also observing the 
positive impact that the implementation had on broadening the roles of MAs. The 
‗bean-counter‘ is defined in terms of an accountant who generates numerical reports 
that contributes little to managing the business efficiently, a process which serves a 
self-fulfilling purpose. Friedman and Lyne (1997) found that:  
 
…the term bean-counter was used wholly negatively to describe 
accountants who have no understanding or feel for the business, and  
can only count beans, a mechanical process divorced from business  
reality, which can stifle initiative and even lead to decisions which 
will harm the business (p. 20).  
     
While noting that these new costing practices had significantly improved the ‗bean-
counter‘ image of the accountants in the firms studied, it is argued in the long term 
that it is incumbent on accountants to develop new techniques in response to changing 
business environments to dispel such an image. Only six of the eleven companies 
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provided direct evidence that relations with OMs had improved, and management 
accounting information was more useful, resulting from the implementation. It must 
also be noted that the 11 firms selected had adopted ABC methods successfully which 
is not reflective of the generally low levels of adoption of accounting innovations (see 
section 3.13.9). The ‗bean-counter‘ image was also evident in Brignall et al’s. (1999) 
study that noted poor involvement of MAs in change programmes with some 
managers unsure of their potential to contribute. Ahrens and Chapman (2000) found 
the perceptions of MAs in less senior positions as unfavourable with regard to the 
preparation of reports dismissing, as the MAs put it, ‗just reporting‘ that could be 
performed by ‗anybody‘ (p. 489). Ahrens and Chapman (2000) comment that 
reporting was perceived as an activity that ought not to form a part of ‗their 
occupational sphere‘. In terms of the move to the business partner model, it could be 
suggested that the accountant‘s image, both projected and perceived, may have an 
impact on how easy the accountant finds the move to such a role.  
 
This section on the characteristics of MAs has drawn attention to empirical studies 
which have identified factors such as the MAs understanding of the business, 
interpersonal skills and management team membership, flexibility, physical location 
and structural alignment as well as analytical, accounting, and technology skills as 
relating to the roles of MAs. There is a strong descriptive and survey orientation to 
some of this research and therefore a lack of theoretical engagement although Hopper 
(1980) drew on role theory in finding managers‘ information expectations better met 
in decentralised structures, while Piece and O‘Dea (2003) note contingencies between 
managers and MAs in being perceived as ‗strong‘ or ‗weak‘ in their roles. What is 
also missing from some of these studies, particularly survey research, is the 
perceptions of not just MAs but also of the managers. 
 
3.13 Characteristics of management accounting information  
Atkinson et al. (2001) define management accounting information as ‗financial and 
operating data about an organisation‘s activities, processes, operating units, products, 
services, and customers; e.g., the calculated cost of a product, an activity, or a 
department in a recent time period‘ (p. 577). Traditionally in the accounting literature 
the effectiveness of the controller‘s work was determined by the economic provision 
of useful information. Simon et al. (1954) state that: 
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A controller‘s department is effective to the extent that it: provides 
informational services of high quality; performs these services at a 
minimum cost; and facilitates the long-range development of 
competent accounting and operating executives (p. 1). 
 
The literature makes a number of distinctions with regard to management accounting 
information. A number of authors have made the distinction between management 
accounting information that managers might use for decision making purposes and 
information that managers might use for control purposes (Emmanuel et al., 1990; 
Horngren et al., 2000; Zimmerman, 1997, 2001; Atkinson et al., 2001). In the context 
of the contemporary roles of MAs, CIMA (2009) observe that: 
 
…at the heart of the role is providing information to support decision 
making. The quality of information is key to finance business 
partners‘ credibility. It is the basis for their invitation to the decision 
making table (p. 14). 
 
The characteristics and dissemination of information in organisations is distinguished 
and presented by Emmanuel et al. (1990) as: 
 
  Routine generated  or  ad hoc 
  Formally transmitted  or  informally transmitted 
  Quantitative   or  qualitative (p. 6) 
 
Simon (1960) identifies a spectrum of executive decision making which involves 
decisions of a ‗programmed‘ or a ‗non-programmed‘ nature. The former is described 
as ‗repetitive and routine‘, while the latter is described as ‗novel, unstructured, and 
consequential‘ (p. 5, 6). Emmanuel et al. (1990) distinguish between information that 
supports decision making and control in situations of a routine (‗programmed‘) or 
non-routine (‗non-programmed‘) nature. The former occurs where there is clarity and 
understanding leading to a sound anticipation of consequences, while the latter occurs 
where such clarity and understanding does not exist and therefore more managerial 
discernment is necessitated. Emmanuel and Otley (1985) define non-programmed 
decisions as ‗those whose outcomes cannot be accurately predicted‘ and which 
‗require a high degree of judgement‘ (p. 255).  
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A committee report on internal reporting by the American Accounting Association 
(AAA) (1974) set out particular characteristics relating to the attributes of accounting 
information within an organisation. These are illustrated in Table 3.8. 
 
Information characteristic 
Relevance / mutuality of objectives 
Accuracy / precision / reliability 
Consistency / comparability / uniformity 
Verifiability / objectivity / neutrality / traceability 
Aggregation 
Flexibility / adaptability 
Timeliness 
Understandability / acceptability / motivation / fairness 
 
Table 3.8 – Characteristics of information for internal accounting  
          Source: AAA (1974, p. 83) 
 
To evaluate the perceived quality of management accounting information, a review of 
the literature identifies important dimensions. These include the relevance, accuracy 
and timeliness of management accounting information, the financial orientation of 
accounting information, the volume of information, non-financial measures and multi-
dimensional frameworks, functional information needs and the use of accounting 
information. These are now discussed in turn.  
 
3.13.1 Relevance 
There has been much research on the relevance of management accounting 
information and practices, which in part can be seen to have been prompted by the 
claims of Johnson and Kaplan (1987): 
 
Today‘s management accounting information, driven by the 
procedures and cycle of the organisation‘s financial reporting system, 
is too late, too aggregated, and too distorted to be relevant for 
managers (p.1). 
 
Kaplan and Cooper (1998) maintain the claim that there is an excessive orientation 
towards financial reporting, product costs are inaccurately calculated, customer 
accounting is little used, the focus is more on the areas of responsibility than the 
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processes, and management accounting information is excessively summarised, too 
financial, and too late. These views have been challenged by some who observe that 
although management accounting information and techniques may be exhibiting a 
slow pace of innovation (Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994), the manner in which the 
information and techniques are being used has changed (Bromwich and Bhimani, 
1989) and their use broadened beyond MAs to OMs (Scapens et al., 1996; Burns et 
al., 1999).  
 
McKinnon and Bruns (1992) observe a number of challenges to the relevance of 
management accounting information including: the diverse range of sources of 
information that managers use, the publishing of redundant reports, the overuse of 
financial measurements while managers frequently use non-financial measurements, 
and an ineffective mode of presentation. In investigating accounting in electronic 
firms, Innes and Mitchell (1989) found that management information was perceived 
to be too complicated and financial in orientation. Lewis (1993) identifies weaknesses 
in traditional information provided to management as: having a poor relationship to 
the firm‘s objectives, critical information being lost in the ‗detail‘, information being 
‗too late to be useful‘, information stated exclusively in financial terms, and 
inappropriate alignment of information to the ‗organisational structure, not the 
activities and processes‘ (p. 44).  
 
Findings in an Irish context corroborate these studies. O‘Dea and Clarke (1994) 
conducted a field study of 16 multinational companies in Ireland. In gathering 
evidence on MASs, some financial controllers raised a number of concerns about the 
inadequacies of their company‘s accounting information system. Some of these 
concerns included factors that would suggest the information was not as relevant as it 
could be e.g., late delivery of control information, key performance indicators (KPIs) 
such as time and quality not being reported, and an inability to change costing 
systems without head office sign-off. Pierce and O‘Dea (2003) investigated the 
perceptions of the usefulness of management accounting information in 12 
manufacturing firms in Ireland. Managers anticipated less need for management 
accounting information unless it became broader in scope, more flexible, timely and 
user-friendly. Feeney and Pierce (2007) found that MAs were not meeting the control 
and decision making information needs of managers.  
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McKinnon and Bruns (1992) identify the characteristics of useful management 
accounting information as including: how related the information is to action in the 
manager‘s function, how customised or adaptable the information is to the managers‘ 
needs, how briefly and simply information is presented that allows a speedy 
interpretation, the timeliness of the information, and how trustworthy it is. Otley 
(1995) warns that OMs will ignore reports from the accounting information system if 
their value is not explained. Littler and Sweeting (1989) note in their case analysis of 
technology firms that managers were trying to shift the accounting orientation from a 
historical perspective to a more forward looking perspective. 
 
Ezzamel et al. (1997) observe that a wider dissemination of management accounting 
information in organisations has an impact on this information i.e., an ‗increased 
demand for additional, more detailed, more timely, and more frequent information‘ 
(p. 16). The use of comparative information (e.g., actual performance versus forecast, 
budget, last year and external benchmarking) has also been highlighted as useful to 
managers (McKinnon and Bruns, 1992; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). 
 
3.13.2 Accuracy and timeliness  
Accuracy is identified as an important characteristic of management accounting 
information for it to have value (AAA, 1974) although Belkaoui (1980) recommends 
the setting of ‗upper and lower bounds within which accuracy may be an effective 
property of management accounting information‘ (p. 16). Hopper (1980) found that 
managers perceived management accounting information as more precise, timely, and 
useful in decentralised structures. 
 
Pierce and O‘Dea (2003) found the compromising of the timeliness of management 
accounting information by MAs in pursuit of accuracy, while managers placed a 
stronger emphasis on timeliness and therefore sourced the required information 
immediately and directly themselves from elsewhere. This can be linked to the notion 
of MAs deploying a ‗good enough accounting‘ approach (Johnston et al., 2002b), as 
noted earlier. Jazayeri and Hopper (1999) note a trade off between the timing and 
accuracy of information from some case research: 
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It was recognised that the weekly accounts [produced through an 
MRP II system by the production departments] were less accurate 
than the eight times per year management accounts….both managers 
and accountants believed…that the advantages of immediacy 
outweighed any additional accuracy that might be secured through 
further delay. 
 
From case research, Johnston et al. (2002b) note that ‗all the organisations believed 
that their accountants should assume a more strategic role, i.e., move away from 
focusing on the minutiae of measurement to supporting competitive strategy‘ (p. 259). 
Feeney and Pierce (2007) note that while managers highly rated both relevance and 
reliability for control and decision making purposes, it was found that managers rated 
accuracy and consistency more for control purposes and timeliness and aggregation 
more for decision making purposes.  
 
There is evidence that management accounting information is not furnished to 
managers in a timely manner (O‘Dea and Clarke, 1994; Kaplan and Cooper, 1998; 
Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). Drury et al. (1993) found that timeliness was a particular 
issue for management accounting information. One result of providing untimely 
information is that managers may seek out alternative sources of information 
(McKinnon and Bruns, 1992) and ‗efforts to speed up accounting processes in hopes 
of meeting more of managers‘ information needs may be misdirected‘ (p. 204) as 
managers may already be familiar with the information. However, Chenhall and 
Morris (1986) note that improving the timeliness and breadth of scope of management 
accounting information was perceived as important where organisations faced 
environmental uncertainty. 
 
3.13.3 Financial orientation 
According to Johnson and Kaplan (1987) and Kaplan and Cooper (1998) there is an 
excessive financial orientation in the provision of management accounting 
information. The problem is stated by Johnson and Kaplan (1987) as ‗with increased 
emphasis on meeting quarterly or annual earnings targets, internal accounting systems 
focus narrowly on producing a monthly earnings report‘ (p. 1). In a UK study, 
Scapens et al. (1996) found no evidence of the dominance of external financial 
accounting systems over MASs or that the former were instrumental in the design of 
the latter. In contrast, Drury and Tayles (1997) found evidence that would not permit 
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the dismissing of Kaplan and Johnson‘s claims. Littler and Sweeting (1989) found a 
dominance of financial measures in one of the technological companies studied and 
note that it ‗may have been at least partially a consequence of the need of this 
business to conform with overall group policies‘ (p. 33). McKinnon and Bruns (1992) 
note the existence of a ‗financial mentality‘: 
  
One problem is that much of the accounting data collected is 
orientated towards the production of corporate financial statements 
(p. 155). 
 
O‘Dea and Clarke (1994) found that one controller identified head office accountants 
as being more interested in financial reporting requirements than with providing 
decision-focused information. In a survey of chief operations officers in 85 US 
manufacturing firms, Fry et al. (1995) found the use of standard costing systems 
(74%) to be inappropriate for the production and cost characteristics of the plants and 
the manufacturing strategy pursued and found an excessive reliance on financial 
reporting. They suggest that MAs need to become ‗educators‘ in introducing 
appropriate accounting systems to the business and also ‗students‘ in understanding 
the nature of the products, the process of manufacturing and the business‘s 
manufacturing strategy. 
 
Given the accountant‘s past orientation towards predominantly financial systems, it 
can be argued that accountants may not be best placed to produce the broader 
performance information required in business decision making processes. For 
example, Eccles (1991) notes how one company assigned the development of a 
broader performance system to the finance function ‗to broaden their perspective and 
measurement skills‘, while another company bypassed the finance function ‗to avoid 
the financial bias embedded in the company‘s existing management information 
systems‘ (p. 137).  
 
3.13.4 Volume of information 
With the advent of organisation-wide integrated systems, such as ERP systems, Burns 
et al. (1996) point to the challenges of an excess of information. Macintosh (1985) 
states that: 
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Organisations collect far more information than they could ever 
reasonably use for decision making…it seems that organisations, 
even the best ones, over-invest in a glut of redundant information (p. 
209). 
 
Bromwich and Bhimani (1994) similarly observe that organisations collect masses of 
information which may be presented in reports but may be little used by OMs. 
McKinnon and Bruns (1992) did not find managers concerned with an excess of 
information but rather note their approach to skilfully draw from a wide pool of 
sources and to develop their own personalised systems. Mendoza and Bescos (2001) 
also found that 70% of the 120 managers interviewed were deploying personally 
developed approaches to understanding reports: 
 
Documents are rarely read from beginning to end. Reading 
documents of twenty pages or more would be too time-consuming. 
Thus managers create their own reading strategies and techniques: 
they start by leafing through seeking specific data and, if a figure is 
not in line, they know exactly what data need checking, and in which 
documents they can find the required information (p. 275). 
 
King et al. (1991) conclude, from 16 longitudinal case studies in the UK, that 
managers sometimes desire to be ‗over-informed‘ because of it legitimising 
managers‘ positions but also because of it being a cultural characteristic of the firm.  
 
3.13.5 Non-financial measurement 
Accounting is frequently defined in terms of information provision with the 
effectiveness of the controllership function assessed in terms of the quality of the 
information provided (Simon et al., 1954). As noted in section 3.13.3, there is 
criticism of accounting information in terms of its excessive financial orientation 
(Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan and Cooper, 1998; McKinnon and Bruns, 1992) 
even though managers appear to have a preference for non-financial information. 
Notwithstanding the recent and growing interest in the literature in the subject of non-
financial measurement, as far back as Simon et al. (1954) this was evident: 
 
In those companies where the products can be measured, at least 
roughly, in physical units, manufacturing and some sales executives 
make more use of data expressed in physical units than data 
measured in dollars (p. 31).  
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In response to the criticisms of traditional reporting systems, a number of broader 
performance measurement systems have developed, which extend ‗from treating 
financial figures as the foundation for performance measurement to treating them as 
one among a broader set of measures‘ (Eccles, 1991, p. 131).  
 
From a survey of 303 UK manufacturing firms, Drury et al. (1993) note that 
increasing focus would be placed on non-financial measures. Similar findings are 
evident from case study research. Jazayeri and Hopper (1999) found increased use of 
non-financial measures in their UK case study and that these non-financial measures 
were not just in the production area but in other areas such as customer performance 
and innovation. Hoque and Alam (1999) found in a case study of a New Zealand 
construction company that management had to refocus the MAS to one that included 
both financial and non-financial aspects. The importance of NFIs became apparent as 
management realised that long term survival was dependent on ‗quality, customer 
satisfaction, and operational efficiency‘ (p. 205). In an Irish context, a survey of 108 
MAs by Pierce and O‘Dea (1998) notes that nearly 50% of respondents indicated use 
of non-financial measures. This supports previous studies in an Irish context that 
show some adoption of non-financial measures (Clarke, 1992; O‘Dea and Clarke, 
1994). More recently, Ittner and Larcker (2009) observe a number of developing 
strands of research on non-financial measurement; that is non-financial measurement 
and performance, determinants of measure selection and the balance of financial 
versus non-financial measures, and the consequences of systems using these 
measures. Attention in future research is directed towards understanding the changing 
nature of these measures in practice, their application in the context of risk and 
regulation, and relationships between their application inside and outside the firm. 
 
One concern with the increased adoption of these measures is the extent of 
involvement of MAs in their development, capture and reporting. Drury et al. 
(1993)‘s survey reveals that in many instances such activity took place outside the 
finance department and that this poses a serious threat to MAs in that they ‗will 
relinquish their role as specialists in management information (p. 30). In contrast, as 
noted earlier (see section 3.10), Vaivio (2004) found that the introduction of non-
financial measures resulted in an enlargement of the controller‘s role.  
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3.13.6 Multi-dimensional frameworks  
The combined use of financial and non-financial measures have become more 
integrated and formalised in the recent development of a range of multi-dimensional 
performance frameworks. The ‗Balanced Scorecard‘ was initially advanced by Kaplan 
and Norton (1992) as a multi-dimensional performance measurement framework but 
subsequently has been linked to the organisation‘s strategy as a management 
framework (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). The scorecard essentially includes a range of 
‗leading‘ and ‗lagging‘ scorecards which encompass the performance of internal 
processes, responding to customers, innovation and expansion and a financial 
scorecard. There are a number of other multi-dimensional frameworks in the 
literature, including the: EFQM (European Foundation for Quality Management) 
Business Excellence Model (EFQM, 2003), Performance Prism (Neely et al., 2001), 
Tableau de Bord (Lebas, 1993; Epstein and Manzoni, 1998), Results and 
Determinants Matrix (Fitzgerald et al., 1991), and the Performance Pyramid (Lynch 
and Cross, 1995). Collectively, these frameworks aim to promote a broader 
conceptualisation of performance beyond the financial and short-term frame to take a 
more integrated, holistic, externally-oriented, long-term, and strategic approach.   
 
Pierce and O‘Dea (1998) note that over 90% of respondents indicated that they never 
or very rarely used the BSC but as the incidence of non-financial performance 
measures in use was high, they suggest that companies have developed informal 
performance measurement systems. A possible explanation of this is provided by 
Littler and Sweeting (1989): 
 
It is not possible to create a stereotype range of financial and non-
financial measures. Those that should be employed need to be 
related to the features and circumstances of the particular business 
(p. 30). 
  
This follows the contingency theory of management accounting as discussed in 
section 2.3 and suggests that performance systems ought to be adapted to each 
organisation‘s particular setting (Otley, 1999). Otley (1987) recognises the challenge 
facing organisations in determining what particular measures to adopt. Littler and 
Sweeting (1989) found that managers in technology firms focused considerable 
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attention on determining the indicators that were key to the firm and then attempted to 
embed these in the firm‘s systems. In the services sector, Fitzgerald and Moon (1996) 
support the contingency notion in the design of appropriate performance systems. 
 
3.13.7 Functional information needs 
It can be argued that those who use management accounting information, the decision 
makers, due to their functional orientation (e.g., marketing, production, research and 
development) may have varying levels of satisfaction in relation to that information. 
The work of McKinnon and Bruns (1992) indicates substantial differences in the type 
of information used by functional managers. Pierce and O‘Dea (2003) found that 
functional requirements contributed to different perceptions between the users and 
preparers of accounting information: 
 
Functional differentiation was another contributor to the preparer-
user perception gap, in that there was consistent evidence of a wider 
gap for sales managers than for their counterparts in production (p. 
285). 
 
In explaining managers‘ information needs, Mendoza and Bescos (2001) note that 
satisfaction levels with management accounting information varied between 
functions. Managers in the executive management, production, logistics and 
purchasing functions indicated a higher degree of satisfaction than managers in sales 
and marketing, and R&D and projects. Similarly, managers in the latter functions 
appeared to be missing more information. 
 
Richardson and Barker (2001) conducted a survey of accountants‘ and marketers‘ 
perceptions of the use and importance of management accounting techniques. There 
was a general consensus on the perceived importance of management accounting 
techniques between the two groups but differences were found in the actual use of 
techniques between the two groups. Market share reports, break-even analysis and 
marketing cost reports were ranked higher by marketing managers than accounting 
managers i.e., these techniques were in the top 10 mean responses for marketing 
managers but were respectively 13
th
, 14
th
 and 18
th
 for accounting managers. 
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A survey of 52 marketing managers and 52 production managers by Lau (1999) found 
that cost control affected the relationship between a focus on tight budget targets and 
a tendency to create slack for manufacturing, but not marketing functions. Lau (1999) 
suggests that revenues as opposed to costs may be more relevant to control in the 
marketing function and that ‗the management of marketing operations and costs may 
demand quite different techniques from those used for the management of 
manufacturing operations and costs‘ (p. 431). 
 
Mia and Chenhall (1994) found differences between the marketing and production 
functions in terms of the relationship between broad scope MAS information and 
managerial effectiveness. A greater use of broad scope MAS information by 
marketing managers is associated with improved performance and this relationship is 
less so for production managers. The basic argument is that, although both functions 
may face the same environmental uncertainty, production may be ‗buffered‘ to a 
greater extent than marketing. 
 
Chenhall and Morris (1986) examine perceptions of the usefulness of management 
accounting information along the dimensions of scope, timeliness, aggregation and 
integration as being influenced by the uncertainty of the environment and both the 
interdependence and decentralisation within the organisation. The findings indicate 
that managers prefer broad scope, aggregated and integrated information where there 
is interdependence between the organisation‘s functions. The uncertainty of the 
environment is linked to accounting information being broader in scope and timely.  
 
3.13.8 Use of accounting information 
Information contained in management accounting and control reports may be used in 
many ways. Simon et al. (1954) note that managers at various levels use accounting 
data to address three different types of questions (p. 3):   
 
1) Score-card questions: ―Am I doing well or badly?‖  
2) Attention-directing questions: ―What problems should I look into?‖  
3) Problem-solving questions: ―Of the several ways of doing the job, which is the 
best?‖ 
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The score-card use of accounting data relates to performance evaluation and the 
attention direction use relates to identifying problems that need to be addressed. The 
problem-solving use relates to the provision of analyses supporting management 
decision-making, for example capital investment, pricing policies, allocation of 
marketing expenditures, location of plant, remuneration, and stock policy.  
 
McKinnon and Bruns (1992) distinguish between four different types of management 
accounting information: operating (short term performance management), status 
(summated operating data to check outcomes as expected), comparisons to 
benchmarks (positional data on firm‘s relative performance), and reference 
(aggregated information for longer term or planning purposes). Some examples of 
these dimensions of management accounting information are provided in table 3.9. 
 
Information Examples Some report characteristics 
Operating Downtime 
Units produced 
Order bookings 
Daily updated 
Physical counts 
Often informally transmitted 
Status Rail car availability 
Inventory levels 
Backlog 
Site remediation status 
Employee injury status 
Frequently updated 
Physical counts 
Narrative descriptions 
Benchmark Actuals to budget 
Year-to-date 
Performance to last year 
Comparisons to ratios 
More financial added 
Longer time horizons 
More complex data 
Reference Divisional income 
Assets, liabilities 
Corporate goals 
Customer records 
Employee records 
Logs of production,  sales activities 
Detail 
Complex data 
Even more financial in nature 
Narrative summaries 
Historical nature 
 
Table 3.9 – Classification of information for management reports 
             McKinnon and Bruns (1992, p. 129) 
  
Otley (1999) notes the contrasting cycles of information flows for control purposes 
between the immediacy of manufacturing systems to the feedback cycles that stretch 
from daily, weekly, monthly to yearly and long-term horizons. Bruns and McKinnon 
(1993) found that OMs procured information from informal sources and built their 
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own personalised information systems which contained information that could later be 
expected to appear in the formal reporting system to serve as a form of validation:  
 
…those that provided information that allowed managers to 
confirm that the actions they had taken had had the intended 
effects, or they provided information on current status of 
resources or capacities (p. 107).    
  
Similarly, Bromwich and Bhimani (1994) note that accounting information can be 
retrospectively relied upon as a post-hoc rationalisation of decisions made, even 
though the information might not have shaped the decision despite its availability. 
 
3.13.9 Use of management accounting techniques 
Considerable attention has been given by management accounting researchers to the 
extent of adoption of management accounting innovations, following on in part from 
the criticisms levied on the irrelevance of management accounting information as 
noted (see section 3.13.1). Table 3.10 lists examples of traditional management 
accounting techniques (and their mean usage, 1 = never and 5 = very frequently) from 
a survey of Irish manufacturing organisations by Pierce and O‘Dea (1998). 
 
Traditional management  
accounting techniques  
Mean Usage 
(n=106) 
Budgets 4.54 
Variance analysis 4.08 
Standard costing 3.85 
ROI 3.34 
Volume-based overhead absorption 3.20 
DCF 3.06 
Marginal costing 2.98 
Cost-plus pricing 2.97 
Flexible budgets 2.93 
Breakeven analysis 2.63 
 
Table 3.10 - Usage of traditional management accounting techniques  
       Source: Pierce and O‘Dea (1998, p. 42) 
 
The table shows that traditional techniques continue to be used in practice (and usage 
is higher than for newer management accounting techniques – the mean score range 
for which is 3.42 down to 1.34). Traditional control devices such as budgets, 
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variances and standards top the list, indicating high adoption, consistent with findings 
on the wider use of budgets (see section 2.2.5). It could be suggested that some of 
these techniques are calculative, complex in nature and perhaps do not necessitate the 
involvement of many from outside the finance function. Cotton et al. (2003) note 
ABC adoption of 20.3% in New Zealand companies compared to 17.5% found in 
Innes et al.‘s (2000) UK study of ABC adoption. From ABC surveys conducted in the 
1990s, Clark et al. (1999) note ABC implementation rates between 36-41% in the US, 
6-20% in the UK, 23% in Canada, 12% in Australia, and 12% in Ireland. More recent 
research suggests ABC adoption levels are slowing in Ireland (Pierce and Brown, 
2003). In a survey of  1,995 US MAs, Garg et al. (2003) found widespread use of 
traditional management accounting tools with almost 80% indicating that the adoption 
of management accounting innovations would be a ‗low to medium priority‘ (p. 33). 
The literature thus suggests that, while there has been a US-led take up in the adoption 
of management accounting innovations, many companies continue to use traditional 
management accounting techniques. While the adoption of management accounting 
innovations is linked in the literature to broadening roles for MAs (see section 3.10), 
the low levels of innovation adoption noted here places some limits on the extent that 
the roles of MAs may develop towards the model of the business partner. 
 
The literature on the information characteristics provides evidence of a range of 
characteristics important to MAs providing useful information to managers, while 
recognising that there have been shortcomings in this endeavour but also innovations 
attempting to address these. While there has been a strong emphasis on management 
accounting information classifications, tools and use, less attention has been paid to 
theoretical conjectures. Some of the studies above identify unmet expectations of 
managers regarding their information needs, and while implicitly relating to role 
theory‘s emphasis on management expectations, this theoretical perspective is not 
explored. Furthermore while there are some studies above that indicate contingencies 
in management accounting information (e.g., see section 3.13.7 on differing 
functional needs of managers) there is considerable scope to develop this further and 
to relate this not just to the information (e.g., contingencies that might attach to 
different types of information or reports in particular contexts) but to the specific 
expectations of managers. The control literature makes a useful theoretical distinction 
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between information for decision making and control which lends itself to further 
empirical analysis. 
 
3.14 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has examined a number of dimensions of the roles of MAs that include 
factors that might be shaping roles, characteristics linked to the roles and, to a lesser 
extent, some potential impacts of these roles. The review of the literature leads to the 
following conclusions: 
 
1) The roles of many MAs are located in organisations operating in very competitive 
and dynamic environments and these external forces, combined with 
organisational responses to these forces in the form of innovations in 
management, accounting, manufacturing and IT systems may have implications 
for the shaping of these roles. A number of studies have attempted to classify the 
contemporary finance function in organisations and have drawn attention to the 
enhancement of information and communication systems, different functional 
orientations and transitions between them, and the reduction or removal of cross-
functional barriers. While there is some evidence of a functional orientation 
moving in the direction of greater support for managerial decision making, there is 
also evidence to the contrary and concern over the potential negative impact of an 
increasing regulatory burden. This literature however requires greater theoretical 
application in understanding the contemporary finance function and shows 
inconsistencies between the perceptions of financial and non-financial personnel, 
thus warranting more research on these.   
 
2) The literature provides a number of definitions and descriptors associated with the 
roles of MAs and suggest roles that have a wide remit. The roles of MAs have 
frequently been dichotomised between roles oriented towards independent control, 
financial accounting, historic reporting and roles oriented towards supporting 
managers‘ business decision making processes. The empirical research to date is 
mixed with regard to what roles MAs are actually playing in organisations. For 
example, there is some evidence that the traditional ‗bean-counter‘ roles cannot be 
discounted, that the roles are broadening and not necessarily discarding traditional 
roles but expanding on them, and that some roles are aligning with the model of 
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the business partner, while others fail to do so. With this incomplete and 
inconsistent evidence, it is thus not possible to conclude on the extent to which the 
roles of MAs are aligned with the model of the business partner as espoused in the 
literature. There are even some arguments that some of the roles of MAs may 
diminish or disappear. Many of these studies have a weak theoretical foundation 
or a singular theoretical perspective and so consideration of the three theoretical 
lenses as outlined in chapter two would have merit in further examining and 
explaining the roles of MAs and particularly they might better assist in the 
reconciliation of some of the inconsistencies that are appearing in the empirical 
record.  
 
3) The literature identifies control as an important aspect of the roles of MAs and 
suggests that MAs may encounter role conflict in the fulfilment of roles that 
attempt to adopt the model of the business partner, while maintaining independent 
control and upholding the integrity of the accounting systems. The literature does 
not concur on the combining of these roles as some point towards role separation, 
while others maintain that it is possible if MAs possess certain characteristics, or 
certain arrangements are put in place. This literature draws upon aspects of 
management control, contingency, and role theories as presented in the last 
chapter but offers scope to build on these bases, and explore how the roles of MAs 
are implicated in the enactment of control in organisations and their impact on 
control, their experience, or not, of role conflicts with respect to meeting, or not 
meeting, managers‘ expectations.   
 
4) The literature indicates a range of factors that might influence the extent that MAs 
are actively involved in supporting managerial decision making processes 
including management expectations; emphasis on financials, planning and capital 
budgeting and controllership development; the extent of a common view between 
MAs and OMs; management backing for innovations; having an accounting 
advocate; prerequisite individual characteristics and skills; and the reliance placed 
on the official hierarchical structure. There is mixed evidence regarding the 
impact of IT systems, such as ERP systems, on releasing MAs for more business 
support. There is some evidence that the introduction of management accounting 
innovations provides scope for MAs to develop broader managerial decision 
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support roles in organisations but the adoption of such innovations, and 
particularly in an Irish context, is noted as quite low. For MNE subsidiaries the 
literature provides some weak evidence that the head office function has an impact 
on the roles of MAs in the subsidiaries.   
 
The range of identified influences on the roles of MAs in these studies suggests 
that there is considerable theoretical potential to build on some of these factors.  
The contingency lens could highlight which influences impact on the roles of 
MAs in which situations. Role theory with its prediction of the influence of 
management expectations could reveal insights into the nature of expectations and 
their relationships to the roles of MAs, which has been little visited since the work 
of Hopper (1980) and Sathe (1982). The management control perspective provides 
scope to better understand how management control operates in organisational 
environments where these influences shape the roles of MAs.  
 
5) Certain attributes have been identified in the literature as very important to the 
contemporary roles of MAs including having a very strong knowledge of the 
business, possessing effective interpersonal skills and engaging in management 
team decision making with these characteristics being linked more to the model of 
the business partner. There is empirical evidence to suggest that some MAs 
possessed these characteristics, while other evidence suggested otherwise. A 
number of models and role profiles are suggested regarding the characteristics and 
activities that might assist MAs moving towards the model of business 
partnership, although these are largely normative and descriptive in nature and 
lack theoretical perspectives. Regarding the latter, there is scope to apply some of 
the theoretical lenses to these characteristics in perhaps identifying contingencies 
regarding certain characteristics of MAs being sought in certain circumstances or 
in relating the characteristics of the MA and their inter-personal relationships with 
managers to the expectations of managers, all of which are important concepts 
within role theory.   
 
6) The literature identifies a range of management accounting information 
dimensions including relevance, accuracy and timeliness, financial orientation, 
volume of information, non-financial measurement, multi-dimensional 
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frameworks, functional information needs and the use of accounting information 
and techniques. The anecdotal evidence and empirical studies largely suggest that 
MAs are not fully meeting the information needs of managers and some 
information may be characterised as untimely, irrelevant, excessive, overly 
detailed, financially oriented, and forfeiting timeliness for absolute accuracy 
where approximations would suffice. The growing adoption of non-financial 
measures, and the incorporation of these into wider performance management 
frameworks, is noted in the literature. There are mixed results regarding their 
impact on the roles of MAs as some appear to occur largely outside the remit of 
MAs, while others seem to have enabled MA to get much more involved in 
supporting business decision making processes. The literature also makes clear 
distinctions in managers‘ functional information needs and MAs appear to have 
not adequately addressed these. These studies have a strong descriptive or 
prescriptive orientation and there is theoretical merit in further understanding the 
information needs using the theoretical lenses in chapter two by examining 
management‘s information expectations from a role theory perspective, how 
control information is used from a management control perspective, and if there 
are contingencies attached to particular forms or types of management accounting 
information and reports as some studies for example, on functional differentiation, 
are suggesting.  
 
7) The vast majority of the research to date on the roles of MAs has not occurred in 
an Irish context and this thus represents an opportunity to add to the very limited 
body of management accounting knowledge generated in this context. In 
conducting a study in a single country context it eliminates country effects and by 
gathering data in a country with a limited empirical record, it means that this data 
may have some merit in subsequent studies of a transnational nature. 
 
This chapter began by presenting the general contextual environment that MAs 
operate within (see section 3.2) followed by classifications of the contemporary 
finance functions. Section 3.4 and 3.5 respectively defined management accounting 
and the roles of MAs and the various labels, and associated meanings, that attach to 
alternative depictions of these roles. The importance of the control aspect to the roles 
of MAs was set out in section 3.6 linking to management control theory reviewed in 
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section 2.2. Section 3.7 reviewed a number of studies providing empirical evidence 
regarding the orientation of the roles of MAs towards hierarchical reporting (the 
‗bean-counter‘ model) or towards supporting managers (the ‗business partner‘ model). 
Inherent in this latter orientation is role conflict, which was examined in section 3.8. 
 
Section 3.9 through to section 3.11 reviewed the literature on factors that potentially 
shape the roles of MAs in organisations including what might influence the MA 
becoming more involved in providing support to managers (the ‗business partner‘ 
model) and this was followed by empirical evidence on the individual characteristics 
and perceptions linked to the contemporary roles of MAs by both MAs and managers. 
 
The last major theme of the literature review examined the characteristics of 
management accounting information (see section 3.13). This section covered a 
number of characteristics that have been noted as important in the provision of 
management accounting information and also some evidence as to whether this 
information meets the needs of OMs. This section has presented a summary of the 
preceding literature review as a precursor to the following chapter on research 
methodology.  
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the development of the research questions and the associated 
research methodology and methods for the dissertation. It commences with a review 
of the philosophical assumptions underpinning the research, followed by a review of 
trends in methodologies and methods in the management accounting discipline. Next, 
the research problem and related objectives are presented, followed by the research 
design for phase one and phase two of the study. The section following this discusses 
the concepts of validity, reliability, and generalisability and relates them to the 
research undertaken. The next section explains how access was secured and provides 
operational details for both phases of the study. The final section outlines the 
qualitative data analysis strategies undertaken. 
 
4.2 Appreciating philosophical research underpinnings  
How we view the world and gain an understanding of it may have implications for the 
research design we adopt. Sometimes these views or assumptions are explicit in 
research output but frequently they are implicit. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) suggest 
that it is important to appreciate the philosophical underpinnings of research as such 
understanding impacts the identification, clarification, and operationalisation of 
research designs. Recognising the philosophical assumptions underpinning social 
enquiry also indicates to the researcher the limitations associated with the making of 
particular claims in regard to what represents a contribution to the understanding of a 
particular topic (Thomas, 2004). Johnson and Duberley (2000) state that ‗how we 
come to ask particular questions, how we assess the relevance and value of different 
research methodologies so that we can investigate those questions, how we evaluate 
the outputs of research, all express and vary according to our underlying 
epistemological commitments‘ (p. 1). The following sections review the various 
philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of reality, knowledge, human nature 
and methodology that underpin the research activity in general and the assumptions 
that underpin the current study in particular.  
 
4.2.1 Ontology  
Ontology pertains to the fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality; that is 
very simply, what is reality? Gill and Johnson (1997) define ontology in terms of ‗the 
study of the essence of phenomena and the nature of their existence‘ (p. 178). There 
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has, for some time, been an ontological debate polarised between the positions of 
nominalism and realism. Burrell and Morgan (1979) note that a nominalist 
perspective ‗revolves around the assumption that the social world external to 
individual cognition is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels 
which are used to structure reality‘ (p. 4). In simple terms, it means reality is only in 
the mind. The realist position is based on the assumption that reality is essentially 
outside the mind; that is it exists independently of human beings. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) note the realist position assumes that the ‗social world external to individual 
cognition is a real world made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable 
structures‘ (p. 4) i.e., the characteristics of the world are stable or unchanged over 
time.  
 
Morgan and Smircich (1980) present a useful framework that analyses the ontological 
assumptions underlying social enquiry into six types (see table 4.1). 
 
CORE ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Reality as a projection of human imagination                 SUBJECTIVE 
2. Reality as a social construction 
3. Reality as a realm of symbolic discourse 
4. Reality as a contextual field of information 
5. Reality as a concrete process 
6. Reality as a concrete structure                                         OBJECTIVE 
 
Table 4.1 - Ontological assumptions underlying social enquiry 
     Source: Morgan and Smircich (1980, p. 492) 
 
Thus, there is a range of possible ontological assumptions that underpin social 
enquiry. The subjective and objective continuum mirrors the preceding discussion, 
distinguishing respectively the notions of idealism (or nominalism) and realism. 
Following on from ontology and its debate about what constitutes reality is how it can 
be known or as Hughes (1980) states ‗claims about what exists in the world almost 
inevitably lead on to issues about how what exists may be known‘ (p. 6). 
 
4.2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology can be explained as the assumptions relating to the nature of 
knowledge; that is how we acquire knowledge or simply as Crotty (1998) states: ‗how 
107 
 
we know what we know‘ (p. 8). Gill and Johnson (1997) define it in more detail as 
‗the branch of philosophy concerned with the study of the criteria by which we 
determine what does and does not constitute warranted or valid knowledge‘ (p. 177).  
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) polarise epistemologies between the philosophical 
perspectives of positivism and anti-positivism. In the positivism camp knowledge is 
understood in terms of searching for universal laws (much akin to the natural 
sciences) and the nature of relationships (causality) between variables. Hughes (1980) 
notes that positivism acknowledges ‗only two forms of knowledge as having any 
legitimacy and authority, the empirical and logical‘ (p. 21). In the anti-positivism 
camp, which may also be loosely referred to as qualitative research, phenomenology, 
interpretivism or social constructionism, knowledge is understood in terms of the 
subjective meanings that the particular individuals involved create (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the original proponent of 
phenomenology, argues that knowledge is ‗socially constructed‘. The anti-positivism 
school, or qualitative perspective, is an extremely broad one (Hughes, 1980). Tesch 
(1990) for example in attempting to map the qualitative research territory identifies 45 
distinctive methodologies or perspectives. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) present the 
key characteristics of the positivist and phenomenological paradigms as per table 4.2. 
 
 Positivist paradigm Phenomenological paradigm 
Basic 
beliefs 
The world is external and objective The world is socially constructed and 
subjective 
Observer is independent Observer is part of what is observed 
Science is value-free Science is driven by human interests 
Researcher 
should 
Focus on facts Focus on meanings 
Look for causality and fundamental 
laws 
Try to understand what is happening 
Reduce phenomena to simplest 
elements 
Look at the totality of each situation 
Formulate hypotheses and then test 
them 
Develop ideas through induction from 
data 
Preferred 
methods 
include 
Operationalising concepts so that 
they can be measured 
Using multiple methods to establish 
different views of phenomena 
Taking large samples Small samples investigated in depth 
or over time 
 
Table 4.2 – Key characteristics of the positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
          Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, p. 27) 
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Evered and Louis (1981) distinguish the nature of social science enquiry between that 
which is positioned as being from the outside or the inside e.g., one aims at generating 
knowledge with ‗universality and generalisability‘ which is ‗context free‘, while the 
other aims to generate knowledge with ‗situational relevance‘, which is ‗interpreted‘ 
and ‗contextually embedded‘ (p. 388). It is argued that an appreciation of the 
epistemological implications of these distinctive approaches enables the researcher to 
make suitable research designs and to better align particular research capabilities and 
aims. The dominance of research from the outside in organisational science is 
recognised and critiqued as producing ‗results that are precise but irrelevant‘ (p. 393). 
 
4.2.3 Human nature 
Assumptions are made in the social sciences on the extent to which human beings are 
influenced by their environment or are independent of it. Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
describe determinism as the view that the environment itself determines human 
activities. At the other extreme, voluntarism represents the view that human beings 
are ‗completely autonomous and free-willed‘ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 6). Social 
science researchers‘ assumptions must gravitate towards the determinist or voluntarist 
perspective or they can take a more middle position ‗which allows for the influence of 
both situational and voluntary factors in accounting for the activities of human beings‘ 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 6). 
 
4.2.4 Methodological debate 
There are numerous research methodologies available to the social science researcher. 
Crotty (1998) provides examples of methodologies including experimental research, 
survey research, ethnography, phenomenological research, grounded theory, heuristic 
enquiry, action research, discourse analysis, and feminist standpoint research. Within 
each of these methodologies a number of research methods or tools can be selected 
(e.g., sampling, observations, questionnaires, case studies, interviews, content 
analyses, focus groups). Although sometimes confused or used interchangeably, there 
is an important distinction to be made between research methodologies and research 
methods; the former addresses the philosophy of approaches to research, while the 
latter represent the ‗tools of the trade‘. The following discussion continues the focus 
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on methodological concerns and then moves on to the particular research 
methodologies and methods deployed in this study. 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) polarise the methodological debate between the 
ideographic and nomothetic approach. The ideographic approach stresses the 
importance of ‗obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation‘ (p. 
6) and entails gaining insights and close interaction between the researcher and the 
subject of study. The nomothetic approach is rigorously scientific in nature and 
typically involves the testing of hypotheses, instrument design and quantitative 
analysis (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Gill and Johnson (1997) compare the two 
approaches (see table 4.3). 
 
 
  Nomothetic methods emphasise  Ideographic methods emphasise 
 
1. Deduction     vs.  Induction 
 
2. Explanation via analysis of causal  Explanation of subjective meaning 
    relationships and explanation by vs.  systems and explanation by 
    covering laws (etic)                 understanding (emic)   
 
3. Generation and use of quantitative vs.  Generation and use of qualitative 
    data      data  
 
4. Use of various controls, physical or  Commitment to research in research 
    statistical, so as to allow the testing vs. settings, to allow access to, and  
    of hypotheses    minimise reactivity among the 
     subjects of research 
 
5. Highly structured research   Minimum structure to ensure 2, 3 
     methodology to ensure replicability vs. and 4 (and as a result of 1) 
     of 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
    Laboratory experiments, quasi-experiments, surveys, action research, ethnography 
 
Table 4.3 – A comparison of nomothetic and ideographic methods 
 
 Source: Gill and Johnson (1997, p. 37) 
 
As can be seen from table 4.3, approaches to research that facilitate the testing of 
prior theory in a research process that ends with empirical data collection are 
associated with deduction. Approaches to research that facilitate the development of 
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theory in a research process that commences with data collection are associated with 
induction. Although these research approaches are presented as a dichotomy, 
intermediate positions are possible as can be seen by the transition of research designs 
at the bottom of the table. These designs, from left to right, tend to increase in 
flexibility and embeddedness in real world contexts.   
 
4.2.5 Continuum of the assumptions underlying social science 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) present the researcher‘s ontological, epistemological, 
human nature and methodological assumptions across the subjectivist – objectivist 
continuum. Figure 4.1 illustrates the opposite spectrum ends of social science research 
assumptions.  
The subjective-objective dimension 
 
The subjectivist       The objectivist 
  approach to       approach to 
 social science       social science 
     
   ontology 
 
     
    epistemology  
      
      
    human nature 
 
     
methodology 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Continuum of social science research assumptions  
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3) 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) assert that the alternative perspectives are not reconcilable 
as ‗they offer alternative views of social reality‘ and a ‗synthesis is not possible, since 
in their pure forms they are contradictory‘ (p. 25). However, Gill and Johnson (1997) 
note that researchers are not necessarily faced with selecting either/or methodological 
extreme as ‗it would appear that such a view of methodology, purely in terms of a 
dichotomy, is fundamentally flawed‘ (p. 134). 
 
Nominalism Realism 
Anti-positivism 
Voluntarism 
Ideographic 
Positivism 
Determinism 
Nomothetic 
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Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) note that there is a philosophical issue in attempting to 
triangulate methodologies due to their nature i.e., ‗a single, objective and stable truth 
[positivism] is not compatible with the social constructionist view of reality being 
flexible, fluid and continually renegotiated‘ (p. 134). They advise the researcher that 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches can be used within the one paradigm 
(positivistic or phenomenological) and to remain within the one paradigm, crossing 
over rarely and with caution.  Remenyi et al. (1998) in contrasting the philosophical 
positions of positivism and phenomenology conclude that the important distinction in 
the end is ‗the degree of caution with which the results will be used‘ (p. 37). This is 
thus framing the limits, and setting the criteria, that should direct the interpretation of 
the outcomes of the research in the context of the assumptions underpinning them. 
Thus, the literature highlights the purist or extreme philosophical positions that are 
associated with the undertaking of the research task, while also demonstrating that 
researchers may adopt a reconciling or ‗methodological pluralism‘ (Gill and Johnson, 
1997, p. 133) approach, albeit with difficulty. 
 
4.2.6 Philosophical perspectives in accounting research 
Traditionally, management accounting research has its roots in neo-classical 
economics (Scapens, 1985, 1990) and in general terms the positivist paradigm has 
been the dominant one in the past, although alternative paradigms (e.g., interpretative 
and critical research) have gained ground recently. Shields (1997) notes that 
economics was the largest theoretical base (75 of 152 articles) in research published 
in eminent US accounting journals between 1990 and 1997. In a review of 
management control research, Otley et al. (1995) state that: 
 
The predominant ontological stance is a realist, stemming from the 
original concentration of the practical theorists on what they saw as 
real problems in practice. The primary epistemological stance of 
these control theorists is positivist and functionalist (p. S38). 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) map the philosophical assumptions underpinning social 
science research as the subjective-objective continuum (as per figure 4.1 above) and 
further map the philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of society in terms of 
regulation (maintaining and improving on the status quo) and radical change 
(fundamental societal change required). Figure 4.2 presents the combined dimensions. 
112 
 
 
Radical change 
 
   Radical humanist Radical structuralist 
Subjective       Objective 
   Interpretative  Functionalist 
 
Regulation 
 
Figure 4.2 – Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory 
           Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 23) 
 
The continuum stretching from regulation to radical change can be related to the 
development of critical theory. Observing its roots in works of Karl Marx (1818-
1883) and the development of feminist research, Sarantakos (1998) notes that critical 
theory is located between the contrasting epistemological and human nature positions 
as identified above by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Lee and Lings (2008) observe that 
this philosophical school aims to ‗uncover the implicit assumptions and ideologies 
which underlie accepted ideas of the ‗truth‘ in a given social situation‘ (p. 63) based 
on an ‗interventionist mode of revolutionary politics‘ (Roslender, 2006, p. 248). In an 
accounting context, Chua (1986) distinguishes between three philosophical 
perspectives namely positivism, interpretivism and the critical perspective using the 
following categories as a basis for doing so, as presented in table 4.4. 
 
 
A. Beliefs about knowledge  
Epistemological 
Methodological 
B. Beliefs about physical and social reality 
Ontological 
Human intention and rationality 
       Societal order/conflict 
C. Relationship between theory and practice 
   
Table 4.4 – Categorisation of philosophical assumptions 
        Source: Chua (1986, p.  605) 
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Chua (1986) argues that the development of accounting knowledge has been overly 
dominated by positivism and shows how the alternative philosophical characteristics 
of interpretivism and critical theory can make a valuable contribution to the 
advancement of accounting knowledge. The undertaking of research using these non-
traditional perspectives is therefore advocated. Lending support to this analysis, Ryan 
et al. (2002) note that much of the management accounting research in the past could 
be positioned in the Burrell and Morgan‘s (1979) objective – regulation quadrant in 
figure 4.2; that is functionalism. Hopwood (1983) recognises the functionalist 
research traditions in accounting research where the activity is viewed from ‗a 
relatively unproblematic technical perspective‘ (p. 290). Some attempts have also 
been made to chart and reconcile philosophical positions underlying accounting 
research. Laughlin (1995) for example maps a wide range of different philosophical 
schools of thought according to selections made on the basis of methodology, a-priori 
conceptualisation and emphasis on change with each selection being scaled as low, 
medium or high, illustrated through a grid of nine boxes. The irreconcilable positions, 
at the extremes of this philosophical analysis, lead to the argument for a ‗middle 
range‘ approach that attempts to gainfully take some of the merits from the outer 
irreconcilable positions. 
 
Notwithstanding the noted dominance of positivistic research in previous accounting 
research, there has been a notable increase in the publication of accounting research in 
the other three quadrants of Burrell and Morgan‘s (1979) analysis in figure 4.2. 
Contributions, guidance, and debates on alternative management accounting 
methodologies are growing (Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998; Ahrens and Dent, 1998; 
Ahrens et al., 2008; Vaivio, 2008). Hwang and Wu (2006) note that journals 
dedicated specifically to management accounting research display a broader focus on 
research topics, methodologies and theoretical perspectives. The mutually exclusive 
subjectivist and objectivist philosophical positions that Burrell and Morgan‘s (1979) 
note (see figure 4.1) are becoming blurred in management accounting research 
(Ahrens, 2008; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, 2008). 
 
Philosophical perspectives can also be analysed specifically in the context of 
particular research designs. Dichotomising between the positivist and interpretivist 
paradigms Ryan et al. (2002) identify how these perspectives are related to case 
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research in accounting. The positivistic oriented researcher is likely to use the case 
study method as a first-step exploratory device to be followed by hypothesis testing 
on a large sample basis.  
 
Positive researchers are concerned with developing general theories, 
and they regard case studies as a tool for the generation of ideas and 
hypothesis, which it is intended will be subjected to empirical testing 
in large-scale statistical studies at a later stage (p. 147). 
  
Conversely, the interpretivistic oriented researcher is likely to use the case study 
method to explain the nature of the social phenomena observed. Ryan et al. (2002) 
recognise that this polar distinction simplifies the eclectic uses of the case study 
method. This draws attention again to the link between philosophical perspectives and 
methodology as noted in section 4.2.4 but in addition, highlights how research designs 
are not exclusively aligned to one particular philosophical position. Otley and Berry 
(1994) draw out features of four management control case studies including their 
distinctive epistemological, method, and theoretical features. Scapens (1990) notes the 
increasing importance of case study research in management accounting research and 
notes the various roles that this research approach provides to management 
accounting researchers. Drawing on Burgess‘s (1984) ‗Veranda Model‘ of field 
research (that was used by colonial anthropologists as an enquiry somewhat removed 
from the native‘s daily experiences) Scapens (1990) suggests that to get the most from 
case study research, researchers should be ready to investigate the everyday 
experiences of management accounting at different organisational levels and between 
different managerial groups.  
 
4.2.7 Research assumptions underpinning this research 
The theoretical assumptions underpinning social research have informed the design of 
this study. The ontological position taken could be located as ‗reality as a contextual 
field of information‘ (Morgan and Smircich, 1980, p. 492) which is somewhat 
midway between the polarities of reality as objective and reality as subjective. The 
epistemological position taken, although again not moving towards the extremities of 
positivist or interpretivist positions, is more oriented towards the interpretivist 
position. Thus, the focus is more, in Easterby-Smith et al.‘s (1991) terms, on 
‗meanings‘ than on ‗facts‘, on the ‗subjective‘ perspective rather than the ‗world is 
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external and objective‘, and on ‗totality‘ and ‗trying to understand what is happening‘ 
(p. 27), rather than on reductionism, hypotheses testing and establishing cause and 
effect. Atkinson and Shaffir (1998) state that: 
 
…field research, when done well, sensitises us to the actors‘ 
perspectives and enables us to understand situations and events from 
their perspective (p. 59). 
 
Similarly, the approach adopted in this study is more from the insider than outsider 
with the role of the researcher somewhere between the ‗empiricist‘ and the 
‗unobtrusive observer‘ (Evered and Louis, 1981, pp. 388-389).  
 
In regard to assumptions in the debate on human nature as determinist or voluntarist, 
this study adopts a more central position that allows for both the scope for individuals 
to determine, and to be determined by, their environments (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). Finally, the assumptions underpinning methodology gravitate towards 
ideographic, as opposed to nomothetic, methods which are associated with 
‗induction‘, ‗qualitative data‘, and ‗explanation of subjective meaning systems‘ (Gill 
and Johnson, 1997, p. 37). Although there is debate in the literature on reconciling 
between the extremities of the philosophical assumptions (Rossman and Wilson, 
1985; Lee, 1991; Morse, 1991; Gill and Johnson, 1997) this study does not attempt to 
make such reconciliations. In collectively considering the major ontological, 
epistemological, human nature and methodological debates this study as a whole is 
more oriented to the ‗subjectivist‘ position and more oriented towards ‗regulation‘ 
than ‗radical change‘ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The philosophical position adopted 
has been informed by works cited above but also importantly by the research problem 
that this study addresses (see section 4.4). The position adopted applies consistently to 
both phases of data collection, outlined in section 4.4.2.  
 
The rationale behind not selecting the other research designs is outlined below. 
Longitudinal and ethnographic research was not possible in this study because while 
they would provide an in-depth understanding regarding the roles of MAs these 
designs typically require very high levels of organisational access for prolonged 
periods which the researcher did not have. While there are frequently calls in the 
management accounting and control literature for more studies with these designs the 
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access and timelines associated with such designs might perhaps explain why we do 
not see very many of them. Action research is premised on commencing with and 
addressing a real organisational issue (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005) and often 
undertaken by those working in the particular organisation, which was not the case for 
the author of this study. This study was also motivated by gaps in the academic 
literature as noted (see section 4.4).  
 
Survey research can be seen to be a reasonably popular research design in 
management accounting research (see table 4.5, section 4.3). The adoption of this 
design would have included prior specification of research hypotheses, construct 
definition and operationalisation and statistical analysis.  The reason for not selecting 
this design was that it would not provide the required depth of insight to address the 
research problem. The literature review identified a number of contradictions in 
previous studies and also presented a largely fragmented picture of the roles of MAs. 
It can also be argued that there are few well developed instruments that attempt to tap 
constructs that relate to the roles of MAs. There have only been a few instances where 
for example studies have attempted to measure the involvement aspect of the roles of 
MAs (Sathe, 1982, Emsley, 2005). 
 
Experimental research, as can be seen from table 4.5 (see section 4.3), is not among 
the most common of methods adopted in management accounting research, 
particularly outside the US. Smith (2003) observes that obtaining participation from 
accountants in practice for experiments is extremely challenging and ‗experiments in 
the field still appear very rarely in the literature largely because of the constraints 
imposed by access, ethical considerations and even trade unions‘ (p. 113). For this 
study, experiments were deemed inappropriate as not enough was known about 
potential causal relations nor would it have been straightforward to set up control and 
treatment groups in the context of the research problem outlined. The following 
section presents a methodological review of recent research in the field of 
management accounting prior to the statement of the research problem. 
 
4.3 Review of research in management accounting  
In a review of the first decade of research published in the UK‘s Management 
Accounting Research (1990 to 1999), Scapens and Bromwich (2001) note the eclectic 
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nature of contributions across such dimensions as the source country, topic 
investigated, research setting, underlying theory and research method employed. The 
organisational roles of MAs appear much less presumed than in US accounting 
journals where the studies of such roles are not particularly forthcoming. In a review 
of US management accounting research from 1990-1997, Shields (1997) analyses 
contributions into research topics, research settings, theories used and results. The 
centrality of management control research is evident from 85 of the 152 (approx. 
56%) articles being on that topic in Shields‘s (1997) review and about 19% (approx. 
34 out of the 178 papers) are classified under control and performance measurement 
in Scapens and Bromwich‘s (2001) review. There is considerable divergence in 
published studies using case/field studies, with only 7% in the US journals and 39% 
in the UK journal (representing the most used method in that journal‘s articles) with 
21% in the European Accounting Review (EAR) (Bhimani, 2002).  Table 4.5 provides 
a comparison of research methods from these reviews. 
 
Papers Scapens and 
Bromwich (2001) 
Shields  
(1997) 
Bhimani 
(2002) 
Journals MAR (UK) 
 
AOS, TAR, CAR, 
JAE, JAR and 
JMAR (US) 
EAR (EU) 
Years (full/partial) 1990-1999 1990-1997 1992-2001 
Column number  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Research method*1: 
Analytic 
 
45 
 
25% 
 
49 
 
32% 
 
10 
 
23% 
Experiment 7 4% 21 14%   
Case/ Field studies*2  69 39% 10 7% 9 21% 
Survey 27 15% 28 18% 5 12% 
Literature review 14 8% 13 9% 15 35% 
Archival research*3 12 7% 22 14% 4 9% 
Multiple methods   7 5%   
Other*4 4 2% 2 1%   
TOTAL 178 100% 152 100% 43 100% 
 
MAR = Management Accounting Research, AOS = Accounting, Organizations and Society, TAR = 
The Accounting Review, CAR = Contemporary Accounting Research, JAE = Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, JAR = Journal of Accounting Research, JMAR = Journal of Management Accounting 
Research, and EAR = European Accounting Review. 
 
* Notes: 1. Figures are rounded as only percentages are available in Scapens and Bromwich  
      (2001) (column 2) and only absolutes are available from Shields (1997) (column 3). 
      Bhimani (2002) (column 5 and 6) includes both.  
2. Action research is included in this category as it is separated out by Scapens and  
    Bromwich (2001) but not by Shields (1997). 
3. Archival research, as used by Shields (1997) is taken to be the equivalent of  
   ‗Historical analysis‘ and ‗Financial statement analysis‘ from Scapens and Bromwich (2001). 
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4. Other represents ‗methodological discussion‘ in Scapens and Bromwich (2001) and 
    ‗behavioural simulation‘ in Shields (1997). 
 
Table 4.5 – Review of management accounting research methods  
Sources: Adapted from Scapens and Bromwich (2001, 
p. 250), Shields (1997, p. 9) and Bhimani (2002, p. 106) 
 
Shields (1997) suggests that the low level of published case/field studies may be 
attributable to a deficit in field research skills, availability of fellow researchers, 
incentives, access, and the editorial orientations of accounting journals. Historically in 
the US a similar paucity of field research is noted by Kaplan (1986) as 87% of the 
papers had no data sourced from actual companies or data that were investigated in an 
organisational context and field studies amounted to only 4.5% of research methods. 
Bhimani (2002) argues that articles in the EAR may have greater diversity in their 
philosophical underpinnings than in the US (see Shields, 1997). Bhimani (2002) 
classifies 24% of EAR papers (10 out of 43) as interactionist or postmodernist in 
orientation. Thus, the nature of published management accounting research reveals 
significant diversity, with European research apparently affording more space to the 
publication of case-based research.  
  
There is a strong record in the literature calling on management accounting 
researchers to conduct more organisational-based research. In a number of papers 
Kaplan (1983, 1984, 1986, 1993, 1994) has led the call for a greater emphasis on 
field-based research in advancing management accounting knowledge. Burchell et al. 
(1980) state that ‗it is quite staggering to reflect on how few studies there are of the 
organisational functioning of accounting‘ (p. 23) and Anthony (1989) reflects on the 
lack of knowledge in regard to management accounting practices. Hopwood (1983) 
similarly comments on the paucity of organisational-based accounting research that 
captures contextual insights. Otley (1994) suggests that case study approaches may 
play a critical role, given the potential breadth of control practices that could be 
observed. Spicer (1992) further documents the increasing interest in the adoption of 
case-based methods in the theory and practice of management accounting research. 
Notwithstanding these calls for more field research, and some progress being made, 
field studies do not largely feature in the top US accounting journals, and worryingly 
management accounting is representing proportionally less of US accounting research 
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output (Maher, 2001). In the UK, Kaplan‘s mandate for more field research was well 
received, given that research efforts had already been dedicated to such approaches 
since the 1980s, and have been generally more diversified in nature (Hopper et al., 
2001). 
 
Young (1999) calls for accounting researchers not to neglect the real issues facing 
managers in their research and further advocate that field methods may be effective in 
this regard. Further, Mitchell (2002) argues that much stronger links with practitioners 
are required, particularly involving them more in the research process and in 
disseminating research output. Tomkins and Groves (1983) similarly argue that 
accounting research should get closer to the practitioner‘s world and a broadening 
(and articulation) of the ontological assumptions, across a continuum ranging from the 
traditional scientific approaches to more interpretative, approaches is promoted. 
Vaivio (2007) argues that qualitative or case-based research in management 
accounting counteracts the literature‘s ‗textbook view‘ (e.g., overly focusing on 
accounting techniques), the ‗economics view‘ (e.g., rational models of decision 
making), and the ‗consultancy view‘ (e.g., prescriptive direction on performance 
enhancement).  
 
4.4 Research problem, objectives and research design   
This section presents the research problem, as identified through the review of 
literature, the research objectives established from that review, the overall design of 
the study, and the particular research methods employed. 
 
The research design is provided in detail in subsequent sections, covering the overall 
design (see sections 4.4.2, 4.5, and 4.6) and operationalisation (see section 4.8), and 
finally some reflections on pre-conceived designs that did not materialise (see section 
4.10). In brief, a two-phase approach is designed, both qualitative in nature, with the 
first phase inductively seeking to address the emerging issues from the literature 
review through in-depth interviews with FMs and OMs and with phase two seeking to 
investigate specific relationships around a particular sub-set of variables that emerged 
from phase one data analysis. 
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4.4.1 Research problem and associated objectives for phase one 
The literature has indicated a need to better understand the roles of MAs (Jablonsky et 
al., 1993; Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998b; Brignall et al., 1999; Pierce and 
O‘Dea, 2003). The research to date on the roles of MAs and management accounting 
in general is limited (Anthony, 1989), fragmented in nature (Chapman, 1997; 
Chenhall, 2003, 2007), and there is a need to build a more comprehensive picture of 
the contemporary roles of MAs. Young (1996) notes that ‗25 years of survey research 
has yet to yield a cohesive body of knowledge about management accounting‘ (p. 55). 
Further, previous academic research fails to adequately bring together, in one study, 
an investigation of influences on the roles of MAs, the characteristics that might be 
linked to such roles, and what the outcomes are of the roles that MAs actually enact in 
organisations. These are important as they may determine the effectiveness of MAs in 
their roles, which includes support MAs give to OMs in their decision making 
processes. There are a number of gaps in the literature that underpin the research 
problem and these will now be presented in the derivation of each the three research 
objectives for phase one of the study.  
 
4.4.1.1 Research objective one  
A number of studies have noted the poor understanding that exists of the forces that 
might be shaping the nature of management accounting in organisations (Libby and 
Waterhouse, 1996; Burns and Scapens, 2000). In chapter two (see section 2.3), 
contingency research has identified a range of variables that have been linked to MCS 
design including environment, structure, technology, size, strategy and culture 
(Emmanuel et al., 1990; Chenhall, 2003, 2007) and set out the contingency premise of 
‗fit‘ between the organisational context or situation and particular contingent 
variables. This study attempts to apply the contingency analysis to the roles of MAs. 
Role theory, reviewed in section 2.4, predicts that management expectations impact 
upon the behaviour of those occupying roles i.e., whom those expectations relate to. 
As a potential influence on the roles of MAs, this has not been examined in the 
management accounting literature since the early work of Hopper (1980) and Sathe 
(1982). From a management control theoretical perspective (see section 2.2), Otley 
(1994), Scapens et al. (2003) and Berry et al. (2008), make calls to develop greater 
insights into the nature of the management control function in contemporary practice 
and the roles of MAs in this regard.   
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The empirical literature on the roles of MAs provides some evidence of the factors 
that may be impacting on these roles, albeit based on an incomplete picture that 
emerges from a range of disparate studies with some evidence being from a limited 
number of studies or being more anecdotally based. Some evidence is equivocal with 
respect to the impact of certain factors e.g., technological developments (see section 
3.9) (Ezzamel et al., 1997; Granlund and Malmi, 2002; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003; 
Hunton, 2002; Jack and Kholeif, 2008), the introduction of accounting innovations 
(see sections 3.10 and 3.13.9) (Bhimani and Pigott, 1992; Anderson, 1995; Friedman 
and Lyne, 1997), and firm ownership (see section 3.11) (Granlund and Lukka, 1998a, 
1998b; Yazdifar and Tsamenyi, 2005; Yazdifar et al., 2008).  
 
The literature suggests other factors that may have an impact on the roles of MAs 
moving towards the model of the business partner (see section 3.9). These include: the 
business environment (Sathe, 1982, Burns et al., 1999; CIMA, 2007), management 
expectations and financial and budgetary orientations (Sathe, 1982), career path 
(Sathe, 1982; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001), and structural arrangements and physical 
location (Hopper, 1980; IMA, 1999; Granlund and Lukka, 1998a; Pierce and O‘Dea, 
(2003). Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998b) also note that MAs having a common 
perspective with OMs, having management support, and having accounting leadership 
may be an influence on the roles of MAs. Finally, the literature suggests that certain 
orientations or individual qualities of the MA may be influential in moving towards 
the model of business partnership (Nulty, 1992; Mouritsen, 1996; Coad, 1999; 
Johnston et al., 2002a; CIMA, 2009).  
 
Bringing together these literature strands relating to potential influences on the roles 
of MAs leads to the statement of the first research objectives as follows: 
 
To investigate antecedents associated with the roles of MAs. 
 
4.4.1.2 Research objective two 
The theoretical lenses discussed in chapter two may be informative in attempting to 
understand the nature of the roles of MAs in contemporary organisations. Thus, 
contingency theory (see section 2.3), in simple terms, suggest that it might be possible 
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to develop contingencies around the characteristics of the roles of MAs pertaining to a 
particular match or ‗fit‘ to some attribute associated with the context in which that 
role is located. Role theory (see section 2.4) predicts that the characteristics of those 
occupying roles can influence those who have expectations of them. From a 
management control theory perspective (see section 2.2) the literature points to the 
requirements for the existence of control but these are not related to how the MAs are 
implicated in the exercise of this control. 
 
The research to date on characterising the roles of MAs has indicated, mainly from 
descriptive and professionally-oriented research (see section 3.12.3) that certain 
characteristics are important with respect to roles moving towards the model of 
business partnership (IMA, 1996, 1999; Burns and Yazdifar, 2001; CIMA, 2007, 
2009). These include possessing strong inter-personal and team skills and having a 
sound understanding of the business (while not negating characteristics such as 
technical, analytical and IT skills, and integrity). Some empirical research (see section 
3.12.1) has lent support to the importance of these attributes for MAs as business 
partners, and also emphasise strategic orientation and flexibility (Jablonsky et al., 
1993; Sheridan, 1997; Brignall et al., 1999; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003; Vaivio and 
Kokko, 2006) but have also sometimes found that MAs do not adequately possess 
these. The literature also suggests that a decentralising of MAs or their physical 
location (see section 3.12.2) may be a characteristic of roles more closely linked with 
the model of the business partner (Hopper, 1980; Granlund and Lukka, 1998a; IMA, 
1999; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). With the rising accounting acumen of non-financial 
managers (Sheridan, 1997) and the wider dissemination of accounting information 
(Ezzamel et al., 1997) there are arguments that the roles of MAs may decline in 
organisations (Cooper, 1996; Burns et al., 1996; Pierce, 2001). There is thus some 
uncertainty around the MA‘s espoused transition to the model of business partnership. 
 
Empirical research has indicated a somewhat contradictory set of findings. Some 
studies note that MAs play an important part in organisational decision making 
processes akin to the model of business partnership (Ahrens, 1997; Caglio, 2003; 
Vaivio, 2004; Vaivio and Kokko, 2006). Others note that the roles of MAs may not be 
meeting the expectations of those whom they support regarding the information 
provided or the extent of their involvement in organisational processes (Chenhall and 
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Langfield-Smith, 1998b; Johnston et al., 2002a; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). Regarding 
the informational dimension of the roles of MAs (see section 3.13) the literature 
review identifies a range of pertinent dimensions (e.g., information relevance, 
accuracy and timeliness, financial orientation, volume of information, non-financial 
measurement, multi-dimensional frameworks, functional information needs, and the 
use of accounting information and techniques). There is also evidence that managers‘ 
information expectations are not being met (Littler and Sweeting, 1989; McKinnon 
and Bruns, 1992; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). Since 
Johnson and Kaplan‘s (1987) challenge on the relevance of management accounting 
information much attention has been directed towards the adoption of innovations to 
counter this challenge. The evidence seems to indicate varying but relatively modest 
levels of adoption (see section 3.13.9) and the low, and perhaps slowing, adoption 
levels in an Irish context (O‘Dea and Clarke, 1994; Pierce and O‘Dea, 1998; Clarke et 
al., 1999; Pierce and Brown, 2003).  
 
The literature thus presents different characteristics of the roles of MAs and 
collectively there is a somewhat inconsistent and unclear picture of these roles with 
respect to both the business partner model and the information provision aspect to the 
roles. This leads to the statement of the second research objective as follows: 
 
To investigate the characteristics associated with the roles of MAs. 
 
4.4.1.3 Research objective three  
The literature review indicates that there has been very little research on the actual 
outcomes of the enacted roles of MAs in organisations, and particularly in comparison 
to the antecedents and characteristics noted above.  
 
Following from the literature review, one strongly expected outcome of the roles of 
MAs would be the information that they furnish in support of managers‘ decision 
making and control processes. However, the literature also shows evidence that MAs 
are not providing timely and relevant information towards these ends and there are 
contradictory results with respect to whether MAs are moving towards the model of 
the business partner, which thus raise questions regarding what the outcomes of the 
roles of MAs actually are. The literature on the outcomes of the roles of MAs is very 
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limited as noted and so there is a need to identify and understand these. Furthermore, 
some of the research to date has had a professional institute, anecdotal or normative 
orientation about the roles of MAs (Scapens et al., 1996; Burns et al., 1996; IMA, 
1996; Sheridan, 1997; Jablonsky and Keating, 1998; Burns et al., 1999; IMA, 1999; 
Burns and Yazdifar, 2001; Siegel et al., 2003a, 2003b).  
 
Theoretically, there is a prediction from role theory that one possible outcome for the 
roles of MAs, if they do not meet the expectations of managers is role conflict and 
role ambiguity (see section 2.4). There is limited empirical research (see section 3.8) 
in this theoretical frame save the, now somewhat dated, work of Simon et al. (1954), 
Hopper (1980) and Sathe (1982) and some professional institute-based observations 
(Siegel, 2000; Keating and Jablonsky, 1991), with Maas and Matějka (2009) a notable 
exception. Management control theory (see section 2.2) is noted as needing insights 
regarding its nature in contemporary settings (Otley, 1994; Shields 1997; Scapens and 
Bromwich, 2001) and thus there is a need to understand the outcomes of the roles of 
MAs from a management control perspective. The contemporary control setting (see 
sections 2.2.6 and 3.2) reveals changing environmental, management and 
technological contexts which are likely to give rise to management control outcomes 
which require investigation (Ezzamel et al. 1997; Granlund and Mouritsen, 2003; 
Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003), and particularly in the context of the roles of MAs who 
are likely to play important roles in these outcomes. 
 
The existing literature on the outcomes of the roles of MAs is limited and therefore it 
would seem important to address this particular gap. This leads to the third research 
objective:  
 
To investigate the consequences associated with the roles of MAs. 
 
4.4.2 Overview of research design of phase one and phase two 
The research problem was investigated in two phases, each within the qualitative 
mode of enquiry (see section 4.4.3). The first phase of this study sought to address the 
identified gaps in the literature by providing a more comprehensive and in-depth 
picture of the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles 
of MAs. The research design deemed most appropriate to address these gaps was 
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inductive in nature as the literature only tentatively suggested a limited number of 
individual factors that might emerge as antecedents, characteristics, and consequences 
associated with the roles of MAs. 
 
The research method employed to address these objectives in phase one was in-depth 
interviews (see section 4.5) with 18 FMs and 18 OMs in 16 manufacturing firms. The 
research design may be classified as a cross-sectional field study (Lillis and Mundy, 
2005) as opposed to an in-depth case study or a more broad-based survey. In support 
of this choice of method, Lillis and Mundy (2005) note that this method enables 
researchers ‗to uncover reasons that might explain conflicting results, ambiguities, or 
tensions in prior research‘ (p. 131). The analysis of the qualitative data from phase 
one led directly to the design of phase two of the research.  
 
The research design for phase two was built upon an analysis of phase one data. The 
outcomes of the analysis of phase one leading to the research objectives for phase two 
is presented at the commencement of the phase two findings, having first presented 
the findings from phase one in chapter five. Phase two of the study concentrated on an 
in-depth examination of a reduced set of variables from the list of variables that 
emerged from phase one. The need to gain more depth and focus of enquiry from the 
emerging comprehensive picture in phase one by definition necessitated the selection 
of a limited number of factors for phase two i.e., it was not possible to bring all the 
factors into phase two. The process that led to the selection of these particular 
variables, and therefore the exclusion of other variables is set out in section 6.2 (at the 
beginning of the phase two findings chapter), and this process was one that followed a 
detailed qualitative data analysis process (see section 4.9.1). 
 
The research design of phase two (see section 4.6) was built upon the case study 
research design (Yin, 1994) where the MAs represent the ‗case‘ being investigated, as 
Bryman (1989) notes, ‗the ‗case‘ can also be a person‘ (p. 171). Yin (1994) states that 
‗in the classic case study, a ―case‖ may be an individual‘ where ‗information about 
each relevant individual would be collected‘ (p. 21). The research methods employed 
in phase two were a combination of in-depth interviews and the analysis of 
documentation associated with MAs, and associated with OMs. In phase two, the 
focus was on 12 specific MAs as ‗cases‘. 36 interviews were conducted by 
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interviewing the 12 MAs (twice) and 12 associated OMs. The 12 MAs and 12 OMs 
were based in five manufacturing firms. 
 
In both phases of the research, the perspectives of accountants and non-accountants 
(i.e., OMs), were captured. In phase one this served the purpose of validating FMs‘ 
perceptions of the roles of MAs against OMs‘ perceptions, and thereby mitigating the 
risk of bias or a one dimensional perspective. In phase two of the research this 
practice was repeated, bearing the same purposes in mind, but also more specifically 
drawing on role theory methodology (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978; 
Hopper, 1980) in connecting specific MAs to OMs that were identified by MAs as 
those OMs most influencing their particular roles (see section 4.6.4 for role theory 
application to interview guide design and see section 4.8.3 for role theory application 
to linking specific OMs and MAs). 
   
4.4.3 Rationale for research design: qualitative 
The selection of a research design requires the making of a number of decisions in 
pursuit of the most appropriate design which inevitably means not being able to 
maximise utility on all possible dimensions of research (McGrath et al., 1982). 
Research design issues also require consideration of a number of factors as illustrated 
in figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Factors relating to research design 
Source: Remenyi et al. (1998, p. 45) 
 
Paramount in these factors is the research question as Brannick (1997) observes that 
the ‗one decision that focuses, and to a large extent drives all the rest, is the definition 
of the research question‘ (p. 3). The research question is a prerequisite to the selection 
of research methods (Abernethy et al., 1999). The basis therefore for the selection of 
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the research design for this study was built upon the preceding statement of research 
objectives. 
 
The research problem identified a number of contradictions in previous research, 
criticism of management information, the need for a more holistic perspective and a 
dearth of research, particularly on role consequences. Collectively, these pointed to 
the need to conduct a study of a more in-depth nature. One of the noted hallmarks of 
qualitative enquiry is its capacity to produce a greater depth of enquiry than that 
possible through quantitative research (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992). Although 
quantitative research has a dominant history, Van Maanen et al. (1982) attributes an 
increasing dissatisfaction to the findings from quantitative-based research due to: 
 
..the relatively trivial amounts of explained variance, the abstract and 
remote character of key variables, the lack of comparability across 
studies, the failure to achieve much predictive validity, the high level 
of technical and notational sophistication rendering many research 
publications incomprehensible to all but a highly trained few (p. 13). 
 
In addressing the need for a more comprehensive picture, Patton (1990) identifies 
holism as a major dimension of qualitative enquiry which acknowledges the 
complexity inherent in investigating phenomena. Hakim (2000) comments on the 
relative merits of the ‗worms eye‘ as opposed to the ‗bird‘s eye‘ view of qualitative 
enquiry: ‗qualitative research is valuable for identifying patterns of associations 
between factors on the ground, as compared with abstract correlations between 
variables in the analysis of large-scale surveys and aggregate data‘ (p. 37). Ahrens 
and Dent (1998) succinctly attribute the richness of field study to ‗mean life-like, born 
out of recognisable organisational contexts‘ (p. 4). The first phase could be 
characterised primarily in inductive terms and the second could be characterised 
primarily in explanatory terms, with both phases having some descriptive 
components. Some of the major methods employed in qualitative research were 
employed in the research design i.e., semi-structured interviews and company 
documentation (Bryman, 1989). Guba and Lincoln (1994) comment that ‗qualitative 
data, it is asserted, can provide rich insight into human behaviour‘ (p. 106) and Shank 
(2002), in concise terms, states that ‗qualitative research is first and foremost about 
meaning‘ (p. 4). Thus, this research approach and data would assist gaining a more in-
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depth understanding of the meanings that MAs and managers attach to the roles of 
MAs in context. 
 
Three theoretical perspectives were employed in the study (see section 2.5) as devices 
to guide data analysis, and to some extent in determining interview guide design and 
data collection (see section 4.6.4). However, the lenses were not used as an a priori 
basis for deriving hypotheses for testing. This quantitative approach is more 
appropriate for studies that are primarily theory-driven. Thus, the attempt to employ 
theory for explanatory purposes complemented the use of a qualitative approach. It 
can further be argued that the employment of more than one theoretical frame in a 
single study is possible as qualitative research tends to have a less narrowly defined 
approach than quantitative research. In field studies, Ahrens and Dent (1998) 
recognise the ‗possibility of interpreting the data through a multiplicity of theoretical 
perspectives‘ as part of the process of ‗the production of rich accounts‘ (p. 33). In a 
review of 82 management control studies, Ferreira and Merchant (1992) recognise the 
purposes of undertaking field research as descriptive, theory creation, and the 
investigation of hypotheses. In line with this study, Ferreira and Merchant (1992) 
observe that frequently these motivations overlap and field researchers ‗intend to 
describe their observations and to reflect on their observations‘ theoretical 
significance‘ (p. 13).  
 
Qualitative data can be an ‗attractive nuisance‘ as the data are ‗rich, full, earthy, 
holistic, ―real‖; their face validity seems unimpeachable‘ (Miles, 1979, p. 590). The 
‗nuisance‘ associated with qualitative data include the time and effort required to 
collect such data, anxiety, the overpowering impact of the tasks in collecting, 
managing, and analysing a large volume of data. The selection of any particular 
research design has its limitations. McGrath et al. (1982) identify the trade-offs in 
research design as a ‗three-horned dilemma‘ in attempting to appropriately maximise:  
 
(A) generalisability with respect to the populations, (B) precision in 
control and measurement of variables related to the behaviour(s) of 
interest, and (C) existential realism, for the participants, of the 
context within which those behaviours are observed‘ (p. 74).  
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Thus, the design of this study maximises (C) but as a result accrues less merit in terms 
of (A) and (B). These issues, and those relating to analysing qualitative data, are dealt 
with in section 4.7 on validity, reliability and generalisability. There are also a number 
of limitations associated with the methods associated with the qualitative approach 
and these are presented in sections 4.5.3, 4.6.3, and 4.6.5. 
 
4.5 Research methods: phase one interviews  
Interviews are a frequently used research method in the gathering of qualitative data 
in social research (Yin, 1994; Seale, 1998; Bryman and Bell, 2007), and in accounting 
research (Smith, 2003; Lee and Humphrey, 2006; Vaivio, 2007, 2008). This section 
presents a rationale for using interviews, the primary vehicle of data collection in 
phase one, and a major component of the data collection in phase two. The rationale is 
followed by an examination of the major merits and limitations of employing this 
research method. 
 
4.5.1 Rationale for the interview method 
The research literature commonly identifies interview designs across a spectrum from 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured formats (Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Saunders et al., 2006). Although interviews can be designed to facilitate a more 
structured enquiry, in this study the interviews were designed specifically to gain in-
depth insights with respect to the research problem and specific objectives (see 
section 4.4.1), and so can be positioned closest to the semi-structured format which 
permits the necessary probing and flexibility in execution, while at the same time 
imposing some overall direction and structure on the interview. The semi-structured 
interview can also be referred to as the qualitative interview. To avoid ‗semantic 
wranglings‘, King (1994) categorises interviews as ‗depth‘, ‗exploratory‘, ‗semi-
structured‘ or ‗unstructured‘ under the heading ‗qualitative research interview‘ (p. 
14). Similarly, Kvale (1983) notes that ‗technically the qualitative research interview 
is ―semi-structured‖, it is neither a free conversation nor a highly structured 
questionnaire‘ (p. 174). Lee (1999) characterises the semi-structured format as 
‗having an overarching topic, general themes, targeted issues, and specific questions, 
with a predetermined sequence for their occurrence‘ and ‗the interviewer is free to 
pursue matters as circumstances dictate‘ (p. 62). 
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These interviews therefore probe ‗the meanings interviewees attach to issues and 
situations in contexts that are not structured in advance by the researcher‘s 
assumptions‘ (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p. 73), or as Patton (1990) states ‗to allow 
us to enter into the other person‘s perspective‘ (p. 278). Rubin and Rubin (2005) note 
that ‗qualitative interviews build on naturalistic, interpretive philosophy‘ and are 
‗extensions of ordinary conversations‘ (p. 12). However, it is important to distinguish 
research interviews from conversations, as the former are designed and conducted 
with particular aims in mind. Dane (1990) describes the interview as a ‗conversation 
with a purpose, but it is not an interrogation‘ (p. 130). Bechhofer and Paterson (2000) 
describe the interview as an ‗interactional process‘ as opposed to a ‗conversation‘ in 
that the ‗shared interactional rules‘ are not the same; the interview is performed 
between ‗strangers‘ and the conversation is frequently a ‗one-off‘ affair (p. 69). 
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) observe that the ‗qualitative interview‘ is appropriate 
where the purpose is to ‗understand the constructs that the interviewee uses‘ and to 
‗develop an understanding of the respondent‘s ‗world‘‘ (p. 74). King (1994) also 
notes the appropriateness of the qualitative interview ‗where a study focuses on the 
meaning of particular phenomena to the participants‘ (p. 16).  Kvale (1996) notes that 
‗the purpose of the qualitative research interview…is to understand themes of the 
lived daily world from the subjects own perspectives‘ (p. 27).  
 
Thus, the literature on qualitative interviewing supports the approach adopted in the 
interviews conducted in this research as they sought to uncover the meanings that 
MAs attach to what influences their roles (the antecedents), what characteristics are 
associated with their roles, and finally what they perceive as the consequences of their 
roles. These meanings could then be compared to those that managers attached to 
such roles. 
 
4.5.2 Merits of the interview method 
McCracken (1988) recommends the long interview as an indispensable tool of 
qualitative enquiry: ‗it can take us into the mental world of the individual, to glimpse 
the categories and logic by which he or she sees the world‘ (p. 9). Qualitative enquiry 
‗mines‘ the surface as opposed to surveying it and there is more merit in working 
carefully and longer with fewer respondents that with many from a distance 
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(McCracken, 1988). King (1994) notes that the interview is ‗a method which most 
research participants accept readily‘ (p. 33) as well being very flexible. Seale (1998) 
notes the flexibility in qualitative interviewing in that interviewers can ‗invent 
questions on the spot in order to follow up interesting leads‘ (p. 205). Sarantakos 
(1998) identifies 14 merits in employing the interview method: 
  
1) Flexibility – there is scope to accommodate changes during the interview.  
 
2) High response rate – in comparison, for example, to a survey, interviews tend to 
achieve a good response rate.   
 
3) Easy administration – participants engage in a dialogue as opposed to say 
requiring skills to digest lengthy or sophisticated survey instruments.   
 
4) Opportunity to observe non-verbal cues – the interviewer is present and can thus 
relate the dialogue to, for example, interviewee body language.  
 
5) Less patience and motivation – interviews require the interviewer and interviewee 
to engage and this may be more appealing than say completing a questionnaire by 
oneself.  
 
6) Control over the environment – as the interview is in the environment where data 
collection occurs, this affords scope to the interviewer to exercise some control 
over that environment.  
  
7) Capacity for correcting misunderstandings by respondents – the interviewer can 
intervene to clarify any uncertainties that arise. 
 
8) Control over the order of the questions – interviewees respond to interview 
questions in the order in which they are asked and cannot, as could be possible 
with a questionnaire, attend to questions in a different sequence.  
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9) Opportunity to record spontaneous answers – interviewees are generally ‗on-the-
spot‘ in an interview situation and therefore an instinctive response is more likely 
to be acquired.  
 
10) Control over the identity of the respondent – the interviewer has no doubt about 
whom the interviewee is, while in a mail questionnaire this is not the case. 
 
11) Completeness of interview guaranteed – it is quite likely that as the interviewer 
directs the interview, the questions that are brought to the interview should be 
addressed. 
 
12) Control over the time, date and place of interview – the interview method can be 
conveniently scheduled and located to accommodate interviewee requirements.  
 
13) More complex questions – as the interviewer participates in the interviewing 
process, it is possible to address more complicated questions than for research 
methods where there is nobody present.  
 
14) Greater permissible length – this can be achieved as the interview dialogue may 
continue beyond the time that had been allocated for it. 
 
These particular factors provide the justification of employing the research method in 
this study. The next section highlights some of the limitations. 
 
4.5.3 Limitations of the interview method 
The methodological literature records a number of limitations of employing the 
interview method. King (1994) notes that one of the disadvantages to the qualitative 
interview is the enormous quantity of time required in designing interview guides, 
conducting interviews and analysing the data. Whyte (1982) remarks that ‗interviews 
yield voluminous data‘ (p.117), making the task of data management and analysis 
more challenging. Glensne and Peshkin (1992) recognise the differences that may 
occur in interviewing in relation to ‗who is conducting the interview with whom, on 
what topic, and at what time and place‘ (p. 75) and that ‗the spontaneity and 
unpredictability‘ requires the researcher ‗to think and talk on their feet‘ (p. 77).  
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Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) rank the interview-related tasks, in ascending order of 
the time commitment required, as conducting the interviews, transcribing the 
interviews and performing the analysis of the interview data. Smith (2003) identifies 
the wording of interviewing questions, memory difficulties, variability and 
inconsistency in questioning, and difficulties in capturing interview data, as 
challenges in the interviewing process. Another difficulty with interviewing is getting 
consent from potential interviewees (Robson, 1993). 
 
Sarantakos (1998) identifies the specific limitations of interviews as: a) the cost and 
time dimensions, b) potential for interviewer bias, c) the disruptiveness of interviews 
compared to completing a survey, d) the respondent‘s identity and circumstances are 
revealed, and e) interviews do not facilitate collecting data of a delicate nature where 
respondents are more disposed to documenting, as opposed to speaking about, such 
matters. Sarantakos (1998) adds the more general limitations that apply to research 
methods in general such as ‗deliberate misrepresentation of facts, genuine mistakes, 
unwillingness or inability to offer information‘ but with ‗interviewing, it is easier to 
detect problems‘ (p. 267). The researcher was mindful of these limitations in both the 
planning and execution of the interviewing processes and reference was made to the 
methodological experiences and practices reported in studies of accounting that 
employed a similar qualitative approach (see Horton et al., 2004; Marginson, 2004). 
 
4.5.4 Design of interview guide: phase one 
The interview guide designs for phase one, and phase two, were informed by the 
methodological literature. The initial guide design commenced from consideration of 
the research problem, objectives and the type of investigation (Berg, 1995). To 
capture ‗the most complete story‘ Berg (1995) states that the interview guide should 
include ‗essential questions, extra questions, throw-away questions and probing 
questions‘ (p. 36). The interview guide ‗is not a structured schedule or protocol‘ but ‗a 
list of general areas to be covered‘ (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998, p. 105). 
 
The interview guide for phase one of the research was at the unstructured end of the 
semi-structured interview classification. Particular emphasis was placed on open-
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ended, probing questions and discussion prompts.  The major sections of the interview 
guide are as follows: 
 
1) Background information – e.g., job title, responsibilities, company information.
  
2) Management accounting roles in general – e.g., instinctive impression of role. 
  
3) Factors influencing the roles of MAs – e.g., discussion of factors and use of 
prompts when required.  
 
4) Characteristics of the roles of MAs – e.g., what makes an effective MA?  Use of 
probes as appropriate. Exploration of roles in control and decision making 
functions.  
 
5) MCSs and management accounting information – exploration of roles of MAs in 
the context of the wider organisation‘s accounting and control systems. 
 
6) Consequences of the roles of MAs – e.g., exploration of perceived consequences 
of roles of MAs.   
 
7) Other issues – open-ended invitation to discuss other points perceived as 
important to interviewee on the subject matter. 
 
A copy of the full interview guide is included in Appendix A. While the interview 
guide may appear neatly structured, the actual interview exchange included the 
interviewer requesting an elaboration of points, examples of when or how something 
occurred or why something was the case. It is not possible to fully convey this in the 
hard copy presentation of the interview guide. 
 
4.5.5 Use of tape-recording equipment: phase one and two 
Permission was sought to use tape-recording equipment for all interviews in both 
phases of data collection. Interviews were the dominant form of data collection in 
both phases of the study and all interviews were recorded using a tape recorder where 
permission was given to do so, which was 63 out of a total of 72 interviews.  
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Whyte (1982) recommends recording ‗as close to verbatim as possible. Among other 
things, this helps the student stretch his powers of observation and his memory‘ (p. 
117) and ‗a tape recorder on the spot provides the fullest recording‘ (p. 118). Taylor 
and Bogdan (1998) note that recording allows the researcher to obtain more data than 
that which could be obtained from having to mentally recall the interview. Patton 
(2002) states that ‗a good hammer is essential to fine carpentry, a good tape recorder 
is indispensable to fine fieldwork‘ as all the interview preparation and approach 
‗comes to naught if you fail to capture the actual words of the person being 
interviewed‘ (p. 380). 
 
From an accounting perspective Hayes and Mattimoe (2004) identify the key factors 
in the recording decision as ‗the nature of the topic being researched; the sectoral 
setting of the study; the preferences of individual respondents and the preference and 
competencies of the researcher‘ (p. 371). In defence of recording Taylor and Bogdan 
(1998) provide some interviewee perspective: 
 
…informants are acutely aware that the interview‘s agenda is to 
conduct research. Since the interviewees already know that their 
words are being weighed, they are less likely to be alarmed by the 
presence of a tape recorder. The interviewer often also has an 
extended period of time in which to get informants to relax and 
become accustomed to the tape recorder (p. 112). 
 
The final decision to record the interviews was based, on balance, on the merits of 
obtaining a more accurate and complete record of the interview and being a little more 
free from continuous note taking to concentrate on the interview dialogue against the 
drawback that the presence of recording equipment might result in the interviewee 
being more reticent. It should be noted that the recording did not replace note taking - 
which still occurred during and after the interview. Lee (1999) notes that the recorder 
does not capture the ‗visual aspects of the physical context, facial expressions, or 
body language‘ (p. 86) and also equipment can fail.  
 
Warnings were also heeded from the literature regarding the danger of the recording 
equipment resulting in the interviewer relaxing, not concentrating or listening 
(Brownell, 1995). Practical methodological advice on recording was followed 
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including: using a small-sized device with good recording quality, careful positioning 
of the device, having sufficient (and spare) tapes and batteries, and pre-testing the 
equipment (Adam and Healy, 2000). 
 
The transcription of interview tapes is ‗an exceedingly time consuming task‘ (Whyte, 
1982, p. 118). Robson (1993) suggests a multiple of ‗ten between tape time and 
transcription time‘ (p. 230) unless ‗highly skilled‘. Seale (1998) indicates the merits 
of transcribing interviews: 
 
…the transcription of taped interviews in order to prepare them for 
analysis constitutes one of the major chores of qualitative 
interviewing. Though laborious, the experience of transcribing can 
bring a much closer appreciation of the meanings in the data, and 
this is often the time that ideas for coding…arise, as well as ideas for 
topics to pursue in subsequent interviews (p. 207). 
 
Where the researcher sought some very limited assistance with the transcription task, 
the transcripts were carefully checked. 
 
4.6 Research methods: phase two case study approach 
The case study approach is not a research method but a collection of methods and so 
is more appropriately referred to as a research strategy (Yin, 1994). This section 
presents the rationale for selecting this approach, the relative merits and limitations of 
taking this approach and finally the particular data collected in investigating the cases. 
  
4.6.1 Rationale for the case study approach 
Yin (1994) notes that the case study ‗investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomena and context 
are not clearly defined‘ (p. 13). As the name suggests, this approach focuses on a 
particular ‗case‘, or ‗cases‘ in an in-depth fashion. This study examines the roles of 
MAs very much in their current ‗real‘ and ‗live‘ roles and in the context of their 
organisational settings. The MAs are the central point of focus in this study, and 
hence represent the ‗case‘. In phase two, 12 roles of MAs were investigated as 
‗cases‘. 
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A distinction may be made between case studies in terms of their underlying purpose. 
Ryan et al. (2002) analyse accounting case studies according to their purpose, while 
recognising that there is some ambiguity here in that case studies may incorporate a 
number of these types and ‗ultimately, it is the intention of the researcher that 
determines the classification in each instance‘ (p. 144). Ryan et al. (2002) and 
Scapens (1990, 2004) distinguish five categories of accounting case studies: 
descriptive, illustrative, experimental, exploratory and explanatory. The particular 
case study design employed in this study, while having some exploratory and 
descriptive components, was primarily explanatory. The case design was exploratory 
as it remained open to deeper insights tentatively coming from phase one and was 
explanatory in that it sought to explain relationships that emerged in the analysis of 
phase two data, through the use of three theoretical lenses. 
 
4.6.2 Merits of the case study approach 
There are a number of merits in undertaking research employing the case study 
method. These include:  
 
1) Context – Yin (1994) highlights the ‗real-life‘ contextualisation of the topic of 
investigation in case studies as a major strength of the approach. 
Surveys, particularly mail surveys, are somewhat removed from the actual context 
of the investigation. Scapens (1990) argues the case research provides a holistic 
perspective on the phenomenon under investigation; no individual part is 
examined in isolation of its wider context.  
 
2) Different data sources – the case method facilitates the gathering of data from a 
number of different sources within the same research site, thus enabling the 
researcher to analyse corroborating and contradictory evidence as it is presented. 
Yin (1994) describes the case study as the ‗all-encompassing method‘ that relies 
on ‗multiple sources of evidence‘ (p. 13). The two case sources relied upon in this 
study are documentation and interviews, as explained by Ryan et al. (2002) in 
table 4.6. 
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Source of evidence Explanation and examples 
Artefacts Physical evidence including reports, statements, minutes 
from meetings, memorandums, informal notes  
Interviews Face to face interviews with respondents that may vary 
from unstructured to structured. Most common source of 
evidence in case study research 
 
       Table 4.6 – Data evidence in case study research  
Source: Adapted from Ryan et al. (2002, p. 154) 
 
3) Flexibility – because the researcher is present, typically on the respondent‘s 
premises, there is considerable scope for the researcher to pursue unexpected 
findings, to prompt elaboration and to seek clarification at the point of enquiry. 
Further the researcher can provide any clarifications sought by the respondent in 
regard to the study. 
 
4.6.3 Limitations of the case study approach 
The case study approach has been criticised for its apparent lack of scientific rigour, 
poor implementation, scope for bias, limited scope for generalisation, and for being a 
time-consuming activity that produces voluminous, illegible documents (Yin, 1994). 
Scapens (1990) suggests three common problem areas of case research: 1) the 
challenge of mapping the perimeter of the case in terms of the number of cases or in a 
longitudinal sense, 2) the potential for bias through the presence of the researcher, and 
3) the principles of the researcher, for example confidentiality issues inside and 
outside the research setting. The researcher was mindful of these limitations and they 
were addressed in so far as was possible through the research design and by 
addressing issues of validity, reliability, and generalisability, which are discussed in 
section 4.7. 
 
4.6.4 Design of interview guides: phase two 
Before interview guides were designed for phase two, the data from phase one were 
carefully analysed (see section 4.9.1), key conclusions from these findings determined 
(as set out at the end of the next chapter in section 5.5), phase two objectives 
determined (as set out at the start of the chapter following in section 6.2), and the case 
study methodology selected as the most appropriate approach through which to 
acquire the required depth of enquiry for the reduced set of variables being focused 
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upon in phase two (see section 4.4.2). Thus, this is the process that led to the 
development of the phase two interview guides. 
 
The methodology applied in previous research using role theory (Kahn et al., 1964; 
Katz and Kahn, 1978) and specifically with regard to management accounting 
(Hopper, 1980) informed, in part, the design of the interview guides. The specific 
research instruments used by these researchers were obtained and examined, and 
adapted for use in this study. This adaptation included converting a somewhat 
structured quantitative instrument into a more thematic style guide more appropriate 
for qualitative interviewing as well as the necessary adaptation for phase two 
objectives. In line with role theory studies, three interviews were arranged with 
respect to each MA in each company: firstly an interview with the MA, secondly an 
interview with an OM that the MA worked closely with, and thirdly, a second 
interview with the MA. The interview guides for each interview addressed different 
aspects of phase two of the study as follows: 
 
1) Interview guide for the first interview with MAs (see appendix C1) – the major 
themes addressed in this guide were: description of the roles of MAs, major 
factors influencing the roles, sources of role definition, involvement nature and 
expectations, role stress, ambiguity and conflict, and role characteristics.    
 
2) Interview guide with OMs about MAs –  (see appendix C2) – the major themes 
addressed in this guide were: background information on the OM, general role 
perceptions, interaction, involvement nature and expectations for specific 
activities, influence of MAs over OMs and vice versa, role conflicts and other 
issues. 
 
3) Interview guide for the second interview with MAs - (see appendix C3) – the major 
themes addressed in this guide were: perceptions of management reports and 
interaction with OMs, examples of routine reports and associated interaction with 
OMs, examples of non-routine reports and associated interaction with OMs, 
procedural documents and the roles of MAs, follow-up questions from phase one 
interview, involvement influences, characteristics and consequences and other 
issues. 
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In a similar manner to phase one, the interview instrument was used as the name 
suggests, as a guide, to gather rich and in-depth data pertaining to the objectives of 
phase two of the study. 
 
4.6.5 Analysis of company records 
The gathering and analysis of documentation is a common component of qualitative 
enquiry (Bryman, 1989) and frequently ‗documents are used to provide additional 
data and to check on the findings derived from other sources of data‘ (p. 151). Table 
4.7 presents the strengths and weaknesses associated with company documentation, as 
identified by Yin (1994). 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Stable-can be reviewed repeatedly 
 Unobtrusive-not created as a result of the 
case study 
 Exact-contains exact names, references, 
and details of an event 
 Broad coverage-long span of time, many 
events, and many settings 
 Retrievability can be low 
 Biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete 
 Reporting bias-reflects (unknown) bias of 
author 
 Access-may be deliberately blocked 
 
Table 4.7 – Strengths and weaknesses associated with company documentation 
Source: Yin (1994, p. 80) 
 
Forster (1994) identifies many examples of company documentation that may be 
analysed in a qualitative study and comments that: 
 
These varied documentary records constitute a rich source of insights 
into different employee and group interpretations of organisational 
life, because they are one of the principal by-products of the 
interactions and communication of individuals and groups, at all 
levels, in organisations (p. 148). 
 
Bechhofer and Paterson (2000) recognise the merits of analysing documents. 
Although the researcher has not influenced their creation, ‗unlike transcripts of 
interviews, [they] are not the result of a highly complex and inevitably somewhat 
artificial process of interaction‘ (p. 59). 
 
141 
 
4.7 Validity, reliability, and generalisability 
Validity, reliability and generalisability are concepts that have been of concern to both 
the natural and social sciences, although there has been much debate about the 
appropriate application, or application at all, of these to the latter. The following 
sections explain these concepts, their application to qualitative research, and finally 
their application to this study.  
 
4.7.1 Validity, reliability, and generalisability: definitions  
Robson (2002) explains validity as ‗whether the findings are ‗really‘ about what they 
appear to be about‘ (p. 93). Mason (2002) notes that ‗if your research is valid, it 
means that you are observing, identifying, or ‗measuring‘ what you say you are‘, 
while reliability ‗involves the accuracy of your research methods and techniques‘ (p. 
39). Reliability refers to ‗the ability of an instrument to produce consistent results‘ 
(Sarantakos, 1998, p. 83). Parker (1994) relates the seeking of validity and reliability 
in research to the scope for its replication: ‗the search for both validity and reliability 
rests on the assumption that it is possible to replicate good research. A qualitative 
researcher, however, will never make the mistake of claiming that their work is 
perfectly replicable‘ (p. 11) as it is not possible to do so. Banister et al. (1994) note 
that ecological validity, where the ‗particular meanings of the research setting are 
explored‘ (p. 11) is achieved in qualitative enquiry.  
 
Generalisability relates to if, and how, the findings from a study can be extended, or 
‗generalised‘, beyond the particular context of investigation to the wider population 
i.e., Mason (2002) explains it as ‗the extent to which you can make some form of 
wider claim on the basis of your research and analysis, rather than simply stating that 
your analysis is entirely idiosyncratic and particular‘ (p. 39). Generalisation is closely 
associated with external validity, a criterion that is applied to the relevance of the 
findings to other settings. 
 
4.7.2 Validity, reliability, and generalisability in qualitative research 
The concepts of validity and reliability have their roots in the positivistic perspective 
underpinning the natural sciences. Smith (1984) argues that developing a means of 
evaluating the quality of research taking an interpretive approach could be 
‗misguided‘ (p. 379). Taylor and Bogdan (1998) note that the validity of qualitative 
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research is something that researchers do consider as ‗it is a piece of systematic 
research conducted with demanding, though not necessarily standardised, procedures‘ 
and it is ‗not an impressionistic, off-the-cuff analysis based on a superficial look at a 
setting or people‘ (p 9). Yin (1994) provides procedures for enhancing validity and 
reliability in case research, which includes using more than one source for data, 
having participants review case material, marrying ‗patterns‘ and constructing 
explanations, following a case ‗protocol‘, and building a case ‗data base‘. In 
considering these criteria, however, Berry and Otley (2004) note that achieving these 
are difficult: 
 
This is not to say that research design is not important, but rather to 
recognise that in many accounting studies the constraints are such 
that many of the above criteria will be violated. In particular, we 
have found that research access is often opportunistic and precludes 
proper advance design (p. 237). 
 
In place of the traditional criteria of internal validity, external validity, reliability and 
objectivity, Guba and Lincoln (1989) suggest substituting credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability respectively. Credibility may by achieved by 
‗member checking‘ which involves interviewers presenting findings to interviewees 
for verification purposes. Transferability may be achieved through capturing the 
richness in describing the contextual situation or circumstances to ‗facilitate 
transferability judgements on the part of others who may wish to apply the study to 
their own situation‘ (p. 242). Feldman (1995) hints at how, in the qualitative analysis 
of cultural data, ‗the goal, it seems to me, is to develop one‘s own interpretation of 
how parts of the culture fit together or influence or relate to one another that is 
intrinsic to the setting one has studied and, at the same time, sheds light on how 
similar processes may be occurring in other settings‘ (p. 2). Dependability may be 
achieved by ensuring that the qualitative process, and the judgements made during it, 
is amenable to an audit by external reviewers. Confirmability may be achieved 
through ensuring that ‗data…can be tracked to their sources, and that the logic used to 
assemble the interpretations into structurally coherent and corroborating wholes is 
both explicit and implicit in the narrative of a case study‘ (p. 243). Guba and Lincoln 
(1989) use the analogy of the accounting audit in the need for an ‗audit trail‘ and a 
rationale for how the ‗bottom line‘ was reached.  
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In addressing validity and reliability concerns for case study researchers in accounting 
Ryan et al. (2002) highlight the importance of contextual validity, transferability and 
procedural reliability. Contextual validity (addressing internal validity) relates to the 
plausibility of the case evidence collected, which can be enhanced through the 
triangulation of data, method and theories in the study. Transferability (addressing 
external validity) relates to how relevant the case findings are to other settings with 
theoretical, as opposed to statistical, generalisation being more appropriate (see also 
Scapens, 1990). Procedural reliability refers to how reliability has been enhanced 
through the procedures deployed in the research design e.g., using a detailed research 
plan, specific interview guides, meticulous data collecting and recording procedures, 
and complete documentation of data analysis. The following section details how the 
criteria discussed above apply in this study. 
 
4.7.3 Validity, reliability, and generalisability in this study 
While recognising the challenges inherent in enhancing reliability to facilitate 
replication in qualitative studies (Parker, 1994) a number of measures were 
incorporated into the study to provide some reliability. These include:   
 
1) ensuring those participating in the study clearly understood the purpose of the 
study and access agreements (McKinnon, 1988); 
 
2) a detailed preparation of data collection plans or ‗protocols‘ (Yin, 1994);   
 
3) the advanced planning and organising of qualitative data in various forms (e.g., 
transcripts, internal and external company records);  
 
4) the consistent overall design of interview guides for each interview conducted and 
being guided by the methodological literature;  
 
5) the recording of the majority of interviews as permitted by interviewees, which 
amounted to all bar nine of the 72 interviews being recorded;   
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6) the application of specific qualitative data analysis strategies adopted in the study 
(see sections 4.9.1 and 4.9.2);   
 
7) the building up of ‗case‘ files in both an off-line (e.g., folders) and on-line (e.g., 
analysis software) format; and   
 
8) the keeping of a research journal that chronologically recorded project notes 
relating to theory, design, data analyses, and any judgements made in these 
contexts (see appendix E5).  
 
Validity in the research was addressed in the study by note taking, fully transcribing 
interview data and returning transcripts to all interviewees for confirmation purposes. 
Validity was also somewhat demonstrated by the interviewee‘s willingness in openly 
sharing extremely sensitive management accounting and control information and 
reports with the researcher. There was also corroboration between the interview data 
and the company documentation, which permitted triangulation of the findings and 
added to the validity of the findings (McKinnon, 1988). Validity in the findings was 
also provided in providing a transparent record of how the researcher reached the 
conclusions to the study through the use of various analytical techniques, and in 
relying on the evidence as being that presented by the interviewees and in the 
company records that formed part of the data collected (see appendices E, F, and H). 
 
The study does not claim to be representative of MAs beyond those who formed part 
of this study. The output of the research was a generalisation to theory and not 
statistical significance (Yin, 1994). Further, in line with inductive and qualitative lines 
of enquiry the findings are analysed with a view to developing a set of themes that 
might lead to further research of a quantitative nature, more suited to statistical 
generalisation analysis.   
 
4.8 Gaining access, interviewee selection, and operational details  
According to Bryman (1989) ‗one of the most vexed areas for many researchers is 
quite simply getting into organisations‘ (p. 161). Buchanan et al. (1988) observe the 
increasing access requests that organisations receive for research purposes, and that 
companies have ‗little time to devote to non-productive academic research activities‘ 
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(p. 55). Regarding management accounting research specifically, Ahrens (1994) 
identifies the nuances around developing the research problem(s) while attempting to 
gain entry to organisations and describes the process as a ‗long, drawn out‘ (p. 306) 
one. Such nuances include the use of gatekeepers, initial and on-going relationship 
development, opportunism and communication. Hakel et al. (1982) distinguish 
between ‗doing research‘ and ‗doing implementation‘ (p. 15) with the latter requiring 
‗good timing‘ and sometimes ‗luck as well‘ (p. 120). Similarly, Buchanan et al.. 
(1988) recognise the tension between the ideal and the pragmatic approach in 
accessing organisations but nevertheless conclude that ‗the claim for research as the 
art of the possible and the plea for opportunism do not therefore rule out the need for 
controlled, systematic, morally justifiable methods and scientific rigour‘ (p. 67). The 
following section draws out some of the operational considerations of the study. 
Mindful of these access challenges and opportunities, the next sections discuss how 
access was obtained for both phases of the study, together with the relevant 
operational details. 
 
4.8.1 Phase one: gaining access   
In selecting particular companies in which to conduct the initial field research phase 
of the study, the key criteria were that companies should be of sufficient scale to have 
separate management accounting and other organisational functions (e.g., production, 
marketing, distribution, sales) and be in the manufacturing sector. Apart from this, 
convenience sampling was employed where possible.  Ryan et al. (2002) note that 
case selection should be governed by theoretical considerations rather than statistical 
(wider representation) ones and, in terms of studies incorporating theory development, 
the case selection is ‗relatively unimportant‘ (p. 151).  
 
The individuals that give permission for research to proceed in organisations are often 
referred to as ‗gatekeepers‘; that is ‗those people who have the power to grant or 
withhold access‘ (Burgess, 1984, p. 48). Chua (1996) suggests seeking approval ‗as 
high up the organisational hierarchy as possible‘ (p. 221) to minimise future access 
restrictions, being mindful that the researcher is not viewed as an undercover 
detective hired by management.  
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The personnel targeted in the companies were:  
 
1) Senior MAs, financial controllers or directors operating in a managerial capacity 
with responsibilities for the commercial aspects of the business (therefore 
excluding accounting responsibilities such as treasury, external financial reporting 
and audit); and  
 
2) Senior OMs within different organisation functions e.g., production, logistics, 
distribution, sales, marketing and operations.  
 
The selection of these particular respondents was justified as the study‘s objectives 
required investigating the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences relating to 
the roles of MAs. Secondly understanding the nature of management accounting 
roles, and their effectiveness, necessitated procuring the perceptions of those whom 
MAs support i.e., functional decision makers. Access for phase one of the study was 
attained through the following procedure:  
 
1) A contact name of the head of finance or senior MA for the organisation was 
obtained through personal contacts and professional accounting institute member 
listings (i.e., the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) 
Yearbook 2003 and the CIMA South East Committee details on a branch 
information bulletin) primarily for medium and large manufacturing companies 
located in the Southeast of Ireland, although one company in Dublin was 
contacted.   
 
2) From the CIMA membership listings and the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Ireland (ICAI) Handbook 2004, a database of medium and large companies in 
the Southeast was compiled. In conjunction with these accounting institute 
publications an electronic spreadsheet listing of manufacturing companies in the 
Southeast was procured from IDA Ireland (foreign multinationals) and Enterprise 
Ireland (Irish companies). These listings were for the southeast region (defined as 
Counties Carlow, Kilkenny, Tipperary Southern Region, Waterford and Wexford) 
and classified companies as small (0-50 employees), medium (51-200 employees) 
and large (over 201 employees), and provided business nature and contact details.
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3) A phone call was made to the personal contact or the CFO briefly indicating the 
academic nature of the study and that the commitment only amounted to two 
meetings lasting approximately one-hour. A request was then made by e-mail with 
an attached brief document explaining the requirements of the research, 
assurances on confidentiality, and what was required for participation in the study 
(see appendix B).   
 
4) Follow-up phone calls were then made a few days after the initial letter to discuss 
a response to the request or the researcher was contacted and informed of the 
decision by the respondent.  
 
5) Where consent was given, arrangements were made over the phone regarding 
setting up of the interviews. 
 
Nine companies declined involvement in the study primarily due to time pressures, 
with one private firm expressing concern over confidentiality issues. Personal 
contacts were used, where they existed, in the targeted manufacturing firms. One 
company had significantly downscaled operations and was deemed unsuitable. 
 
4.8.2 Phase one: operational details  
Initially, the objective was to interview two senior MAs and two senior OMs to 
provide a broad picture of the roles of MAs in each organisation. However, following 
a review of the data gathered from the first two manufacturing firms it became 
apparent that there would be greater merit in expanding the number of organisations 
by only interviewing one senior MA and one senior OM in each organisation. This 
decision was based on: the perceived greater merit of having a slightly broader range 
of companies in this inductive phase of the research, the scope for more variation 
being detected in the findings, and medium sized firms tended to only have one senior 
MA or controller.  
 
In total for phase one, 36 interviews were conducted (lasting approximately one hour) 
with the last interview taking place on October 15
th 
2004. In total 16 manufacturing 
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companies were involved (two interviews in 14 companies and four interviews in the 
first two companies).  Six of the 16 companies were medium-sized indigenous Irish 
firms and the remaining 10 were Irish or foreign-owned multi-national public 
corporations or large private firms. All bar six interviews were recorded. The un-
recorded interviews were at the interviewees‘ request. Extensive field notes were 
taken and interview summaries were written up immediately following the interview. 
Table 4.8 summaries some of the interviewee details. The interviewee reference is for 
reasons of anonymity and the first letter represents the company reference and the 
second letter, the functional role of the manager (e.g., F = Finance Manager, O = 
Operating Manager). 
 
Ref. 
 
Job Title Turnover  / 
Employees 
Interview 
Date (2004) 
Interview 
length 
Recorded 
AF1 Financial Controller & AIS Manager >€200m 
550 
May 5  
 
75 mins Yes 
AF2 Senior Management Accountant: 
South Region 
 June 24 
 
60 mins Yes 
AO1 Development Manager  June 24 
 
60 mins Yes 
AO2 Commercial Manager  July 14 
 
40 mins Yes 
BF1 Director of Finance and Automation 
of IT 
Not given 
430 
May 7 
 
60 mins No 
BF2 Finance 
Manager 
 May 7 
 
60 mins No 
BO1 Logistics 
Director  
 May 7 
 
70 mins No 
BO2 Director of  
Manufacturing 
 May 7 
 
60 mins No 
CF Management 
Accountant Team Leader 
$70m+  
160 
May 13 
 
70 mins Yes 
CO Materials Director  May 20 
 
40 mins Yes 
DF Finance 
Director 
€99m 
583 
May 14 
 
100 mins No 
DO Operations 
Manager 
 July 30 
 
60 mins Yes 
EF Financial 
Controller 
$25m 
200 
July 26 
 
60 mins Yes 
EO Site Director  May 17 
 
25 mins Yes 
FF Financial 
Controller 
€11-12m 
130 
Oct 15 
 
45 mins Yes 
FO Executive Chairman  June 21 
 
40 mins No 
GF Finance  
Director 
€5m 
110 
June 22 
July 27 
60 mins 
30 mins 
Yes 
Yes 
GO Manufacturing 
Manager 
 July 27 45 mins Yes 
HF Finance  
Director 
$80-90m 
500 
June 29 80 mins Yes 
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HO Operations 
Manager 
 July 20 60 mins Yes 
IF Finance  
Manager 
€300m 
500 
June 30 60 mins Yes 
IO Factory 
Manager 
 June 29 45 mins Yes 
JF Financial 
Controller 
€95m 
280 
July 6 50 mins Yes 
JO Sales and Export Manager 
 
 July 6 60 mins Yes 
KF Financial  
Controller 
€5m-€8m 
40+ 
July 15 80 mins Yes 
KO Operations 
Manager 
 Sep 1 60 mins Yes 
LF Chief Financial Officer €50m+ 
250 
July 16 50 mins Yes 
LO Export Sales  
Director 
 July 16 55 mins Yes 
MF Company Secretary/ Finance 
Manager 
€7.5m 
70 
July 19 60 mins Yes 
MO Factory 
Manager 
 Sep 10 60 mins Yes 
NF Financial 
Controller 
€25m 
100 
July 19 75 mins Yes 
NO Managing 
Director 
 Oct 14 45 mins Yes 
OF Financial 
Director 
€22m 
165 
July 19 55 mins Yes 
OO Marketing 
Manager 
 Aug 26 60 mins 
 
Yes 
PF Finance 
Manager 
€50–100m 
540 
July 21 60 mins Yes 
PO Manager Customer  
Services 
 July 21 60 mins Yes 
 
Table 4.8 – Summary details of interviewees in phase one of the research 
 
4.8.3 Phase two: gaining access   
Convenience sampling was used in phase two, as continuing in the qualitative mode 
of enquiry the aim was to understand in a deeper sense, the nature of particular 
antecedents, characteristics, and consequences that emerged from phase one (see 
section 6.2). Phase one of the study focused on senior MAs but phase two focused on 
more junior MAs. A number of factors related to this decision: 
 
1) The overall aim of the study, including phases one and two, is to understand the 
roles of MAs and not senior financial officers. Phase one included some senior 
financial officers who had duties of a more fiduciary and external nature, and 
therefore, less of an internal management accounting function. However, in phase 
one, many FMs would have previously been in more junior management 
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accounting roles and now had MAs reporting into them. 
 
2) In phase one there was some variability (see table 4.8 in section 4.8.2) in the 
seniority of MAs (i.e., senior MA or financial controller or finance director) and 
variability in the type of firm (i.e., indigenous or MNE subsidiary). This 
variability was removed in phase two by targeting MAs in MNE subsidiaries who 
reported into FMs. 
 
3) The analysis of phase one data indicated that some perceptions of the roles of 
MAs were of a normative nature (see sections 5.5 and 6.2). This was partly related 
to the extent that management accounting was a part of FMs‘ roles, as per the 
variability noted in the previous point. To counteract this, and to address the phase 
two objectives, it was deemed important to focus on very specific or actual roles 
of MAs.  
 
4) The outcome of the analysis from phase one indicated that a distinction was being 
made between the FM and the MA as regards the extent of the involvement of 
MAs in supporting the strategic decision needs of managers (see sections 5.2.2.5, 
5.3.2.1, and 5.5). Phase one captured the views of FMs in this regard, but not the 
views of MAs, and so it was deemed appropriate to focus on these more junior 
MAs. The focus on more junior MAs also linked to the wider findings from phase 
one (see sections 5.5 and 6.2) that showed variability in the roles of MAs in 
supporting OMs. 
 
Thus, phase one generally captured the perspectives of senior MAs, or FMs, and 
phase two targeted specific MAs in more junior positions. Phase two entailed the 
employment of the case approach as noted earlier to investigate, through interviews 
and documents analysis, particular factors relating to these actual roles of MAs. The 
junior level of MAs targeted also matched the level targeted by Hopper (1980) who 
defined the MAs in his study as those occupying ‗the lowest position within the 
organisation responsible for producing the management accounts and liaising with 
other managers regarding their interpretation‘ (p. 403). 
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These specific roles of MAs examined in phase two were linked to specific managers 
that interacted with these MAs, drawing on role theory methodology (Kahn et al., 
1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978). The criteria that determined this linkage was the MA, in 
the first interview (see section 4.6.4), who was asked to identify who in the 
organisation most influenced their roles. Unlike Hopper (1980), but consistent with 
role theory methodology, MAs could identify anyone in the organisation who most 
influenced their roles e.g., FMs could be identified if that was the case. This more 
inclusive approach permitted the relative ranking of FMs and OMs as influencers. The 
process generated a list for each MA of ranked members of the organisation who most 
influenced their roles. On the basis of this list, the highest ranking, or most influential, 
OM on the roles of the MA, was targeted for the next interview. This list will be 
referred to in phase two findings (chapter six) and the discussion (chapter seven), and 
is also presented in appendix G. For 11 of the 12 roles of MAs the most influential 
OM was interviewed; one exception was in Company E where the most highly ranked 
OM was a sales manager who declined to be interviewed, notwithstanding a number 
of efforts at securing it. However, the next ranked OM on the list was selected and 
interviewed. The third influencer for the MA in Company C was the managing 
director but the MA observed that this influence was primarily through the financial 
director and so the next OM influencer was selected. A limitation in this overall 
process is that only the primary, and not all, role influencers are included, which is 
noted in the limitations of the study (see section 8.6.2). This inevitably was a question 
of trading off the number of individual MAs linked to individual managers as ‗cases‘ 
versus less MAs as cases but more role influencers for these MAs. 
 
To initiate the selection of MAs to participate in phase two, the researcher contacted 
the FMs who had participated in phase one and arranged a meeting with them. On 
contacting the FMs, the researcher thanked the participants for their contribution to 
the first phase of the research and asked for an opportunity to discuss some of the 
summary themes that emerged from the research to date with a view to discussing the 
opportunity of their company participating further in the study. As in phase one, the 
purpose of the next phase of the study was outlined and assurances were given 
regarding confidentiality. In the meetings, it was outlined that phase two of the study 
required interviewing MAs, and managers that interacted with them, and the analysis 
of documentation and reports that may relate to that interaction. The meetings 
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generally lasted about 30 minutes. The phase one companies that were targeted 
regarding phase two were generally the larger companies as they tended to have a 
MA, or a team of MAs, reporting into the FM. Thus, contact was not made with 
companies F, G, J, K, M, and N. Table 4.9 provides a summary of the outcome of 
these meetings that linked into phase two of the study. 
 
Ref. 
 
Job Title Date  
(2006) 
Outcome  
AF1 Financial Controller  
& AIS Manager 
Feb 2 
30 mins 
Access granted for phase two. 
BF1 Director of Finance 
and Automation of 
IT 
Feb 2 
60 mins 
Access denied for phase two. 
Reason: recruiting an MA at present and a major audit 
coming up. 
CF Management 
Accountant Team 
Leader 
Jan 16 
30 mins 
Suggested that access may be okay but would need to 
speak to the financial controller. 
 
 Financial Controller 
[Not in phase one] 
Feb 1 
20 mins 
Access granted for phase two. Confidentiality 
agreement required and a presentation to MAs at end of 
study. 
DF Finance 
Director 
Jan 13 
45 mins 
Access granted for phase two. 
HF Finance Director Feb 16 
30 mins 
Suggested contact in following couple of weeks but 
following two phone calls HF commented that he would 
contact the researcher. Contact was not made. 
LF Chief Financial 
Officer 
Jan 19 
30 mins 
Access denied for phase two. 
Major restructuring in progress and many consultants 
had been on site and therefore having a researcher on site 
was not best at that time. 
PF Finance 
Manager 
Jan 11 
20 mins 
Mar 10 
20 mins 
Requested a subsequent meeting to explore further. 
 
Access granted for phase two. 
 
 
Table 4.9 – Meetings with phase one participants seeking phase two access 
 
Contact was also made by e-mail with OF but the researcher was informed that the 
MA had an ‗extremely heavy workload at present‘. Brief contact was made with IF by 
phone but IF had to attend a meeting immediately and subsequent phone calls were 
unsuccessful in securing any response. With regard to company E the FM no longer 
worked for the same company.  As the meetings were progressing and there appeared 
to be some invitations being accepted and some being declined, the researcher 
deemed that it would be prudent to consider MAs in other organisations that had not 
participated in phase one to ensure that there were 12 MAs to participate in the study. 
The setting of 12 as a target number of MAs for phase two was determined by 
balancing the need for an in-depth enquiry of each MA against the need for some 
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meaningful comparative analysis, while also being mindful of the resource 
constraints. Through a personal contact, the researcher contacted a financial controller 
of another manufacturing company by phone and e-mail and access was granted for 
the study to proceed.  
 
4.8.4 Phase two: operational details  
Table 4.10 summarises the interviewee details for phase two of the study. As MAs 
were specifically linked with OMs that they interacted with, the table presents each 
MA with the matched OM beneath. The linkage was established by MAs identifying 
who most influenced their roles in the organisation, following role theory 
methodology as noted in section 4.8.3, and see appendix G for the rankings provided 
by MAs. The same MA appears twice as each MA was interviewed twice, following 
the role theory design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
Ref. 
 
Job Title Interview 
Date (2006) 
Interview 
length 
Recorded 
AM1 
AO1 
AM1 
Operations Accountant – Business Unit A, Site A 
Supply Chain & Maintenance Manager 
As above 
Feb 16 
May 4 
Aug 11 
 
60 mins 
60 mins 
60 mins 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
AM2 
AO2 
AM2 
Operations Accountant – Business Unit B, Site A 
Operations Manager 
As above  
 
Feb 23 
May 4 
Aug 11 
75 mins 
60 mins 
75 mins 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
AM3 
AO3 
AM3 
Financial Accountant – Business Unit C, Site A 
Business Unit Manager 
As above 
Mar 3 
May 17  
Aug 10 
 
105 mins 
60 mins 
75 mins 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
AM4 
AO4 
AM4 
 
Operations Accountant – Site B 
Plant Manager – Site B 
As above  
Mar 9 
May 16 
Aug 11 
 
90 mins 
80 mins 
75 mins 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
     
BM1 
BO1 
BM1 
Management Accountant  – Capital  
Project Manager 
As above  
Feb 22 
Apr 21 
Aug 29 
 
75 mins 
60 mins 
60 mins 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
BM2 
BO2 
BM2 
Management Accountant – Inventory 
Planning / Business Partner 
As above  
 
Feb 22 
Apr 4 
Aug 29 
50 mins 
50 mins 
60 mins 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
BM3 
BO3 
BM3 
Management Accountant  – Planning  
Production Director 
As above  
Mar 6 
Apr 4  
Jul 27 
 
60 mins 
50 mins 
60 mins 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
BM4 
BO4 
BM4 
 
Management Accountant  – Cost Analyst 
Packaging Production Manager 
As above  
Mar 6 
Apr 6 
Jul 27  
 
60 mins 
50 mins 
45 mins 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
     
CM 
CO 
CM 
Financial Accountant 
Operations Director 
As above  
Apr 26 
Sep 20 
Oct 18  
 
80 mins 
65 mins 
100 mins 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
     
DM1 
DO1 
DM1 
Management Accountant Supply Chain  
Commercial Manager Supply Chain  
As above 
 
Jun 23 
Jun 29 
Sep 14 
60 mins 
50 mins 
85 mins 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
DM2
DO2
DM2 
Management Accountant  – Sales Divisions 
Commercial Manager 
As above 
Jun 23 
Jul 17  
Aug 10 
 
60 mins 
85 mins 
75 mins 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
     
EM 
EO 
EM 
 
Financial Services Manager 
Production Manager 
As above  
Jul 13 
Aug 29 
Aug 29 
 
90 mins 
75 mins 
75 mins 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Table 4.10 - Summary details of interviewees in phase two of the research 
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Company E in table 4.10 is the only company that did not participate in phase one of 
the research. Table 4.11 summarises the mapping between the different referencing 
systems used for the same companies between phase one and two of the research and 
also indicates if the MAs relate to the FM that was interviewed in that company in 
phase one of the research. 
 
Co. ref. 
phase two 
MAs Co. ref. 
phase one 
Manager who was 
a FM in phase one 
A AM1 to AM3 
 
D DF 
 
B BM1 to BM4 
 
C CF 
 
C CM P PF 
D DM1 and DM2 A AF1 
 
Table 4.11 – Summary of phase one and two referencing systems and connections 
 
AM4, while a MA in Company A, was located at a nearby site and reported to a 
financial controller on that site. This company A site was engaged in manufacturing a 
different product to the site where AM1 to AM3 and AF1 were located. As can be 
seen from table 4.11, the FM in phase one was in most cases, the manager of the MAs 
interviewed in phase two, although the design did not require this as the criterion for 
the selection for phase two was to target more junior MAs than those in phase one. 
There were two instances where the same individual was interviewed in phase one 
and phase two of the study. Table 4.12 presents details about these interviewees and 
provides an explanation of why this occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
 
Phase one 
reference 
Phase two 
reference 
Comment 
 
AF2 
[Finance] 
 
DM2 
[same 
interviewee] 
 
Company A was the first company in which the interviews of phase 
one occurred. At this early stage, the design had commenced by 
targeting two FMs and two OMs in each company. As noted above, 
following a review of emerging interview data from Company A 
and Company B - the only companies in phase one in which four 
interviews took place - the researcher deemed that the research 
would have greater merit if the design was altered to focus on one 
FM and one OM in each manufacturing firm. Thus, only one FM 
and one OM were interviewed in companies C to P in phase one.  
 
The FM was also asked to respond to a different set of questions in 
phase two as per section 4.5.4 and section 4.6.4 on the interview 
guide design, which were based on different research objectives as 
specified in section 4.4.1 (phase one) and section 6.2 (phase two). 
 
 
DO 
[Operations] 
 
AO1 
[same 
interviewee] 
 
 
In phase one DF (a FM) had suggested DO as an OM to interview 
about the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences regarding 
the roles of MAs in general. In phase two, AM1 specifically 
identified AO1 as the OM that most influenced her roles, which 
following the research design of phase two, necessitated re-
interviewing that OM.  
 
The OM was also asked to respond to a different set of questions in 
phase two as per the comment above for AF2 and DM2. 
 
Table 4.12 – Interviewees that participated in phase one and two 
 
4.9 Qualitative data analysis 
Miles (1979) poses the ultimate challenge in analysing qualitative data: ‗how can we 
be sure that an ―earthy‖, ―undeniable‖, ―serendipitous‖ finding is not, in fact wrong?‘ 
(p. 590). This section sets out how qualitative data analysis was approached in both 
phases of the research. Burgess (1984) notes that ‗field research involves the 
simultaneous collection and analysis of data‘ (p. 166) which includes a ‗vast range of 
documentary material‘ and ‗interview transcripts‘ which relates to the nature of this 
study. The process of analysis is not linear as Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the 
process is a ‗strikingly iterative one‘ (p. 546).  
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) advocate a tripartite iterative approach that involves the 
reduction of data, the use of data displays, and drawing and verifying conclusions. 
Data reduction refers to the ongoing ‗process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or 
transcriptions‘ (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). Data reduction is present in the 
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process of selecting particular research questions and cases, identifying themes, 
conceptualisations and up to the point of the final write up of the study. Components 
of data reduction include ‗writing summaries, coding, teasing out themes, making 
clusters, making partitions and writing memos‘ (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). 
Burgess (1984) identifies three separate roles for field notes i.e., substantive, 
methodological and analytical field notes. Substantive notes record the operational 
details, methodological notes are ‗personal impressions of situations and personal 
involvement‘ (p. 192) and analytical notes relate to the researcher‘s exploration, 
thematic analysis and analysis of the data. Data displays are used to enhance 
understanding of the subject in terms of what is occurring. Included here are the use 
of various data matrices or charts or models which map or organise the data in a way 
that assists the researcher with analysis. The final component is drawing conclusions 
which essentially forces the researcher to contemplate what the data actually mean. 
This is an ongoing process of testing and verifying the plausibility of tentative and 
emerging conclusions until data collection and analysis is finished.  
 
Drawing on this literature, the following sections articulate the qualitative data 
analysis strategies pursued in each phase of the research. While the strategies in both 
phases had many commonalities they also had some unique features e.g., some 
manual methods occurred in both phases but different software was used in phase one 
and phase two. The use of specifically designed qualitative data analysis software 
(NVivo7®) was only at the very early stages of institutional adoption during phase 
one analysis and a detailed analysis strategy had already been developed and 
implemented and so timing precluded its use in phase one.  
 
4.9.1 Analysis of data: phase one 
A number of parallel processes underpinned the analysis of the qualitative data. 
Transcripts were typed up, read, and re-read, and a manual coding procedure was 
adopted in that the researcher made notes in a wide right hand margin of the transcript 
(Burgess, 1984). The 30 interview tapes were listened to repeatedly on car journeys 
and the interview field notes and interview summaries were continuously consulted 
(O‘Dwyer, 2002). Qualitative data analysis ran in parallel with data collection and 
initial ideas or reflections on the meaning of the data were recorded for future 
reference. Transcripts were returned to interviewees for validation purposes. 
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Data grids, similar in principle to the notion of data displays or data matrices, as 
advocated by Miles and Huberman (1994), were then constructed in spreadsheets to 
get a better feel for the data. Excerpts from the data grids are reproduced in appendix 
D. The grids were three dimensional in that they were constructed by mapping the 
respondents (in the rows) against the codes or labels (in the columns) identified in the 
manual coding procedure, with the third dimension being a categorisation of variables 
into antecedents, characteristics, and consequence (in separate data sheets). 
 
These grids allowed the researcher to identify the antecedents (see appendix D1), 
characteristics (see appendix D2), and consequences (see appendix D3) by each 
respondent (and type of respondent, FM or OM, and firm), the commonality of 
perceptions (or not) with other respondents, and to produce a bird‘s eye view of the 
data in a visual display. The grids were printed off for viewing and analysis purposes 
and were then carefully examined and reflected upon in light of recurring, isolated, 
and conflicting themes. A data reduction exercise also occurred (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) as some variables that were initially separately identified were 
subsequently found to be the same. The grids, being in electronic form, facilitated the 
moving of codes (i.e., variable names or labels) around the grids as for example 
certain antecedents had links to characteristics and this was straightforward to do. The 
grids also facilitated the grouping and re-grouping of data e.g., comparing FM 
perceptions to OM perceptions by company and then as a group of FMs and as a 
group of OMs (see appendix D4). 
 
The analysis concluded by making a summary list of all the antecedents, 
characteristics, and consequences identified in the grids with a reference to their 
precise location. Finding references to a particular antecedent, characteristic, or 
consequence in an individual transcript was facilitated by transcript file organisation 
around organisations and the word processor search facility. 
 
4.9.2 Analysis of data: phase two 
The approach adopted for the analysis of the data was one that involved a number of 
sequences and parallel processes. Following each interview an interview summary 
was immediately written up and the interviews were transcribed and returned to 
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interviewees for confirmation and clearance purposes. As various management reports 
were also gathered, these were put together with the relevant interview transcripts and 
filed separately. Initially, and subsequently, the material was read and re-read in its 
raw form and notes were made in the margins of the transcripts.  
 
The next step was the importation of the transcripts into NVivo7® for further 
analysis. The initial codes created, or ‗free nodes, were based on the preceding 
manual analysis (see appendix E1). Keeping the phase two research objectives in 
mind the free nodes were explored in regard to their relationships to other free nodes 
and from this analysis emerged a hierarchical structure of nodes or ‗tree nodes‘ (see 
appendix E2). In conjunction with these functions a number of other NVivo7® 
functions were used to facilitate the analysis including search tools, querying tools 
(see appendix E4) that effectively cross-tabulated various nodes and modelling tools 
(see appendix E3), a form of data display (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The process 
just outlined was not a smooth one but required numerous iterations, the on-going 
creation, deletion, merging and splitting of nodes and these analytical decisions were 
recorded in the research log (see appendix E5). Frequently the researcher had recourse 
to the transcripts and management reports for further ‗off-line‘ analysis. One 
particular function of NVivo7® that was continually employed was memos, the 
analytical tool popularised by grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). These 
were analysis documents that were created for each transcript (see appendix E4) 
where analytical notes were made. There was also an overall research log created that 
chronologically recorded notes on analytical strategies, interesting observations, 
contradictions, design related factors and tentative conclusions (see appendix E5). 
 
The researcher constantly returned to the raw transcripts to re-read and reflect on 
them and to make further notes and a word processor was used to compile various 
tables that mapped particular themes against other themes, a sort of non-statistical 
cross-tabulation. This was very effective for creating an overall picture and for noting 
co-occurrences and inconsistencies. While the matrix query function of NVivo7® 
could perform these functions to some extent, the researcher found operating within 
the word processor environment was more effective.  For example, a 53 page analysis 
document, containing numerous code mapping tables, was produced during the data 
analysis (see appendix F). A number of analysis checking mechanisms were 
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employed throughout the analysis to guard against invalid inferences or rash 
conclusions being made. These included: using a number of analysis approaches (e.g., 
comparison of manual coding, automatic coding, using alternative analysis strategies), 
the seeking of further supporting or conflicting evidence, and the continuous 
recording of analysis comments in a research log. 
 
4.9.3 Qualitative data analysis: an evaluation of approaches 
Considering the long history of qualitative research it is worth noting that it was as 
recent as the 1980s that qualitative data analysis tools became available (Kelle, 1995). 
There is some debate in the literature on the merits and drawbacks of employing 
software to assist qualitative data analysis. Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006) note that 
these tools offer to radically change how qualitative data analysis is conducted but 
also present some limitations for researchers. 
 
In engaging with qualitative software Tesch (1990) states that we should be neither 
‗mystified‘ nor ‗expect to get away with no investment in time or no mental struggle 
whatsoever‘ (p. 175). Fielding and Lee (1998) comment that ‗to be convinced about 
the ubiquity of new developments and to be excited about their potentiality is not, of 
course, to endorse those developments uncritically‘ (p. 1). Thus, the use of software in 
the second phase of the research was undertaken having considered the merits and 
challenges associated with its use. Bazeley (2007) identifies the primary concerns 
with software use as: 1) disconnecting the researcher from the data, 2) the over use of 
the ‗code and retrieve‘ analytical approach over and above other analytical options, 3) 
possibly formalising analysis in a way that shifts analysis towards more quantitative 
models, and 4) the software has a particular methodological bent e.g., grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), or manufactures one. To address these concerns 
Bazeley (2007) notes that: 1) the software permits the researcher to return to the 
original data at any point in the analysis, 2) there are many other analytical functions 
within the software besides code and retrieve, 3) coding is a process of analysis and 
interpretation in the software and not prescribed like more structured, quantitative 
programmes, and 4) the software facilitates the use of a wide range of methodologies. 
It is also recognised that qualitative data analysis software removes much of the 
burden from the traditional manual analysis process (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; 
Fielding, 2002) e.g., highlighting (coding) transcripts, copying them, cutting out the 
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highlighted (coded) segments and arranging them for further analysis in relevant 
groups. Richards (2002) observes that: 
 
software (skilfully used) supports more rigorously and fluidly the 
research process we engaged in with manual methods, and provides 
a range of techniques and tools that were impossible, unknown or 
too time-consuming before computers entered the field (p. 267). 
 
However, against this benefit must be weighed the drawback of having to learn to use 
a new piece of software. To address the latter concern the researcher attended three 
NVivo® training programmes, and consulted the relevant literature (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996; Fielding and Lee, 1998; Richards, 2005; Bazeley, 2007). 
 
While it is important to note that both phases followed recommendations in the 
methodological literature (e.g., coding, using memos, summaries, analysis tables, re-
reading the transcripts) it is worth noting some of the more distinctive features of the 
qualitative data analysis strategies between phase one and phase two of the data 
collection. By using alternative analysis strategies, the researcher gained insights into 
the relative merits and challenges inherent to each strategy. In support of the first 
phase analysis strategy the merits included using the tools available and familiar to 
the researcher (e.g., word processor, spreadsheet) and an intimacy with the raw data at 
hand. This approach was challenged by difficulties which included: quickly accessing 
particular parts of transcripts, not permitting much sophisticated searching, and 
perhaps being more labour intensive in managing the volume of paper and array of 
electronic and paper files and records. In support of the second phase analysis strategy 
the merits included: efficient coding and retrieval of transcripts or sections there of, 
the choice from a suite of analytical software functions, and a more integrated or 
centralised management of relevant data files and records. This approach was 
challenged by having to spend considerable time becoming proficient on the software, 
being overwhelmed by the array and sophistication of the analytical tools within the 
software, and the ease with which coding could be performed resulting in over-coding 
or undue complexity in the analysis. The conclusion from this study on the two 
qualitative data analysis strategies used would be to suggest that specifically designed 
analysis software would have greater merit in the analysis process but only very 
marginally so, as there is a steep learning curve and a range, and sophistication, of 
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analytical tools that would seem to be beyond what one would use in one piece of 
research. 
 
4.10 The methodological journey: personal perspectives 
The initial anticipated approach in this study was the ‗QUAN->qual‘ approach 
(Morse, 1991). This is primarily deductive, sequential, facilitates exploring the 
unexpected, and is based on a large quantitative survey followed by smaller 
qualitative phase. It is similar to what Creswell (2003) terms the Sequential 
Explanatory Strategy and its purpose is to ‗use qualitative results to assist in 
explaining and interpreting the findings of a primarily quantitative study‘ (p. 215).  
The researcher notes that this original intention was based more on desired 
methodological exposures for training purposes at the time rather than the emerging 
research problem determining the most appropriate design. 
 
However, following a review of the literature on the research topic it became apparent 
that this approach was untenable; there was an insufficiently strong literature present 
for the construction of robust hypotheses. Thus, the literature only tentatively 
suggested variables that might be relevant to the research problem and at best only 
indicated a loose array of potential factors that may be pertinent. Further, there were 
very few established or appropriate measures available for these potential factors. 
Consequently, the commencement of an inductive phase of data gathering was 
justified: 
 
1. Validation - gathering empirical data from the field enabled the researcher to 
validate the loosely emerging relationships from the literature, while 
simultaneously being receptive to other variables and relationships that were 
not present in the literature. Further, it was possible to qualitatively ascertain 
the perceived strength and direction of relationships.  
 
2. Risk – beginning the study with a survey, without a strong literature base and 
hence a tentative framework, would run the risk of maybe ignoring certain 
relevant variables or under/over stating their importance or perhaps 
oversimplifying the relationships. There was a further risk that the field work, 
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originally planned to precede the survey, would expose serious problems with 
the theoretical framework due to its weak literature foundations. 
 
Prior to the analysis of the data from phase one of the study, the intention was to 
follow up in phase two with what Creswell (2003) terms a sequential exploratory 
design which is depicted in Figure 4.4. 
 
QUAL  QUAL  quan  quan  Interpretation 
Data  Data  Data   Data  of 
Collection Analysis  Collection Analysis  Entire Analysis 
 
 
Figure 4.4 – Sequential exploratory design 
Source: Creswell (2003, p. 213) 
 
However, following the analysis of the phase one data, this research strategy was 
carefully reconsidered. While the analysis of the data indicated a reduced set of 
particular variables that warranted further examination, a decision was made that the 
most appropriate means of conducting a further investigation was to acquire a greater 
depth of enquiry using a qualitative approach. The basis of this decision was: 
 
a) Phase one highlighted particular issues that could not be further explained 
through a quantitative investigation as the variables and their associated 
measurement lacked adequate understanding and definition. 
 
b) Undertaking an in-depth qualitative enquiry would provide a better 
understanding of the key issues that emerged from phase one of the research. 
 
c) The nature of the key variables that emerged from phase one could be viewed 
as sensitive to organisational contexts, multi-faceted and dynamic. Thus, 
investigating variables such as the role expectations, interaction between MAs 
and OMs, role conflicts and ambiguities and contingent antecedents and 
characteristics was deemed to be more suited to a qualitative enquiry than a 
quantitative one. 
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The purpose of the presentation of the research journey is to reflect the evolving, 
iterative nature of the research process from a personal perspective. 
 
4.11 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has presented the research philosophy, problem, objectives and research 
design for two phases of data collection and has identified the merits and challenges 
inherent in such designs. The chapter has presented the methodology adopted in the 
context of the trajectory of previous management accounting methodologies, and has 
explained how the study accounted for validity, reliability and generalisability. Finally 
the chapter dealt with the qualitative data analysis strategies adopted in the research, 
and some reflections on the research journey. The next two chapters respectively 
present the findings from phase one and phase two of the research process. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Findings: Phase One 
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5.1 Introduction   
The findings are presented around three major groups of variables to the study: 
antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles of MAs, in 
line with research objectives of phase one (see section 4.4.1). The findings are based 
on the data collected from 36 in-depth interviews as outlined in the methodology 
chapter (see section 4.5). To protect the confidentiality of individuals and 
organisations a simple lettering system is used to attribute quotations. The first letter 
refers to the manufacturing firm (e.g., A to P) and the second letter refers to whether 
the manager is a finance (F) manager or an operating (O) manager. If there is more 
than one individual in the same firm, a numbering system is used to distinguish them 
(see section 4.8.2 for all interview details). Thus, PO is an OM (or director) and PF is 
a FM (or director) in Company P, and BF2 the second FM interviewed in Company 
B. The general abbreviation of FM and OM is also used. However, in designating 
OMs for operating managers it must be noted that there was considerable variation in 
the roles of OMs e.g., ‗Development Manager‘, ‗Logistics Director‘, ‗Factory 
Manager‘, ‗Manager Customer Services‘, and ‗Export Sales Director‘ (see table 4.8 in 
section 4.8.2). 
   
The next section presents the antecedents associated with the roles of MAs grouped 
into categories of antecedents as relating to external, organisational, and individual. 
The findings on antecedents are then further classified within each of these major 
categories according to sub-categories that became apparent in the data analysis. The 
next major section presents the characteristics associated with the roles of MAs. The 
characteristics are broken down into those characteristics that relate to: the individual, 
the activities that that individual is involved in, and management accounting 
information. The findings on characteristics are then further classified where sub-
themes emerged in the data. The final major thematic component is the consequences 
relating to the roles of MAs. These findings are presented under three major sub-
category headings, namely those consequences that relate to influencing performance, 
information impact, and role interface. As with the findings presented for antecedents 
and characteristics, these three categories of consequences are further broken down 
into sub-theme headings. 
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5.2 Antecedents associated with the roles of MAs 
The antecedents associated with the roles of MAs are grouped into those that may be 
classified as external to the organisation, those that may be classified as organisational 
level antecedents, and finally those that may be classified as individual level 
antecedents. 
 
5.2.1  External antecedents  
Managers, FMs and OMs, indicated that there were a number of external influences 
on the roles of MAs. The interview findings on external antecedents are categorised 
into ownership antecedents, environmental antecedents, and regulatory antecedents. 
 
5.2.1.1 Ownership  
Some of the companies participating in the study were large multi-national 
subsidiaries, while others were smaller indigenous or family-owned firms. As might 
be anticipated, FMs and OMs in subsidiaries noted a very strong influence on the 
roles of MAs from corporate head office as AF1 noted that ‗a lot of dictatorship is 
coming from the group‘ or BO2 who commented that the ‗corporate entity has a huge 
influence on the finance organisation‘. Typically this influence was perceived as a 
demanding, and in some cases expanding reporting regime. Notwithstanding the 
onerous head office reporting requirement, there appeared to be some autonomy 
regarding the provision of local management accounting information as LF remarked 
that ‗all the management information they leave to ourselves‘. Indigenous firms did 
not have this constraint and acknowledged a freedom and a speed to be able to change 
performance management activities locally as they saw fit.  
 
5.2.1.2 Environment 
The majority of FMs and OMs noted that market antecedents, for example economic 
conditions, industrial and related sector trends, intensive competitive forces, 
seasonality and foreign exchange exposure, represented an influence on the roles of 
MAs. EF noted: 
 
The business environment has impacted because when I joined in 
2000 the IT sector was booming and cost control was not an issue 
then whereas now like business in Ireland is like a cost centre, a huge 
cost centre as such. 
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Only one manager commented that their particular firm was not exposed to strong 
competitive pressures as ‗we have a very specialised product that is regarded highly 
by the end user‘ and ‗capacity is ensured‘ [PF]. In contrast DO noted that ‗we were on 
a knife-edge, production was going to move to Asia but we got a stay of execution‘. A 
notable distinction became apparent between larger multinational subsidiaries and 
smaller indigenous firms as MAs in the former were perceived as only being 
indirectly influenced i.e., the business environment impacted the company on a 
corporate level firstly and then this trickled down to the finance function in the 
subsidiary or the environment impacted OMs more so, as BF2 observed: 
 
…environment influencing head office influencing management 
accounting. 
 
One manager felt particularly strongly about MAs being remote from the business 
environment, describing them as ‗almost happy in their ignorance of the market 
forces‘ [LO] but did comment on useful competitive cost analyses that they 
performed. In smaller, self-managed firms MAs were perceived as being more aware 
and directly influenced by market forces.   
 
5.2.1.3 Regulation 
Most managers recognised the influence of statutory and other regulatory factors on 
the roles of MAs. The implementation of the SOX legislation was perceived as having 
a significant impact on US multi-national subsidiaries as HF commented: ‗Sarbanes 
Oxley has thrown the business into confusion‘. EF noted: 
 
Reporting has become a huge part in it but even in the last three 
years it has grown I mean it seems to be growing more because of 
the Enron scandal. There are a lot more requirements introduced by 
the SEC. 
 
Managers in most companies mentioned the influence of compliance requirements 
relating to legislation and accounting regulation on the roles of MAs.  
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5.2.2 Organisational antecedents  
On an organisational level quite a number of factors were perceived as influencing the 
roles of MAs. These included the: organisation‘s size, structure, culture, technology, 
management, the business‘s nature and circumstances, location, and the performance 
management systems.  
 
5.2.2.1 Size 
The organisational size was perceived as an influence in terms of determining the size 
of the accounting function, the awareness MAs have of activities occurring outside 
the finance function, and the extent to which the roles of MAs are formally structured. 
PO commented that ‗the size of the organisation, that definitely affects their role‘ and 
with that particular company facing imminent expansion PO questioned whether 
larger firms are ‗more regimented; are they as flexible because they don‘t have the 
ground contact that we have here in a small company?‘. FO remarked that the: 
 
…dynamics that occur in indigenous business, some come from a plc 
background, more institutionalised in bigger companies, boundary 
they won‘t venture out of. 
 
In a large IT multinational EO stated that ‗the role is defined and then you hire the 
person to fit the role rather than the person defining the role‘ and ‗there are 35,000 
people in Company E so there are very typical standard definitions of roles‘. In 
Company D, during the interview, the finance director printed out and presented a 
detailed activity list pertaining to every job description in the finance function. 
Generally speaking, the findings indicated that the smaller the organisation, the wider 
the remit of responsibilities for the roles of MAs and the easier it was for MAs to be 
informed of what was going on in the business.  
 
5.2.2.2 Structure 
Functional structures dominated in the manufacturing organisations with structures 
flatter in the smaller organisations. Despite the structural definition there was a 
recurring perception between FMs and OMs that boundaries were translucent as CF 
remarked: ‗they don‘t like departments sitting together‘. BO2 drew more attention to 
how MAs interacted across functions as opposed to aligning rigidly to structures: 
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…depends on individuals involved, stand alone departments…here 
extent of cross-functionality, stop thinking one function, all 
processes are cross-functional, team training… really how you use it, 
don‘t think in lines. 
 
In the larger MNEs a more hierarchical and rigid structure prevailed and this impacted 
on reporting structures also.  
 
5.2.2.3 Culture 
Culture was perceived as an influence on the roles of MAs across the manufacturing 
companies. IF remarked that ‗the culture really in my experience is a huge influence 
from one organisation to another‘. The most common cultural theme was a ‗team‘, 
‗open‘ culture and was sometimes expressed as a customer perspective: 
 
Very much team spirit, very much what we do is destined for the 
patient - the patient is at the centre of all that we do [CO]. 
 
Some cultural influences reflected the nature of the business, its status, its industry or 
the extent of perceived control. Some cultures were referred to as ‗cost‘ cultures or 
somewhat negatively due to complacency or the prospects of a company closure. One 
manager commented how the culture could determine the difficulty that MAs may 
experience in control: 
 
If the culture is conducive to controls for example and good 
procedures it makes the work and the job of the financial controller a 
lot easier. If the culture is the opposite it makes the financial 
controller‘s job extremely difficult [AO2]. 
 
Culture was generally perceived as a phenomenon that permeated the wider 
organisation but some cultural values were attributed to finance such as a ‗cost‘ 
culture, or one that had formerly been referred to as an ‗overtime, working weekends‘ 
culture [AF1]. In Company L, a family-owned MNE, the OM described ‗a low style 
accounting culture, that is more controlled and sort of, hoarders of information rather 
than a dispenser of information‘ and ‗a culture that resists change‘ [LO]. 
 
5.2.2.4 Technology 
The findings show technology as being influential on the roles of MAs, particularly in 
the automation of transaction processing, information integration, and reporting cycle 
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time reduction. EF commented that ‗it is nearly a bookless office at this stage‘ and in 
Company H, where an ERP system was globally installed, HF commented that: 
 
...we‘re starting to leverage some of the benefits like we‘ve now got 
in Strategic Enterprise Management where your ledger now is 
actually almost downloaded into the US, day two.  
 
DF commented on their electronic set of accounts: 
 
….40 page report once upon a time, P and L, Balance Sheet, now go 
to boardroom and PC takes numbers directly from the network, to 
throw up analysis files. 
 
There was also a sense that due to automation of routine accounting activities, the 
activities of MAs had moved to a higher analytical level as GF commented: ‗what you 
are doing is you are getting rid of lower level work by the computer‘. Many of the 
larger firms had integrated systems such as ERP systems installed but the perceived 
impact of these systems on the roles of MAs appeared ambiguous as some FMs 
observed:  
 
Well I‘d say it‘s probably made things easier but has also produced a 
lot more information. But in terms of making life easier or lessening 
the workload, never. In terms of the benefit of a lot more information 
and in a different way, yes [LF]. 
 
We as a corporation have invested serious money in SAP [an ERP 
system]. We had a terrific system prior to SAP, we implemented 
SAP and it certainly hit us back probably two to three years until we 
really got back to where we were [HF]. 
 
While most managers perceived technology as an influence on the roles of MAs, there 
was a perceived need to make much greater use of technology. AO1 viewed SAP as 
‗more a financial accounting system rather than a management accounting system‘, 
while CF identified the need to ‗get better quality information out of it. So that‘s, yes, 
a challenge here for us‘. In total, six FMs and three OMs specifically commented on 
leveraging information systems more. 
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5.2.2.5 Management  
A very strong emphasis was placed on management as an influence on the roles of 
MAs. The findings indicate there was an expectation for MAs to be involved in 
supporting managers and that this in turn influenced the roles, as IO remarked: 
 
The demands that we make upon them as factory managers would 
certainly influence them. 
 
The extent of management influence was perceived as varying according to where the 
immediate difficulties lay, how amenable the area was to manage, the OM‘s previous 
experiences of the roles of MAs in a different company, and the individual manager‘s 
style. LO noted that ‗I wanted to see the data compared to what I was used to in my 
previous company so I have come from one sort of model into a slightly different one‘ 
[LO]. The influence of management was manifest in a number of different ways in 
organisations i.e., some managers demanded interaction and others less so: 
  
Management accountants, they are trying to get involved, but 
commercial managers will only involve them when they see fit, 
which is not necessarily a good idea, but like I said, things are 
changing definitely [AO1]. 
 
Some [OMs want more involvement with MAs] do and some 
don‘t…some have different styles of doing things [AF2]. 
 
The managing director was perceived as a significant influence as PF stated ‗the 
managing director is a huge influence‘ or as OO stated ‗the MD, he would be a huge 
influence over very aspect of the company‘. The functional background of the 
managing director was generally considered an influence as GF stated: 
 
It [the business] would actually be driven more by non-financial 
indicators and again that is because we have an MD who is from the 
engineering side and who is not a financial…who doesn‘t like 
financial indicators really. 
 
In one firm, in contrast to most, the FM had a strong decision making role in 
management and one OM suggested that the FM should ensure OMs were involved in 
all decisions. The head of the finance function or the general perceived approach of 
173 
 
the finance function was perceived as a significant influence on the roles of MAs as 
OMs noted: 
 
Different management styles have a huge influence like as I said the 
dictatorial style [of the former financial controller] didn‘t seem to 
work with anyone I saw in there. But the innovative style and the 
openness and go on have a stab at it, that works [AO1]. 
 
Director of finance mandates, forces involvement, could box the 
department, not here. Now working closely, partnership approach 
[BO2]. 
 
DF noted an ‗expectation‘ that the MA ‗does not just sit at the desk‘ but is ‗going to 
meetings, problem solving‘, while having to ‗go through finance director, depends on 
level‘. DF explained that the: ‗finance director, 50% away from desk, management 
accountant, 20%‘. Further, there tended to be a matching of the management level of 
the FMs and the OMs in terms of interaction. In many firms operating directors 
generally liaised with finance directors, senior OMs generally liaised with financial 
controllers, while MAs were generally perceived as interacting with OMs. DO 
remarked that: ‗the management accountant is operational and the financial controller 
is strategic‘ [DO]. 
 
5.2.2.6 Business nature and circumstances 
The current status of the business was perceived as influencing the roles of MAs e.g., 
some of the events occurring in the participating companies during the research 
included major business expansion, business ownership transfer, a major business 
start-up phase, and public floatation as GF remarked: ‗it all depends on what is going 
on. At this moment in time we are in the middle of fundraising so at this moment in 
time…that would take most of my time now‘. In Company N, a change of ownership 
had taken place since the initial interview with the financial controller and the 
subsequent interview with the OM. The OM, who was the former managing director 
of the company, had at the time of the interview, just commenced operating in a 
consulting capacity reporting to the new management team. NO commented how the 
MA was pivotal in the business circumstances: 
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…in most cases when I was away, she was in charge. But she had 
also a very strong influence on the organisation because she was 
forced to have, purely because we were so cash strapped. 
 
The impact of circumstances relates to on-going variability in activities associated 
with the roles of MAs (see section 5.3.2) and although some of these circumstances 
appeared to have a one-off quality, there was a sense that responding to changing 
circumstances was an on-going influence on the roles of MAs. Some of the smaller 
firms commented on the positive influence of a non-executive director on the nature 
of the firm‘s accounting function. Further, the nature of the business in terms of its 
complexity (e.g., multiple and different products) and its primary function (e.g., 
manufacturing, sales) dictated an influence on the roles of MAs.  
 
5.2.2.7 Location 
The location of accountants was largely perceived as not of much concern to many 
OMs due to the existing physical proximity of MAs to OMs, the MAs having an 
approachable open-door policy, and the ease of technological communication. DO 
explained: 
 
Location doesn‘t make much difference to me because they‘re 
always accessible, they have an open plan office, so it‘s straight 
forward to talk to them [DO]. 
 
In contrast, in Company L the finance function was located in a different building and 
the OM commented that the FM ‗may as well be in Dublin [considerable distance 
from location] in some respects as in a different building, we don‘t necessarily 
interact‘ [LO]. However, this was the exception rather than the rule. One OM 
commented that, whatever the physical location of MAs, MAs need to interact with 
OMs out in the business operations:  
 
I think they do need to be seen to be out in the bushes as it were. 
Certainly, on occasions, on a regular basis, should not be in an oval 
office type situation. That is important [AO2]. 
 
Managers recognised that the existing physical office infrastructure had to be 
accepted as it was. 
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5.2.2.8 Performance management systems 
The performance management systems which included budgeted organisational 
targets were perceived as influencing the roles of MAs in determining a focus on key 
business drivers or indicators. In all companies the annual budget was the primary 
organisational target, with varying degrees of flexibility in its use i.e., less flexibility 
in MNE subsidiaries than in independent firms. HF remarked that ‗we have a very 
aggressive budget set every year, we cannot, we have very little scope in improving‘ 
[HF]. This reflected the extent that MAs were involved in the design, production, and 
monitoring of such systems, as IO remarked that ‗that shapes their lives‘. There was a 
common theme of coming in on budget and this influenced the interaction between 
MAs and OMs, and sometimes created a tension between group and local managers‘ 
requirements. Performance management systems were also evident as impacting on 
the roles of MAs at the individual level through individual goals and objectives that 
typically linked into annual performance reviews.  
 
5.2.3 Individual antecedents  
Managers generally identified individual-level antecedents as the MAs themselves. 
MAs as antecedents to their own roles related to the extent that MAs had some 
influence over their own roles. These findings are presented under the categories of 
the orientation of the MA and the background of the MA. 
 
5.2.3.1 Orientation 
Many of the FMs and OMs noted that the type of individual in the role, in terms of 
attitude, approachability, self-drive, and personality could largely shape the actual 
role itself in the organisation. Managers referred to ‗how they interpret their role‘ 
[DO], a ‗mentality‘ [KF], the role as ‗individual-based‘ [LO], or as GF stated: ‗it‘s up 
to them to actually make a role‘. One FM regarded the finance function as ‗pretty 
much self-driven‘ [PF]. HO suggested that ‗you have got to be hungry for this kind of 
stuff‘ [HO]. EO suggested that MAs tend to have an orientation towards one of two 
role types: 
 
…the one thing I would see influencing it is the individual‘s 
strengths in terms of whether or not their tendency is more towards 
accounting or whether their tendency is more towards the business 
management, business partnering side of things. 
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In Company H the finance director remarked that he had a MA and a financial 
accountant reporting to him and due to ‗personality and focus‘ differences, ‗if I flip 
the roles, both would not survive in the business more than six months. I‘d be 
replacing both of them‘ [HF]. 
 
5.2.3.2 Background 
The general perception was that the educational and career background of MAs had 
an influence on their current roles. Although previous experience was valued, it was 
noted that it did not have to be in the same industry, as BF commented that he was 
‗not too concerned about business knowledge, bright 22 year old, hire, will know it 
quickly‘. Regarding perceptions of professional qualifications, there was generally a 
high regard attributed to the CIMA qualification. The FM of Company H commented 
that he employed three CIMA qualified staff and stated that ‗I‘ve come through a 
totally different route, I‘m Chartered. It is totally the wrong route to come into 
manufacturing‘. Also, three of the 18 OMs interviewed were CIMA qualified MAs. 
 
5.2.4 Summary of antecedents 
This section has presented a range of antecedents to the roles of MAs which relate to 
external factors and internal factors including both organisational and individual 
factors with further antecedents presented within these categories. The antecedents 
identified by interviewees were not perceived as discrete but more varied and 
sometimes simultaneously pressing. Further, one FM noted that role influences may 
be unexpected, as ‗sometimes you could come in and say I‘m going to do X, Y and Z 
now today and that‘s the day all hell breaks lose‘ [JF]. Interviewees were asked to 
identify what influenced the roles of MAs the most, and many responded that 
management and the MA themselves were the strongest influences. Other managers 
that commented typically suggested that it was a combination of influences as 
previously discussed and one FM and one OM mentioned SOX. Head office was also 
noted specifically by one FM. The findings on the antecedents to the roles of MAs are 
analysed in the discussion chapter in sections 7.2 and 7.3. Having presented the 
antecedents to the role of MAs, the following section presents the findings regarding 
characteristics relating to the roles of MAs.  
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5.3 Characteristics associated with the roles of MAs 
The findings on the characteristics of the roles of MAs are categorised as individual 
characteristics, activity characteristics, and information characteristics. Within each of 
these categories of characteristics further sub-themes are presented following from the 
data analysis.  
 
5.3.1 Individual characteristics 
A number of individual characteristics were identified by the interviewees and the 
major characteristics included business knowledge, interpersonal and communication 
skills, IT skills, flexibility, personal qualities, technical skills, monitoring skills, and 
organisational influence.   
 
5.3.1.1 Business knowledge  
Both FMs and OMs portrayed a very similar view of the desired characteristics of the 
roles of MAs. A recurring characteristic identified included possessing an in-depth 
understanding of the business as HO noted: ‗internally in the business, externally in 
the environment‘. DO gave an indication of the knowledge required by suggesting 
that ‗they should be able to bring down anybody to the shop floor and give them a 
comprehensive shop floor tour‘ and stated that:  
 
I would like them to know a lot, a lot more about the process and to 
understand it fully and to get involved as opposed to, you know what 
I mean, to be up in the finance office and you come down on the 
factory floor once a year. 
 
However, OMs emphasised the need for a broad understanding of the business as 
opposed to understanding ‗the ins and outs of every nut and bolt‘ [KO]. CO 
prioritised ‗business acumen first, financial management second‘ and FMs and OMs 
gave an indication of the importance attached to business knowledge by describing it 
as ‗vital‘ [JO], ‗absolutely key‘ [NO], ‗essential‘ [GO], and ‗fundamental‘ [LF]. 
Business knowledge was noted as taking time to acquire and giving MAs a better 
understanding of, and ability to explain, performance information. There was some 
evidence that MAs lacked business knowledge as DO and GO observed that MAs 
ought to know why variances arose. 
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5.3.1.2 Interpersonal and communication skills 
OMs and FMs stressed the criticality of strong interpersonal and communication skills 
for the roles of MAs. DF noted that accountants ‗don‘t like going to meetings, prefer 
one to one, or informal meetings‘ and EO remarked that ‗I think it needs more people 
skills than sometimes accountants would typically be known for‘. BF2 identified that 
‗being able to communicate on a number of levels‘ as important, be it in oral or 
written form to ‗get [the] message across, what is driving numbers so management 
can understand‘. DF noted that ‗the look of presentations is as important as the 
content‘. Being a member of a team (e.g., cross-functional, management, project) was 
a recurring theme in the interviews as GF commented: ‗I‘m part of the management 
decision-making team‘. It was also suggested that being a team player was now a 
characteristic required of individuals across the entire organisation and not just for 
MAs. LO noted that ‗often there is a perception that accountants are serious, and if 
they could spend a little bit of time…integrating a bit more with the other functions‘. 
 
5.3.1.3 IT skills 
Most managers perceived the MAs as playing an important role in developing the IT 
systems within their respective organisations. ‗Knowledge of IT systems‘ as BF1 
remarked was perceived as important. GF added that ‗management accountants need 
to understand the systems, what they can do, what information is in there‘. It was 
apparent that the finance function worked closely with the IT function in most firms, 
and finance played leading roles in IT projects.  
 
5.3.1.4 Flexibility  
Flexibility was identified as an important characteristic by both FMs and OMs. The 
FM and OM in Company O had opposite perceptions on flexibility, as OF remarked 
that ‗I am probably viewed as being too flexible‘, while OO remarked that ‗they 
would be flexible to a certain degree not so much maybe as the others but they…they 
could be a bit more flexible‘. OMs had varying views on flexibility regarding 
accountants in their organisations. DO remarked that ‗how they do them [reports] and 
how to do it quicker and better, they are flexible to change‘, while other OMs 
observed less flexibility: 
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I don‘t think…it is a feature of financial people or financial 
accountants as much as anything else. There is a style in the 
individual that makes them want to do different things and be 
flexible to change [HO]. 
 
…you find the finance people might not be very flexible, a few of 
them [PO]. 
 
Similarly, the need for open-mindedness was recognised by FMs and OMs, as OO 
commented: ‗to be open to things that you might not normally consider‘. Inflexibility 
was also perceived by OMs with respect to budgets as PO noted: 
 
The accountants tend to be pretty rigid from what I‘ve had from my 
experience. They can be. It might be a perception that the money is 
coming out of their own pocket, which it‘s not really. They can hold 
on to stuff. You definitely have to have a certain flexibility. 
 
In regard to strategic decisions, some managers mentioned the need to be flexible with 
regard to the strict adherence to only financial considerations, as GF commented ‗for 
strategic reasons you will make…you will actually manufacture loss makers‘. AO2 
similarly supported this by noting that MAs should accommodate other non-
accounting factors in decision processes. The findings also indicate that MAs should 
not be overly bound by previous routines or experiences: 
 
Accountants tend to accept the way it‘s done rather than questioning 
because that‘s the way they learnt how to do it, that would be my 
greatest criticism [AO1]. 
 
The FM of Company H commented that ‗anyone who is trying to do as we‘ve always 
done can be pushed aside relatively quickly within the organisation‘.  
 
5.3.1.5 Personal qualities 
A number of FMs and OMs commented on the type of person that would suit 
performing the roles of MAs. One major dimension noted was having the personal 
qualities that facilitated on-going interaction between MAs and OMs. This included 
the interpersonal and communication skills, as noted in section 5.3.1.2, ‗being 
accessible, efficient, willing to fight the corner, not being dogmatic about it‘ [MF], and 
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to ‗have a good mix of aggression and politeness, to bring things home, just to make 
sure that they get things done‘ [LF]. AO1 repeatedly emphasised: 
 
…it‘s a huge people role, it‘s a huge people role. If you don‘t get on 
with people, if you can‘t drive people, if you‘re not forceful enough, 
it can really affect the role, the role would just die.  
 
One FM relayed a recent experience of a MA who had now left the organisation: 
‗people didn‘t know who he was or if you said such and such a person is gone, ―who is 
he? Now I don‘t remember him‖‘ [IF].  
 
There was a perception that MAs should use initiative and be proactive in their roles. 
BF1 noted that the roles had become more ‗technology management‘ and ‗proactive‘. 
Proactiveness in the roles of MAs was mentioned by three FMs and six OMs. CF 
described it as: 
 
…very much proactive, more so than the reactive in financial where 
you‘re always minding your actuals, too late to do anything about it 
[CF].  
 
CF elaborated: 
 
…to be able to go and tackle issues, proactive you know, don‘t rely 
on, you know, somebody to spot something in the US or your own 
financial controller [CF].  
 
PF described his own role as ‗very, very proactive here, I wouldn‘t quite say in their 
face but I sometimes get told to push back…this is my area even though I am 
throwing ideas and things like that at people‘. FO stated: ‗must be proactive, really 
impresses me, shows initiative, demonstrates it‘ and HO remarked that MAs in 
Company H were ‗highly proactive individuals‘. LO sought more proactiveness in the 
roles of MAs as ‗offering support: is there anything you need me to do?‘. DF stressed 
the ‗ability to be able to use your own initiative‘ as an important characteristic for 
MAs. 
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5.3.1.6 Technical skills 
The technical aspects to the accounting role were noted by interviewees as essential 
but taken as a ‗given‘ or as KO remarked: ‗as it says on the tin‘. BF noted that the 
‗devil is in the detail with cost accounting‘ [BF2]. FMs generally remarked that 
technical skills were not an issue and such skills while essential played a secondary 
role to some of the more people oriented skills required in team environments.  
 
5.3.1.7 Monitoring skills  
General desirable characteristics of MAs associated with effective control included 
being ‗very organised and systematic‘ and ‗disciplined‘ [AF2], being ‗gatekeepers 
and advisors in matters of control‘ [BF1], up-to-date with regulatory requirements, 
paying ‗attention to detail‘ and having a ‗very good technical knowledge of what is 
going on in industry‘ [FF].  JF noted that one needed ‗a strong personality‘ with ‗your 
own opinion on things‘ [JF] and DF warned: ‗don‘t adopt a stand off approach, 
constant involvement‘ [DF]. JO recognised the need for MAs to exert control 
influence as needed but to do so in a reasonable way: 
 
Just firm but fair, if people are out of line as regards the group or the 
group financial policies, they need to be reined in, but without being 
dictatorial. 
 
Within certain firms, some FMs perceived themselves as playing a large control role 
as OF commented ‗part of my role is that I am guardian and watchdog to the financial 
accounts‘. Similarly, LF remarked that MAs need: 
 
a clear and consistent view of the business, what‘s important within 
the business, whatever metrics that are important for managing the 
business…so we don‘t feed people lots of contradictory stimuli.  
 
While the need for independence and objectivity was perceived as important by FMs 
and OMs, the effectiveness of the control was viewed by some OMs as greater when 
the controller possessed a sound knowledge of the business: 
 
Understand the process, know the business, know the business. I 
know there‘s a common set of [control] principles per se but it‘s how 
you apply those principles, and interpret the rules specific to this 
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organisation or any industry. That‘s why I go back to business person 
first, accountant second almost [CO]. 
 
AO2 added that ‗I think the ability to be able to outline and identify procedures which 
are workable in the day to day operation and are capable of being implemented‘. OMs 
generally perceived accountants as having strong monitoring skills. 
 
5.3.1.8 Organisational influence  
It was apparent from the interviews that the finance function‘s role in the firm was 
perceived as being either very influential, of equal standing to other functions or not 
very influential with other functions taking the lead. Perceptions of the finance 
function‘s influence varied from ‗disproportionate‘ [HF‘], ‗dysfunctional‘ [LO] to 
being secondary to the sales and marketing functions.  OO commented that ‗they 
would have a very big role in the company in that it has often been said that the 
company is run by accountants so it would be very cost conscious, which is not a bad 
thing either‘. In one firm that had effectively been rescued, the former managing 
director (NO) noted that NF had exerted a very strong influence on the company 
which was necessitated by a liquidity crisis. Some interviewees, for example in large 
pharmaceutical and IT firms, commented on how the profile of the finance function 
had risen with a strong cost focus in the business due to increased competitiveness 
and comparatively weaker company performance relative to former years.  
 
In summary the findings on individual characteristics show that FMs and OMs placed 
strong emphasis on business knowledge, interpersonal skills and communication 
skills, flexibility, using initiative, and having a strong character complemented by 
personal qualities for effective interaction. IT and technical skills were perceived as 
necessary and interviewees did not perceive any difficulties with these characteristics. 
OMs observed scope for MAs to interact more in business operations and enhance 
their business knowledge, flexibility, and initiative. 
 
5.3.2 Activity characteristics 
The findings present an extensive range of activities in which MAs engage. As some 
FMs put it: ‗doing everything‘ [AF]; ‗basically into everything‘ [PF]; ‗in general, it‘s 
very much jack of all trades‘ [CF]; and ‗after month end, three days, no set routine‘ 
[DF]. One OM remarked on the roles being ‗a fairly broad brush‘ [KO]. Typical 
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activities described included: information provision, interpreter, and decision 
supporter; periodic performance reporting and planning; project assignments, ad hoc 
analyses; administration; use of techniques; and educating OMs. These are now 
discussed in turn. 
 
5.3.2.1 Information provider, interpreter, and decision supporter  
There was a unanimous perception that information provision and interpretation were 
quintessential characteristics of the roles of MAs; a ‗reservoir of knowledge‘ is how 
BO1 referred to the MA and CO commented that ‗they are a huge source of 
information, management information‘. Decision making was described as either in 
the context of being a part of a decision making team and process, or in a supportive, 
‗advising‘ capacity or rarely, not at all. The views of FMs were generally along the 
lines of ‗a partner and an influencer probably more so‘ [AF1] or ‗not so much a 
decision maker in the end‘ [LF]. One FM stated clearly that OMs ‗don‘t view me as a 
partner…don‘t make decisions in their functions‘ [DF]. A much stronger role was 
generally perceived in information provision and interpretation than decision 
partnering. The views of OMs similarly suggested a less than full decision 
partnership: ‗support function‘ [CO], ‗not so much decision makers, but 
recommenders‘ [AO1], ‗suggest-ors‘ [HO] and; ‗part of the management that who 
took the plant decisions‘ [NO]. LO explained: 
 
They should be providing information, they have to do that anyway. 
They should interpret it in a logical way. Not a decision maker in 
other functional areas. They interpret it and provide you with good 
raw data, and then you should be the one to make the decision [LO]. 
 
Analogies were used to describe accounting roles which included a ‗linesman‘ [NO] 
with the managing director as referee and sales and production competing or as ‗the 
referee, he keeps the score‘ [LO]. Similarly, OF remarked about finance‘s 
‗consolatory work‘ between sales and production functions. 
 
Further, as EF noted, a MA could be any of the three, or a combination thereof, 
depending on who the MA is working with; that is ‗you might be information 
provider for the MD plus an interpreter but you would not be a decision maker‘ [EF]. 
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The notion of the management accounting function as a ‗service‘ to other functions 
was raised by a number of managers: 
 
…very much a service, we are there as their partner to help them to 
do better and at the end of the day it is the one company so us all 
doing better is better for every one so that is how I see it absolutely 
[IF]. 
 
Some FMs referred to the roles of MAs as an ‗aid‘ and ‗guide‘ to management in 
providing expertise to manage performance and assist the achievement of objectives. 
The position of MAs in the organisational structure typically reflected the magnitude 
and strategic nature of business involvement; thus, finance directors and financial 
controllers were perceived as more involved than junior MAs in strategic activities. 
Senior FMs typically had MAs reporting into them who had responsibilities that 
included producing the accounts, highlighting issues, and liaising with other 
managers. One finance director remarked that ‗there are not many life threatening 
decisions that the management accountant would make in the organisation‘ [HF], and 
another similarly stated that ‗I would be the decision maker and they [MAs] would be 
the providers‘ [FF]. This links to the influence of FMs as a part of management in the 
antecedents (see section 5.2.2.5). HO however noted that it was not just the FM 
getting involved at the strategic level, but also, increasingly, the MA: 
 
Primarily on day to day stuff the financial department would be more 
or less involved in. In terms of our strategic position obviously the 
FD and of course the…the business analyst is becoming more and 
more influential in…because we involve him [in] an awful lot more 
things [HO].  
 
The extent of involvement was perceived by OMs as generally satisfactory regarding 
MAs in more senior positions. Involvement levels were referred to as ‗good‘ [AO2], 
‗always available‘ [GO] or specific in terms of certain accounting roles (e.g., the FD 
and business analyst in Company H). However, FMs and OMs sought greater 
involvement: 
 
They should be more involved I‘d say in decisions like I would think 
that commercial decisions are almost made outside of the realm of 
the management accountants. They should be involved more in those 
decisions than they currently are [AO1]. 
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Could be better, they (decisions) get to a level before finance hear 
about them [BF1]. 
 
MAs were generally not perceived as the final decision makers in organisation 
functions, although they could influence such decisions. A distinction was also made 
by some interviewees between decisions that were finance-related and those that were 
more commercial or non-finance related with MAs playing a stronger role in the 
finance-related decisions.  
 
5.3.2.2 Periodic performance reporting and planning 
The periodic preparation of planning and forecast information and regular 
performance reviews was a constantly recurring activity identified by FMs and OMs. 
As mentioned earlier (see section 5.2.2.8), most firms were very budget oriented and 
although planning on a number of time horizons, the focus was generally the current 
budget year. Furthermore these review activities enabled the MA to gain an 
organisational perspective on performance, one that was perhaps not apparent 
elsewhere. OMs commented on the MA having ‗the big picture as a site‘ [BO2] and 
they ‗have the figure on the pulse of site-wide operations‘ [CO]. One FM remarked 
that finance was like the ‗hub‘ with information flowing in and then back out again. 
Emphasis was placed more on the application of the management accounts to the 
business, than their production as such: 
 
I think the role of the management accountant or business analyst is 
now to take that data and say what does it really mean to the 
business, where are we against our targets, where are we against our 
plans and I think that is the role that the guys are actually pushed 
into, interpreting the data, and control is critical. But I think his role 
is certainly interpreting data and looking at opportunities and what 
from there out. But it is certainly no longer number crunching, those 
days are gone [HF]. 
 
Even in using the term ‗number crunching‘ when referring to 60% of the roles of 
MAs, the FM in Company L explained that ‗with modern computer systems that 
doesn‘t happen anymore‘ and the ‗crunching‘ as such represented high level analysis 
with information from different sources i.e., ‗it‘s all brainy stuff‘ [LF] or as KO 
remarked, crunching ‗in a business sense‘.  
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5.3.2.3 Project assignments 
Half of the FMs interviewed specifically attributed project work to the roles of MAs. 
IF remarked that ‗I would say that they are pretty much involved certainly in any of 
the big projects that are going on at the moment they are very much involved in, we 
are there as an equal person on the team‘ [IF]. The types of projects that accountants 
were associated with included a major IT deployment (e.g., ERP implementation), 
division closures, BSC development, capital projects, relocation decisions, and waste 
reduction initiatives. Projects were generally viewed as mechanisms for accountants 
to ‗get out a little bit more‘ [HF]. Some OMs indicated potential difficulties around 
the participation of MAs in projects:  
 
And there would be a perception that when they [accountants] do say 
that they want to get involved, then it‘s more to be a big brother 
watching, than actually saying I want to add value to the project 
because I have particular skills that I can bring to the party [HO]. 
 
Thus, projects were activities identified with much cross-functional interaction but 
they had consequences (see section 5.4.3) depending on the interaction as PO 
remarked that MAs may be perceived as interfering e.g., ‗by putting the spotlight on 
production, you‘re saying something is wrong‘.  
 
5.3.2.4 Ad hoc analyses 
FMs made reference to various ah hoc financial analyses, including ‗what-if‘ 
scenarios and ‗cost benefit analyses‘ [BO1] that were conducted to support decision 
making. OMs suggested MAs should play strong roles here, and there was some 
evidence that this was occurring: 
 
…they have gone off and analysed some of the competitor prices we 
have gotten for them and shown them to the business here saying, 
well if competitor A can do product ―X‖ for that much, why is it 
costing us 20% more [LO]? 
 
…we try to work out their cost model against our cost model so, a lot 
of that can be good work and it‘s very valuable [DO]. 
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CF commented that the MAs were central in providing ‗what-if scenarios‘ and 
perceived it as ‗an aid to your senior management and being able to bring expertise 
from a financial background but also from an operations background‘. 
 
5.3.2.5 Administration 
Some FMs and OMs perceived the roles of MAs as comprising administrative 
activities as BF2 commented: ‗level of administration is significant‘ [BF2]. Increased 
corporate reporting (see section 5.2.1.1) and governance regulation (see section 
5.2.1.3) appeared to have increased the administration burden on many firms, 
particularly US multinational subsidiaries. Even in firms where governance and 
corporate requirements were not perceived as having much influence on the roles of 
MAs, there was still a perception of MAs engaging in administrative tasks: 
 
You wouldn‘t need the accountant in a controlling role at all, more a 
management role would be better and that‘s the problem, they‘re too 
much involved in day to day, sorting out administration, and getting 
that up and running and corrected [AO1]. 
 
Further , as one OM, who formally worked as a MA in the finance function noted that 
‗there is life outside finance‘ and recalled when he worked there ‗you didn‘t realise 
you were making a million [products] a month underneath you in the factory floor‘ 
[DO]. Similarly, another OM suggested that MAs had a disposition towards the detail: 
 
I suppose to be frank they don‘t offer support and they don‘t say I‘ve 
done it that way, do you want me to look at it another way or what 
do you think of that? What do you think of this? They probably then 
go off and get too consumed in the detail in say the tactical side of 
things [LO]. 
 
FMs were generally aware of the administrative demands placed on them and were 
keen to reduce them.  
 
5.3.2.6 Use of techniques 
Regarding the use of modern management accounting techniques they were, in the 
main, not implemented as, for example, only two organisations were planning on 
implementing a BSC system. Despite many companies having financial and non-
financial measures, often as KPIs, these were described as ‗multi-measures, non-
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financial indicators used, no balanced scorecard as such‘ [BF1] and ‗we haven‘t got 
into the balanced scorecard, mainly kind of performance indicators….non-financial 
and financial [FF]. One company appeared to have activity-based costing (ABC) in 
one small department only and another firm had ABC ‗in a way‘ [HO]. 
 
Traditional techniques such as budgeting, standard costing, variance analysis, and job 
costing tended to dominate in most firms.  OMs were critical of particular forms of 
traditional management accounting techniques, particularly budgets. Many 
weaknesses were identified by FMs and OMs across the different firms. These 
included: poor follow-up or action following budgetary performance reviews, ‗results 
management‘ [EF], the budget becoming meaningless in the changing circumstances, 
being ‗haphazard‘ [KO], no ‗contingencies‘ [LO] being incorporated, and a 
discouraging budgetary approval process that was as HO remarked ‗not worth my 
while doing‘. JO indicated how budgetary information became obsolete: 
 
It‘s probably one of the most, one of the toughest industries to make 
a budget for because there are so many variables. The annual budget 
in a [product] plant will probably disintegrate after six weeks. 
 
Regarding the production budget, the factory manager in Company I commented that: 
‗I would change our budgeting procedure; that needs radical change‘ [IO]. Planning 
systems were heavily criticised in some firms as inaccurate, too simplistic or as IO 
stated: ‗these are of no assistance to production, none‘. 
 
5.3.2.7 Educating OMs  
Some OMs commented that they were comfortable with much of the performance 
terminology used in their respective businesses. FMs noted how the ‗accounts have 
been tailored to suit‘ [MF] and also by aiming to ‗neutralise the terminology‘ [PF] the 
accounts were more accessible. BO2 did however comment that accounting terms 
were ‗hard to understand‘. As managers typically had budgetary ownership, they had 
become more familiar with the terminology as IO commented: ‗most factory 
managers are fairly tuned into it‘. There were some opportunities, however: 
 
…managers don‘t understand how they are impacting on numbers, 
how their actions are affecting results [GF]. 
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There would be a constant battle for the financial controller to 
educate people to use the systems more, rather than work with pen 
and paper. Solve a great thing [JO]. 
 
In Company L, there appeared to be some reluctance about the sharing of 
management accounting information which was apparent from the comments by the 
FM and OM: 
 
…maybe...the less they know the better. You don‘t want too many 
pseudo-accountants floating around the place but no I think it is 
important that the management accountant has got some confidence 
in people they are dealing with [LF]. 
 
So there is a little bit of mystique there that finance doesn‘t really 
want to let us into because we might start to argue with them about 
how costs are apportioned [LO]. 
 
However, in general a number of OMs commented that they had little difficulty 
understanding terminology particularly the language used for the key performance 
criteria of the business. 
 
In summary, many of the MA activities identified were those that necessitated MAs 
closely interacting with other OMs on business wide issues. These activities included 
information interpretation and decision support, performance reporting and planning, 
project assignments, ad hoc analyses, and educating OMs. MAs interacted less with 
OMs around some reporting, regulatory, and administrative activities. The next 
section examines the findings regarding management accounting information in 
respect of the roles of MAs. 
 
5.3.3 Information characteristics 
This section in many ways elaborates on the activity characteristics associated with 
the roles of MAs identified above in the sections relating to information provider, 
interpreter, and decision supporter (see section 5.3.2.1), periodic performance 
reporting and planning (see section 5.3.2.2), and by presenting the findings 
specifically on the information characteristics that form part of these activities. This 
section presents findings on attributes of information sought by managers, meeting the 
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information needs of managers, managers‘ use (non-use) of accounting information, 
and management accounting information challenges. 
 
5.3.3.1 Attributes of information sought by OMs 
Managers described the need for timely, accurate, relevant, understandable and 
concise information. Generally, most FMs emphasised the need for accuracy and 
timeliness, while some OMs included the same characteristics, they also mentioned 
the need for management accounting information to be understandable and concise. 
The urgency of management accounting information was perceived amongst OMs in 
their willingness to accept a trade off between the timing of information provision and 
its absolute nth degree of accuracy: 
 
…and that information [key monthly drivers], to get it as quick as 
possible is the key. Whether it is 95% right, or 50% right, or 80% 
right, it is an indication that something has gone right or wrong. So 
quick information is key from a financial control point of view, for 
us anyway [FF]. 
 
Notwithstanding the urgency attached to information, ‗confidence in the figures‘ [FF] 
was perceived as very critical as KF remarked that providing incorrect information 
‗jeopardises the whole [finance] department‘.  
 
5.3.3.2 Meeting the information needs of OMs  
Sometimes it was apparent that managers may be unsure of what information they are 
seeking, as GF used the analogy of managers asking for a ‗biro‘ when in fact an 
erasable  ‗pencil‘ was more appropriate and thus ‗it is understanding what they are 
going to use the information for‘ [GF]. Both sets of managers generally expressed a 
desire to make more use of management accounting information: 
 
I think we have as much information as we need. In fact we don‘t use 
all of the information that we have. And that is the issue, the sales 
people and other people don‘t use that information fully, so we don‘t 
exploit the amount of information that we have [AO2]. 
 
Somewhat contradictory to this, one OM noted how the removal of detailed 
management accounting information (and the removal of an actual person‘s 
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accounting role in furnishing that information) had not been as detrimental as 
anticipated when critical indicators had been provided instead: 
 
Of course you are worse off without having that information but 
when we measure ourselves against the key performance indicators 
in the plant, I am not sure whether that is having a major impact on it 
all. As a matter of fact I know it is not having a major impact [HO].  
 
The provision of management accounting information in firms was typically 
characterised as occurring formally in monthly and, to a lesser extent, in weekly 
cycles with on-going ‗ad-hoc‘ information provision in response to managerial 
requirements. More frequent reporting was linked to creating the monthly picture:  
 
If you produce a good set of weekly accounts that you are happy 
enough with, it‘s the cornerstone of a good set of monthly accounts 
[JF]. 
 
NO also identified how information flows could vary depending on the particular 
focus at a point in time 
 
5.3.3.3 OMs’ use (non-use) of accounting information 
FMs were sometimes unsure as to how managers used management accounting 
information that was provided to them or that they paid more or less attention to it: 
 
It is hard to know what they do with them because, basically all they 
are interested in is making sure that they have created a profit for the 
month and if they didn‘t why not, and turn it around for the 
following month [MF]. 
 
So like the more progressive and the good ones [managers] are 
continually looking for information in different ways or different 
cuts or whatever. The other ones probably wouldn‘t…like…they 
might leave the accounts that you send them in an envelope until, Oh 
she‘s coming now and I‘d better have a look at them [AF1]. 
 
Sometimes it was observed that OMs were accessing information directly themselves 
and therefore were aware of what management accounting information was going to 
be presented in reports later: 
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I don‘t have to wait for monthly management reports, I can see it in 
real time [CO]. 
 
I could take numbers, put them into a system, add them up and get a 
result with relative ease [HO]. 
 
I often check that the finance pack reflects what I think I know, so, 
just to make a sanity check [DO]. 
 
These comments clearly indicate some redundancy in management accounting 
information provision. One FM referred to management accounting information as 
‗the concrete to the business it is driving, so it becomes boring‘ [FF] and one OM 
described it as ‗pretty mundane but pretty necessary‘ [IO]. While it was sometimes 
used as ‗a post mortem‘ [JO] it was also viewed as being a part of performance review 
processes that moved from the historical analysis to forward planning. JO explained 
the process in the context of a board meeting: 
 
…when we have our board meetings where obviously the 
management accounts would be used. Based on what‘s there, and 
based on the prospects, and based on the nose and the feel for the 
thing at the time. I mean…you can, in all this, you can write a book 
on what you think is going to happen in six months time and justify 
everything and present it to the board. At the end of the day, it comes 
down to maybe three or four guys on the board making a decision, 
having a hunch, having the ‗nose‘ or whatever it‘s called. They 
would have gone through all the financial data, you have to achieve 
that I suppose. To a degree it is a ‗nose‘ job, as I call it [JO]. 
 
Managers‘ comments indicated a variety of uses of management accounting 
information:  
 
I suppose the ad hoc information is used for decision making. The 
more formal information is used as purely historical and then from 
the historical then used to drive what do we have to do which then 
becomes more of an ad hoc…then make the decisions going forward 
[NF]. 
 
…it‘s first of all to get a picture of where we are at a point in time, 
would be the main one. To get a picture of where we have our major 
deficiencies and I suppose to come up with actions then to come 
around that [AF1]. 
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Control in the first instance, device to measure, achieving objectives, 
control device [FO]. 
 
OMs did remark that they tend not to examine much of the contents of the 
management accounts but focus more on the bottom line and pay most attention to the 
part most relevant to their respective function as GO commented ‗we probably glaze 
over it‘. 
 
5.3.3.4 Management accounting information challenges 
Some information provision and support opportunities were identified particularly by 
OMs for the roles of MAs. These included a better explanation of accounting 
information provided and it was also noted that it would be helpful to have MAs 
providing more future-based cost analysis for example: 
 
…if I wanted to see in advance what it is going to cost me in labour 
next month, you haven‘t a hope in hell of it, not a hope in hell. If I 
could see in advance, what is left, that would be useful [IO]. 
 
Many OMs stressed the importance of supporting the ‗user‘ in the reporting of 
management accounting information and that MAs should have this in mind. While 
many managers observed the use of non-financial measures as well as financial there 
seemed more scope for MAs to move more towards the former: 
 
There needs to be a lot more focus on non-financial indicators 
because they all fall through to the financial results [AO2]. 
 
OMs also identified information that they were not receiving which might assist them 
in their roles: 
 
Maybe some external market information [JO]. 
 
…maybe some amount of activity-based type costing where you 
identify value-adding activities or non-adding value and that you can 
identify those and sometimes in the standard accounting procedure 
that we have, we cannot see that [AO2]. 
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As noted in section 5.3.2.6, much of the management accounting information 
provided to managers utilised traditional management accounting techniques and 
managers were, as noted, critical of these but managers‘ comments also reflected a 
need to consider alternative systems. A number of OMs and FMs expressed interest in 
alternative systems but were generally unaware of the possibilities. IO unknowingly 
remarked that ‗maybe there are friendlier systems out there‘ and HO stated that 
‗nobody comes in here and says this is a wonderful package‘. 
 
In concluding this section on information characteristics, the findings on information 
characteristics indicate a range of criteria that are perceived as important in the 
provision of management accounting information and show that there are some 
aspects to management accounting information that managers seek to have addressed. 
 
5.3.4 Summary of characteristics 
This section on characteristics has presented characteristics relating to the roles of 
MAs under the headings of individual characteristics, activity characteristics, and 
information characteristics. The findings indicate both a broad range of individual 
characteristics and activities associated with the roles of MAs. The findings on 
information characteristics indicate a range of criteria that are perceived as important 
in the provision of management accounting information, and show that there are some 
dimensions to management accounting information that OMs would like addressed. 
Both FMs and OMs were asked to identify the characteristic(s) most important to the 
roles of MAs. FMs generally identified having communication, interpersonal, and 
team skills, having a solid understanding of the business, being involved with 
managers or these collectively. OMs similarly generally identified these traits but 
tended to emphasise these more broadly in the context of being integrated into the 
running of business operations, and also added being flexible and innovative. The 
findings also show using initiative and strength of character with complementing 
personal qualities in interacting with OMs as important. The findings on the 
characteristics associated with the roles of MAs are analysed in the discussion chapter 
in section 7.4. Having presented the characteristics of the roles of MAs, the following 
section presents consequences associated with these roles. 
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5.4 Consequences associated with the roles of MAs 
The findings for the consequences of the roles of MAs are presented under the theme 
headings of influencing performance, information impact, and role interface. Further 
sub-themes of consequences are presented beneath each of these headings. 
 
5.4.1 Influencing Performance  
The findings present a largely positive picture regarding the consequences of the roles 
of MAs relating to their involvement in supporting business performance. The 
consequences identified varied among respondents but included the making of better 
business decisions, improved planning and control, and more business-informed MAs.  
 
5.4.1.1 Decision making and performance 
Some FMs commented on how involvement facilitated ‗problem-solving‘ [PF]. Some 
managers linked the interaction to assisting the firm‘s growth and improved company 
performance. GF remarked that ‗managers have more information and make better 
decisions‘. The involvement of MAs was also linked to company expansion: 
 
I suppose it helps the company grow. If they are involved in that 
they know where, if they are more involved in sales and they know 
that we‘re going for big contracts or something like that, they know 
that later down the line you‘ll have to allocate more resources to….it 
will affect head count because you‘ll have to hire people to make 
that product, it will affect inventory because you‘ll have to keep raw 
materials [PO]. 
 
HF noted ‗how can we improve performance, finance is really a kind of supporter and 
a partner in that role‘. CO recognised different aspects to the roles of MAs but 
specifically linked interacting with MAs to performance in his function: 
 
…very much as a support function. There‘s obviously the fiduciary 
piece that goes with the function but if you look at the management 
accounting piece in terms of producing monthly accounts or cost 
centre spend analysis reports or whatever, very much as a support 
function to me and my group in terms of helping us do our job. 
Rather than big brother, big stick type approach, it‘s very much a 
collaborative role. 
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CO emphasised that interacting with MAs could enhance ‗productivity, and results 
from a collaborative understanding perspective rather than a control perspective‘. IO 
noted that it was ‗worse if they [accountants] are out in the cold‘ and ‗better decisions 
would be made if they were more involved as I say they would have the benefit of 
looking at the figures but also of understanding the project, the product or the 
process‘. LO identified the decision making consequences of the business knowledge 
of MAs when stating that ‗the more you understand the business the better it assists to 
make the right decisions‘. LO noted: 
 
I‘m not sure how accountants view themselves, in terms of what 
they see the role as but, the more you integrate, the more you get 
involved with each other, and each managerial function, the better it 
is for the business. People are often guarded about their area. 
 
KO remarked that the accountant ‗would have a way of tackling the situation that 
maybe I won‘t think of‘ and MO noted that ‗they have made management more aware 
of what they should be looking at which…they have…not taking it from day to day 
but looking further ahead‘. 
 
5.4.1.2 Planning and control 
Increased dissemination of management information was perceived by CO as 
resulting in less reason for control. 
 
…if we can be part of a team and the information can be 
disseminated out then there‘s less reason for control provided it‘s not 
abused or anything like that. 
 
The consequence of interaction for the roles of MAs was that control was perceived as 
easier or more effective as a result i.e., as FF noted: ‗I would say that the more they 
are involved the more control there is, because the more knowledge he has of the 
business‘. AO2 noted that: 
 
…the implementation of what they set out as controlling, control 
measures etcetera is how well they interact with the team, depends 
on how well they interact with the team and their input to decisions 
then kind of comes with that, part and parcel of being part of that 
team. 
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AO2 further noted that ‗if there was no financial control input at the table‘ then 
‗people might tend to play down or ignore the financial control aspect of the business 
so I think from that point of view it makes the whole management of it if you like 
more total or fuller‘. PF observed a contrasting practice in the US head office to theirs 
which PF perceived as leading to less control:  
 
…my attitude towards the whole finance function is totally different 
to the guys in the States and how they run it they literally have a 
finance team in a separate building away from the total company 
itself.  They do not interact with the company and I would see that as 
they are not in control.  They have no idea as to what is going on in 
the business itself. 
 
A further consequence of the roles of MAs was that involvement, and particularly 
involvement early on in processes, has positive consequences from a control 
perspective. FMs noted that one consequence of being more involved was the earlier 
detection of problems as AF1 stated you ‗understand more what‘s happening out at 
the grass roots level‘. Similarly other FMs pointed to benefits of MAs being involved: 
 
But being more involved with the manufacturing people, he is 
hearing there is problems here, problems there, you know, better idea 
ok that is the way the accounts should be shaping up, and that is what 
I should expect and when I see it, if it is not that way, what‘s 
happened? [FF] 
 
JF commented that the consequences of the accountant interacting could be seen in 
business performance: 
 
It is fair to say it has a huge affect on it [performance]. The fact that 
you‘re in there, you are in the thick of things, you know exactly 
what‘s happening and you‘re fully briefed and all that on all aspects 
of the business. Nothing happens or nothing has happened…nothing 
important has happened without you actually knowing about it [JF]. 
 
KF added that ‗the level of involvement lets you see whether controls are needed‘. 
AF1 remarked that ‗you‘re actually in a much stronger position, well I know you can, 
so this, because I‘ve seen X, Y, and Z or do you remember I went through that with 
you…so in that way it‘s probably easier‘. 
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5.4.1.3 Business-informed MAs 
Some perceived a mutual benefit in terms of the MAs gaining a greater understanding 
of the business and the OMs gaining from the financial expertise of the MA. 
Involvement was perceived as providing an understanding of ‗the motivation behind 
why people want to make certain changes or want to actually implement‘ [NF] 
something. Essentially, the interaction provided an opportunity for MAs to gain a 
greater understanding and appreciation of the business operations as: 
 
No point in you being kept in the dark about it, mushroom farming 
as they call it…you know how they grow mushrooms, you keep 
them in the dark and feed them [excrement] [JF] 
 
KO stated that ‗they need an understanding of what makes it tick but again that comes 
from being involved‘. Similarly LO observed that if MAs ‗spend time‘ in 
‗understanding how the commercial side of the business operates‘ then ‗they would 
have a greater understanding of what‘s involved‘ and ‗if you can get that appreciation 
of other parts of the business then that allows them to do their job in a better way‘. 
 
5.4.2 Information impact  
The findings indicate that the consequences of the roles of MAs included the quality 
of management accounting information, an appreciation of non-financial criteria for 
MAs, and assessing the quality of information. 
 
5.4.2.1 Quality of management accounting information  
The quality of the accounting information was related by respondents to the 
interaction  between MAs and managers:  
 
…we are talking to people and we can see what they want and we are 
actually giving them what they want rather then just giving them a 
whole page of figures, pick out what you want out of it, that‘s giving 
you all the information…[IF]. 
 
…you actually provide better information because you understand 
what they are looking for or what the decision they are going to 
make is about. So I think in one sense you actually provide much 
better information because you are so involved in it [GF]. 
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GF continued that ‗being so involved in the strategy and in the business decisions then 
you provide better information. I know myself that I have changed the way we would 
give our management accounts on a monthly basis so as to make it more relevant‘. 
Similarly, NF remarked on the consequences for management accounting information 
from being more involved: 
 
…it is considered to be more live and relevant than if it was just 
being produced as month accounts every month and left at that. 
 
OMs noted a positive attitude towards management accounting information as a result 
of having interaction with the accountant. GO commented that ‗I think you are fairly 
likely to question it more and to actually ask where it came from‘ with more 
interaction with the MAs. DO noted how having the interaction with the MA fostered 
a better approach to the information produced by MAs:  
 
If you had your linkage with the accountant and you work with him 
daily or weekly…perhaps, you as a manager…―right, I‘ve known the 
accountant that prepared this, he‘s involved with me now, he‘s taking 
some time to prepare this, I‘ll go through it now in detail and see 
exactly where the areas of concern are‖, or you know, I‘d spend a bit 
of time at it. Whereas perhaps if you‘re saying ―That‘s one of the pen 
pushers or the bean counters‖, you might throw it into the waste 
paper basket, you might be tempted [DO]. 
 
If MA interaction was not present, negative consequences regarding information were 
perceived. JF commented that if the MA is not ‗in-there‘ then ‗the horse is well past 
the post and in the meanwhile there‘s more damage done‘ [JF]. DO identified the 
limitations of providing management accounting information without its operational 
context: 
 
So at times, you know if you‘re trying to explain, he [the financial 
controller] can be asking tough questions without understanding the 
process fully, expects that…the business can be managed on a 
spreadsheet. Whereas if you work in operations, there‘s many twists 
and turns that can happen that are far away from a spreadsheet. 
 
AO1 noted that ‗there‘s certain figures you might not understand and you might need 
a basis for‘ and PO remarked that ‗it wouldn‘t be as meaningful, so you do need the 
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accountant there to explain‘. Thus, involvement was generally perceived as critically 
impacting on management accounting information by both FMs and OMs.  
 
5.4.2.2 MAs’ appreciation of non-financial criteria 
The interaction gave MAs a sense of the wider organisational regard for non-financial 
criteria in decision making. GF noted that to ‗realise that financial information is not 
the only criteria used to make a business decision and I think that would be one of the 
biggest ones [consequences]…sometimes it is more strategic why you to do 
something [GF]. AO2 noted: 
 
…not to stop those decisions being made or be an obstacle to those 
decisions being made just because they do not satisfy pure 
accounting criteria. There are other criteria which have to attach to 
strategic type decisions. 
 
There was also a sense that MAs appreciated that their roles were ‗actually there to 
service a lot of the other functions‘ and ‗being involved, I suppose sometimes you do 
realise why you have to come second place sometimes in the pecking order‘ [GF]. 
 
5.4.2.3 MAs can assess the quality of information 
There was a perception that through MAs interacting with OMs, they were likely to 
be more adept at evaluating information. NF stated that MAs ‗have to have an 
understanding of how the business works to know whether or not the information is 
good‘. IO noted that MAs: 
 
…need to understand what a project or what a product is about to 
make an informed decision rather than just basing it on how figures 
tot up. 
 
CO observed the importance of having a mutual understanding and many 
interviewees recognised the mutual benefits accruing to MAs and OMs through 
interaction. CO stated that: 
 
By having the finance function very clued in to the day to day 
operations of the site as much as the monthly reporting of the 
activities or whatever means they know where we are coming from. 
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IO noted that if:  
 
…financial people can understand what is happening in the business, 
you have the benefit of their experience and how financially things 
will transpire, or should transpire.  
 
FMs remarked how assessing the quality of information depended on the MA 
interacting in the business: 
 
…figures, you don‘t get everything from the figures you don‘t see a 
true picture from the figures sometimes.  You have to be out and 
about, you talk to people, you listen to peoples‘ problems and 
certainly from my point of view I have solved problems [PF]. 
 
…if an accountant is sitting in an office not going to general 
meetings or not going to…not inter-relating with factory people he 
won‘t know what to expect at the month…or why the information 
could be this way or that way or why the figures could be up or 
down [FF]. 
 
Thus, many FMs and OMs connected the MAs ability to assess the quality of 
information to their interacting in, and understanding of, the business. 
 
5.4.3 Role interface 
The relationship between FMs and OMs was perceived in the main as positive in 
regard to the interfacing that took place between them. The consequences of the roles 
of MAs included: enhanced relationships, role conflicts, potential to challenge 
managers, the likelihood of managers to present issues to MAs, and a need to sell the 
roles of MAs. 
 
5.4.3.1 Enhanced relationships 
FMs and OMs generally perceived that the various interactions between MAs and 
OMs had led to enhanced working relationships. IO remarked that the involvement 
‗would be positive, in general it is reasonably positive‘ and: 
 
…they would be more involved in the business and it would make 
them better people within the company and probably assist us as 
well. 
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As a result of MAs interacting more with OMs, AF1 observed that it facilitated better 
relationships, which fostered more openness and it ‗probably helps the 
communication piece‘. AF2 noted that ‗if you have a good relationship it helps‘ as:  
 
...if you build up a relationship with a manager then obviously the 
flow of the information, the better the relationship the better you can, 
like if you don‘t know someone that well, it is harder to get them to 
change [AF2]. 
 
CO observed that interacting with MAs ‗would foster good working relationships‘. 
Moreover, CO explained that it was ‗how you approach the role will determine how 
successful you will be at it and if you can adopt a customer relationship perspective‘. 
JO observed that ‗it‘s a very positive relationship‘ and ‗it‘s well respected‘. 
 
5.4.3.2 Role conflict: policing and partnering  
A recurring theme was the extent to which conflict was a consequence of the existing 
roles of MAs. In general most managers recognised the potential for some role 
conflict in the MA being involved in business decision making processes, while also 
maintaining a required degree of independence as AO2 remarked that ‗being part of a 
team, a business team, there is a conflict, yes‘. The conflict was seen as inevitable but 
as JO remarked ‗it is just a matter of gauging within your individual company the best 
fit of marrying them [being independent and being involved] both together‘ [IO]. BF2 
perceived a conflict but was clear on allegiances: 
 
There are two hats, it is a challenge at times, no matter what we say 
or do in a decision making process our golden rule is we follow 
Company B standards [BF2]. 
 
NF perceived the potential for conflict but also the necessity for MAs to be involved 
in business decision making as a means of being more effective at control: 
 
…well I know it is hard, it sounds like a contrary, a contradiction in 
terms but it is actually easier to be objective when you know what 
you are being objective about. It is very difficult to be objective 
about a business when you don‘t know enough about it to know 
whether the information you‘ve being given is the truth or not [NF]. 
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Similarly, AO2 observed a link between having both business knowledge and 
objectiveness in the roles of MAs: 
 
It just needs a full understanding of their own role and a full 
understanding of what other people around the table are trying to do 
which at times may be in conflict and you can only resolve that by 
using objective data and having a total understanding of the business. 
And it is only by being at the table that you will have a total 
understanding of the business [AO2]. 
 
One manager noted it was not a conflict but a ‗balance‘ that needed to managed: 
 
…so it‘s to find the balance between supporters or partners in a 
process and maintaining some vigilance over the financial reporting 
of the company as well [CO]. 
 
In Company E, the organisational structure was such that potential role conflict was 
addressed by having separate roles for MA: 
 
Those roles within Company E are separated. So you have the 
business partners who would be very much along the lines of 
partnering with the business, you know helping the business make 
decisions. And then you have the people who run the accounting 
services centres [EO]. 
 
When asked about whether splitting the roles addressed the conflict, EO and EF 
responded: 
 
I think it does…vice presidents can put a lot of pressure on 
accountants to do certain things [EO]. 
 
At the end of the day the integrity of the figures may not be one 
hundred percent so probably there is an advantage…risk is too 
high….I‘d imagine having them separated is a good idea [EF]. 
 
As noted earlier regarding involvement and personal qualities (see section 5.3.1.5), a 
certain amount of strength of character was perceived as required, and experience, to 
fulfil such roles. Although the conflict was recognised as inevitable, many 
respondents perceived it as manageable, given certain strength of character. OO 
commented that ‗I think if the right personality, well if they can make their decisions 
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objectively, and keep the overall company objective in mind I don‘t think it should be 
a problem‘. One FM noted how ‗there is respect for saying no‘ [IF]. Many FMs 
underscored the need for strength of character in the roles of MAs: 
 
Close to the business, not the manager, not close on a personal level, 
otherwise compromising your position, close to what‘s going on 
[DF]. 
 
When an accountant moves into other areas and he is part and parcel 
of that decision process…he has got to have a strong personality to 
make sure that the standards and demands of that function are 
protected and maintained [HF]. 
 
I think you have to be very independent minded, very strong minded 
[PF]. 
 
The finance director of Company H relayed a story from an earlier experience of 
getting too involved: 
 
I think if I had of maintained an independence of that, we would not 
have been stuck with as much a debt as we would have been because 
I was completely involved and I was not objective enough. I was in 
my late 20s at the time and it was a lesson I learned well [HF]. 
 
The financial reporting burden, and in particular in US multinational subsidiaries with 
the SOX impact, seemed to consume a disproportionate part of finance resources and 
orientate accounting more towards policing than partnering as HF reflected: 
 
I am very pessimistic about that [MA] role today because of what I 
see as the Sarbanes Oxley environment. It is gone back…it has set 
back what I call the business like hours, years at this stage, in terms 
of more and more controls, controls, controls [HF]. 
 
BO1 similarly noted that ‗compliance role can make partnership role not work but not 
a problem here, don‘t police‘. 
 
5.4.3.3 Role conflict: MAs’ approach to involvement with OMs 
Some OMs identified consequences for functional relationships based on the 
perceived purpose and extent of interactions between MAs and OMs as CO 
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commented: ‗the style dictates a lot…how the function operates, if it can be 
collaborative rather than controlling, then it‘s probably much more beneficial‘ [CO]. 
A number of OMs made reference to unsolicited or inappropriate involvement. PO 
commented that ‗there are times you have to say to them to hold on a second you 
don‘t need to get that involved‘ and they ‗step on other people‘s toes‘. One manager 
mentioned the unnecessary questioning of variances by MAs, as ‗if they were tuned 
into what‘s going on they should be well able to answer those questions‘ [DO]. DO 
elaborated further: 
 
Sometimes it [interaction] can lead to conflicts with financial people 
not fully understanding how a situation develops on the shop floor 
resulting in a poor financial or a better financial report than 
expected. They might ask silly questions, ―how did that happen?‖ if 
they understood the process, those questions might not be asked or 
they might understand without having to ask the questions. It can 
lead then into a lot of ―argy bargy‖, you get, ―you were 10% down 
here‖, you know you‘re asked a lot of questions. 
 
Some managers indicated that involvement of MAs might not be always welcomed by 
OMs: 
 
…a lot of management accountants would like to involve themselves 
in production management….and they don‘t fit there, but they 
actually don‘t fit there because they don‘t have the same perspective 
[IO]. 
 
…you do find if someone has respect and command and is seen to be 
there helping they will be encouraged more to get involved in the 
issues and difficulties whereas if you‘re there as a...I would say a 
corporate person, kind of watching the errors, watching the 
slippages, you would be very excluded very quickly from the 
difficulties and the resolutions [HF]. 
 
…whether they should or shouldn‘t [be more involved], depends on 
the individual and what they want to get out of it. If it‘s a control 
thing, no, but if there is something that they want to contribute and 
offer an opinion on how to help with the decision then why not [LO]. 
 
The same manager continued by elaborating further on the purpose of the interaction: 
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There are project teams and there is interaction but generally 
speaking people will quite often leave finance out of that loop 
because they see them as that controlling, almost interfering 
influence rather than we must get so and so on the team because he is 
going to add value to the end result [LO]. 
 
GF commented that one ‗may have conflict with other managers over information you 
provide, don‘t like results‘ [GF]. In Company I, the OM commented that the 
involvement of MAs ‗can be positive or negative‘ with ‗penny pinching‘ being 
perceived as negative and ‗flexibility accounting‘ regarding switching project over-
spends and under-spends for different projects being perceived as positive. Regarding 
the roles of MAs in decision making processes, IO stated that ‗they shouldn‘t try and 
make decisions, production decisions themselves‘ as they are ‗part of [the process], 
yes, but not, but not…some of them try to make the whole lot‘.  
 
5.4.3.4 Potential to challenge OMs 
Some FMs noted that having interaction with OMs made it less difficult to challenge 
managers. CF noted that: 
 
If you have a good relationship and you are dealing with people on a 
regular basis, and regular conversations, regular updates, it‘s not 
such a big deal then to challenge…and also to share information both 
ways. 
 
CO largely confirmed this with a description of the interactive nature of control in 
Company C: 
 
I suppose watchful overseers as control has a strong connotation to 
it. Working with us and helping us to maintain the focus on the 
things we need to do. Control, I prefer not to use the word control, 
more collaborative. We have SOX for control. 
 
IF explained that: 
 
…control is easier, everyone understands, they know at the end of 
the day it is all for one and one for all we are not out here on our 
own trying to knock them all down. We are there to work with them 
and I suppose that is a growing, it‘s a nurture thing over the last few 
years, look it‘s not the bad old accountants there. 
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FMs noted that with interaction it was possible to ‗build up much better relationships 
with the managers‘ [PF]. 
 
5.4.3.5 Likelihood of OMs to present issues to MAs 
Some FMs noted that one consequence of being more involved was that managers 
were more likely to approach MAs if they had concerns. HF observed that OMs 
would draw MAs into issues in their functions as ‗some of them can command the 
respect of the other departments‘. AF2 noted that: 
 
…they would ask you for the information and they would obviously 
try to understand…and if they didn‘t understand they would ask you 
about it… 
 
CF noted that: 
 
If you are that bit more remote and hands off, people will be hands 
off to you, you are not going to be aware of the changing factors, 
they‘re not going to be as upfront if something goes wrong. 
 
KF remarked that ‗I get other departments involved in various aspects then the more 
they feel they can funnel the information from us‘. KF added: 
 
…got them today, production figures, to give me their reports to see 
what their efficiency levels are like and once they start getting used 
to this information, then I am asking them, well if you looked at it 
this way or you looked at it that way. 
 
AF1 observed that MAs interacting with OMs led to OMs being more open with MAs 
about matters of concern to them: 
 
…if people are out and about you‘re, I suppose from a non-
accountant role, they…know that you‘ve an understanding of what 
they‘re doing. They also know that they can show you things that are 
causing them issues. 
 
MF commented that ‗if any of them have a query they would come to us and check it 
out‘.  
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5.4.3.6 Need to sell the roles of MAs 
In some companies there appeared to be a need for MAs to convince OMs that 
interacting with them was in their interest. The following comments by FMs and OMs 
imply that OMs may be sceptical or apprehensive about involving MAs in their 
functions: 
 
…we have been trying to work with the guys and saying if we 
actually worked with you, you might get a better result at the end of 
the day [IF]. 
 
…but the key is for the accountant to get the people in the [business 
units] to actually buy into it and say yes this is going to benefit you, 
and it‘s a very hard sell [AO1].  
 
…they are very involved at times and some people feel that they are 
being nosey. It‘s hard. It is a fine line, I know because, like I say you 
might get involved in a project in production, but it‘s to explain that 
it‘s for the bigger picture [PO]. 
 
One FM recognised the contribution from MAs being involved on project teams may 
not initially be apparent: 
 
Being on project teams where it wouldn‘t be obvious to the people 
first, oh, we should have management accounting here, but once 
we‘re on board then you can bring a bit to the table so to speak [CF]. 
 
CF further noted the selling dimension to the roles of MAs in a comment about MAs 
‗developing and being taken seriously‘. One OM noted that part of being an effective 
MA required one ‗to be recognised within the organisation as being good at their job‘ 
[AO2] indicating a need for MAs to build a reputation around their roles. 
 
5.4.4 Summary of consequences 
The findings on consequences of the roles of MAs have been presented in relation to 
those that can be grouped as having an impact on performance, those that relate to 
impacting upon information, and those that relate to the interaction between MAs and 
managers. When FMs were asked to indicate where MAs were most effective at 
making a contribution, and hence the consequences of their roles, the most common 
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theme to emerge was acting as a guide or support to senior management decision 
making, which typically involved provision of financial analyses towards this end. 
Two FMs mentioned project work while two others emphasised control and two 
others noted adding value in a general sense. The OMs response tended to be more 
varied but about one third of OMs emphasised that the greatest contribution lay in the 
area of cost management. Only one manager noted ‗business partnership‘ [CO] as a 
contribution, while another suggested strategic positioning but more in the context of 
the financial director as opposed to the roles of MAs. The findings on the 
consequences associated with the roles of MAs are analysed in the discussion chapter 
in section 7.5.  
 
5.5 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has presented the findings from phase one of the study derived from 18 
interviews with FMs, and 18 interviews with OMs in medium and large 
manufacturing firms. The chapter has established a range of antecedents, 
characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles of MAs with each of these 
major finding streams being analysed further into sub-categories of findings. The 
analysis of these findings, following the data analysis process described in section 
4.9.1, led to the establishment of the research objectives for phase two of the study. 
The range of antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles 
of MAs serve as a useful template of factors that would be relevant in any subsequent 
research on the roles of MAs, or in focusing on some particular role of the MA. The 
second phase of the research did adopt this template as a starting point in the 
development of phase two objectives, which is presented at the start of the next 
chapter (see section 6.2). Table 5.1 presents a summary of the findings which is 
followed by an explanation of these themes. 
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ANTECEDENTS CHARACTERISTICS CONSEQUENCES 
EXTERNAL 
Ownership 
Environment 
Regulation 
 
INDIVIDUAL  
Business knowledge 
Interpersonal and 
communication skills 
IT skills 
Flexibility   
Personal qualities 
Technical skills 
Monitoring skills 
Organisational influence 
INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE 
With interaction:  
- Enhanced decisions  
- Better planning & control 
- Business-informed MAs  
Less interaction: 
- Weaker control    
  and performance  
- MAs lack  
  business  
  knowledge 
INTERNAL 
Size 
Structure 
Culture 
Technology 
Management 
Business nature and 
circumstances 
Location 
Performance 
management systems 
ACTIVITY 
Information provider, 
interpreter, and decision 
supporter 
Periodic performance 
reporting and planning 
Project assignments  
Ad hoc analyses 
Administration 
Use of techniques 
Educating OMs 
INFORMATION IMPACT 
With interaction: 
- Enhanced quality, use, and  
   value of information 
- MAs appreciate non- 
   financial criteria  
- MAs can assess quality of  
   information  
 
Less interaction:  
- Less interest and  
   value attached to  
   information 
 
INDIVIDUAL 
Orientation 
Background 
 
INFORMATION 
Information attributes  
Meeting information needs  
Information use (non-use)  
Information challenges 
 
ROLE INTERFACE 
With interaction: 
- Enhanced relationships 
- Role conflict: policing and  
   partnering  
- Role conflict: MAs‘  
   approach to involvement  
   with OMs 
- Potential to challenge OMs 
- Managers more likely to  
   present issues 
Less interaction:  
- Less scope for  
   conflicts 
- Managers more  
   remote 
- Need to sell the  
   roles of MAs 
SUMMARY THEMES OF PHASE ONE FINDINGS 
ANTECEDENTS CHARACTERISTICS CONSEQUENCES 
HO and SOX strong 
antecedents in US 
MNE subsidiaries. 
Interpersonal skills, business 
knowledge, flexibility, 
taking initiative, being 
innovative and strength of 
character emphasised. 
MAs interacting with OMs can lead to positive 
outcomes for performance, the OM, and the MA. 
Management 
(including FMs and 
OMs) perceived as 
strong antecedents. 
MA as provider, interpreter, 
and decision supporter but 
scope for more involvement.  
Conflicts and ambiguities associated with the 
interaction between MAs and OMs.  
MAs themselves 
perceived as strong 
antecedents. 
FM uncertainty on 
information use and OM 
indications of information 
needs not met. 
Most effective contribution as a guide to senior 
management decision making and control. 
Levels of analysis: 
external, the firm, 
and the individual. 
Level of analysis: the 
individual. 
 
Levels of analysis: the firm and the individual. 
Some normative orientation of interviewees‘ perception of the role of MAs.  
FMs‘ distinction of roles of MAs as ‗operational‘. 
 
Table 5.1 – Summary of phase one findings 
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The findings indicate a number of issues that require further, and deeper, 
investigation. There was a strong consensus in the findings from FMs and OMs on the 
roles of MAs in providing and interpreting information that supported OMs in their 
decision making and control processes. However, with respect to performing this 
function effectively the findings highlight that some MAs: lacked characteristics such 
as business knowledge, flexibility, using initiative, and were not adequately involved 
in supporting OMs. Strength of character in conjunction with effective interpersonal 
skills was also emphasised for the roles of MAs. Some information provided was not 
always relevant to OMs as some FMs were unsure of how accounting information 
was used by OMs and OMs indicated scantily reviewed, redundant, or missing 
information. OMs also displayed a capability to procure information independently of 
MAs. These findings relied exclusively on interview data and so specific management 
accounting reports or information were not examined although the findings clearly 
suggest that including accounting reports and information in follow-up research 
would be strongly merited based on these findings.   
 
The range of antecedents identified seem to suggest that some could be classified as  
having a negative impact on the roles of MAs with respect to supporting OMs. The 
influences of head office and SOX were perceived very strongly in US MNE 
subsidiaries which could curtail or negatively impact on interaction between MAs and 
OMs. These two factors would merit further examination in how they influence the 
roles of MAs, given their perceived prominence in the findings above. It has been 
noted that management, or OMs, were perceived as a strong influence on the roles of 
MAs, and within this category, the roles of FMs themselves were perceived by OMs 
as instrumental in the roles of MAs enacted e.g., regarding ‗openness‘ [AO1] and 
‗involvement‘ [BO2]. The findings presented above capture the perceptions of FMs 
regarding the roles of MAs but not necessarily how they as FMs may shape these 
roles, apart from the perceptions of OMs on this. This would indicate a value in 
capturing the perceptions of MAs themselves on this point. 
 
The consequences, as outcomes of the roles of MAs, suggest that MAs interacting 
with OMs can lead to positive support for OMs and company performance, and 
positive impacts for MAs. The variability of involvement of MAs in supporting OMs 
appears to lead to different consequences e.g., more interaction was associated with 
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information provision, enhanced decision making, planning and control, better 
performance, and more business-informed MAs which, without the interaction, may 
not be the case. This interaction between OMs and MAs however was not found to be 
straightforward e.g., more interaction was linked to a number of role conflicts for 
MAs that made providing support to OMs somewhat conditional and uncertain, while 
less interaction implied that MAs would have to invest in convincing OMs of the 
merits of their involvement. Furthermore, and linking with the antecedents, it was 
observed that the expectations of OMs were sometimes unclear, suggesting a need to 
better and more deeply probe the expectations of OMs. The ambiguity, conditionality 
and uncertainty around how MAs support OMs from the findings above suggest that 
further investigation could usefully probe further into the nuances surrounding the 
interaction between MAs and OMs, especially how MAs can more effectively achieve 
positive, as opposed to negative, outcomes for managerial support.  
 
It can be seen from the findings that the factors associated with the roles of MAs 
operate at different levels. There are antecedents that are at the external level (e.g., 
environment, corporate), organisational level (e.g., size, structure, culture) and 
individual level (e.g., orientation and background). Two antecedents that were very 
strongly emphasised by interviewees were the influence of the MA on their own roles 
and the influence of the manager (as an element of management) on the roles of MAs. 
There are characteristics that again relate to the individual level and characteristics 
that relate to the accounting activities that these individuals engage in, and the 
information that they provide. The consequences relate to performance, at both the 
organisational level and the individual manager level, and information impact and role 
interface that relate to the individual level of the MA and the OM. With respect to 
advancing from this range of antecedents, characteristics, and consequences to further 
research, the findings overall suggest that focusing on individual level factors would 
have greater merit than focusing on variables at the organisational or external level. 
This is because the findings uncovered more variation in individual level factors than 
for factors operating at the organisational or external level. Thus, MAs at an 
individual level, seemed to be more or less effective in their roles due more to factors 
which included their orientation, background, understanding of the business, inter-
personal skills and approach to involvement with OMs, than to organisational factors 
such as size, culture, technology or external factors such as the environment or head 
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office. That is not to say that organisational and external factors did not influence the 
roles, they did as noted above, but that these factors were perceived as doing so to a 
lesser extent and that there was less notable variation between MAs from these 
influences. 
 
One limitation of these findings is their somewhat normative orientation e.g., the 
perceived antecedents, characteristics, and consequences were largely expressed as 
how these factors should operate. There were, for example, normative notions 
regarding what skills MAs need to possess, what information they ought to provide, 
and how they should interact with managers or ‗tend to‘ [PO, AO1] behave. Also 
senior FMs (e.g., finance directors, financial controllers) provided their perceptions of 
the roles of MAs, roles which they may previously have occupied, or were currently 
performing in some capacities, or were roles reporting into their more senior financial 
roles in the organisational hierarchy.  There was also a perception that MAs were 
‗operational‘ [DO], ‗providers‘ [FF], and mostly at their ‗desk‘ [DF], while FMs were 
‗strategic‘ [DO], ‗the decision maker[s]‘ [FF], and ‗50% away from desk‘ [DF]. What 
is somewhat lacking in this analysis therefore, is a deeper understanding of the ‗real‘ 
and ‗live‘ individuals enacting the roles of MAs in organisations. Furthermore, the 
OMs who participated in this phase of the research provided their perceptions of the 
roles of MAs generally in normative terms and not in the specific context of particular 
MAs. 
 
The basis for the phase two objectives are presented at the beginning of the next 
chapter in section 6.2. The collective picture that emerges regarding the roles of MAs 
is examined in the discussion chapter (see section 7.2), while the individual sub-
themes are also discussed in chapter seven under the discussion of antecedents (see 
section 7.3), characteristics (see section 7.4), and consequences (see section 7.5). The 
next chapter presents the findings from phase two of the study as per the design 
outlined in section 4.6. 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from phase two of the research using the case 
methodology as discussed in section 4.6 which involved the investigation of the roles 
of 12 MAs as ‗cases‘ through interviewing them and the OMs they worked closely 
with, and examining management accounting reports around these roles. The first 
section sets out the analysis of the phase one findings leading to the establishment of 
phase two objectives, while keeping the underlying literature gaps in mind. The 
section following presents a brief profile of the 12 MAs in the context of the five 
manufacturing firms in which they were based before presenting the findings. 
 
6.2 Phase one analysis leading to phase two objectives 
The outcome of phase one was an extensive list of antecedents, characteristics, and 
consequences associated with the roles of MAs, and some key themes and issues 
relating to these as noted in section 5.5. Phase one provided a template of factors both 
to assist in the formulation of phase two objectives and to be the reference point in the 
context of phase two data collection in being what phase one had pre-determined as 
associated antecedents, characteristics, and consequences for the roles of MAs. As 
phase one was an inductive piece of research it was not possible to conclude that this 
template of factors was definitive and so the researcher was prepared to be open to 
other new factors arising in phase two. Notwithstanding this, the template was used as 
the relevant basis for further investigating factors pertinent to phase two objectives. 
The interview guides used in phase two (see further discussion below) contain 
discussion ‗prompt boxes‘ that were based on phase one analysis (see appendix C). 
Thus, phase two of the research focused in on particular aspects of these factors and 
the methodological design was also informed from this analysis. The major themes 
from phase one analysis that framed the setting of phase two objectives were as 
follows:  
 
1) The findings reveal a range of antecedents to the roles of MAs (see section 5.2), 
with a strong emphasis being placed on the influence of managers on the roles of 
MAs, and the influence of the MAs on the roles themselves. Some of the 
antecedents seem to be oriented towards meeting external requirements (e.g., 
head office, SOX), while others seem to be oriented towards meeting internal 
requirements (e.g., OMs). The findings on individual antecedents, i.e., the ability 
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of MAs to influence their own roles, suggest that MAs may have orientations to 
particular accounting roles. These accounting roles may vary in the extent that 
they support OMs i.e., the individual could be more oriented towards meeting the 
needs of OMs or could be more oriented towards external financial reporting (see 
section 5.2.3.1).  
 
2) The findings on individual characteristics reveal a wide skill set (see section 
5.3.1) and there seems to be much consensus between FMs and OMs regarding 
important characteristics (e.g., interpersonal and communication skills, business 
knowledge, flexibility, and initiative) with some OMs indicating that MAs should 
be stronger on the latter three in particular. The necessity for strength of character 
in interacting with OMs was also emphasised. The characteristics noted suggest 
that the extent that MAs possess these may have repercussions for how 
effectively MAs discharge their roles.  
  
3) The activity characteristics (see section 5.3.2) identified in the findings reveal 
concurrence between FMs and OMs on the roles of MAs as information 
providers, interpreters, and influencers of managerial decision processes across a 
range of activities. The findings show that MAs should be more involved in 
supporting OMs, that their level of involvement was generally not strategic, and 
that the way that MAs actually got involved in activities with OMs could be 
supportive or unsupportive to OMs. A distinction was also made by some FMs 
that MAs were more involved in information provision, operational issues, and at 
their desks versus FMs who were more involved in the business, and in decision 
processes which were of a more strategic nature. Some MAs appeared to be 
overly consumed in administrative tasks, which could have implications for 
supporting OMs.  
 
4) The information characteristics (see section 5.3.3) noted in the findings reveal 
some variability in OMs‘ perceptions of management accounting information 
with suggestions that there might be redundancy, under-use, manager variability 
in use, a more financial and historical than non-financial and future orientation, 
and low levels of adoption of accounting innovations. The findings therefore 
suggest that MAs have some scope to better provide management accounting 
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information in supporting OMs.  
  
5) The findings on the consequences (see section 5.4) of the roles of MAs indicate 
there are some positive managerial outcomes regarding information provision, 
decision making, planning and control, and outcomes for performance associated 
with the involvement of MAs with OMs. However, some consequences of the 
roles suggest that the involvement of MAs might not have positive outcomes for 
supporting OMs, such as a number of role conflicts that were evident in the 
findings. It was observed in the findings that MAs may have to ‗sell‘ aspects of 
their roles to OMs i.e., demonstrate the potential of their roles to support OMs. 
The findings on consequences of the roles of MAs thus reveal that MAs 
providing support to OMs have a number of challenges associated with it. This 
suggests a need to better understand how MAs can better support OMs in the 
performance of their roles.  
 
6) The list of consequences identified in phase one may be categorised into those 
that relate to the manager (e.g., involvement in decision making, planning and 
control, information provision) and those that relate to the MAs in their roles 
(e.g., being more informed, appreciating non-financial criteria, and easier to 
challenge). It could be argued that further research on the latter category of 
consequences, while maybe of interest to MAs, could be challenged as being 
limited in scope in this regard. By focusing on how MAs can better support OMs 
in their roles phase two would therefore be selecting a particularly relevant 
outcome variable that was identified as such by the interviewees.  
 
7) Collectively, the findings on antecedents, characteristics, and consequences 
reveal that the perceptions of important roles for MAs expressed strongly, by 
FMs and OMs, were in terms of MAs supporting OMs in their decision making 
and control functions (see sections 5.2.2.5, 5.3.2.1, 5.4.1, and 5.4.2). Furthermore, 
when perceptions of the greatest contribution of the roles of MAs were sought it 
was generally stated in relation to supporting OMs (see section 5.4.4).  
 
8) Phase one provided the relevant antecedents, characteristics, and consequences 
associated with the roles of MAs that could be relied upon in the further, more 
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focused, investigation of the roles of MAs in phase two i.e., reference might be 
made to some of these in the specific context of addressing the objectives of 
phase two, outlined below. Thus, it was not necessary to reinvestigate these as 
this work was done in phase one. This also justifies the conducting of phase one 
prior to phase two as it would not have been possible to conduct phase two 
without first having known these associated antecedents, characteristics, and 
consequences and the issues emerging as noted in section 5.5. 
 
The analysis of the phase one findings presented above formed the basis for the 
establishment of phase two objectives. A recurring theme is the extent that MAs 
appear to have an impact on managers performing their roles (e.g., consequences 
relating to information provision, decision making, control, performance outcomes), 
given the existence of a range of antecedents and characteristics which demonstrate 
considerable variation, and associated conditions, in the making of this impact. Figure 
6.1 illustrates the movement from phase one to phase two of the study that reflects a 
sharpening focus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 – Movement from phase one to phase two  
 
Thus, phase two focuses specifically on the roles of MAs with respect to the 
consequences for assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. The objectives of 
phase two are: 
 
1) To analyse the extent that antecedents associated with the roles of MAs have 
consequences for assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
  
PHASE 2 
Extent that antecedents and characteristics 
associated with the roles of MAs  
have consequences for assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles 
PHASE 1 
Antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles of MAs 
 
 
 
 
FOCUS 
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2) To analyse the extent that characteristics associated with the roles of MAs have 
consequences for assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
 
From a research design perspective, the findings from phase one indicated that an in-
depth case approach would be the most appropriate design. The design of phase one 
(see section 4.4.2) captured the views of 18 senior FMs and 18 OMs in 16 
manufacturing firms regarding the roles of MAs and, as noted in section 5.5, these 
views were largely normative as opposed to relating to actual ‗real‘ and ‗live‘ specific 
individuals in the firms. In phase one there were no pre-defined criteria set with 
respect to specific working relationships or interactions, and specific individuals in 
actual roles. 
 
The MAs in phase two were more junior to those in phase one (see section 4.8.3). In 
phase one senior MAs were often finance directors and controllers providing their 
perceptions of the roles of MAs, not perceptions of the roles of senior financial 
officers, and the overall focus of this study is on the roles of MAs. The findings in 
phase one also showed some distinctions being made between the roles of FMs and 
MAs, often suggesting that MAs were not as actively involved with OMs as the FMs 
were (see sections 5.2.2.5 and 5.3.2.1).  
 
For the research design of phase two, role theory (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 
1978) played an important part in the case study data collection (see section 4.6.4) 
because it predicts that the expectations of managers (i.e., as role senders) has an 
influence on others in the organisation (i.e., the focal roles, MAs). As noted above, 
managers were perceived as a strong influence on the roles of MAs (see section 
5.2.2.5) but this influence seemed to lead to MAs not meeting these expectations 
(under points 2, 3, 4 and 5 above). Role theory methodology therefore provided the 
guiding data collection tools to acquire an in-depth understanding of the expectations 
of OMs. As noted in section 4.8.3, role theory methodology also enabled a specific 
MA to be linked to a specific manager with respect to understanding the extent to 
which MAs meet the expectations of OMs. This brings into sharp focus how MAs are 
actually assisting OMs in the performance of their roles in the context of specifically 
paired MA-OM relationships, and not how MAs ought to do so. 
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The phase one findings identified antecedents, characteristics, and consequences 
associated with the roles of MAs at different levels of analysis (environmental, 
organisational, and individual), and the individual level of analysis, as noted in 
section 5.5, showed greatest variation and perceived strength of impact on the roles of 
MAs. Thus, the case design (see section 4.6) was based on treating the MA, and not 
the firm, as the ‗case‘ in the case studies. Finally, in linking back to the literature 
review, the focus on further understanding the effectiveness of the roles of MAs in 
assisting OMs in the performance of their roles has already been identified as a gap in 
the existing literature (see sections 3.7 and 3.14). 
 
6.3 Profiles of MAs in manufacturing firms 
To protect the confidentiality of individuals and organisations in the presentation of 
findings, the interviewees are anonymously referred to using a double lettering system 
(see section 4.8.4 and table 4.10). The first letter indicates which of the five firms the 
MA or OM is located in (e.g., A, B, C, D or E) and the second letter indicates whether 
the interviewee is a MA or an OM: M for MA, and O for OM. If there is more than 
one MA, or related OM, in the firm a numbering system is used e.g., BM3 is the third 
MA in Company B. MAs identified OMs that most influenced their roles and thus the 
referencing also reflects a matched pair e.g., AM1 and AO1 is the MA (AM1) and the 
OM (AO1) that the MA identified as most influencing her role. This section provides 
a brief profile of each manufacturing firm and the MAs therein.  
 
6.3.1 Company A: four MAs 
Company A is a large engineering firm that manufactures components for 
international markets, is a member of the Fortune 500 US listed companies, and 
operates in over 90 counties with a workforce in excess of 100,000. The long 
established subsidiary employs approximately 700 employees. Four MAs and an OM 
that worked closely with each MA were interviewed as part of the study. There were 
two separate sites in the same locality, one larger one where three MAs were based 
and aligned with three particular business units, and one other smaller site where one 
MA was based. Figure 6.2 provides an organisation chart for the four MAs. 
 
 
 
221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Phase two interviewees 
 
Figure 6.2 – Finance organisation chart for Company A 
 
The subsidiary was a ‗completely metric driven organisation and even though I am 
the managing director of this facility I have no autonomy to spend money here other 
than what is in our annual operating plan‘1. The subsidiary was primarily focused on 
manufacturing and distributing engineered products, as a part of the wider group 
structure, and did not have any local sales and marketing functions. The company was 
in an extremely competitive manufacturing environment and there was a very 
aggressive focus on cost reduction as there was a threat of manufacturing moving to 
lower cost locations. The company used SAP® (an ERP system) and its support had 
recently been outsourced to Bangalore in India. 
 
6.3.2 Company B: four MAs 
Company B is a subsidiary of a large US listed multinational corporation in the 
pharmaceutical sector. The subsidiary employs over 400 people. There was a team of 
four MAs (BM1 to BM4) reporting to a team leader as depicted in figure 6.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial Controller 
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*Phase two interviewees #New position created during data collection 
 
Figure 6.3 – Finance organisation chart for Company B 
 
Company B was primarily a one-product manufacturing firm and was in the early 
stages of its development with rapid expansion occurring at the time of this study. 
There was not the same competitive cost focus (as was evident in Company A) but 
more a focus on operational setup and expansion. Unusually, all non-production staff 
on site were juggled in that the finance function staff did not sit together e.g., one MA 
could be sitting amongst staff from the supply chain, production planning, and 
packaging functions. The open plan office style and relatively short distance between 
staff made contact with fellow functional members straightforward. The site had a 
database-based system but it was perceived as sub-standard to other market offerings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1
 Opportunistic interview with the managing director, March 28
th
, 2006. 
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6.3.3 Company C: one MA 
Company C is a subsidiary of a large US multinational corporation in the medical 
devices sector. The organisation is a private family-owned business with 1,400 
employees worldwide located in 30 countries. Figure 6.4 illustrates the finance chart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
*Phase two interviewee 
 
Figure 6.4 – Finance organisation chart for Company C 
 
With a private firm status, Company C was understandably the most cautious of the 
participating firms in the discussion and examination of performance and reports. The 
company had recently undergone a traumatic doubling of scale of operations as 
‗managing a 300-person business is totally different to managing a 700-person 
business‘2. The IT system was very basic and ‗25 years old‘, linked to the owners 
insistence, and so much use was made of spreadsheets. The product was of a premium 
standard and in a high-demand niche market. The factory operated a continuous 
improvement philosophy and was relatively autonomous. 
 
6.3.4 Company D: two MAs 
Company D is a major division of a large Irish multinational corporation in the food 
and beverages sector and approximately 400 people are employed in this division. 
The company very recently installed SAP® as can been seen from the finance chart 
below where there was an accountant full-time on the project. The company has a 
number of regional business units and has sales, marketing, and retail divisions as 
well as production and distribution in common with the other firms in the study. 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the finance organisation chart. 
Managing Director 
Finance 
Director 
 
Financial 
Accountant 
CM* 
Operations functions 
 
Accounts/Payroll 
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*Phase two interviewees 
 
Figure 6.5 – Finance organisation chart for Company D 
 
6.3.5 Company E: one MA 
Company E is a subsidiary of a large French industrial materials multinational firm 
that operates in over 50 countries and employs in excess of 200,000 people. The long-
established subsidiary in Ireland operates in the construction sector and employs over 
100 people. Figure 6.6 illustrates the finance organisation chart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Phase two interviewee 
 
Figure 6.6 – Finance organisation chart for Company E 
 
The company has two major product divisions and a sales and marketing function. 
The IT systems were very basic and not integrated and there was a heavy reliance on 
spreadsheet use. The company was at the very early stages of the introduction of 
World Class Manufacturing and SAP® at the site. Since the undertaking of this 
                                                                                                                                            
2
 Opportunistic interview with the finance director, 26
th
 April 2006. 
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research a decision was made to end production at the site, with the collapse of the 
building industry being cited as the major contributing factor
3
. 
 
6.3.6 Profiles of the roles of MAs  
The MAs‘ professional qualifications and years of service with the company and time 
in the current job are illustrated in table 6.1. 
 
MA Qualification Time in job Time in 
company 
AM1 CIMA 4 years 9 years 
AM2 CIMA 7 months 7 months 
AM3 FCCA 5 years 5 years 
AM4 CIMA 2 years 7.5 years 
BM1 CIMA 1.5 years 1.5 years 
BM2 CIMA 10 months 10 months 
BM3 CIMA 2-3 years 4 years 
BM4 CIMA (PQ) 2 years 2 years 
CM ACA 10 months 10 months 
DM1 ACA 2.5 years 9 years 
DM2 ACCA 6.5 years 9 years 
EM CIMA/ACCA 2.5 years 3.5 years 
 
Table 6.1– Professional accounting qualifications and service years of MAs 
 
MAs identified those in the organisation who they perceived as most influential on 
their roles (see appendix G). These influences largely related to the roles of MAs 
being aligned to support particular functional roles of OMs e.g., MAs in Companies 
A, B, and D – the largest firms - were aligned to support specific business units or 
business processes. MAs were involved in some common and some very different 
activities and Appendix I provides two tables in this regard: one which lists the 
activities making up the roles for each individual MA and one which lists the 
activities most associated with interaction between the MA and the OM. Table 6.2 
illustrates job titles of the MAs and OMs that they were linked with which provides 
some indication of the roles of MAs and OMs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Steven Carroll, The Irish Times, August 15
th
 2008. 
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OM Job Titles MA Job Titles 
AO1 Supply Chain, Maintenance Manager AM1 Operations Accountant (Unit A) 
AO2 Operations Manager AM2 Operations Accountant (Unit B) 
AO3 Business Unit Manager AM3 Financial Accountant (Unit C) 
AO4 Plant Manager AM4 Financial Accountant 
B01 Project Manager BM1 Project Accountant 
B02 Planning / Business Partner BM2 Management Accountant 
B03 Production Director BM3 Management (Planning) Accountant 
B04 Packaging and Production Manager BM4 Cost Analyst 
CO Operations Director CM Company Accountant 
DO1 Commercial Manager - Supply Chain DM1 Supply Chain Management Accountant 
DO2 Commercial Manager - Regional  DM2 Management Accountant -  Divisions 
EO Production Manager EM Financial Services Manager 
 
Table 6.2 – Job titles of paired MAs and OMs 
 
MAs had numerous roles that required them to interact with many OMs. For example, 
AM1 associated most influence from, and interaction with, AO1 the Supply Chain, 
Maintenance Manager but also interacted with other OMs (see appendix G). There 
were multiple interactions between MAs and OMs but the study limited the 
investigation to the OM that the MA identified as the OM most influencing their 
roles. EM was the only exception where the Production Manager was interviewed in 
place of the Sales Director who declined the interview request (see section 4.8.3). 
 
6.3.7 Profiles of management accounting reports  
MAs were requested to bring along an example of a routine (R) report and a non-
routine (NR) report, to the second interview, which related to the MA interacting with 
OMs. Details of the 34 routine reports and 17 non-routine reports examined in the 
study are presented in appendix H which gives a brief description and summary of the 
report, its reference (e.g., R1 is routine report number one (see appendix H1), NR1 is 
non-routine report number one (see appendix H2)), and the MA to which the report 
relates. As can be seen in appendix H, MAs in many instances freely provided more 
than the one requested example. Additional routine reports were provided by certain 
participants who worked closely with MAs and details of these are also listed in 
appendix H1. The findings presented below will continually make reference to these 
reports. 
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Some MAs spent more time than other MAs on routine reports versus non-routine 
reports. In general, the routine reports tended to dominate the roles of MAs, and 
particularly for AM3, EM, and BM4 who remarked that ‗it is mostly all routine‘. In 
contrast, for AM1 and AM2 this was 60:40 (routine: non-routine) and 70:30 
respectively, and for BM3 ‗not much of it is routine‘. DO1 commented that ‗DM1 
probably spends more time generating routine reports but I would spend more time 
looking at the non-routine stuff‘. In general the time spent on routine and non-routine 
reports reflected the roles the MAs occupied i.e., AM1, AM2, BM1, BM3, and DM1 
occupied roles that linked to OMs involved in projects, while AM3, BM2, BM4, and 
EM occupied roles that necessitated the routine preparation of financial and 
management accounts. Other MAs, such as AM4, CM, and DM2, tended to have a 
mix of both.  
 
6.4 Thematic foundation of findings and presentation structure 
The findings are presented around dimensions of the central focus of phase two of the 
research which is the extent that antecedents and characteristics associated with the 
roles of MAs have consequences for assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
The consequence of assisting OMs in the performance of their roles as the point of 
focus in phase two is analysed into three major elements in the presentation of the 
findings which are impact, information, and interaction (the three ‗i‘s). Impact 
examines to what extent the roles of MAs specifically impact on the OMs‘ 
performance outcomes. Information examines to what extent the roles of MAs in 
providing information assists OMs in the performance of their roles. Interaction 
examines to what extent the roles of MAs in interacting with OMs assists OMs in the 
performance of their roles.  
 
As noted in section 6.2, role theory methodology was used to investigate the 
expectations of OMs as a means of understanding to what extent MAs were assisting 
OMs in the performance of their roles. This also adds much more depth to the 
identification of management as a strong antecedent in phase one (see section 5.2.2.5) 
of the research now being related specifically to assisting OMs in the performance of 
their roles. Thus, the findings presented below analyse this antecedent of management 
into the expectations of OMs and the extent that MAs were meeting these 
expectations and therefore assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. Within 
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these expectations, there are findings on the expected characteristics of the MA, 
expected characteristics regarding the information provided by the MA, and expected 
interaction with the MA which builds further on these important characteristics as 
identified in phase one (see section 5.3).  
 
The findings of phase two are presented under a number of themes which are:  
 
1) Impact of MAs on OMs‘ performance outcomes; 
2) General characteristics of information and assisting OMs;   
3) Meeting OMs‘ control information expectations; 
4) MAs and control information; 
5) Meeting OMs‘ control interaction expectations; 
6) Meeting OMs‘ decision information expectations; 
7) MAs and decision information; 
8) Meeting OMs‘ decision interaction expectations;  
9) MAs‘ perceptions of OMs‘ expectations; and 
10) Antecedents challenging the support MAs can provide to OMs. 
 
As expectations form a significant part of the presentation of the findings it is 
important to explain how the managers, who held these expectations of MAs, actually 
conveyed them to MAs. OMs communicated their expectations of the roles of MAs to 
MAs sometimes through formal and informal meetings and sometimes through 
telephone calls and electronic mail e.g., DO1 commented that DM1 could challenge 
and push ‗each of the managers and that is a thing that I talked to him about‘. MAs 
also became aware of the expectations of OMs in relation to their roles through their 
line (finance) manager and through documented expectations depicted in annually 
stated and reviewed goals and objectives and to a much, much lesser extent, job 
descriptions. 
 
Specific reports will be referred to in presenting findings on general information 
characteristics assisting OMs, in the control and decision information expectations of 
OMs, and in the control-related and decision-related reports that MAs provided. 
While reports were not examined in phase one, phase two adds depth to the important 
information support role highlighted in phase one (see section 5.3.2.1). 
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6.5 Impact of MAs on OMs’ performance outcomes 
There was some variability in the perceptions of OMs regarding the extent that MAs 
influenced them in the performance of their roles. OMs were asked about satisfaction 
with the influence of MAs upon them and vice versa. AO1, BO3, BO4 and CO sought 
the MAs to influence them more, while the remaining OMs were satisfied with the 
influence of the MA on them. Most OMs were generally satisfied with the extent of 
their influence on MAs but AO3 described it as ‗not much‘, BO1 desired more ‗value 
add‘, and DO2 noted his influence as ‗bordering too little‘. BO4 wished to ‗explore‘ 
the scope to influence BM4. In summary, four OMs wished MAs had more influence 
over them and three OMs wished they had more influence over MAs.  
 
OMs explained their extent of dependence on MAs to enable them to achieve their 
objectives which reveals, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, to what 
extent MAs impact on performance outcomes for OMs. AO1 stated: 
 
AM1 would be a big help in terms of delivering information which 
can aid you obtain your objectives, she wouldn‘t be involved in the 
day to day help in terms of AM1 won‘t do anything in terms of 
helping me get delivery performance up but if I ask her to help on 
providing the data, she gladly will…the data can make a difference 
to help me, it can help me to look in the right direction. 
 
AO2 described AM2 as ‗part of the operations team and he is a functional role, cost 
reduction and I will be looking for more from him on that‘ and ‗he contributes to the 
operations team‘. AO2 noted AM2 ‗works with me closely, with me on productivity‘ 
(see R2) and ‗we have visibility on how well we are spending‘. AO2 explained the 
performance consequences of the roles of AM2 as ‗labour productivity, productivity 
would be a big one, I suppose the cost reduction‘ and ‗he would have an impact on 
decision making‘. AO3 did not perceive much dependence on AM3 to achieve his 
objectives: 
 
…in some ways he doesn‘t, I won‘t say he doesn‘t but he delivers the 
results, this is what you achieved…information that you are able to 
work with and then because we have the weekly meeting we review 
[AO3]. 
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AO3 stated that ‗AM3 will come to me if we seem to be going over budget‘ and ‗from 
the interaction we are using the information more, we use the information more to see 
what our costs are, like we know what our high spend costs are which up to now we 
wouldn‘t have looked at‘ and AO3 was ‗most pleased‘, as ‗the information is readily 
available‘. AO4 noted that AM4 ‗assists primarily on the conversion cost productivity 
objectives through the activities on the cost reduction teams‘ (see R13), while ‗some 
of it is purely monthly, the need to deliver monthly financial accounts‘. AO4 added: 
 
My objective as plant leader would be more pure on cost, quality, 
and delivery so yes he also supports the delivery of objectives within 
the finance department that are unique to the finance group but 
outside of that in terms of the plant manager‘s objectives he feeds 
into, positively into activities to reduce, primarily to reduce costs. 
 
AO4 related specific performance results to AM4‘s analysis of overtime issues (see 
R14) and ‗out of that came a whole series of meetings and out of that we agreed some 
overtime rates‘ and ‗we saved ourselves well over a €100,000 year to date‘ and R14 
‗forces people to, it is an active document, it is a live document‘ [AO4]. AO4 also 
noted that AM4 had been instrumental in highlighting escalating cost issues and 
‗relative to prior, he would look at patterns of usage‘. BO1 depended on BM1 to 
manage ‗capital spend, it is where it is at, so it is control capital spend, forecasting 
capital spend‘. BO1 noted: 
 
He is again capital control, without that, without those systems and 
without those systems being up to date and maintained and 
constantly evolving we just simply wouldn‘t have the control in 
there. 
 
BO1 explained that regarding BM1 ‗the key consequence is the word control, we have 
control of capital‘. BO2 noted that BM2 ‗makes sure everything is set up, all the costs 
are there‘ including ‗different signature requirements before it can be approved on the 
system‘. BO2 stated that: 
 
He is setting up a standard cost for purchased items, he would set up 
a standard cost for that so if he doesn‘t prioritise and sign off within 
his three days that could delay something being purchased or it could 
delay something going on the line. 
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BO2 noted: ‗decision making in my job, am, he wouldn‘t really, not because of him 
but it wouldn‘t really come into it‘. BO3 explained his dependence on BM3 as: 
 
…he gives me guidance in terms of actually, directional guidance in 
terms of actually the financial impacts of the decisions that we make 
and the direction and goals of the site…he certainly gives feedback 
to me…also gives me some suggestions in terms of what else could 
we do to try and get some results, we would have less financial 
impact if BM3 was not there. 
 
BO3 explained performance consequences as ‗we get very professional output in the 
areas of new product introduction costing, that is one area, so high calibre in that 
space. We get a very good discipline and quality of cost centre review discussions like 
budget review discussions'. BO4 simply stated that he ‗doesn‘t really‘ depend on 
BM4 to achieve his objectives. Although BO4 did ‗not know enough, what BM4 
does‘ but BM4 ‗keeps us all in line as well, you know there are boundaries there that 
are budgeted to‘. BO4 observed: 
 
It is the control compliance from the financial side it is critical from 
BM4‘s, that we have at the end of, on a weekly and a monthly, that 
we are keeping all the work orders and the costs in line with our 
objectives and that anything that I can do to support it is very 
important. 
 
CO stated his dependence on CM with a specific example relating to his own plant 
wide objectives on managing scrap: 
 
It is an important role [CM] I mean again this thing here again one of 
objectives would be scrap, at least, every department, these are all 
my departments [referring to the scrap report, R24] in the area of 
scrap, 3% here and 5% there, coating maybe 8%, the point is if I 
didn‘t look at this report from January to January and at the end of 
the year scrap was 20% across the plant well I wouldn‘t be here in 
January if it was. 
 
CO perceived performance consequences regarding CM as ‗quality of original 
information that has to be a key point‘ for example ‗project costings or when we are 
in price negotiations‘. DO1 related DM1 to his objective on the ‗supply chain 
management team and looking for him to be more proactive in raising the issues and 
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driving us all to achieve them rather than just reporting where we are‘. DO1 stated 
that: 
 
[DM1] would state where we are, the facts as they are, where we are 
versus our targets [see R34a-c] and he would leave it at that so I 
would have to take it from there to make, go through actions and 
decisions [DO1].  
 
Both DO1 and DO2 perceived the consequences of the roles of DM1 and DM2 to be 
firstly the ‗accounts‘ [DO1, DO2], secondly to push the performance of managers 
towards ‗the achievement of targets‘ [DO1], and ‗identifying the issues at an early 
stage and then those issues being addressed proactively‘ [DO2]. DO2 stated that DM2 
would assist him achieving his objectives through the ‗monthly set of accounts, 
identifying the issues and addressing them speedily‘ for example:  
 
Well if there are issues in a [division] be it a margin issue or at least I 
can step in and work on it straight away so that can have a positive 
impact then if it is worked upon. 
 
EO stated regarding EM assisting him achieving his objectives that ‗he wouldn‘t in 
terms of, not really‘. EO noted that EM was ‗doing his job‘ as ‗there is nothing 
coming back, there is nothing major coming down the line‘ from head office: 
 
EM is giving them the information that they are looking for. All they 
want is information, nothing but, just give them information so he is 
obviously doing that or else you would have people living here. 
 
EO explained ‗if he [EM] wasn‘t there I would carry on anyway [laughs] but at the 
same time…he gets all the figures, the production figures, he plots those in against the 
budget‘. 
 
6.6 General characteristics of information and assisting OMs 
The characteristics of the information provided by MAs and linked to assisting OMs 
in the performance of their roles are presented under the headings of timeliness and 
accuracy, dependability, accessibility and visibility, functional requirements, 
determining needs, user orientation, and aggregation and disaggregation, building 
upon phase one (see section 5.3.3). 
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6.6.1 Timeliness and accuracy 
AO1 attributed ‗accurate and timely information‘ and ‗putting all the pieces together‘ 
to AM1 and noted that AM1 had made his ‗job that bit easier because if I can rely on 
good accurate data‘. AO1 commented that he was ‗very, very happy with the service‘ 
he got from AM1 and that work was done in a ‗good timely fashion‘. AO2 explained 
that ‗believe it or not it is a lot better than it used to be‘ as ‗before that we had the 
financial controller doing it purely from a PC so he was making all the assumptions, 
not necessarily correct‘  but it was now ‗a lot more localised so you have a discussion 
you‘re looking at problems and you‘re saying well it is not quite right to measure it 
that way the labour productivity is actually really…so it is more accurate, it is more  
precise‘. AO2 was referring to a recent decision in the company to align specific MAs 
to support specific business units (see section 6.3.1). Confirming this AM2‘s reports 
on productivity (see R2), output per employee (see R3) and operating supplies (see 
R4a-b) were specifically at the sub-firm level (see Business Unit B in figure 6.2). 
AO4 was pleased with the timeliness of information coming from AM4 in stating that 
‗I think the main delay is getting the information to AM4, as soon as he gets his hands 
on it, he turns it around very quickly‘. BO1 stressed the importance of timely project 
reporting [see R16] by BM1:  
 
It is timely reporting on a weekly basis, it is very important because 
if we look at a project and it is not live and the costs are not live on it 
we could potentially make decisions that are essentially flawed.  
 
BO2 stated that ‗what works best is the timeliness of the item set up and the cost 
rolling‘. BO3 noted the time pressure in forecasting processes as ‗we say ok that 
doesn‘t look directionally right, so lots of rework, re-churning of that type of dynamic 
which would have to be done in a very short timeline in order to actually get to an end 
point fairly quickly‘. CO noted that ‗one of my objectives would be scrap‘ and ‗the 
only way that I know if scrap is high or low is what CM gives me [see R24a-b]…so I 
need accurate information so the more CM can give me the focus points to focus on, 
timely information, and the analysis‘. CO stated that ‗I think timing is everything‘. 
One of the factors that pleased DO1 most about management accounting information 
was that ‗it is timely, it is accurate‘ (see R25 and R34). DO1 stressed firstly regarding 
DM1, the ‗accounts correct and accurate‘ as ‗we put a high focus on financials and 
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measurement. We would have the view that what doesn‘t get measured doesn‘t 
happen‘. DM2 perceived OMs‘ expectations as being ‗to do the accounts properly. 
DO2 attached much importance to ‗identifying the issues at an early stage‘ in the 
context of the ‗monthly accounts‘ (see R26) and ‗by having those issues addressed as 
early as possible, it has a positive impact on the business then‘. EO referred to the 
management accounts as ‗historical‘ which could be understood from EM‘s remark 
that ‗we have so much to do and we are very short of staff‘ and ‗we report to head 
office ok within four or five working days‘ but the management accounts ‗could be 
another two weeks‘ or ‗three weeks after the month end‘ (see R28 and R30).  
 
6.6.2 Accessibility and visibility 
Some OMs raised issues around getting access to information and to getting that 
access earlier in the process. AO1 expressed a preference for receiving information 
prior to meetings so ‗we could get some of the work done prior to the meeting‘. CO 
noted ‗sometimes a report is printed and people see a big figure on the bottom line 
and it could maybe create maybe a kind of excitement‘ and for example sometimes ‗it 
is not actually true scrap but people didn‘t record the correct usage‘. DO2 also noted 
that he would like to see the monthly accounts prior to the review meetings as ‗the 
first time I see the accounts I am presented with a pack and I have no background to 
it‘. Some MAs and OMs noted how there was not much awareness of management 
accounting information that was available. AM3 noted that ‗they didn‘t realise that 
the report was there [see R6a-b, operating supplies], they could use it for various 
different things‘. CO noted that ‗their knowledge of the condition of the plant…it is 
very valuable and that just needs to be shared‘. CO commented that it was a case of 
‗not being asked for it in the past‘ and ‗it was an accident a few months back that I 
came across the scrap report (see R18) and I said who does that and he said I do‘. CO 
and DO2 perceived access to this information as critical: 
 
…he gives me access to inventory reports which are very important 
and we are not carrying too much inventory, gives me access to 
overtime reports, scrap reports and what we call KPIs, key 
performance indicators that kinds of tell you if you are being 
effective. You can be very efficient and produce a lot of material but 
it might not be effective in making a profit [CO]. 
 
…if DM2 wasn‘t there you would be working in a vacuum at that 
stage, not knowing what is really happening, okay you have a hunch 
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but the whole process, you don‘t really have a set of figures there 
that are quite convincing in their own right and I think that one can 
be satisfied that there is accuracy in terms of the figures [DO2]. 
 
DO2 noted that ‗we go through the accounts‘ as ‗there is no point in looking at the 
strategic issues if you don‘t have the set of accounts for a start‘. AM2 attributed 
‗increased visibility of the OPE, the output per employee‘ (see R3) to his interaction 
with AO2 as ‗I am giving him information on costs, labour costs and the productivity 
per person, per employee so he can obviously make judgements or calls on that‘. 
AM4 noted that ‗to get them interested they have to be measured on it‘ e.g., AM4‘s 
report on overtime (see R14) had highlighted overtime issues and AM4 noted that 
‗they keep on saying to me now the overtime, sit down with them…see what we can 
do in terms of, reduce it‘ [AM4]. BO1 remarked about interacting a lot with BM1 and 
‗it is live‘ (see R16). BO1 was ‗very keen on transparency reporting‘ and ‗reporting of 
projects, the transparency of where costs are‘ [BO1]. 
 
6.6.3 Functional requirements  
MAs made distinctions between information for OMs in different organisational 
functions or levels. AM1 interacted with many OMs (see appendix G) and noted: 
 
The Maintenance and the Operations Director, they are not as 
involved in the pure production. Like the Production Manager, really 
all he is interested in is getting good parts out, while the Operations 
Director, he‘d be involved in strategic planning, in all these different 
operational…cost savings plan things so he would look for finance 
more. Same with Maintenance, because, and he is also the 
Scheduling Manager, he would need information on the whole 
inventory side of things, like inventory control. There is a lot of 
information that they would need from us to do their jobs [AM1]. 
 
AM1 added that the ‗Operations Director, who would be involved in capital projects 
(see R1, report on capital projects), they‘ll come to us a lot more looking for 
information and asking us to sit in on different meetings so they would have higher 
expectations of finance than the actual pure production people‘. CM remarked that ‗if 
it is a production manager he is looking at production, if it is a maintenance manager 
he is looking at maintenance‘ and that ‗a lot of it is non-financial‘ for example OMs 
focused on scrap ‗units‘ (see R24a) before scrap value (see R24b). DM1 remarked 
that ‗certain managers do, certain managers don‘t‘ require more ‗ad hoc‘ reporting 
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e.g., one ‗manager would be involved a lot in projects…he is on the development side 
of things so he is obviously going to be using ad hoc reports more than monthly 
reports‘. EM linked specific information types to functional managers, distinguishing 
between production and sales managers. For the production manager EM stated ‗what 
I would work with EO would be production statistics, probably would not be 
monetary figures‘ and for sales people, ‗sales in turns, by product, average sales 
prices, for different product lines, compare contractors, sales, this year versus last 
year, versus budget and also for sales we do margins on bought in products‘ (NR17 
was a debtors analysis for sales managers, while elements of R28 and R29 were for 
production managers). Further distinctions were made by EM for OMs in different 
product business units in that a lot more information was required for the one that was 
more ‗customer specific‘ than the one that was ‗variations of a standard product‘ as 
the former was much more difficult to sell if left in stock (this distinction was visible 
in R28 and R29 in the different analysis by product division). 
 
6.6.4 Determining needs 
AM2 noted that ‗sitting down with him [AO2] and saying what do you need, what do 
you want or I have also given him stuff, I think this is what would be useful, we sit 
down together and go through that‘. BM1 remarked that ‗you have to tailor it to the 
people‘ and ‗it is easier then for you to see what the person is trying to use the 
information for, that you are not just providing figures‘. BM1 noted that ‗it comes 
back to the notion of the internal customer‘ and ‗there would be a kind of an agreed 
service level that to a certain extent that I will provide them with a lot of help‘. BM1 
noted that with OMs you ‗deal with them as they wish to be dealt with‘ which meant 
providing information in person with a quick explanation so ‗they don‘t have to look 
through a spreadsheet, what I am looking for here?‘ or by e-mail where they can 
‗study‘ it, and ‗when it suits them‘. CM revealed some uncertainty around the needs 
of OMs as ‗it is hard to say, you do what you do and it is the old question that if you 
were to stop reporting on certain things tomorrow would anyone notice, I don‘t 
know‘. DM1 noted how the recent appointment of a new divisional head had 
impacted on his role. The former head was described as more ‗presidential‘, ‗a PR 
man‘, while the current head was more ‗hands-on‘ or ‗pernickety‘ and ‗it influences 
what you are doing on your day to day job because when that person is under pressure 
they are relying on you‘. The implication of this for DM1 was ‗you have got to adapt 
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to that and you‘ve got to know how that person, what makes them tick if you want to 
fit into their ideas‘.  
 
6.6.5 User orientation 
With report R1, AM1 interacted with relevant OMs by e-mailing it out and ‗especially 
the ones where there is a lot of spend, the unspent ones, I will go and talk to them, 
ring them, go down and talk individually to each person, the manager or themselves 
about it‘. AM1 noted that OMs had requested changes to R1. BM1 noted that for a 
capital projects report R16, ‗I would have sat with the lads, particularly the Projects 
Manager [BO1] and said what information do you want‘ and ‗how he wants a 
summary report‘. BM1 remarked that ‗they [OMs] added in a couple of lines and 
made a couple of amendments to it‘. BM1 noted that the summary report, R16, was 
‗what he kind of focuses on‘, ‗then he would maybe dig deeper into specific projects 
behind them‘ and also ‗at the close out‘ resolving project ‗issues‘.  
 
AM2 gave examples of using ‗pivot tables and trends and statistics and percentages‘ 
to ‗try and make it better, easier for them‘ e.g., AM2‘s report on output per employee 
(see R3) was graphical and reports on operating supplies (see R4a-b) ranked top 
usages by value and by volume, and in a graph. Both reports were on one page. AO3 
commented upon the information from AM3 as easy to use and then because ‗we have 
the weekly meeting, we review‘. AM3 noted that ‗it [R6a-b] just used to go out this 
way before (AM3 presents the old detailed format) so AO3 has asked for them 
graphically‘ and ‗this year we have changed it to put the top 25‘ in. AO3 remarked 
that ‗he [AM3] is well able to explain you know because a lot of the stuff that 
accountants talk about, they have their jargon there, but he is well able to explain 
around that, you know I think he is good‘. Confirming AM4‘s user orientation, AO4 
stated that ‗he will actually, typically, ok show me what you want and go out on the 
floor, back in, and go through the cost accounts‘ and ‗the quality of the information 
sort of from the cost reduction teams, he is key to that right and now it is in a manner 
that is usable and clear and I think he has delivered that‘ (see R10 and R11 on 
electricity and gas usage respectively).  
 
CO observed a change made to one of CM‘s reports (see section 6.8.2). CO stated that 
‗the balance is positively towards pictorials‘ in Company C and ‗it is mostly trend 
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data so we are able to see are there improvements‘ and ‗if we have a bad spike we can 
actually know if there is a bad week or month, it is out of context, and we probably 
can find out quickly why so‘. DO1 had a ‗preference for non-financial in terms of 
management information‘ (as was visible from the performance indicators on R25), 
and commented that ‗the whole CRM and customer focus really needs to be reflected‘ 
more. DO2 perceived DM2 as ‗very good‘ at ‗pulling together financial information 
and presenting it‘ in that ‗he has access to the information, put it together, and put it 
together with a degree of simplicity so a non-accountant or a non-financial person can 
interpret the results fairly speedily‘. EO commented that EM could ‗use more user-
friendly jargon, some of the stuff‘. 
 
One indicator of user orientation was when many OMs made reference to adopting 
reports from MAs in their own functions. AM2 had conducted a one-off 
comprehensive inventory analysis (see NR2) that AM2 noted OMs had requested 
from him in various forms to facilitate them performing further analysis. AM3 
observed the extension of a usage report (see R6a-b, operating supplies) by OMs to 
other materials than those the report was originally designed for. BO1 commented 
that ‗I think the quality of the information is very important you know and we do 
make a lot of use of that, accounting information that he does produce (see R16) and 
we do flex it. CO remarked ‗so I take that report and I look at it myself obviously and 
I see any issues and also distribute it to all my direct reports so now they can see in 
their departments where there is high scrap‘ (see R24a-b) and ‗it is also very easy to 
share‘ given its graphical form of presentation. CO elaborated that ‗they are being 
shared and it means and I share them with my own direct reports and every month 
departmental managers, every week in fact with overtime, every week for inventory‘. 
CO noted that now ‗rather than waiting to be asked where is my scrap they [his direct 
reports] actually tell you in advance‘.  
 
6.6.6 Aggregation and disaggregation 
AM4 perceived OMs as most pleased about ‗timely‘ but ‗not too detailed, just 
enough‘ information and AM4‘s reports were very simple and brief in presentation. 
AO4 added that AM4 ‗will send out the data but on the front of that e-mail he will 
have the main points, here is the data, I would like to bring your attention to the main 
points. Bum! There it is‘. BO1 placed great importance on weekly project reporting 
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and monthly forecasting and reporting from BM1 as the ‗fourteen project engineers‘ 
all ‗live and die by that cost sheet, it is a one pager‘ [BO1]. BM1 associated 
involvement with providing OMs with a ‗summary‘ (see R16) to ‗get a feel for where 
the problems are and then that is where they want to take a dive down to see what the 
issues are‘ and that the director was more into summaries and the manager into the 
detail. BM3 commented that ‗managers sort of want high level‘ and they are 
‗concerned with the sum total‘. CM commented that ‗you get managers who never ask 
you questions, they might ask the odd question, while other managers tend to look at 
the detail, while others just look at the overview‘. DM2 commented that ‗some people 
take a much bigger interest in their accounts, others they are just into sales and they 
have a limited interest so it varies‘ and ‗some people go through it with very fine 
detail, while others may have a quick look over the main points, the summary points‘. 
 
DM1 associated ‗high level information‘ with involvement with OMs as ‗managers 
don‘t have time‘ and OMs were ‗assuming that everything is ok at the bottom‘ but  
DM1 did note that ‗there are times when they want to go into detail‘. DO1 remarked 
that ‗it can be as detailed as you want it to be as there is loads of stuff behind it‘. DO2 
remarked that he required ‗summary sheets for a start, keep it simple‘. These sheets 
captured sales and cost performance information and the overall results (see R26). 
DO2 noted the value of ‗taking some of the summary sheets and being able to come to 
a fairly quick conclusion to where a [business unit] is at a point in time‘. DO2 stated 
that: 
 
I go through them in detail, go through the set of accounts in detail 
and when I am finished the accounting review then with my own 
lads, get rid of them and hold on [to] the summary pages, hold on 
[to] the summary piece. 
 
EO perceived that EM had an impact on decision making ‗because he is showing a 
bigger picture of the company, where it is, its profitability and where it can improve‘, 
the ‗bottom line‘ and EM ‗has all these ratios‘. EM, supporting this, also noted the 
value of ‗bringing all the activities together, stating it in monetary terms otherwise 
everybody would be working as a separate entity, sales would have their own, we will 
just sell as much as we can, production will just produce as much as we can and there 
might not be a market there for it‘. 
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6.7 Meeting OMs’ control information expectations 
OMs expected MAs to provide information in the development and submission of 
plans on different time horizons (building on phase one, see sections 5.2.2.8, 5.3.2.2) 
and to track actual performance against these plans. The greatest focus for OMs in 
general was the current year‘s annual budget targets. 
 
AO1 was ‗very happy, I mean I would be very happy‘ with AM1 but noted ‗if we had 
time to dig further into our variances against plan‘ but ‗you don‘t get time here to dig 
deep‘ and to examine all variances as ‗if you are red there is a huge steward‘s enquiry, 
so for green I would like to have the same‘. AO1 also expected AM1 to provide 
information on the ‗financial benefit‘ for cost reduction projects (see AM1‘s NR1, a 
cost saving analysis). AO2 remarked that ‗cost is a big impact, is a big factor for us so 
there is quite a lot of information sought on a daily if not a weekly basis on costs‘ (see 
AM2‘s reports on productivity R2 and R3, and operating supplies R4), and 
commented how AM2 was currently working on ‗using SAP‘ to ‗improve‘ the 
‗visibility on how we are spending it‘. AO3 commented that ‗the monthly 
reports…there are certain conversion costs to be achieved, how we amend the 
conversion costs, what has happened to spends, how we are doing against any parts 
that we have, so that will make sure that we are not overspending‘ (see AM3‘s R7, 
cost centre report). AO4 stated: 
 
I would expect him [AO4] to gather data, very usable, in a very user-
friendly format. What is the cost of this activity to date? Within that 
cost, are there any one or two or three elements that are significantly 
more that another? 
 
AO4 commented that AM4 ‗has definitely raised the bar in terms of control of costs‘ 
which ‗I can link directly to him as a person and his activities‘. AM4 provided a range 
of routine reports on operational cost analyses (e.g., R9, R10, and R14). 
 
Regarding BO1‘s expectations of BM1 as the ‗projects accountant‘, BO1 noted that 
‗the major ones‘ relate to ‗individual project reporting‘ (see BM1‘s R16, a project 
summary report) and ‗most importantly control‘:   
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…the reporting of projects, the transparency of where costs are, the 
forecasting of costs corporately and internally, it is extremely 
important [BO1]. 
 
BO1 added that ‗it comes back to real time capital information‘ and confirmed the 
importance of the BM1‘s project reports in stating that ‗the reports he produces are 
absolutely our bibles by which we live and die by on a weekly basis‘. BO2‘s 
expectations of BM2 related to control of inventory e.g., ‗to make sure that when the 
guys are issuing to work orders and receipting stock that they do it right‘ and 
‗advising us you know if we want to write something off‘. BO3 viewed BM3 as 
‗meeting my expectations‘, one of which included to ‗provide information on where 
we are versus budget and forecast on a monthly basis (see R19) and bring that 
information to the various cost centre reviews that I would have with him and then 
you know to actually follow up on any discrepancies that are raised during that 
review‘. BO3 commented on missing information on ‗material usage variance, labour 
variance analysis you know and that is probably because I have not been setting such 
high expectations or level of information on that‘. Although BO4 stated that he did 
not really have expectations of BM4, BO4 did note that ‗I see it is more BM4 is very 
much the financial side…keeping in line the costs of the business‘. BM4 presented 
variance reports (see R20 and R21) that BM4 regularly asked BO4 to explain. 
 
CO stressed that CM played a ‗critical role‘ as accounting ‗tells you [CO] we are not 
making money, or not making enough money‘. CO remarked that he would like CM 
to: ‗say these [results] are the ones that I think we should be focusing on‘. CO 
expected CM to deliver timely and accurate KPIs, ‗some analysis…and a little bit of 
initiative‘. CO noted that ‗they were not sharing it [information] in the past‘ but it was 
‗constantly improving‘. CM remarked about the detailed information OMs requested 
of him to assist them in the building of subsequent budgets (see NR13). CO remarked 
that he would like CM to be ‗picking out your positive variances and you know last 
week was a great week‘ and ‗it is not a question to always to have to well if it is over 
budget that is bad and if it is under budget that is good or within budget…you have 
actually done something more efficiently as well, why was that?‘  
 
DO1 expected DM1 to have ‗key targets for the year in terms of changing each 
business and we would have time frames set‘, and ‗whether it would be growing a 
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business or cutting costs and to see where they are versus those implementation 
plans‘. DO1 noted that DM1 could be ‗more aggressive in looking for change, savings 
and all that‘. These ‗key targets‘ were presented on the performance report, R25. DO1 
noted that ‗we have variance versus targets and analysis of those and then proposed 
actions, not just realms of reports of what is ok and looking for stuff in the middle of 
it‘. Regarding the business plan and DM2, DO2 expected DM2 ‗to provide a wealth 
of information in so far as, what was last year‘s business plan, where are we going 
this year, and matching up this year and last year, and what the environment is, and I 
would say DM2 is quite good at that, very good at that in actual fact‘. DM2 provided 
profit analyses across business units with last year and budgeted benchmarks (see R26 
and R27). EO stated that ‗I don‘t have any [expectations], he has expectations of me. 
He looks for all these figures from me‘ and ‗well I have this already but I have to 
comment on major adverse variances‘. EM provided many accounting reports which 
included variances (see reports R28, R29, and R30). 
 
6.8 MAs and control information and reports 
The routine reports examined in phase two had a strong control role, and the findings 
on the extent that these reports related to assisting OMs in the performance of their 
roles are presented below. Some of these reports, in their use, were observed as being 
the prerequisites to decision making with respect to addressing the consequences of 
these reports. The findings are presented around a number of routine report themes. 
 
6.8.1 Periodic positioning  
Many of the reports provided in the study played a strong role in regard to giving 
OMs a periodic positioning of the performance of the business, or sub-units, against 
predetermined performance targets and key indicators e.g., R31 for Company A 
reported 18 critical site indicators against plan and R33 for Company B reported 32 
site-wide KPIs against targets using a traffic light system. The vast majority of the 
routine reports provided in the research contained some budget benchmark 
information. OMs perceived routine reports as very useful for assessing targeted 
performance and for a position on wider departmental and organisational 
performance: 
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…if am looking at a budget report for a department I go down to the 
bottom right hand corner, over or under budget is the first thing I 
look at because if it is over budget it needs more attention, under 
budget still have to look at it but I suppose it kind of gives me a kind 
of relevant analysis [CO]. 
 
In this context, CM provided an example of a department cost report (see R23). DO1 
noted for detailed periodic reports (see R34a-c): 
 
At this stage I only focus on a few key issues each month. We are 
trying to look forward more than looking back so unless there is 
problems I don‘t go through the accounts in any detail and I can flick 
through them in a couple of seconds and see whether they are ok or 
not [DO1]. 
 
DO1 commented further about the management accounts as ‗an accurate reflection of 
the state of play‘. DO1 remarked that ‗DM1 has written explanations of the variances, 
I would look at those variances. I don‘t look back through the detailed financials at 
all‘ (e.g., R34a-c had a lot of detail behind the front summaries). DM1 noted that 
routine reports were used for reviewing ‗continuous performance‘. DO2 linked the 
routine accounts (see R26, periodic margin reports) to the ‗overall the strategic piece, 
where the business is at any one point in time‘ with respect to planning the remaining 
period to the end of the financial year. Many OMs also attached a value to 
comparative information in routine reports: 
 
Sales value, sales volume, the cost associated with it and then the 
bottom line and to be able to make the comparison between this year 
versus budget versus last year [DO2]. 
 
EO observed getting the aggregated perspective from the accounts (R28 and R30): 
 
…showing a bigger picture of the company, where it is, its 
profitability and where it can improve. He is highlighting all these 
areas where you can…the bottom line is...potential to improve, 
where you can. [EM] has ratios on cost of manpower from tonne of 
product and all this, he has all these ratios. 
 
Regarding EM, EO remarked that ‗it is a supportive role but it is sort of historical 
really. He will tell you how badly you have done or how well you have done‘ i.e., ‗an 
information flow‘. EO stated that ‗month end is a big one‘ (see R30 monthly 
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accounts) for interacting with EM and ‗later on in the month he would produce 
variances and I don‘t know…he will actually do a lot of work on the variances‘. EO 
did not perceive these reports as having much value (see section 6.8.6) and noted that 
‗you don‘t have to have an accountant to see where improvements have to be made 
but at the same time they can tell you exactly what you need to do and what a little 
percentage here, and what effect it will have on the bottom line‘. 
 
6.8.2 Focus 
AO2 required focus in terms of needing ‗AM2 to identify the key drivers that are 
influencing that [cost per unit] and what parts, what of those can we influence, can we 
affect and can we drive down, so labour productivity is a big part‘. AM2 provided 
brief and graphical productivity reports for AO2 (see R2 and R3). AO4 noted that ‗his 
[AM4] activities have contributed to ‗improved decision making‘ in regard to 
‗identifying areas where there are problems, providing useful data, encouraging us to 
look at these things‘ e.g., ‗he did bring to the fore the fact that certain costs and 
consumables have gone through the roof‘ (see AM4‘s reports on electricity, R9, gas, 
R10, and tooling, R15) and ‗definitely on the cost reduction teams they would be 
somewhat rudderless in that they would not know what the priorities are, they would 
not know what the costs are…what to focus on‘. AO4 noted that OMs sought reports 
that quickly drew attention to the key issues, and most of the reports provided by 
AM4 (see R9 through to R15) were simple in design, one-page reports, and timely in 
AO4‘s view.  
 
BO2 stated that ‗BM2 does also prioritise the urgent issues for us‘ from an inventory 
management perspective. CO‘s mandate for CM was to ‗do the content and come up 
with certain areas to focus on‘. In the interview CO demonstrated changes he 
requested to a scrap report [see R24a-b] that CM had e-mailed to him: ‗change I made 
is, the comment boxes are new‘ i.e., pop-up comments visible only on viewing 
particular figures in the spreadsheet to ‗point out the areas‘ and ‗I will then get 
supervisors to come back direct to him [CO]. CO attributed the focusing dimension to 
CM as ‗certainly anytime that we focus on an area we improve it, so a consequence of 
the cost accountant is telling us where to focus‘. CM corroborated this by observing 
that OMs desired ‗information when they want it and it is accurate information, it 
highlights stuff‘, and ‗in a form that they understand‘ that it is ‗not a book‘. DO1 
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expressed a preference for ‗focused information‘ not ‗realms of information, just the 
key issues‘ and DM1 produced a brief one-page report on performance indicators (see 
R25). DO2 further commented that he was most pleased with DM2 regarding the 
‗quick identification of issues‘ from the accounts (see R26). Thus, there were two 
kinds of focus, one in the brevity of reports and two where MAs highlighted particular 
points in the reports. 
 
6.8.3 Budgetary reports 
Some cost centre or departmental reports did not seem to get much attention from 
OMs. For the cost centre report R7, AM3 noted that ‗it would be about a two minute 
session, there is the report, any comments, no, and we move on to operating supplies‘. 
AM3 described R7 as ‗quite awkward‘ as ‗it is an American chart of accounts‘ with 
‗American terminologies‘ and ‗there is a lack of understanding from a non-financial 
person what is in all of these [line items]‘. For R7, AM3 commented that the 
questions that typically arose were: ‗What is there? What is in that? What is that 
doing? Why is that there?‘ AM3 perceived that the cost centre reports like R7 had less 
impact because the emphasis in Company A was ‗get the product out the door, 
everything else can be bedded down later‘. There was more use of R7 ‗coming to the 
back end of the year‘ and ‗when we are preparing our budget‘. Corroborating this, 
AO3 noted ‗when the cycle comes and if demand drops well then certainly the focus 
is going to be on the cost‘. AO3 elaborated that there were more control concerns at 
different times in the operating year in that ‗it was in the latter six months of the year 
that attention was paid to costs‘ i.e., ‗at the moment forget the cost, get what the 
customer wants, get it out the door and it is a kind of cyclical event‘. CM noted that 
‗with the expansion, 18 months say, there was no, they were not sending out, the 
budgets were put to the side‘ and BM3 observed that budgeting information ‗always 
takes a back seat…because we are going through a start up phase it is like literally 
you put out one fire and another one has started‘. 
 
AM4 noted that ‗useful‘ routine reports are ‗reviewed quicker‘ and used to see ‗how 
the trends are going‘. For a cost centre report R8, AM4 noted that ‗I would e-mail 
him‘ and ‗obviously if there was a big issue I would go and see him‘. For R18, a 
transfer sales price report, BM2 had interaction ‗on a monthly basis‘ with lower level 
OMs ‗to verify transfer prices‘. BM3 noted that interaction around the routine reports 
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(see R19, analysis of spend against forecast) had consequences e.g., ‗BO3 may ask 
me why is it so high? What is driving it? What are the key drivers?‘ BM3 noted that 
sometimes OMs ‗might want to see a bit more detail‘ or ‗they might want to see all 
the months leading up to that‘.  
 
CO commented that ‗I like variance reports‘ and ‗at the end of the day you have to be 
in charge of your costs and you have to know that your margins are being preserved 
and you could actually do a very hard and good determined weeks work but if we are 
not at the end of it making money then you have to know that‘. CM‘s reports (see 
R22a-b, R23, and R24a-b) all provided budgetary comparisons and variances. For the 
cost centre report, R23, CM noted that he would ‗hand them around‘ and ‗they come 
back to me and I ask them do they want anything analysed, does anything look 
strange to them because I would not necessarily know‘. CM noted that for an 
inventory report, R22a, ‗if there is an exception on the report that is when it will 
trigger a response…if you are running within budget obviously you don‘t need to 
worry about it‘. DO2 perceived that DM2 had quite an impact on control in that 
‗within the monthly management accounts package, he [DM2] has what is called 
‗Operational Excellence‘ and control weaknesses ‗are quickly identified‘ [DO2]. EO 
commented that ‗I like getting the variances because you need to have a measure of 
where you are at the end of every month‘. These budgetary reports by design played a 
strong role in periodic positioning as outlined earlier (see section 6.8.1). 
 
6.8.4 Non-financial indicators 
Some reports addressed non-financial aspects of performance and these seemed to 
receive quite a bit of attention from OMs. As noted under periodic positioning (see 
section 6.8.1), many management summary reports contained critical NFIs (see R31, 
R33). For AM2, involvement was linked to reporting on ‗productivity‘ as ‗they [OMs] 
are managed or they monitor [it] themselves, they are their own bosses on output per 
employee per hour that is a key one‘ [AM2] and added that he had had ‗good 
feedback‘ from OMs on the productivity report R2. AO2 also produced a closely 
associated graphical report on output per employee versus budget (see R3). AM3 
noted that the operating supplies volume and cost reports (see R6a-b) were ‗the main 
reason I go down to him [AO3]‘ and they ‗would cause us to maybe come back after a 
meeting to see if there is a mistake or some errors here, what exactly is driving it and 
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then we might go back down to see the people using it‘. AM4 noted that for R9 
(electricity usage) and R10 (gas usage) that ‗there is a cost reduction team so it is 
actually been dealt with in that‘ thereby linking his team involvement with these 
reports. AM2 produced similar usage reports for a different business unit (see R4a-b). 
AM4 remarked about how R14 (overtime report) was ‗a live document which we did 
not have and it is now actually used at night and every Wednesday to say you know to 
hammer the lads and this is what it is all about, what gets measured gets done‘ [AM4].  
 
CO explained the company practice of putting brief and simple graphical performance 
reports, which were largely non-financial, on notice boards around the factory (which 
the researcher observed). CO explained that: ‗I might be able to understand a financial 
report written in columns and tables but it is not to say that a supervisor coming up 
through the ranks would‘ and ‗with a tabular with a kind of monthly report like people 
just don‘t read it‘. One example of a NFI report was scrap (see R24a-b) that was 
produced by CM and highly valued by CO. CM noted that in terms of most 
interaction with OMs ‗it would be the inventory [see R22], it would be the scrap [see 
R24] because obviously as I keep saying they are focusing on scrap‘. For R25 
(performance indicators), DM1 noted that ‗they appreciated having all of this down 
on, they had it themselves on an informal sort of basis and then when I started doing it 
they said yes that is a good page, everything is there‘. The report contained key 
measures using various non-financial measures on different costs and usages per unit. 
 
6.8.5 Reports of little or no value to OMs 
Some reports did not actually go to OMs or were discontinued or were a basis for 
MAs gathering information from OMs.  Some reports, while requiring interaction 
with OMs, did not particularly assist OMs in the performance of their roles. AM2 had 
input to a site-wide report for senior management and head office on manufacturing 
cost (see R5) but ‗the only interaction [with OMs] I would have is if I needed more 
information and if there was a big variance‘. On a weekly inventory value report (see 
R11), AM4 commented that ‗it is up to the OMs to come back to me, in terms of the 
detail‘. For R12, a head office report AM4 prepared on delivery performance, OMs 
would ‗input the current issues and actions and outlook‘ and ‗I don‘t hear any more 
about it to be honest with you‘. In regard to a conversion cost report R13, AM4 
remarked that ‗no it wouldn‘t [go to OMs] because they wouldn‘t be able to 
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understand it, it is really only for myself, the financial controller and the general 
manager‘. AM4 added ‗I suppose a lot of these reports that we send out, we don‘t get 
a whole lot of feedback‘ and ‗I presume there are reports being produced here and 
people think they are being used‘. 
 
BM2 remarked that R17, an inventory value report similar to AM4‘s, was complex, 
time consuming and ‗any questions I ever got came from our own department‘. BM2 
noted that R17 was now discontinued as ‗they effectively said this one was not adding 
any value‘ and ‗I had been reporting it to them for three years‘ [BM2]. Regarding R20 
(variances), BM4 stated that ‗we used to have meetings every month with the 
individual managers like but at the moment, we have just kind of cut down on that 
because there was no need like‘. Similarly, EM remarked that ‗we have had a couple 
of variance meetings where we all sit down around the table and discuss it like but 
they are few and far between‘. For R20, BM4 noted that she needed to interact with 
OMs to understand the variances and ‗to try and find out exactly what happened in 
those particular batches‘. BM4 commented that ‗if there are big variances within 
those that is, my role is involved‘ and ‗I would have spoken to either Manufacturing 
or Packing depending if there is a problem, or they are on it‘. For R20, BM4 noted 
that ‗there is a lot of detail on it‘ but ‗we do a summarised version [of R20] for say the 
director‘. For R21, a purchase price variance report, BM4 commented that she would 
be ‗dealing with the Purchasing Manager basically on that maybe once every month‘ 
and ‗that is a designated meeting every month, and usually he has two or three of his 
people that are there‘.  
 
EM noted that he interacted most with OMs around the flash report (see R29) for head 
office as ‗it involves them all‘. This report was effectively OMs‘ predictions, on the 
20
th
 of each month, of where the period end results would be and was not of any 
benefit to the local subsidiary OMs. For EO‘s part of R28, a detailed quarterly 
management report, EM remarked that ‗EO will then explain some of the negative 
variances‘ to include in the commentary for the quarterly report. Supporting this EO 
commented that ‗I have to comment on the major ones‘, ‗I have to comment on 
negative not on positive‘ and ‗before that [see R28] is actually printed now EM and 
myself sit down and we have to thrash through the variances‘. Regarding R28 and 
R30, the monthly and more detailed quarterly management accounts, EO remarked 
249 
 
that: ‗he just gives factual information; it is I who has to give the answers‘. EO 
concluded: ‗oh I just file it away‘ and ‗every month we used to sit down and read 
these things…waste of time, a complete‘.   
 
6.8.6 Monthly management accounts 
Many MAs played a part in the production of monthly site performance summaries 
and more detailed management accounts (e.g., AM1 and R31, AM2 and R5, BM2 and 
R32, BM3 and R33, DM1 and R34, DM2 and R26). Some of the monthly 
management accounts appeared to be somewhat underutilised. BM1 noted that OMs 
‗don‘t want to see the detail really, they want to get the quick glance‘ linking to the 
earlier theme of focus (see section 6.8.2). BM1 remarked that ‗the routine ones, they 
get the whole time, I kind of know what they want so I know what to provide to them‘ 
and there were ‗generally less queries from the routine reports; it is more the ongoing 
bit of how things are progressing and specific analysis as such‘. These non-routine 
reports are presented in section 6.11. 
 
BM2 perceived that the routine was ‗looked over‘ and ‗they don‘t actually concentrate 
much time on [it] because they are seeing it so regularly, they know what they are 
looking for‘. BM3 described R19, an analysis of spend against forecast, as one that 
went into the ‗month end report‘ (see R32) and remarked that ‗I think senior 
management can understand it very well‘ but less senior personnel ‗probably see it as 
mumbo-jumbo load of numbers, not meaning anything‘. BM3 suggested that ‗maybe 
comments down the bottom saying some of the non-financial piece, is more sort of 
technical comments‘ from ‗non-financial people‘ [BM3]. BM3 perceived that the 
management accounts (see R32) had ‗too many numbers in it‘ and ‗it doesn‘t tell you 
anything, how it relates to them [OMs]‘ and remarked that ‗I would love to just put in 
a load of dummy information‘ and ‗see if anybody came back‘. BM3 noted that ‗the 
finance director actually went to them and said are you happy with it and they are fine 
with it‘. BM3 added that ‗I would love to see graphs in there, at least you would see 
trends‘ but ‗they are happy, I just, anyway, bizarre‘. BM3 stated that: 
 
I‘ve pushed that here locally to try and say can we produce 
something that is meaningful to people. Managers are happy with it. 
I don‘t know how they get any information out of it because even by 
looking at it myself I don‘t really understand it [BM3]. 
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On inspection of R32, BM3‘s comments regarding the lack of commentary and 
graphs in R32 were corroborated and R32 did have a lot of financial detail. CM 
remarked that ‗the routine go out, you might get questions back‘. DM1 explained that 
‗there is a financial pack that is prepared and this [see R25] is a part of the financial 
pack and that goes up to, that goes up as high as divisional CEO‘ but the report was 
used differently as the ‗divisional CEO is less looking at the nitty-gritty‘. For R25, 
DM1 noted ‗if something stands out here it is something that I would focus on‘ and 
‗you would be saying that we need some action on this straight away‘ or ‗if it is quite 
good you have just got to say well done lads‘.  DO1 noted that D34a-c, management 
accounts for three business units, ‗drives a lot of decisions and actions‘. As DO1 
flicked through R34a in the interview he commented that ‗we would have changed [it] 
to be more kind of, less finance based and more management based say would be, 
[flicking through R34] we were trying to get to key performance indicators on all the 
main issues‘ and ‗that kind of page [see R25] I would see as very useful, that kind of a 
page [next page] I have no interest at all [detailed financial data]. DO1 noted how the 
management accounts, R34a-c, were used ‗for a line in the sand for where we are 
each month exactly‘ linking to periodic performance (see section 6.8.1) and sought 
more focus on ‗forward looking‘ and less of ‗looking at performance versus last year‘.  
 
DM2 referred to the use of routine reports as ‗gospel‘ as ‗they are the ones that 
everyone looks at‘ and noted that R26 (business unit gross margin reports) prompted 
interaction as ‗managers come back with questions‘ and ‗they look for greater 
analysis and more information on it‘. DO2 noted that ‗it [R26] is good for giving 
information at a point in time‘ and ‗come the following month you can see has this 
guy made progress or not made progress so it is good to raise issues‘ but as noted in 
section 6.6.6, DO2 did not retain the detailed parts of the accounts. DO2 also noted 
that ‗people that aren‘t maybe, that don‘t have any basic level of training, 
accountancy training they might be a little bit intimidated‘ by R26. For R26, DM2 
would ‗e-mail it out to them and then you would meet them maybe a couple of days 
later or a week later‘. DM2 commented that if ‗there are big problems it (see R27, 
adjusted profit by business unit) forces them to act on it‘. With R27, DM2 stated that 
‗you would focus in on the [business units] that are most off budget‘. DO2 noted that 
a decision around a routine report (see R27) ‗would be more of a localised decision 
251 
 
whereas the other ones [non-routine] would address strategic issues at a higher level‘. 
EM had not received any comments back from OMs in regard to their section of R28 
(quarterly management report): 
 
You get very little feedback on it so I suppose most of the questions 
are asked before it is sent out you know what I mean from the local 
managers so the local managers probably know what is inside of it 
before it is distributed [EM]. 
 
EO stated that ‗the whole pack [see R28] is a pile of information, too much‘ and 
seemed to confirm these comments as he flicked through R28 and commented: ‗that is 
just cost account, that is not great, that is not giving you…[flicking through the 
report]…this is putting costs, that is for the sales people that is putting the cost against 
each of the product so that is really not of any interest to me it is more for the sales 
people. Mind you I don‘t think they pay any notice either‘ [EO].   
 
6.8.7 Routine-non-routine 
AM4 commented how a tooling cost report R15 ‗is a routine one in that now it is a 
routine but before it was not being measured at all‘ indicating how the report had 
developed into a routine report having begun as a non-routine one. Conversely, AM1 
noted that a routine report could lead to non-routine report e.g., ‗like the inventory 
report for example this month there was a huge right off of [X], one of our raw 
materials, so immediately different people picked up on it and there is a project going 
ahead‘. Thus, while the findings make a distinction between routine reports and non-
routine reports, one can be the genesis of the other. 
 
6.9 Meeting OMs’ control interaction expectations 
OMs generally expected MAs to interact with them in reporting and addressing 
control issues in their functions. OMs not only expected MAs to provide control 
information but also to interpret and apply it in an interactive context. AO1 observed 
that ‗after our first initial meetings [on the maintenance budget] AM1 could pick up 
from the actual spending for a week, that is not a maintenance item, that is someone 
else, so that is, straight away there is an initial level of control‘. AM1 corroborated 
this by noting ‗if we weren‘t so involved a lot of the costs would go crazy, people 
would just spend crazy‘ and noted she attended a weekly: 
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…operations meeting, I will go through the financials, productivity, 
savings on safety supplies because that is an area that has gone out of 
control so it is one of the things that I have been asked to look at and 
report on every week. 
 
AO1 commented that ‗one of the things that we work on then closely [with AM1] 
would be the forecasting element of it within the month or for the remainder of the 
year to ensure…that they are hitting the future targets‘. 
 
AO2 commented that AM2 ‗could improve the controls a lot like around budgets and 
things like that, we are not there yet and I would expect, and I expect that he becomes 
a lot more involved‘. AO2 expected that AM2 ‗would drive the cost reduction 
initiatives, he identifies from a financial aspect the big cost drivers and he brings them 
to the meeting and he works with the different people in terms of analysis‘, and to do 
so with ‗more assertiveness‘. AO3 expected AM3 to be ‗constantly looking at the 
costs within the business unit and driving action against that‘ as ‗in some ways it is 
only done as an afterthought‘. AO3 suggested: 
 
…spend some time on the floor just to understand the process and 
you never know they might see more things…where savings…their 
background, something could twig, gee you know what we could do 
this, could be cost accounting, there could be different ways of 
costing and management more so than the labour costs and that so I 
would think more time on the production floor like.  
 
AO3 commented about being ‗just driven by costs, costs, costs‘ and ‗you have 
reached your budget so tough‘ when ‗there are certain times well the [units] have to 
be delivered to the customer regardless of the costs‘ and desired a greater awareness 
of this when MAs were interacting with OMs i.e., ‗a lot of other criteria that might 
overrule the cost element‘. AO3 would have liked AM3 to be ‗a bit more involved, 
but I don‘t think there is that much more they can do‘ as ‗at the moment it is more of 
an operations area‘ e.g., ‗quality‘ and ‗health and safety‘. AM4 noted that ‗I think to 
have a meeting, you do, you really do, need to know the process. You can‘t really 
question a manager until you know it, obviously the operations very well‘. 
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BM1 commented that ‗I am certainly sure that there would be project overruns‘ 
without his involvement with BO1. BO1 corroborated this by stating that if BM1 was 
‗not working closely with us, or us not working with him‘ then ‗we lose that control, 
and then with that we are losing all the transparency of where our costs are going and 
all our ability to diagnose or analyse where are our costs are going wrong‘ (see R16). 
BO1 stated that ‗we work very closely with BM1 to give us that sort of financial 
flexibility in reporting, and the flexibility is there but it has to be worked on and we 
obviously have a big influence on that, and we work very closely with BM1‘. BO2‘s 
expectations for BM2 related to stock control e.g., ‗if something was done wrong‘, 
‗advising us you know if we want to write something off‘ and to maintain the 
standard costing system. Similar to AO3‘s remarks above, BM2 noted that ‗the focus 
in Company B at the moment is to get the product to the [customer]‘ and ‗so from the 
big scale picture the financial implications don‘t impact‘. BM2 stressed that it was 
really only when ‗something has gone wrong‘ that OMs ‗look for cost implications‘. 
 
In relation to planning and forecasting, BO3 commented that BM3 ‗provides 
necessary templates‘, ‗gives me direction in terms of guidelines and in terms of 
timeline‘ and ‗provides some element of sanity checking in terms of direction, is this 
the right thing to do?‘ BO3 stated that ‗even though it is important to manage 
financially it may not always be to the budget situation‘ and ‗the key thing is that we 
do what is right for the business and in some cases managing down to the last Euro or 
Dollar may not always be the right thing for the business‘. BO3 explained how MAs 
in Company B had a flexible approach and were not ‗overly hung up on money all the 
time or the financial aspects of it‘ and ‗for it not to be obvious that he is the financial 
guy‘. BO3 stated how the MAs in Company B approached this: 
 
They realise that the first thing to make sure that the problem, put 
boundaries on it as opposed to coming in looking for the cost of it 
day one. So they would have a lot more understanding in that space, 
you know, compared to other organisations I have worked in. 
 
Agreeing with BM2, BM3 noted that ‗the sort of financial aspect of it even though it 
is very important for the site‘ tended to be given less priority which was attributed to 
the challenging start up phase that the company had been going through. BO3 stated 
that BM3 was a ‗very open individual, good working relationship, huge level of trust, 
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so that is the consequence of where his relationship really is, very, very high levels of 
trust‘. BO3 noted that BM3‘s interpersonal approach had implications for 
implementing controls: 
 
…his style would facilitate a bit more our acceptability of some of 
these controls because he is able to influence people to actually make 
sure people buy into these controls…very positive influence on 
people as a result of that so the quality of the introduction of the 
controls would be positively impacted by BM3‘s interpersonal style, 
being able to bring people along with him. 
 
Regarding cost centre reviews with BM3, BO3 was ‗very happy with that, yes, yes‘. 
BO4 had few expectations of BM4 as ‗if there was a cost variance, so to give more 
detail to BM4 if there were any issues, positive or negative variances, it is usually for 
me. BM4 would have none of the details‘ although ‗her manner, that with which she 
approaches you, I think supports you to go and help her‘. Aware of this, BM4 noted 
OM‘s displeasure ‗if you are coming after them with quite a lot‘ with remarks like: 
‗―BM4, do you know what you are? You are a pain in the tooth‖ because you could be 
always on to them to get stuff sorted‘. BM4 noted the need to ‗understand the 
processes most importantly‘ as you ‗just won‘t get on like‘. BO4 observed that BM4 
could interact earlier with BO4 with her queries i.e., ‗rather than just querying work 
orders, cost related things at the end point maybe at the start point‘. 
 
CM noted that the weekly reporting of scrap and inventory prompted interaction with 
OMs and querying of results ‗and managers hate Mondays because I come chasing 
them‘. CO noted a benefit in meeting CM before reports were issued, as did other 
OMs (see section 6.6.2). DO1 explained his interactions with DM1 on the budgeting 
process in that ‗he is fine, very good, to be honest‘ and ‗he knows how the game goes 
as well so he doesn‘t waste time, load of bull like‘. The ‗game‘ was explained as 
preparing the budget with a ‗blank piece of paper‘ but all along having the end point 
pre-determined as ‗we are starting off with the final figure and we are working 
backwards‘.  DO1 credited DM1 with much ‗cop-on‘. DO1 observed: 
 
…one to one is fine, supply chain [management meeting], he could 
give us a kick more, each of the managers…I was saying to him 
could you not be a bit more proactive in that but it is not a huge 
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issue. The accounts meetings are fine, perfect, he cuts straight to the 
chase. 
 
DO2 noted regarding DM2 that an ‗expectation that he would sit down and have a 
meaningful discussion then as well and how that might fit in with the overall business 
plan for the division totality you know building from the ground up‘. Regarding doing 
the accounts reviews with DM2, DO2 noted ‗I would say good delivery‘. 
 
OMs expected MAs to interact with them with the purpose of assisting OMs in the 
achievement of their budgetary targets. Confirming this, MAs frequently noted that 
most interaction with OMs occurred when ‗they need to improve things‘ or ‗when 
things go wrong‘ [AM1], ‗if you report a bad month or a bad quarter‘ [AM2], 
knowing ‗how much they are going to be able to recover their spend‘, ‗spending 
variances related to the standard costing‘, and ‗determining our standard costs 
initially‘ [BM2]. BM3 stated ‗if the actuals are not aligned with the forecasts it can 
create a lot of extra work for myself and just really a lot of interaction with managers 
to try and understand why these things have happened‘. DM2 noted that interaction 
with DO2 ‗depends on how good or bad the accounts are‘. EO did not expect much 
from his interactions with EM: 
 
…it is one-way traffic as far as I am, I mean anything I get back is 
historical, then I have to justify it or explain why or whatever. It 
is….then I have to look and why the hell am I adverse.  
 
OMs did not desire MAs to be interacting with them for the purposes of seeking 
variance explanations, as BO4 and EO observed BM4 and EM doing, which 
underscored a weakness in the MAs understanding of the business. Similar to BO4, 
EO remarked that EM ‗has a good approach. He is relaxed, he has a good way with 
people when he looks for something, he is, it is just about right, he doesn‘t get your 
back up even though he could be hassling the…out of you‘.  
 
6.10 Meeting OMs’ decision information expectations 
OMs expected MAs to provide information that they could use to make decisions in 
regard to the performance of their roles. AO1 anticipated ‗poor decisions‘ if he did 
not have AM1 ‗to actually generate the financial data that we actually require for 
some decision making‘ as ‗you need good data to make good decisions‘ e.g., the 
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‗financial impact of these [capital] projects‘ (see AM1‘s capital report, R1) and ‗we 
have to obviously prioritise them [cost reduction initiatives] and they are prioritised 
on the basis of financial benefit‘. AM1 identified decisions related to assisting OMs in 
the performance of their roles such as ‗outsourcing‘ and ‗different production 
decisions‘ where OMs sought decision information. AO2 associated AM2 with 
decision making in his role regarding ‗labour productivity‘ (see R2, R3) and ‗cost 
reduction‘ and AO4 associated AM4 with decision making in his role on ‗new 
product introduction‘ and ‗cost reduction‘ (see R9, R10). 
 
BO1 commented that ‗we would like to utilise the management accounting resource 
on projects a bit more beyond the control and reporting function into more analysis 
and cost reporting‘ and have ‗more value added I think giving greater analysis to 
costs, to invoices‘. BO1 observed that ‗a lot of what we do on projects that are not 
approved from a business case perspective would be putting the costs together is 
something that I would do, putting cash flows together, things like that it would be 
very useful‘. BO1 identified that the ‗control‘, ‗transparency‘ and ‗reporting 
mechanism‘, that BM1 provided ‗allows a good bit of effective decision making‘ and 
‗importantly it encourages greater development of the site‘. BO3 expected BM3 to 
provide information on decisions around ‗new product introductions for the site‘ and 
‗opportunities to bring new business to the site‘. BO4 stated that ‗there are six or 
seven different projects there, [BM4‘s] role could be helping me within that either 
costing them or querying say the measures‘.  
 
CO drew on CM ‗if I need a costing done for some project, so project costing, so we 
might change a [component], we might change material and you might want to do a 
few what-ifs, so what-ifs, project costings‘. CM commented on how ‗accounting 
information‘ impacted decisions on ‗downscaling‘ or expansion e.g., ‗capital 
investment‘ but stated ‗decision making, to be honest, you would have to talk to the 
managers on that. Again you send them the information, whether they use it, they may 
just look at it and say discard it‘ [CM]. DO1 stated expectations as ‗accurate accounts 
first and secondly drive the management performance‘. DM1 noted that for R25, he 
would ‗sit down with them [OMs] once a month and we go through that page‘ and 
‗you are hoping to see improvements in performance from one year to the next‘. DO2 
explained his expectations of DM2 around projects, specifically closures: 
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…what costs can you eliminate, what costs would be there anyway 
so it is really pulling together financial information and presenting it 
in a fashion that I can present to somebody else. Is DM2 good at 
that? Very good.  
 
DM2 perceived that OMs‘ expectations were for him ‗to assist in other work that 
comes up like project work‘. EO did not have decision information expectations of 
EM but EM perceived a decision impact of ‗accounting information‘ as ‗one division 
of the company is doing quite poorly at the moment so there are decisions to be made 
on downscaling the operation‘ and ‗the other plant which is expanding we are looking 
at what if you are having a capital investment of, a project‘ [EM]. 
 
6.11 MAs and decision information and reports 
Many of the non-routine reports had a strong orientation towards decision making and 
these reports are summarised in appendix H2. This is also supported in phase one 
where non-routine information was perceived as being used for decision making (see 
section 5.3.3.3). A number of major themes of non-routine reports emerged from 
reviewing these reports and from interview discussions around them with respect to 
the extent that they assisted OMs in the performance of their roles. 
 
6.11.1 OM interest 
OMs appeared to be very interested in non-routine reports. AM1 stated that ‗they have 
asked for [them] specifically‘ e.g., NR1 on breakages savings, while ‗a lot of the 
routine stuff I am sure if it is sent out every month some months they probably don‘t 
even look at it depending on how busy they are‘ [AM1]. AM2 noted how different 
OMs wanted a special inventory analysis NR2 in different forms e.g., ‗hard copy or e-
mail, if they don‘t want it all, sometimes they want a SAP copy so they can do their 
own analysis‘. AM3 noted that the routine was ‗to see a trend whereas the non-routine 
reports people would be more interested in what happened here and what happened 
there‘. AM4 noted that for non-routine reports, ‗they need it‘ and ‗they are obviously 
interested‘. For NR8 (order analysis), BM1 noted that BO1 ‗went away and made his 
decisions, he has amended the PO [purchase order]‘ and ‗he [BO1] said it was grand, 
it was what he was looking for‘. BM2 noted about NR10 (new product costing) that it 
‗was all grand, that was theoretical, they had not actually started production but since 
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they started production a lot more questions and queries have come in about how we 
have determined the cost‘. BM3 noted that he got queries around the overhead 
allocation methodology of NR11 in terms of ‗the break down of that, what is in it‘ and 
‗what is causing the increases or the decreases?‘ BM3 noted that NR11 left him 
‗between a rock and a hard place‘ as ‗the business units do not want to take the costs, 
corporate operations don‘t want a big pot of unallocated because it hits the P and L‘. 
BM3 related the use of non-routine reporting to ‗depending on how the business is 
performing‘ because ‗when performance is going poor they actually look at the non-
routine stuff because then they can see what they can do for the future, see where they 
can cut costs‘. BM3 also noted that ‗at times they can do a lot of it themselves‘ as ‗I 
know [BO3] could do a lot of it himself and at other times he will want to get down to 
a little more detail‘.  
 
CO commented that a recycling project report NR14 from CM ‗was spot on‘ as ‗it is 
[a] big saving for the company plus it is, our environment…less trees being knocked 
to give us corrugated boxes‘. DO1 commented that ‗they [ad hoc reports] drive a lot 
of our decision making‘ e.g., ‗last year we spent an awful lot of time ad hoc reporting 
on what we call the project line‘ and ‗DM1 would have spent more than 50% of his 
time last year working on [an acquisition]‘. DO1 added that ‗now we would have 
other projects all the time, smaller ones, on different issues, capital investment or 
redundancies, we are always looking at expanding or cost cutting‘ [DO1]. DO1 
commented that ad hoc reports like NR16, a special customer order analysis, were 
suited to ‗day to day issues that arise so all types of change and opportunities to put a 
financial view on our gut feeling, to put the finance behind the commercial feel‘ 
[DO1]. Regarding NR16, DO1 remarked that ‗when he sends me that now I would 
ring him and talk through it with him and say obviously where are we at on this or 
explain this to me whereas the other stuff is just monthly stuff, and I am blue in the 
face with that‘. DO1 continued: ‗very happy with them, and lots of stuff that DM1 
would do on projections would have borne out to be true‘. In regard to non-routine 
reports on ‗specific projects that hinge around operational issues be it cost savings, 
cost saving issues, development issues‘, DO2 noted that he ‗would interact a lot in so 
far as we would say look these are the type[s] of information that we would pull 
together we would draw it from sources x, y, and z and…there is a lot of interaction 
and discussion on those‘.  
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6.11.2 Specificity 
Many non-routine reports related to very specific operating activities. AM1 noted that 
as a consequence of the interaction around NR1, a cost savings proposal report, was 
that ‗they were surprised how much the savings were and what we were actually 
losing with this scrap‘.  AM2 explained specific non-routine reports on absenteeism 
(see NR3) as ‗they monitor quite a bit on absenteeism‘ and safety equipment usage 
(see NR4) following the introduction of new procedures for accessing expensive 
equipment on the floor. AM3 observed that non-routine reports were ‗of a specific 
nature so we get an awful lot more feedback from them‘. BM2 remarked about NR10 
that ‗at the time of determining the cost for the first product over like I probably 
would have sat down two or three times a week with senior managers just to discuss 
this is how we got to it‘. CM stated that with ‗the non-routine ones they have a 
specific purpose in mind so it could be leading into a either a focus group or maybe a 
couple of people focusing on it‘. CM provided more detailed analysis for OMs to 
facilitate budget compilation such as an analysis of last year‘s spend: ‗this budget 
stuff now [see NR13], it is purely just analysing out accounts but it has to be done, 
again it is non-routine but it is not the type of reports I enjoy doing‘. DO1 remarked 
that ‗the non-routine are as the result of issues or tasks that we have or say we would 
be looking at the benefits of doing a project, doing x, y, or z‘. DM2 simply 
commented that the non-routine ‗can be anything‘. EM remarked that for NR17, an 
analysis of debtors‘ balances, he had got a ‗good reaction, they were happy enough 
with the report‘ as ‗they get a bigger picture‘ that was not available in the system. 
 
6.11.3 Non-routine reports of little or no value to OMs 
Some non-routine reports appeared to be more driven by MAs than by the OMs. AM4 
noted that NR5 (overhead absorption rates) and NR6 (standard cost analysis) were 
‗only for ourselves‘.  BM1 remarked that NR7 was ‗allowing me to justify [forecast 
depreciation] to the Finance Director‘ and ‗he realises that no he can‘t make any cuts 
to it‘. For NR9, a stock revaluation report, BM2 noted that the report ‗wouldn‘t have 
gone any further than our own financial team‘. BM3 commented that OMs ‗wouldn‘t 
really actual get this [see NR11]. They would be aware of how we do it. If they were 
to get something it would be a synopsised version‘ as ‗there is a lot of gobbled-gook 
in the middle that we have to do, just purely from an allocation perspective‘. For 
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NR12, a report on stock adjustments, CM remarked that ‗if I see something I go to [an 
OM], generally I go to him‘ but ‗if there is nothing showing up on it, I don‘t send it to 
anyone‘.   
 
6.11.4 Presentation 
OMs did not seem to be overly concerned with the presentation and formatting of 
non-routine reports. AM1 noted that for NR1 ‗all they wanted was the bottom line, the 
final figures; they don‘t care really how I lay things out‘. However, OMs appeared to 
have scope to change non-routine reports as DO2 remarked that ‗I most certainly 
would have a big input into the design of that [non-routine reports] but added that ‗I 
have little input into the design of that [see R26]…I had little input into the design of 
the monthly package‘. The format and design of NR16 didn‘t concern DO1 much as 
he stated ‗I just ask DM1 to come up with a view on it and he puts the numbers where 
he wants to in a spreadsheet‘ and ‗that is fine‘. DO1 explained that NR16 was ‗clear 
and logical and even without ringing him you could follow [it]‘ and ‗he states 
assumptions and that, very clearly and conclusions‘. In contrast to the non-routine 
reports, DO1 remarked about the routine reports ‗I couldn‘t change obviously the 
finance reports or what comes off SAP I just change the management analysis‘. EO, 
commenting on the management accounts in R28, noted that it was designed by ‗some 
accountant years ago…maybe ten years ago‘ and although it was ‗familiar‘ to 
everyone and products and materials had remained stable, any change to the report if 
it had been needed ‗would have happened and it would be accounting driven rather 
than by me‘. 
 
An examination of the non-routine reports revealed that many of the reports used both 
financial and non-financial information e.g., NR1 analysed broken parts, NR2 
material usage, NR3 absenteeism, NR4 equipment usage, NR8 purchase orders, NR10 
new product costing, NR14 recycling, NR15 storage, and NR16 a customer‘s order. 
Some non-routine reports were more financial in nature including those noted above 
as non-routine reports of little or no value to OMs. 
 
6.11.5 Strategic orientation 
Some non-routine reports appeared to have a strong strategic and future orientation. 
AM1 and BM1 both assisted OMs in the performance of their roles with respect to 
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capital projects and BM3 commented upon his involvement with BO3 regarding the 
introduction of new products or programmes and scoping out opportunities for the 
manufacturing site. DM1 considered non-routine reports ‗strategic‘ and being used 
more by ‗higher level managers‘. DO2 perceived routine and non-routine as playing 
‗a very different function‘ as ‗80% is hard factual information, where we are at a point 
in time, the other 20 is very much driven by the, what are the implications of doing x, 
y, and z and what impact they might have on the overall business‘.  EM commented 
that ‗the routine I suppose by the time it is fed back to managers it is probably looking 
at past information‘ (confirming EO‘s observations, see sections 6.6.1 and 6.8.5), 
while ‗the non-routine then is something going forward‘. 
 
6.11.6 Interaction levels 
Non-routine reports were generally associated with more interaction with OMs than 
the routine reports. AM1 noted that there was more involvement with non-routine 
reports than routine reports ‗because all of our information has to come from the 
different managers so there would be a lot of interaction with managers‘. AM3 
remarked that ‗there is much more interaction around these‘ [non-routine reports]. For 
example, AM3 noted that reports that he had developed to monitor usage of supplies 
had been extended to ‗develop a usage of oil‘ report and ‗it got me more involved 
with the business unit manager which I would not have been hitherto fore‘. For the 
non-routine reports, BM3 stated that ‗with the ad hoc reports and stuff that is new 
they will go down and take some serious time to go through it with you like so they 
will bring me into a meeting, get me to bring them through it so they understand it‘. 
DM1 noted high OM interest and OM interaction for an alternative storage proposal 
report NR15 which was ‗one where you got some support from all high level 
managers, to ring anyone you want, and ask any sort of question‘. Both DO1 and DO2 
noted that ‗there is a lot of interaction and discussion on those [non-routine reports]‘ 
[DO2]. 
 
6.12 Meeting OMs’ decision interaction expectations 
AO1 remarked about AM1, ‗a good relationship there, she will critique, ask why you 
are doing that, would you not be better off doing option b, or option c, and I think she 
has developed herself over the period of time, has a better understanding of the 
overall business‘ one ‗which AM1 has generated over a period of time‘. AO1 noted: 
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…she wants to develop her role, she wants to get a better 
understanding of the business, she wants to come away from the 
financial sort of the stereotype of just number crunching and bean-
counter as opposed to getting involved in the day to day activities of 
the business and to help the business managers make decisions. 
 
AO1 commented that ‗I have brought AM1 along to a lot of meetings which perhaps 
in the past she may not have been‘ and ‗so she has developed and I‘ve probably been 
helped from that development from getting good information and getting good timely 
data from AM1 as required‘. AO1 remarked that ‗the only issue I would say there is 
perhaps AM1 or that role to instigate a little bit more as opposed to me instigate it‘. 
AO1 remarked that ‗AM1 is probably the benchmark in terms of interaction with 
other support functions: the other financial personnel may learn from that‘. AM1 was 
perceived by AO1 as ‗part of the team‘, ‗always open‘ and ‗trustworthy‘. AO1 stated 
that ‗you don‘t have to query the figures and she [AO1] has got a good understanding 
of the business as well and the numbers mean something as opposed to just figures on 
a spreadsheet‘ but qualified that AM1 ‗wouldn‘t be involved enough or exposed to the 
operations side to be putting in some good commentary‘ which ‗she could if she was 
exposed more to the shop floor‘. 
 
AO2 stated that ‗my first expectation is that he becomes a team member and he builds 
up a practical understanding of the workings of the business unit‘ and ‗just to 
understand some of the issues that we are having. After that what I would like is him 
to contribute to the meeting‘ e.g., ‗from a financial point of view so we often make 
decisions at those meetings and I would expect him to say hold on no that is going to 
affect you etcetera‘. AO2 linked understanding the business and decision making:  
 
I expect him to understand what is going on in the business unit, not 
just from a corporate point of view from an overall business unit 
point of view, he needs to understand, to me, if he is going to be a 
good support to the business unit there is no point in him looking at 
SAP or spreadsheets, he needs to understand the practicalities of it. 
 
AO2 explained that AM2 ‗is coming from a background where he hasn‘t had 
exposure to the running of the business units. He is there [at operations meetings] 
every week, he is listening to what is happening, he is able to comment if he wants 
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and he is hearing what is going on and building up a broader understanding‘. AO2 
was pleased with AM2‘s ‗willingness to be involved‘. AM2 noted that for NR2, a 
detailed analysis of inventory, there ‗would be interaction with that especially when it 
came out first there was more interaction, now they understand it‘. 
 
Similar to AM1 and AM2, AO3 noted that ‗we have the weekly operations meetings 
which AM3 comes to and that is where we discuss the financial impact, our 
conversion costs‘ and ‗output per employee‘ as ‗everybody has an impact on the 
performance‘ and ‗that is why we have weekly operating meetings in the business 
unit‘. AO3 however did not perceive strong decision assistance from AM3 in noting 
that AM3 ‗hasn‘t actually made any recommendations to me‘ and perceived business 
understanding as critical e.g., ‗we make product but they don‘t know how we make it 
so you know you could be talking about, you could be talking about a different 
process completely than what we have and the because they don‘t have a familiarity 
to it‘. AO3 noted the opportunity to bring ‗fresh eyes‘ [AO3] to operational issues. 
AO3 and AO4 both emphasised the value of involving MAs in cross-functional 
groups i.e., a ‗part of the business rather than a function within a business‘ [AO4]. 
AO4 commented that AM4 ‗developed a template off his own back [see R14, 
overtime analysis]…because he saw a problem with overtime just from looking at the 
numbers‘. 
 
AO4 stated that ‗I would expect him [AM4] to have some understanding of the 
operation which he has done and gone beyond what I would regard as my 
expectation‘ e.g., ‗ring up an engineer and say look when you get a minute will you 
bring me out to look at this‘ or when AM4 joined the company ‗one work centre a 
week, he sort of okay, I am going to learn about that and he would go out there‘. AO4 
was ‗definitely inquisitive‘. Paradoxically AM4 commented that ‗you get a sense that 
you don‘t spend enough time on the floor and that you don‘t know what you‘re 
talking about or you make assumptions that are not correct so they obviously know 
the operation very well so if you need to have influence over them, question them, 
you need to understand the environment they are working in.‘ AO4 also noted that 
‗our finance group do a very good job we will call it the classical financial function, 
getting out the monthly accounts‘ and ‗they do that quite well so it is more getting 
them involved in driving change in the business‘. AO4 advocated a shift from 
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reporting to a ‗cross-functional approach to business problems‘ but cautioned that 
‗you need to think it through; you don‘t want them [MAs] meddling so to speak, 
where it makes sense‘.  
 
BO1 stated that ‗management accounting is about providing information, quality of 
the information to allow decisions to be made, part of the business process and to do 
that you have to be outgoing, you have to be interactive‘. BO1 stressed that ‗it is 
essential that they are brought into forums and that we leverage off their resources and 
their capabilities‘. BO1 identified the level of business knowledge required in stating 
that ‗it would be very useful to get somebody involved in that area [project analyses] 
but you have to have quite an intimate understanding of what we are doing on the 
projects or the things we might do to be able to do that but it would be nice to get 
someone involved in those kind of areas‘. BO1 suggested that BM1 could ‗be an 
actual part of my function rather than in finance and then I would be able to use him 
for some of those other value added and various areas‘ and sought more influence on 
BM1. BO1 described BM1‘s interfacing with others as ‗reasonable, could do more, 
but I think again we could both do more of it‘. 
 
BO3 was ‗most pleased, is that his sense of personal responsibility on the job, he is 
not just a guy presenting the numbers‘. BO3 expressed concern at ‗not being able to 
actually distil the key messages from a technically complex situation‘ but rated BM3 
as a ‗four‘ on ‗on a scale of one to five‘ (i.e., BO3‘s scale). BO3 noted of BM3: 
 
Good listener, good ability to a pick up a message that may be 
technically based so what I mean by that is some of the key reasons, 
the rationales, the discussions can be technically focused so he needs 
to have his antenna up to be able to actually pick the key financial 
messages out of that technical discussion so in other words linking 
the financial impacts to the technical aspects of it. 
 
BO3 noted that he ‗would have a major influence on his [BM3‘s] role as well by the 
nature of my requests to BM3‘. BO3 related ‗directional guidance‘, ‗scenario building 
for new product introductions, looking at costings associated with that…business 
opportunities‘ to interacting with BM3. BO3 stated that ‗I use him as a sounding 
board then, in order to say like, are we going the right direction here or not and I 
would trust his judgement significantly in that space‘ and BO3 had ‗such a high 
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respect for‘ BM3 that ‗I can‘t get enough of it‘. Confirming this BM3 noted that 
‗probably some of my involvement in the newer programmes…it grows [the location] 
as a site if we do sort of deep dives on some of these new products or programmes 
and detailed costings of it‘. 
 
BO4 did not have decision support expectations of BM4 but observed that ‗I suppose 
BM4 is there [at cross-functional operations meetings] in that capacity if there is 
something that I need to have looked at or has come up, she is there to support‘. BO4 
remarked that ‗it would be good for the lads to understand the processes more because 
when we are discussing items whether they are works orders or costs, or whatever, 
they could probably be oh yes that is that, that is that so they could associate it‘. 
 
CO remarked that ‗one thing CM could do is he could get down on the floor a bit 
more‘ to get a better ‗appreciation of the operations‘. CO noted that continuous 
improvement initiatives had led to the set up of project teams and ‗CM has been 
involved in those as well so it is multi-functional, cross-functional‘. CO remarked in 
the context of information on scrap furnished by CM that ‗we now have a project 
charter in place and there is a team of supervisors with the engineering support for 
that part of the initiative for that and an operator‘. DO1 noted that: 
 
…one of DM1‘s targets would be to push the whole team to try and 
change and be proactive and get things done and where [he] thinks 
there is an issue that he should be saying it at both the accounts 
meeting but also at our monthly management meeting and DM1 is on 
the management team of the Supply Chain so he has equal talk at 
that, equal voice at that.  
 
DM1 stated that ‗if there is any potential for expansion or alternative businesses that 
you would be prepared to drive that forward‘ but DO1 did not perceive DM1 as 
contributing enough ‗drive‘ for DO1 in the management team: 
 
I would like to see us, him [DM1], looking forward and pushing 
strong to make things change and to really kick up stink if they 
haven‘t. And that hasn‘t really been the case, the accountant would 
be more factual reporting than aggressive pushing. 
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DM1 had noted that he was ‗not as pushy as I should be, I should be more, it is 
probably my greatest weakness and I acknowledge that‘ as ‗it is hard to be extremely 
pushy with someone when you are working along side them all the time‘. DO1 
however had remarked that:  
 
I talked to him about, good cop, bad cop. I end up doing all the 
kicking but I have to have a relationship with all of my reportees and 
it is easier for him to be a bit more distant and independent as the 
accountant for the management team so I was saying to him could 
you not be a bit more proactive in that. 
 
DO1 stated that ‗I would like to see the accountant based in the business, working in 
the roles in the business, to have that understanding‘. DO2 noted that:  
 
DM2 and myself definitely will look at the business more from an 
overall strategic point of view and makes suggestions in terms of 
what can be done in terms of the cost base, what issues we may have 
in terms of some [operations] in terms of revenue and sales. 
 
DO2 remarked that ‗it is more than just presenting a set of figures and hightailing it 
until a month down the road. I mean there would be constant contact with DM2‘. 
DO2 expected DM2 ‗to be able to identify issues quickly and then having identified 
the issues who will take responsibility for following up on those issues‘ as opposed to 
‗saying to a…manager out there you have a problem here, do you want to solve it‘ or 
‗going through a set of a accounts and I will see you in a month‘s time, that adds no 
value‘. DO2 commented that ‗the more involvement one has with DM2 the more 
those issues have been hammered home‘ and ‗by having those issues addressed as 
early as possible, it has a positive impact on the business‘. DO2 noted that ‗DM2 will 
raise the issue yes but in terms of resolving it, is it a stock issue, is it an accounting 
issue, or is it a sales issue, is it a margin issue, then I think he probably could get more 
involved in‘ and ‗maybe his approach to resolving the issue could be better‘. DO2 
noted: 
 
I suppose his approach to resolving issues in so far as if there is an 
issue in a [business unit] DM2 will probably assume that it is up to 
the [unit] managers to sort out the issue themselves whereas DM2 
should have a more proactive approach there.  
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DO2 noted that DM2 was reporting up the hierarchy to group finance through the 
financial controller and commented that ‗they [MAs] probably have little opportunity 
to be very proactive they are working with such tight timeframes that it doesn‘t allow 
them to be very proactive‘ (see section 6.15.1). DO2 emphasised the importance for 
DM2 to get ‗seriously behind some of the figures‘.  
 
EO commented ‗I suppose if he understood a bit more the technicalities of the 
business but I don‘t expect it from him…if you are in that area, in accountancy‘. EO 
explained that: 
 
…can be frustrating because, and that applies to EM I know, no 
matter how many times you explain what a certain area or what a 
certain function of a piece of equipment is, they don‘t grasp it and 
that is fair enough like I said early on I don‘t know what the hell they 
are talking about when they are hitting me with accountancy jargon. 
 
EO observed that ‗if you do find an accountant who is good technically, he would be 
the biggest pain in…ever‘ and noted accountants as ‗furrowing for information‘ and 
concerned with their ‗own development‘. 
 
6.13 Summary of findings on impact, information, and interaction 
The initial section of the findings addressed to what extent MAs are impacting upon 
the performance of OMs in their roles from the perspective of mutual influence, OM 
dependence on MAs to achieve their objectives, and perceptions of performance 
consequences of the roles of MAs. For mutual influence it was apparent that for only 
about one third of the 12 MAs and OMs was there a balance between the influence of 
the MA on the OM or vice versa. The dependence on MAs for OMs to achieve their 
objectives and the perceived performance consequences included tangible results 
(e.g., AM4 and overtime savings), ‗control‘ of projects [BO1], information linked to 
specific decision making areas (e.g., AM2 and productivity, CM and scrap), giving 
‗direction‘ on decisions [AO1 and BO3], and producing the ‗accounts‘ and 
highlighting ‗issues‘ [DO1, DO2]. AO3, BO4, and EO did not perceive AM3, BM4, 
and EM as having much of an influence on the performance of their roles. 
 
The next section of the findings examined information provided by MAs and 
identified a range of information characteristics that OMs attribute as important to the 
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performance of their roles. The majority of OMs noted MAs produced very timely 
information – with EM the only exception – and accurate information, with the latter 
perceived as having improved by AO2 with the alignment of AM2 to his specific 
business unit. OMs perceived MAs as providing essential access to key information. 
Many OMs observed how MAs were instrumental in providing relevant, appropriately 
presented and user-oriented information that supported them in the achievement of 
their own objectives, with notable exceptions on the latter being AM3, BM4, and EM. 
OMs were found to have differing information needs determined by OM function and 
managerial style. These are examined further in the discussion chapter section and 
7.3.2.1. 
 
The next section of phase two findings presented themes relating to OMs‘ control 
information expectations and the extent to which MAs were meeting these 
expectations. These findings build upon the overwhelming emphasis placed in phase 
one on the roles of MAs as providing information to support OMs (see sections 
5.3.2.1 and 5.4.2.1). Most OMs expected MAs to provide control information to them, 
especially budget variances, and to interpret and apply these in interactive contexts 
e.g., in review meetings with OMs. There were many examples of such reports 
provided. The findings show that many reports provide a useful periodic positioning 
of performance for OMs with OMs placing importance on ‗key drivers‘, ‗focus‘ and 
non-financial measurement. There was considerable variation in the value OMs 
attached to particular types of reports (e.g., head office reports, expense reports versus 
non-financial performance summaries). Some OMs noted scope to enhance control 
information for example by including more comprehensive variance analyses. 
Regarding control interaction expectations, some MAs appeared to interact very 
‗closely‘ [e.g., AM1, BM1, and BM3] with OMs and this interaction was deemed as 
essential for effective control, which builds on phase one (see sections 5.3.1.7 and 
5.4.1.2). Understanding the business, and having good interpersonal skills appeared to 
facilitate better support for OMs and the introduction of controls. Some OMs 
appeared to have few control expectations of MAs [e.g., BO4 and EO] and these MAs 
expected OMs to explain variances which was not well received and reflected poor 
business knowledge. These are examined further in the discussion chapter sections 
7.3.2.4 and 7.3.2.5. 
 
269 
 
For decision making information expectations, many OMs expected, and received, 
information of relevance for decision making in support of their roles on areas such 
as: cost reduction (AO1, AO2, and AO4), capital projects (BO1), new product 
introductions (BO3), on projects (CO, DO2), and addressing performance (DO1). 
There was some scope noted for more project analysis and decision support by BO1 
and BO4. Some of the non-routine reports had high levels of interest from OMs given 
their focus on very specific issues relating to the OMs‘ roles, OM input into their 
design and outcomes, their mix of financial and non-financial measures, and their 
strategic and future orientation.  MAs also associated non-routine reports with more 
interaction with OMs, more than occurred with routine reports. A minority of non-
routine reports were not of relevance to OMs and were more for finance personnel 
themselves. Some MAs had little or no involvement in non-routine reports (e.g., 
AM3, BM4, and EM). Regarding decision interaction expectations, interpersonal 
skills and understanding of the business emerged as two strongly emphasised 
characteristics in supporting OMs in their decision processes, with all MAs perceived 
as strong on the former but some were weak on the latter, and this builds on these 
same characteristics emphasised in phase one (see section 5.3.1.1 business knowledge 
and 5.3.1.2, interpersonal and communication skills). Some OMs seemed very pleased 
with the decision support they received from their MAs (e.g., AO1 and BO3), while 
others noted opportunities for MAs to understand the business more (e.g., AO2, BO4 
and CO), to more actively and assertively drive performance in an interactive, cross-
functional context (AO2, AO3, AO4, DO1, and DO2), and to be physically located 
more closely within the OMs‘ functions (BO1 and DO1). BO4 and EO had little 
decision interaction expectations of BM4 and EM. These are examined further in the 
discussion chapter section 7.3.2.6 and section 7.3.2.7. 
 
6.14 MAs’ perceptions of OMs’ expectations 
AM1 noted that ‗everything starts there [production] and it all comes back to different 
cost initiatives, cost reduction initiatives that are going on‘. AM1 remarked that AO1 
had ‗high expectations‘ as ‗he came from finance‘ but in regard to the other OMs 
because ‗there are so many problems in production‘ that it was ‗when there is an 
issue‘ and ‗really finance is only an incidental thing to a lot of the operations people, 
leave us get on with our jobs‘. AM2 placed the most emphasis on the financial 
controller and ‗on the operations side, we are not under too much pressure‘ but 
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expectations were ‗growing because, a, they know the information is there and we can 
provide it to them and also, b, they are coming under more pressure internally and 
externally, again this whole cost reduction‘. AM2 also related more ‗expectations‘ to 
‗performance‘ in that ‗if you report a bad month or a bad quarter to [head office], then 
yes expectations, then e-mails are flying around but if you have a good month…they 
are happy enough‘. AM3 noted more influence in regard to the annual budget process 
and expense queries and commented that the OMs would ‗like us to be more 
involved, want us at their side, more clear and easier information‘. AM3 stated that he 
‗would prefer to do more out and about‘. AM4 stated ‗their expectations are that you 
produce timely and accurate information and information that is not too complicated 
and comes to the key point quite quickly‘. AM4 noted that there had been a change in 
plant manager and cross-functional cost reduction teams which had been set up as ‗the 
push is always on to reduce costs‘.  
 
BM1 remarked that ‗their expectations would be that you would provide to them the 
information that they require‘ and ‗there is a kind of implicit agreement between what 
levels of service they require and what information they need‘ but ‗the Engineering 
Projects Manager, he kind of thinks well I should just deal with him…but my job 
is…‘. BM1 noted that he needed to work a lot with OMs on capital forecasts as ‗there 
are may be eight forecasts during the year, you have a long range plan, a four year 
plan and then you have a budget for next year‘. BM2 perceived different expectations 
in that ‗the team leaders are down to earth, they understand that say if time is not 
there‘ and ‗deadlines might not be realistic‘, while ‗at senior management level, they 
just want everything now and they don‘t care‘. BM3 noted that ‗their [OMs] 
expectations at times too high‘ and ‗can be sort of unrealistic‘ as in ‗not understanding 
the amount of work that you might have to do to produce a bit of information‘. BM3 
added that the ‗senior management team here, they would give me a lot of stuff to do, 
just purely from a, just understanding sort of spend, but understanding any new 
project plans or any new stuff‘. BO3 corroborated this by stating that BM3 ‗needs to 
challenge back a small bit to make sure it is not too much‘ as ‗sometimes he [BM3] 
may over flex to the detriment of his routine activity‘. BM4 generally perceived 
herself as more of an influence on OMs in terms of ‗sitting down and going through 
yield‘ and ‗work orders‘ and ‗getting their support to find out exactly why things have 
happened‘. BM4 noted that ‗they would expect me to be more involved like but I 
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suppose it is hard when you are under time constraints, you have a lot of other things 
to do‘. 
 
CM commented that ‗they would expect that if they ask you a question that you 
would answer them‘ and ‗it all depends on what they are looking at in the month‘. 
The influence ‗could be a manager on the line, it could be the financial controller, it 
could be [the managing director], it could be myself if I decide to look at something‘. 
DM1 commented that ‗I wonder at times do they think I am just there to do numbers 
at the end of the month and that is about it‘. DM2 attributed the influence of 
management mainly in regard to the provision and analysis of sales, cost, and 
benchmarking information. DM2 perceived OMs‘ expectations as being ‗to do the 
accounts properly…to assist in other work that comes up like project work‘. EM 
perceived the expectations of OMs as ‗looking for guidance‘ on areas such as 
‗costing‘ and sales. EM noted that OMs ‗will let you know about capital projects and 
what is happening in production and that would reflect how you present your 
management accounts and your variances‘. EM noted an influence from the general 
manager and the sales director and his team (more so than the operations staff as they 
had less access to information).  
 
6.15 Antecedents challenging the support MAs can provide to OMs 
The findings on antecedents associated with challenging the support MAs give to 
OMs in the performance of their roles are presented under the headings of reporting 
responsibilities, regulatory influences, finance manager, and OMs‘ awareness and 
understanding of the roles of MAs. 
 
6.15.1 Reporting responsibilities  
There was a general perception among OMs and MAs, particularly in Companies A, 
B, and E, that MAs were overly involved in the preparation of reports, building on 
initial observations in phase one (see section 5.2.1.1). A number of OMs specifically 
commented upon the lack of support from MAs due to head office, the financial 
controller or period end requirements: 
 
…with the financial calendar and the month end you wouldn‘t get 
near AM1…the best value for money, if they were ever looking, in 
terms of, helping make some key decisions on the shop floor [AO1]. 
272 
 
 
…he wouldn‘t always be readily available for me because the push 
would come from head office, these reports must come out‘ [AO2]. 
 
…he [AM3] is driven by head office and driven by the financial 
controller so it is only when we go look for the information that 
AM3 will give it to us [AO3]. 
 
I think people in finance, month end seems to be every week [BO1]. 
 
…the only thing that I would like to change, when I know he won‘t 
be able to, is when finance have their month end, they don‘t look at 
anything [BO2]. 
 
…corporate requirements, I suppose would have a major influence 
on his role [BO3]. 
 
…a lot of directives that come…[EM] looks for all this information 
on the first day of the month [EO]. 
 
MAs were very aware of these pressures and AM1 expressed a common view: 
 
…it is like as if we are being torn in two because [head office] think 
they are head office, they are the most important so if they look for 
something we have to drop whatever we are doing to get it back to 
them and on the other side we have production, people like the Plant 
Manager, the Cost Reduction Manager giving out because they are 
not getting enough support from Finance.  
 
Many MAs corroborated the comments of OMs about the colossal reporting burden 
and the sacrifice of decision support e.g., ‗the projects would slip altogether‘ [AM2], 
‗if they left the local, the plant controllers and plant financial accountants get involved 
more in their plants they would probably see more cost savings‘ [AM4], ‗you are only 
a reporting tool effectively‘ [BM2], and ‗[OMs] might not be able to come to us‘ 
[BM3]. EM noted head office was ‗always looking for more information‘ and ‗half 
the time I know it doesn‘t make much sense‘ and similarly BM3 stated that ‗I can‘t 
take anything meaningful from it‘ [BM3].  
 
Although less onerous, MAs in Companies C and D were involved in a lot of report 
preparations. DO1 observed DM1‘s orientation to reporting information rather than 
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actively addressing issues on the management team (see sections 6.5 and 6.12). DO2 
stated: 
 
It is a time constraint as much as anything, you know talk to DM2 
the first two weeks of the month it is all about getting the accounts  
done and understanding, there‘s no time for anything else. It is very 
much an operational issue as distinct from a strategic issue. 
 
DO2 added ‗I would support that they become more involved but it is always a case 
of how much time they [have] to be involved‘. DM2 supported this when he stated 
that ‗we are just the messengers‘ and ‗it is only a job at the end of the day, you only 
report the figures, you are only the messenger really‘. EM noted that when OMs were 
presented with variances and ‗they don‘t like what they are seeing, sometimes they 
might be shooting the messenger‘. 
 
6.15.2 Regulatory influences 
In Companies A and B, SOX was perceived as a very strong influence as was detected 
in phase one (see section 5.2.1.3). AM1 commented that ‗Sarbanes Oxley would 
influence what we do; we have standard reconciliation templates that we have to 
follow‘ and ‗you have to check to make sure that everything is done and documented 
and done in a certain way‘. AO3 commented that ‗corporate audit has driven a lot of 
changes to our processes‘ and ‗procedures and that so it is certainly it is am, it is up 
there, it is one of the high ones. Two or three of our main objectives for this year are 
all based on corporate audit requirements‘. AM3 noted that he was ‗still selling 
internal controls, have to do it, more than likely not making their jobs easier, adding a 
stage to it‘. AM3 noted that ‗SOX focused people‘s minds on how they are doing 
things‘, having gone down like a ‗lead balloon‘ with OMs. AM3 noted that ‗they 
detest to see me coming when I mention Sarbanes Oxley‘ because documenting their 
roles for SOX resulted in having to ‗to go back and say well that needs to be changed‘ 
and ‗we should be there to help people but that is the way that people perceive us 
because of this‘.  
 
BM1 remarked that ‗compliance again that means that certain things that they want to 
do just can‘t be done‘ and ‗it doesn‘t go well at all‘ e.g., ‗we‘ve to do this for SOX 
and they say is it not a bit like the tail wagging the dog‘. BM1 noted OMs don‘t 
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realise it is black or white, completely black or white and how very small it is to be 
white and how very small it is to be black, that there is nothing in between at all‘. 
BO1 corroborated: 
 
SOX has a huge influence on how we do things and the paper trails 
that we are having to put into place for SOX can seem at times a bit 
OTT [over the top] but we continuously have to do it [BO1]. 
 
BO1 expressed displeasure regarding the lack of ‗financial flexibility‘ and noted ‗we 
have an even greater interface with BM1 than we would normally have‘. BO1 added 
that ‗we have audits eight months out of every twelve‘. BO1 observed that ‗finance is 
very much seen as the governing body in terms of the stick, in terms of brow beating 
all the time‘ but ‗read any definition of management accounting; that is not what it is, 
it is about making strategic decisions, it is about decision making. BO1 stated that 
‗BM1‘s role is essentially mainly compliance‘. BM2 perceived SOX as generating 
additional work e.g., ‗everyone‘s signature‘, need a ‗test model‘, need to have ‗proven 
it repeatedly in different scenarios‘, meeting ‗SOX deadlines‘, and ‗we are enforcing 
our regulations on them at the month end time, as I say, they have no option‘. BM3 
expressed some SOX frustrations: 
 
The deadlines, the deadlines, the preciseness, the accuracy, 
everything has to be, I know you have to have it in accounting but it 
just…you think Sarbanes Oxley and all this lovely stuff getting down 
to, you know, the basic, even the cent in a multi-million dollar 
company to be doing this sort of stuff I think it is non-value add. 
 
BM4 stated that: ‗SOX yes is a big part of my role‘, ‗you are constantly chasing them 
[OMs] for signatures for SOX‘ and ‗they just see you coming…they just don‘t want 
you there at all‘. The increased regulatory tasks associated with the roles of MAs in 
Companies A and B appeared to have been absorbed in the roles of MAs as no 
reference was made to any additional resources for SOX. 
 
6.15.3 Finance manager 
The FM was identified as influential to the roles of MAs in phase one (see section 
5.2.2.5). AO1 commented that the financial controller ‗will get priority obviously on 
her [AM1] time and priorities‘ and ‗in reality then it is what each functional leader 
asks‘. AO1 noted: 
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I think the business unit managers of the three operations would have 
to try and convince the financial controller to the extent that you 
would be better off getting AM1 or any other of the accountants [i.e., 
AM2 and AM3] more involved on the operations side of the house. 
 
MAs were asked to identify who most influenced their roles (see appendix G). The 
first and second most influential members were identified as either FMs or head office 
FMs; the exceptions being for BM1 (Project Manager, BO1) and DM1 (Commercial 
Manager, DO1) as first influencers, and AM1 (Supply Chain and Maintenance 
Manager, AO1) and AM2 (Operations Manager, AO2) as second influencers. Thus, 
OMs for the other MAs were perceived as third influencers with the exception of CM 
and EM where the OMs were perceived as fourth influencers.  
 
AM1 linked less involvement with OMs to ‗the financial controller…probably 
because of head office‘ and noted that he could ‗put more trust in us‘ and AM1 sought 
‗more responsibility as regards making an impact on other departments‘. AM1 stated: 
 
It would also be nice to get a bit more of where the three of us 
accountants [AM1, AM2, and AM3] to have a bit more responsibility 
than we have but we don‘t; the responsibility tends to stay with the 
financial controller. It would be nice if he delegated more to give us 
a chance to develop. 
 
However, with respect to the tension in hierarchical reporting and providing support 
to local OMs (a conflict noted in phase one, see section 5.4.3.2) AM1 remarked that 
‗we need to be a bit stronger in getting on to the managers about their costs. We tend 
to just provide the information. I suppose the finance director would be more involved 
that way‘. AM1 noted ‗he [financial controller] gets a lot of the flack that we wouldn‘t 
get‘ so there was an element of MAs being shielded from this tension. Other MAs 
commented similarly e.g., ‗haven‘t really come across any examples I can give you 
now‘, [AM2], ‗not really‘ [AM3], ‗not really, no‘ [AM4], ‗not that particularly‘ 
[BM2], ‗not so far yet anyway‘ [BM4], and ‗not really‘ [CM]. Some tension was 
perceived around presenting the results e.g., ‗there can be a tension at times…when 
you are putting together numbers and they are bad and it is not nice‘ [DM2]. EM 
noted that ‗yes sometimes the variances you can explain to them why such a variance 
is there, they are finding it difficult‘. Both DM2 and EM however perceived 
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themselves as just ‗messengers‘, as noted in section 6.15.1. DO1 desired DM1 to be 
more confrontational and had communicated that to DM1. DM1 acknowledged this 
but noted it was difficult to do so (see section 6.12).  
 
BM1 perceived tensions around SOX (see section 6.15.2). BM3 observed that ‗if it 
doesn‘t look right, I‘ll say it, I‘ll challenge them on it‘ as did other MAs. If there was 
a tension MAs did not seem to perceive it as a problem: 
 
I don‘t think it creates a tension at all actually. I think it is good to 
have the…I think it is a valued conversation, people challenge one 
another, it is worth it [BM3]. 
 
…if they disagreed with us, we just sat down, talked it out, it is not 
conflict [CM]. 
 
AO2 commented that ‗he [AM2] does a lot of work for the financial controller‘ and 
AM2 noted that ‗you are trying to provide the information and assist the operations 
manager whereas then you are also with the finance director trying to justify stuff and 
things and so there can be conflict there alright, have not experienced too much, what 
the finance director says goes at the end of the day‘. AM2 noted that ‗he [the financial 
controller] is the first point of contact‘. AM3 noted ‗things decided at a management 
meeting come down second hand from our boss [the financial controller], 
interpretation can be different‘ and similar observations were made by AM1 and AM2 
about instructions from the financial controller. AO3 stated that ‗the major 
influences…come from his manager and that direction; they are not entirely driven by 
the operations side at all‘ i.e., ‗the financial department kind of runs separate to the 
business unit‘. BO2 noted: 
 
…the guys are very driven by what the financial controller thinks 
even if it is not right and even if sometimes they know it is not right 
or if he is overreacting, he puts a lot of pressure, he has a lot of hold, 
he has a very strong hold over the lads which is tough [BO2]. 
 
BO2 stated that the financial controller ‗needs to let them [MAs] go on their own‘. 
BM2 remarked that the financial controller expected ‗way more from you than 
anybody else‘ and ‗you don‘t get an inch‘.  CO noted that ‗the finance director would 
be a major influence on him‘ but ‗major projects would go through the finance 
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director‘ and ‗so I wouldn‘t necessarily be aware that the finance director would have 
CM do it‘. EO noted that ‗EM does all the number crunching, [the general 
manager/financial controller] then has the actual overseeing‘.  
 
Continuing from the finding in phase one that the influence of the MA on their own 
roles was a major antecedent (see section 5.2.3.1), in phase two, MAs in Companies C 
and D supported these findings. CM in a family-owned firm perceived that ‗I feel I 
have brought my own thing to it‘ and ‗you run things yourself and you need to be able 
to‘ without ‗running to the finance director every time‘. Similarly in Company D, an 
Irish-based MNE, both MAs noted freedom to define their own roles. DM1 noted that 
‗I would have a huge licence obviously within certain parameters‘ and DM2 
commented that ‗we have a lot of freedom so we can dictate it ourselves‘. In contrast, 
MAs in Companies A, B, and E generally noted that they had limited scope to define 
their own roles. Comments by MAs included: ‗not to a great extent‘ [AM1], ‗very 
limited I would say‘ [AM2], ‗quite structured, things don‘t change‘ [AM4], ‗no there 
is not a huge amount really to change the role‘ [BM1], ‗you are kind of framed in 
management accountant‘ [BM2], ‗told what to do and how to do it‘ [BM3], ‗if I want 
to change it to a certain extent but not a hell of a lot [BM4], and ‗it is defined from the 
outset at the moment‘ [EM].  
 
6.15.4 OMs’ awareness and understanding of the roles of MAs 
Building on phase one‘s findings on ambiguities and challenges around MAs 
interactions with OMs (see sections 5.2.2.5, 5.3.2.3, 5.4.3.3, and 5.4.3.6) phase two 
examined MAs and OMs perceptions on these. AM2 noted that ‗the operations team 
see the importance‘ of his involvement with them but noted a perception of the 
‗accountant coming again…rarely just calls down to say hello‘ and ‗always looking 
for something‘ e.g., ‗a few engineers would think oh here is the accountant with his 
costs again, they just want to get a project done‘ and ‗you are going well what is that 
going to cost?‘. AO3 confessed that ‗for me it is very vague because I don‘t know 
what exactly but he is busy and what he does in is his office is set from the financial 
controller‘s requirements‘. AM3 perceived that AO3 ‗wouldn‘t see finance as being 
of benefit to him‘ as ‗you are monitoring him all the time and you are saying that you 
have that many [units] produced and you have that many people and you should have 
produced more‘. AM3 observed that OMs ‗see accountants dishing out numbers, 
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never good news, could do better, like school reports‘. AM3 noted that AO3 was 
‗willing to see the bigger picture, can see that finance are there to help, while others 
would see finance as an encumbrance and a nuisance‘ [AM3]. AM4 noted that 
‗maybe they [OMs] have not dealt with finance before: they don‘t know the benefits‘ 
as ‗some managers sometimes don‘t realise what finance can do for them‘ or ‗a lot of 
departments wonder what finance do like, what‘s their role, what are they doing?‘ 
AM4 noted that ‗you get the slagging…bean-counters‘.   
 
BM2 commented that ‗they [OMs] don‘t see just the value in discussing topics with 
us in the first place that say effectively we are only causing them more trouble than 
we are worth‘. BM2 added that OMs ‗feel that we don‘t add value for them when we 
talk to them‘ and ‗they don‘t see just the value in discussing topics with us‘. 
Regarding having more involvement with BM4, BO4 commented that ‗if it had 
benefit for me, and I am not really sure of what benefit it is‘. BO4 indicated that ‗a big 
thing for me would be understanding what BM4‘s…more what BM4‘s role…and 
what support that you can give me‘. BO4 stated: ‗to be honest I don‘t know enough, 
only through the queries that I am getting from BM4…what do you do all day BM4?‘ 
CO similarly noted: ‗I don‘t know what they do enough and they probably don‘t know 
that I could use information. There is a little bit of ignorance of maybe what I would 
like to have and what they can give me‘ [CO]. CO remarked that ‗there is probably a 
lot more there that they could share and we could benefit from except I don‘t know 
what they do enough to ask them‘. DM1 also observed that a senior manager who was 
an accountant and formerly ‗a colleague of mine‘ now pulls him ‗aside for projects 
that he is involved in‘. DO1 noted: 
 
Some people probably have a fear of measurement and been told that 
they need stuff to be reported involves them in being forced into 
actions and all that if they are of a conservative nature. And that is 
what the accounts function is, it is used for, to some extent. While as 
other people want to change the world and want the accountant to get 
involved with doing that with them [DO1]. 
 
The findings also indicated there seemed to be greater involvement associated with 
OMs who possessed some financial expertise as AM1 remarked that ‗he [AO1] 
actually used to do my job; he came from finance so he would use us a lot, me in 
particular‘. AM1 noted that AO1 ‗would come to me for a lot more information than 
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say the business unit manager will because AO1 knows how to do it or knows that I 
will have it, while [with the] business unit manager it is only if there is an issue with 
something costing too much‘. AM2 mentioned that ‗some of the managers are ex-
finance people‘ and ‗would have a closer understanding of what goes on‘ and BM3 
noted that BO3 ‗is very financially aware of doing things and he would challenge me 
as well, me challenge him, so it is like a two-way process‘ and ‗the people who are 
quite astute financially would have higher expectations definitely‘ compared to 
‗people who are not sort of…that wouldn‘t have much of a sort of a 
finance…background‘. Confirming this, BO3 noted that if BM3 ‗isn‘t available to do 
that for whatever reason I would go ahead and deliver it independent of BM3‘ as BO3 
was ‗confident in my own judgement‘ but ‗more comfortable doing it with his input‘. 
BM3 added that involvement was more difficult where OMs were ‗focused on their 
area in isolation and their area of expertise is only either operational, that they don‘t 
really have a bit of financial background‘. BM1 remarked that OMs that were more 
financially astute ‗might dig further‘ but do ‗see things earlier‘, while with the less 
financially astute ‗you may have to step in and start pinpointing‘ and ‗you might have 
to take it on a lot more‘. BM2 attributed more financial awareness to the operations 
manager level but perceived that this was not shared with his direct reports who had 
less but needed it to process transactions appropriately.  
 
6.16 Summary of antecedents not assisting OMs in their roles 
The findings reveal that MAs, particularly in Company A and B, were under 
considerable pressure to meet the reporting and regulatory requirements dictated by 
head office, sometimes to the detriment of assisting OMs locally. MAs in the other 
companies were also commented upon by OMs as spending a disproportionate 
amount of time on formal periodic reporting. The findings locate the MAs‘ managers, 
the financial director or controller, as instrumental in how the roles of MAs were 
deployed with consequences therefore for how MAs could assist OMs in the 
performance of their roles. These particular antecedents are discussed further in 
section 7.3.2.1. The findings indicate that the OMs‘ financial acumen and their 
awareness and understanding of the roles of MAs impact on the extent that MAs assist 
OMs in the performance of their roles. These findings are discussed further in section 
7.3.2.1 and 7.5.3. 
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6.17 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has presented the findings from phase two of the research with respect to 
those antecedents and characteristics associated with the roles of MAs that relate to 
the extent that MAs assist OMs in the performance of their roles. Table 6.3 
summarises key themes for the three ‗i‘s, impact, information, and interaction, as 
noted in the presentation section 6.4, showing the extent that MAs are perceived by 
OMs as influencing their performance. The table also identifies opportunities which 
summarise areas where the MA could have more influence on OMs in the 
performance of their roles. 
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OM/
MA 
Impact Information Interaction 
AO1/
AM1 
Information for 
decisions and 
‗direction‘ on them 
Opportunities 
Influence OM more 
‗Accurate and timely‘ 
Bring ‗pieces together‘ 
Project ‗financial benefits‘  
Opportunities 
Information in advance 
‗Dig further‘ on variances 
 
Budget meeting leading to more 
control 
Forecasting assistance  
‗Good relationship…will critique‘ 
‗Brought AM1 to meetings‘  
‗Benchmark…part of the team…   
  open…trustworthy‘ 
‗good  understanding‘ of business 
Opportunities 
‗Instigate a little bit more‘ 
AO2/
AM2 
‗Productivity‘ 
‗Cost reduction‘ 
‗Contributes‘ to team 
Opportunities 
‗Looking for more‘   
 contribution 
Information on 
‗productivity‘ and ‗cost 
  reduction‘ 
‗Visibility‘ on ‗spending‘ 
‗More localised‘ information  
from business unit alignment  
‗Identify the key drivers‘ 
 
‗Part of the operations team‘ 
Opportunities 
‗Improve the controls…budgets‘ 
‗More involved‘ 
‗More assertiveness‘ 
‗Drive the cost reduction‘ 
‗Builds up a practical  
  understanding‘ 
AO3/
AM3 
‗Not much‘ influence  
  on MA or dependence  
  for objectives 
Opportunities 
‗Hasn‘t actually made  
 any recommendations‘ 
‗Delivers the results… 
  information that you are  
  able to work with‘ 
‗Information is readily  
  available‘ 
‗Graphical‘, ‗top 25‘ 
Information on ‗conversion  
 costs‘ and ‗spends‘ 
Opportunities 
‗Only when we go look for  
  the information‘ 
‗Weekly meeting we review‘ 
If ‗going over budget‘ 
‗Able to explain…jargon‘ 
Opportunities 
Awareness of when focus is on  
 cost, other OM priorities 
‗Driving action‘ on ‗costs‘ not as  
  an ‗afterthought‘ 
‗Time on the floor‘ – ‗fresh eyes‘ 
Awareness of ‗other criteria‘  
‗Very vague…what he does‘ 
AO4/
AM4 
‗Conversion cost  
  productivity‘ 
‗Cost reduction‘ e.g.,  
  overtime savings 
‗Raised the bar in  
  terms of control of  
  costs‘ – ‗link directly‘ 
‗New product  
  introduction‘ 
Opportunities 
‗Driving change in the  
  business‘ 
‗Patterns of usage‘ 
Information ‗very quickly‘ 
‗Usable and clear‘ 
Highlights the ‗main points‘ 
‗Identifying areas‘ 
 
‗Did bring to the fore‘ cost issues 
Will ‗go out on the floor, back in‘ 
‗Cost reduction teams they would  
  be somewhat rudderless‘ 
‗Gone beyond‘ expectation of  
  business knowledge 
‗Don‘t want them meddling so to  
  speak, where it makes sense‘ 
 
BO1/
BM1 
‗We have control of  
 capital‘ 
‗Forecasting capital  
 spend‘ 
Opportunities 
More ‗value add‘ 
‗Beyond the control  
 and reporting function  
 into more analysis‘ 
‗Systems being up to date  
 and maintained‘ 
‗Timely reporting‘, ‗live‘ –  
  if not, ‗decisions… flawed‘ 
‗Real time‘ and ‗do flex it‘ 
‗Cost sheet, it is a one pager‘ 
Opportunities 
‗Flexibility in reporting…to  
 be worked on‘ 
‗Work very closely with BM1‘ 
Opportunities 
‗Useful to get somebody  
 involved‘ but ‗intimate  
 understanding‘ needed 
‗Could do more‘ interacting 
Be ‗part of my function‘ 
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BO2/
BM2 
Standard costs: ‗set up‘ 
and ‗maintain‘ 
‗Signature  
 requirements‘ 
Inventory control 
‗Timeliness of the item set  
 up and the cost rolling‘ 
‗If something was done wrong‘ 
‗Advising‘ on ‗write…offs‘  
BO3/
BM3 
‗Directional guidance‘ 
‗Suggestions in terms  
 of what else‘ 
‗Templates…sanity  
 checking‘ 
‗Scenario building‘ 
Opportunities 
Influence OM more 
‗Very professional output,    
 new product introductions‘ 
‗Where we are versus budget  
 and forecast‘ 
Opportunities 
Missing information on 
some variances 
‗Quality of cost centre review  
 discussions‘ 
‗Good …relationship…trust‘ 
‗His style… acceptability of some  
 of these controls‘ 
‗Personal responsibility on the 
  job‘ 
‗I can‘t get enough of it‘ 
BO4/
BM4 
‗Doesn‘t really‘ depend  
 on BM4 for objectives 
Opportunities 
Influence OM more 
and ‗explore‘ influence 
on MA  
‗Six or seven different  
 projects there‘ BM4  
 ‗could be helping‘ 
‗Don‘t know enough, only  
 through the queries that I  
 am getting from BM4‘ 
‗BM4 is very much the financial  
 side‘ 
‗Give more detail to BM4‘ 
‗Is there‘ at operations meetings 
‗If it had benefit for me, and I am  
 not really sure of what benefit it  
 is‘ 
Opportunities 
Interact with queries ‗at the start  
point‘ 
‗Understand the processes more‘ 
CO/ 
CM 
‗My  objectives  
 …would be scrap…   
 what CM gives me‘ 
‗Critical…making  
 money, or not making  
 enough money‘ 
‗Recycling‘ report, a  
‗big saving‘ 
Opportunities 
Influence OM more 
‗Quality of original 
 information‘ 
‗Project costings or when we  
 are in price negotiations‘ 
‗Access to inventory  
 reports…KPIs‘ 
‗Very easy to share‘ (graph) 
Opportunities 
‗Needs to be shared‘ 
‗Analysis‘ and ‗initiative‘ 
‗Change I made is the comment  
 boxes‘ 
Meeting OM before issuing report 
avoids ‗excitement‘ 
Opportunities 
‗Get down on the floor a bit more‘ 
 
DO1/
DM1 
‗Management team   
 …equal voice‘ 
‗Projects…investment 
 …redundancies… 
 finance behind the  
 commercial feel…‘ 
DM1 ‗projections  
would have borne out  
to be true‘ 
‗Accounts‘ first 
Opportunities 
Influence OM more 
‗It is timely, it is accurate‘ 
MA ‗generating‘ reports, 
OM ‗looking at‘ non-routine 
‗Non-financial‘ preference 
‗As detailed as you want‘ 
‗Key targets…see where we  
 are…implementation plans‘ 
‗Focused information‘ 
‗Where we are each month‘ 
‗Clear and logical…states  
 assumptions‘ 
‗Management team‘ 
Budgeting…‗very good….knows  
 how the game goes‘ 
‗Lot of interaction and discussion  
 around non-routine reports‘ 
Opportunities 
Could ‗give us a kick more‘ 
‗More proactive in raising the  
 issues and driving us all to 
 achieve them‘ 
‗More aggressive in looking for  
 change, savings and all that‘ 
‗Looking forward‘ 
‗Based in the business…have that  
 understanding‘ 
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DO2/
DM2 
‗Accounts‘ first 
‗Identifying the issues  
 and addressing them  
 speedily‘ 
‗Makes suggestions in  
 terms of what can be  
 done‘ 
Control weaknesses 
 ‗are quickly identified‘ 
Opportunities 
Influence on MA  
‗bordering too little‘ 
 
‗Identifying the issues at an 
 early stage‘ 
‗Information at a point in  
 time‘ 
Otherwise a ‗vacuum‘ 
‗There is accuracy‘ 
‗Very good…presenting  
 it…degree of simplicity‘ 
‗Summary sheets‘ 
‗Wealth of information‘ for  
 planning purposes 
Opportunities 
See accounts before issuing 
 
‗We go through the accounts‘ 
‗Good delivery‘ on ‗accounts  
reviews‘ 
‗Would interact a lot‘ on non- 
 routine reports 
‗Big input to design‘ of non- 
 routine but ‗little input‘ on  
 routine 
‗Constant contact‘ 
‗More involvement‘ leads to 
‗issues been hammered home‘ and 
‗positive impact on business‘ 
Opportunities 
‗Could get more involved…his 
approach to resolving the issue 
could be better‘ 
EO/ 
EM 
‗Not really‘ assisting 
 achieving objectives 
‗Bigger picture‘ 
‗EM does all the 
 number crunching‘   
 …controller ‗has the 
 actual overseeing‘ 
 
‗Plots…against budget‘ 
‗Measure of where you are‘ 
‗Historical‘ 
‗I have this already‘ 
‗Highlighting…areas… 
potential to improve‘ 
‗An information flow‘ 
‗Pile of information, too  
 much‘ 
Opportunities 
‗Use more user-friendly  
 jargon‘ 
‗Month end is a big one‘ 
‗Have to comment on the major  
 ones [variances]‘ 
‗We used to sit down and read  
 these things…waste of time‘ 
‗It is one-way traffic‘ 
‗Good way with people when he  
 looks for something‘ 
Opportunities 
‗Understood a bit more the  
 technicalities of the business‘ 
 
Table 6.3 – MAs and assisting OMs in the performance of their roles 
 
The findings in a holistic sense in table 6.3 indentify that there are a number of 
dimensions of MAs influencing OMs in the performance of their roles across the 
themes of impact, information, and interaction and that there is considerable variation 
in these across MAs. This variation which will be discussed in the next chapter where 
MAs are grouped according to the extent that they meet OMs‘ expectations (see 
section 7.3.2.2), that they have expected characteristics (see section 7.4.1.5) and in 
evaluating the roles of MAs based on models in the literature (see section 7.9). 
 
The use of reports in the case design has led to a number of findings pertaining to the 
extent that MAs assist OMs in the performance of their roles. These include general 
characteristics of reports which are useful (or not) and the extent that information and 
reports (routine and non-routine) assist OMs in the performance of their roles in 
control and in decision making functions. These are discussed in the next chapter in 
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section 7.3.2.3 through to section 7.3.2.7 regarding OMs‘ expectations of MAs and 
the extent that MAs meet them. Finally there are antecedent constraints that the 
findings suggest have implications for the support that MAs can provide to MAs and 
these are discussed in section 7.3.1. 
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Chapter seven 
 
Discussion of findings 
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7.1 Introduction   
This chapter presents a discussion of the findings from phases one and two of the 
study. The findings are examined in the context of the literature reviewed on the roles 
of MAs (chapter three) and the theoretical lenses of control, contingency, and role 
theory (chapter two). The study set out to address specific gaps in the literature 
regarding the contemporary roles of MAs, using qualitative research methods. The 
findings have helped address apparent contradictions in the literature and provide a 
more comprehensive picture of the roles of MAs. They also provide a basis for 
gaining further insights using the three theoretical perspectives of management 
control, contingency, and role theory. The discussion is structured around the 
antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles of MAs in 
general, for phase one, and more specifically in the context of association with the 
consequence of assisting OMs in the performance of their roles, for phase two. This 
chapter compares the results with prior empirical findings and draws upon the 
theoretical perspectives to develop a deeper understanding of the antecedents, 
characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles of MAs. 
 
7.2 Comprehensive perspective on the roles of MAs 
The phase one findings provide evidence of an extensive combination of variables 
associated with the roles of MAs. Figure 7.1 presents a summary of the antecedents, 
characteristics, and consequences, presented in line with the categories that emerged 
from the data analysis. 
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Figure 7.1: Antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles 
of MAs 
 
Phase two of the research focused on antecedents and characteristics associated with 
the roles of MAs – identified in phase one – that could be linked to the extent that 
MAs assist OMs in the performance of their roles. Assisting OMs in the performance 
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of their roles is thus an overarching variable that can be related to a number of the 
consequences identified in phase one e.g., decision making support, assistance with 
planning and control, and the relevance of information provision and interaction. The 
analysis of phase two is embedded in the phase one discussion around antecedents, 
characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles of MAs. However, the 
analysis highlights the relevance of specific antecedents and characteristics in the 
context of the extent that they assist OMs in the performance of their roles. Thus, the 
chapter is largely structured around headings displayed in figure 7.1, but draws on 
phase one and phase two findings as is appropriate for the objectives set for each 
separate phase (see section 4.4.1 for phase one objectives and section 6.2 for phase 
two objectives). 
 
The antecedents in figure 7.1 are grouped according to whether they represent 
influences that are external, internal, or relate to the individual MA themselves. The 
characteristics are grouped according to whether they relate to the individual MA, to 
the activities in which MAs engage, or to information. Finally, the consequences are 
grouped into those that relate to influencing performance, information impact, and 
role interface. The consequences are further divided between those that are associated 
with more or less interaction between the MAs and the OMs.  Existing literature has 
tended to focus narrowly on a limited number of particular antecedents (Fisher, 1995, 
1998) and thus the findings on antecedents, characteristics, and consequences bring 
the disparate strands of previous research together in presenting a comprehensive 
picture of the roles of MAs, thereby addressing one gap in the literature. The findings 
have indicated new dimensions of the roles of MAs (e.g., consequences of the roles), 
while also confirming and expanding on previously researched dimensions (e.g., 
antecedents and characteristics associated with the roles). The findings also identify 
key dimensions of the extent that MAs assist OMs in the performance of their roles. 
These findings are discussed next under the headings antecedents, characteristics, and 
consequences. 
 
7.3 Antecedents 
The antecedents are presented under the major headings of external, internal, and 
individual antecedents. The external and internal categories of antecedents in figure 
7.1 relating to the roles of MAs can be extended to the homogenising forces affecting 
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management accounting practices (Granlund and Lukka, 1998b). Some antecedents 
reveal the impact of economic forces such as advanced technologies and international 
competition. For example, a renewed emphasis on cost competitiveness had raised the 
profile of MAs in many firms, while other antecedents point to the institutional forces 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) impacting the roles of MAs. These institutional forces 
can be further analysed into those that are ‗coercive‘ such as the SOX legislation in 
the subsidiaries of US MNEs or ‗normative‘ such as the local cultural norms and 
values that were associated with the roles of MAs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The 
antecedents are now discussed as external, internal, and individual antecedents. 
 
7.3.1 External antecedents 
The findings from phase one indicate the presence, or absence of, a corporate head 
office (see section 5.2.1.1) represents a contingent factor in determining the roles of 
MAs. Thus, MAs that were located in foreign MNE subsidiaries were required to 
spend considerable time meeting reporting requirements and responding to queries 
from head office. The influence was described in terms of ‗dictatorship‘ [AF1] and a 
‗huge influence‘ [BO2]. The extent to which MAs were informed and influenced by 
their respective businesses and environments (Sathe, 1982; Burns et al., 1999; Burns 
and Baldvinsdottir, 2007; CIMA, 2007) seemed contingent upon the presence, or 
absence, of a head office. For example MAs in smaller independent manufacturing 
firms were more knowledgeable of their businesses and were influenced more 
immediately by their environments.  
 
The phase two findings, supporting phase one findings, indicate that the presence of a 
corporate head office may be a contingent factor in determining what scope a MA has 
to assist local OMs in the performance of their roles (see 6.15.1). The findings also 
indicate that this contingency was less strong in some MNE subsidiaries e.g., Irish, 
French, and US family owned firms. MAs that were located in foreign MNE 
subsidiaries, particularly in Companies A, B, and E, were required to spend 
considerable time meeting the reporting requirements and responding to queries from 
head office. The impact of head office was perceived as very strong and OMs 
perceived that they received less assistance in the performance of their roles as a 
consequence of MAs being, as AO1 remarked ‗oriented to the external world‘ with 
the opportunity cost of ‗helping make some key decisions on the shop floor‘. AO2 
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noted that ‗there is an awful lot of external work done, I don‘t see it as being a benefit 
to myself‘ [AO2]. BO1 stated that ‗month end seems to be every week‘. AM2 noted 
‗projects would slip altogether‘ and AO3 stated that AM3 ‗wouldn‘t always be readily 
available‘ when the ‗push would come from head office‘. This created a role conflict 
for MAs which is discussed in section 7.5.3 and 7.6.  
 
While there has been limited research to date on the roles of MAs in subsidiary 
organisations, some emerging case study evidence suggests that such ownership 
structures can impact on the roles (Yazdifar et al., 2008), while survey evidence 
indicates that MAs do not hold significantly different perceptions of their roles with 
respect to working in either subsidiary or independent organisations (Yazdifar and 
Tsamenyi, 2005). Although little has been researched on the nature of subsidiary 
reporting to head office, Littler and Sweeting (1989) found widespread use of 
financial measurement in one case firm and linked it to complying with corporate 
requirements. O‘Dea and Clarke (1994) found rigidity in changing costing systems 
due to the requirement for corporate consent. 
 
From a role theory perspective, some MAs had difficulty interpreting head office 
management‘s expectations as they remarked upon the ambiguity in head office 
instructions and requests, as EM noted ‗it doesn‘t make much sense‘ and BM3 stated 
that ‗I can‘t take anything meaningful from it‘ [BM3]. Many MAs in phase one, and 
all in phase two, performed their roles in subsidiaries of MNEs where there was a 
very strong head office emphasis on achieving the site‘s budgetary targets (see 
sections 5.2.2.8, 6.5, and 6.15). It was observed frequently in phase two that there was 
more head office interaction when subsidiary performance was off target. The model 
of control deployed could be classified as formal hierarchical systems in the literature 
e.g., administrative controls (Hopwood, 1974), routine controls (Hofstede, 1981), 
bureaucratic controls/mechanisms (Macintosh, 1994; Ouchi, 1979), and results 
controls (Merchant, 1998). As noted, on a corporate level there appeared to be an 
expectation of management to targets, while locally OMs desired flexibility in the 
detailed budgetary allocations. Thus, the findings emphasise the ‗how‘ that control 
theory has traditionally tended to underplay but more recent research has incorporated 
(Simons, 1995). While Simon‘s work was based on senior executives‘ use of 
alternative control mechanisms, this study provides evidence lower down in the 
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organisation. Many MAs facilitated the traditional control model, Simons‘ diagnostic 
control systems, by providing key management information against budgets. Some 
MAs were also further involved in management and project teams in discussing the 
implications of this management information and formulating an appropriate response 
to it. This demonstrated an ‗interactive‘ (Simons, 1995) use of control systems. The 
MAs in independent firms had more flexibility in the design and implementation of 
management control procedures than their counterparts in subsidiaries of MNEs 
where MAs experienced a more imposed corporate model, as was the case for all 
MAs in phase two. Phase two revealed inflexibility in management control e.g., with 
regard to corporate ‗terminology‘ [AM3, EM] in reports, design inflexibility of some 
management accounting reports (see sections 7.3.2.5 and 7.3.2.7). MAs in both phases 
were expected to interact around control systems with OMs (see section 7.3.2.4). 
 
In phase one, the environment was perceived as impacting more directly on the roles 
of MAs in indigenous independent firms, while MAs in MNEs were perceived as at a 
remove with the environmental impact descending via the group hierarchy (see 
sections 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2). Role theory, while recognising the influence of 
organisational factors on role sender expectations (see figure 2.7 in section 2.4), does 
not take adequate account of environmental factors influencing roles. A further 
distinction can be made in role theory on the impact of environmental factors in that a 
more direct impact is found for MAs who operate in smaller independent firms than 
those in subsidiaries of MNEs. In phase two, the environment was perceived more as 
an indirect influence through head office but was generally not perceived as an 
antecedent to the roles of MAs in the context of assisting OMs in their roles. It did 
however heighten MAs‘ awareness of corporate priorities e.g., the establishment of 
cross-functional cost reduction teams that MAs sat on in Company A. 
 
In the subsidiaries of US MNEs there was evidence in phase one that the introduction 
of SOX had a significant impact on the roles of MAs in phase one (see section 
5.2.1.3) and there was a perception that SOX was moving the roles of MAs away 
from assisting OMs in the performance of their roles (see section 5.4.3.2). SOX had 
added considerable workload to the accounting function and had brought more of a 
control orientation to the roles of MAs. This particular antecedent has received little, 
if any, attention in the literature. Phase two confirmed that the implementation of 
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SOX was perceived by MAs and OMs as being a major influence on the roles of MAs 
(see section 6.15.2) in US MNE subsidiaries, Companies A and B. While there was 
recognition that SOX had brought a better control environment, many MAs and OMs 
perceived its introduction as leading to a stronger control interface that was perceived 
as ‗OTT‘ (BO1) and ‗a bit like the tail wagging the dog‘ [BM1]. SOX introduced a 
new layer of control that: was ‗black and white‘ [BM1], precise to ‗the cent in a 
multi-million dollar company‘ [BM3], mandated ‗templates‘ [AM1], required more 
‗audits‘ [BO1], ‗deadlines‘, ‗signature[s]‘, and the repeated use of ‗test model[s]‘ 
[BM2]. It was considered ‗non-value add‘ [BM3] and cast the roles of MAs as the 
‗governing body in terms of the stick, in terms of brow beating‘ [BO1]. 
 
The implication of this orientation was that it required MAs to follow up with OMs 
regarding compliance with SOX requirements and OMs did not perceive these SOX-
related interactions as assisting them in the performance of their roles. Furthermore, 
by MAs having to absorb SOX requirements into their own activities, they had 
consequently less time to assist OMs. This compliance orientation aligns with Keating 
and Jablonsky‘s (1990) classification of some finance functions having a 
‗conformance orientation‘ that emphasises a bureaucratic, procedural, and technical 
approach.  The literature notes that managers perceive FMs as more oriented towards 
a ‗conformance‘ and ‗command and control‘ than towards a ‗competitive team‘ 
classification (Jablonsky et al. 1993; Jablonsky and Keating, 1998), while FMs 
perceive themselves having the opposite orientation. As these studies preceded SOX 
the findings of this study would suggest additional ‗conformance‘ orientation, and in 
contrast both MAs and OMs were equally concerned about a detrimental impact of 
SOX. Since little research on the impact of SOX on the roles of MAs has been 
conducted, this perhaps might be worthy of further research (see section 8.8). 
Anecdotally, Sharman (2007) has observed a SOX-driven re-orientation of the 
accounting profession away from decision support to control. There is further 
discussion of SOX in the context of the control and partnership orientation of MAs in 
section 7.9. There was a difference between the MAs operating in firms under SOX 
legislation and those that were not e.g., MAs in the latter category did not perceive 
much direct regulatory impact on their roles, while the MAs in the former category 
referred to their roles being influenced by many SOX requirements, as noted earlier. 
Thus, SOX was a contingent factor in determining the roles of MAs and in particular 
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it necessitated additional interaction with OMs regarding its implementation and 
compliance which OMs did not perceive as being of much value. From a role theory 
perspective the influence of SOX was perceived as leading to role conflicts (see 
section 7.5.3). From a management control perspective, MAs and OMs questioned the 
contribution SOX made to assisting OMs in the performance of their roles, and by 
implication, the wider organisation‘s performance. The theory of management control 
largely views control systems as leading to the achievement organisational objectives 
(Anthony, 1965; Otley and Berry, 1980; Flamholtz et al., 1985) but the findings in 
this study would suggest the importance of identifying the appropriate extent of 
control which ensures control without compromising performance outcomes.  
 
7.3.2 Internal antecedents: management 
Management, or as individuals, OMs, were perceived as a strong influence on the 
roles of MAs in phase one (see section 5.2.2.5) and in phase two of the research (see 
from section 6.5 through to section 6.14). Phase two provided a much deeper 
understanding of the influence of OMs on the roles of MAs through the investigation 
of OMs‘ expectations and the extent that MAs meet these expectations, and these are 
discussed in some detail in section 7.3.2.1 through to section 7.3.2.9. There are other 
antecedents in phase one and these are discussed in a later section on other internal 
antecedents in section 7.3.3. The discussion is presented under the themes of 
variability in OMs‘ expectations, extent that MAs meet OMs‘ expectations, general 
information characteristics and assisting OMs, meeting OMs‘ control expectations, 
routine reports and OMs‘ control expectations, meeting OMs‘ decision support 
expectations, non-routine reports and OMs‘ decision support expectations, OMs‘ 
unmet expectations, and MAs perceptions of OMs‘ expectations. 
 
Management expectations that emanate from role senders (i.e., OMs) to the focal 
roles (i.e., MAs) according to role theory determine the roles enacted by the focal 
occupants. In phase two, this ‗sent‘ and ‗received‘ role was communicated from OMs 
to MAs at management or project meetings, informal meetings, or via the telephone, 
e-mail, or through the FM. The expectations were also formalised through the annual 
appraisal processes that were used in all the companies involved in the study. These 
mechanisms could be seen from DO1 who commented that DM1 could ‗give us a kick 
more, each of the managers and that is a thing that I talked to him about‘ and BO3 
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noted missing variance information but explained that it was ‗because I have not been 
setting such high expectations‘. 
 
7.3.2.1 Variability in OMs’ expectations 
While the phase one findings provide strong support for the influence of management 
(Hopper, 1980; Sathe, 1982), they also highlight a number of difficulties for MAs – 
the focal role occupants – in interpreting role sender expectations when OMs have 
different and discretionary approaches.  In phase one, the involvement of MAs by 
OMs was perceived as arbitrary (‗when they see fit‘ [AO1] and ‗some do, some don‘t‘ 
[AF2]). This means that MAs may have to adapt to different managerial styles and 
simultaneously cope with the role conflict arising from a desire for more involvement 
in management processes in situations where OMs may not wish them to have such 
involvement. This indicates a contingency relationship in that the involvement of the 
MA may be contingent upon managerial style and discretion.  
 
The findings of phase two confirm role theory‘s prediction that the role sender‘s (i.e., 
the OM‘s) expectations influence the behaviour of the focal role (i.e., the MA) (Kahn 
et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978). Building on phase one, many MAs in phase two 
observed variability in the expectations of OMs across a number of dimensions 
including perceptions of finance (see section 6.15.4) and different approaches to 
engaging with management accounting information (see sections 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.10, 
and 6.11). MAs observed OMs with good financial skills as having higher 
expectations of them than those with less thereby indicating a contingency factor to 
the MAs capacity to assist OMs in the performance of their roles. The findings thus 
indicate that there was more involvement between OMs and MAs when OMs 
possessed strong financial skills, supporting the positive association observed by Zoni 
and Merchant (2007). A refinement on this was that sometimes more involvement 
was needed where OMs had less financial expertise and the MA had to ‗step in‘ 
[BM1]. Thus, the former was involvement more driven by the OM and the latter was 
involvement more driven by the MA. Further, the former was linked more to decision 
making processes, while the latter was more linked to budgetary control. In 
addressing the phase two objectives of assisting OMs in the performance of their 
roles, these findings suggest that having some shared financial acumen between OMs 
and MAs better facilitates interaction and enables OMs to utilise the assistance of 
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MAs to a greater extent, or more effectively, than OMs who do not possess such 
financial acumen.  
 
Functional differentiation was indicated by MAs providing information for specific 
managerial functions (see section 6.6.3) e.g., AM1 and BM1 produced capital 
tracking reports, AM1, AM2, and AM3 produced information for specific business 
unit requirements, and DM1 produced different management accounts for different 
business units. EM noted that sales demanded more information than production and 
that one production department required more support than another due to one product 
being standardised and the other customised. There has been a call in the literature to 
better address the differing information requirements of functional managers, as 
studies have observed differences in managers‘ requirements and organisational and 
environmental conditions (Lawrence and Lawrence, 1967; Chenhall and Morris, 
1986), and particularly between sales and marketing and operations (McKinnon and 
Bruns, 1992; Mia and Chenhall, 1994; Lau, 1999; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003; Mendoza 
and Bescos, 2001; Richardson and Barker, 2001). This study has a relatively narrow 
focus on operations functions as only Company D and E had immediate sales arms 
(the other companies were effectively cost centres using transfer pricing). This study 
highlights the need to differentiate even within the same general operations area. 
Thus, from a contingency perspective, the findings supports the legitimacy of the 
functional differentiation of management accounting information, and suggests that 
there could be further refinement of these variables within similar functions. 
 
The findings from phase two also show that the awareness that OMs had of the MAs‘ 
roles related to assisting OMs in the performance of their roles (see section 6.15.4). 
Similar to the note about OMs‘ financial acumen, there appeared to be a contingency 
relationship between OM‘s awareness and understanding of the roles of MAs and the 
extent that MAs could assist OMs in the performance of their roles. Some OMs 
appeared to understand the roles of MAs and had clear expectations regarding the 
assistance that the MA would provide in the performance of their roles. However, 
there were some OMs who only discovered useful accounting reports by ‗accident‘ 
and there was ‗probably a lot more there‘ [CO], or ‗some managers sometimes don‘t 
realise what finance can do for them‘ [AM4], or ‗big thing for me would be 
understanding what BM4‘s…more what BM4‘s role‘ is [BO4].   
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In role theory terms this suggests that the expectations of role senders may be 
influenced by the extent that role senders understand the focal person‘s roles. While 
the theory recognises the influence of organisational factors, attributes of the person 
and interpersonal factors, it pays less attention to the influence of the role sender‘s 
understanding of the focal role on the focal role. This implies a mandate for MAs to 
raise their profile within organisations. CO and EO similarly noted a relatively poor 
level of awareness of how CM and EM could assist them in the performance of their 
roles. These MAs relate to phase one findings where it was observed that one 
consequence for MAs where there was little interaction between OMs and MAs was 
the need to sell the roles of MAs (see section 5.4.3.6). AM2 noted the expectations of 
OMs were ‗growing because, a, they know the information is there and we can 
provide it to them and also, b, they are coming under more pressure internally and 
externally, again this whole cost reduction‘. This is supported by Ezzamel et al. 
(1997) who found that a wider dissemination of information in organisations creates 
an ‗increased demand for additional, more detailed, more timely, and more frequent 
information‘ (p. 16). Thus, there was a contingency in that the more the OM 
understood the roles of the MAs, the more expectations were placed on those roles. 
These findings highlight an awareness and understanding deficit on the OMs‘ behalf, 
which seems to be a barrier to them receiving better assistance in the performance of 
their roles from MAs, and perhaps effort is required on both sides to reduce this 
deficit: MAs to raise their profiles and OMs to explore the potential of the roles of 
MAs to assist them. 
 
Managerial preferences, as found in phase one and noted above, also appeared as a 
contingent variable in phase two in explaining the extent that MAs assist OMs in the 
performance of their roles e.g., DM1 compared the styles of two divisional CEOs with 
the labels ‗presidential‘, ‗PR man‘ versus ‗hands-on‘ and ‗pernickety‘ that required 
DM1 to ‗adapt‘ to each style. OMs‘ preferences for MA involvement indicated a 
contingency e.g., ‗in-person with a quick explanation‘ or ‗by e-mail‘ or to ‗study‘ 
themselves when convenient (see sections 6.6.3 to 6.6.5). Differences were also 
perceived in regard to senior managers versus those more junior with regard to the 
interest in summaries, the level of interest in the management accounts (e.g., ‗quick 
look‘ versus ‗fine detail‘ [DM2]), and whether OMs perceive MAs as ‗there to help‘ 
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or ‗an encumbrance and a nuisance‘ [AM3] (see section 6.15.4). The variability in 
OMs approaches to using management accounting information and reports supports 
the findings of Mendoza and Bescos (2001) who found that managers devised their 
own individual approaches, or ‗reading strategies‘ in garnishing information. These 
findings imply that MAs require some flexibility in their approach to assisting OMs in 
the performance of their roles (see further discussion of flexibility in section 7.4.1.2).  
 
The phase two findings identify the primary role senders for MAs to be FMs and not 
OMs, with only two MAs, BM1 and DM1, identifying an OM as being the most 
influential on their role. This is unsurprising perhaps as the FM was either the 
immediate finance line manager or the FM one level above. Although many MAs 
shared the same line manager the order of manager influence varied. The FM was 
identified as a contingent factor in determining the support MAs provide to OMs, 
detected in phase one, and supported further in phase two i.e., the senior FMs can 
influence the extent of involvement of MAs by restricting or encouraging their 
involvement. This draws attention to a role sender distinction between the signals 
coming from financial as opposed to operations management. Phase two indicated 
that the FM was a very strong influence on the roles of MAs (see section 6.15.3) with 
respect to their capacity to assist OMs in the performance of their roles. Of the 12 
MAs in the study, 10 had FMs as the most influential and eight had FMs as the second 
most influential on their roles (see appendix G). OMs were only the third highest 
influencers for half of the MAs. This was corroborated by some OMs expressing a 
desire for them to have more of an influence on the roles of the MAs and vice versa 
(Hopper, 1980). There was evidence of some contradiction in FMs‘ views on MA 
involvement as DF in phase one conveyed an ‗expectation‘ that the MA ‗does not just 
sit at the desk‘ but is ‗going to meetings, problem solving‘ but must ‗go through 
finance director, depends on level‘ with the ‗finance director 50% away from desk, 
management accountant 20%‘. There was a perception that MAs were ‗operational‘ 
[DO], and FMs were the ‗decision maker[s] and they [MAs] would be the providers‘ 
(see sections 5.2.2.5 and 5.3.2.1).  
 
Corroborating this in phase two, MAs (AM1, AM2, and MA3) sought to have more 
‗responsibility‘ [AM1] and direct interactions with OMs. BO2 similarly perceived 
that the financial controller needed to let the MAs ‗go on their own‘ (see section 
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6.15.3). The findings also reveal some difficulties for MAs e.g., AM1, AM2, and 
AM3 perceived ambiguity in interpreting and satisfying requests from the financial 
controller, and conflict in trying to ‗assist the operations manager‘ and ‗trying to 
justify stuff‘ to the financial controller [AM2]. Another impact of the financial 
controller was that sometimes the expectations of OMs were conveyed directly by 
them to MAs (e.g., at budget and management review meetings or on cross-function 
project teams) but at other times the expectations of OMs were transmitted via the 
financial controller to MAs and ‗interpretation can be different‘ [AM3]. From a role 
theory perspective, this intermediary transmission of OMs‘ expectations via the 
financial controller creates potential for some distortion of these expectations and thus 
a misalignment of sent and received roles. Thus, the findings show that there is more 
conflict and ambiguity when the expectations of management are mediated by the 
financial controller i.e., the signals get distorted which adds to the role conflict. While 
role theory recognises the impact of organisational factors on role senders‘ 
expectations that in turn influence the focal roles, it does not capture the complexity 
inherent in focal role occupants (e.g., MAs in this case) interpreting signals that come 
directly from role senders (e.g., OMs in this case) and those that come from the same 
role senders but indirectly through another role sender (e.g., the financial controller in 
this case). There has been little research on the roles of FMs in shaping the roles of 
MAs and this could point to an avenue for future research (see section 8.8). From the 
perspective of assisting OMs in the performance of their roles, these findings suggest 
that the FM may be instrumental in this regard. 
 
7.3.2.2 Extent of MAs meeting OMs’ expectations  
An outcome of the data analysis in phase two was a broad alignment of MAs to 
particular categories as follows: AM1, AM4, and BM3
4
 as meeting or exceeding 
OMs‘ expectations; AM2, BM1, CM, DM1, and DM2 as partially meeting OMs‘ 
expectations; and AM3, BM2, BM4, and EM as MAs interacting with OMs who had 
limited or no expectations of them. The extent that MAs meet OMs‘ expectations 
should also be considered in light of the time that the MA was in the company, and in 
the particular position e.g., table 6.1 reveals that AM2, BM2, and CM were all only in 
the position and company for less than one year, while AM1, DM1, and DM2 were 
                                                 
4
BM3 was promoted to Management Accounting Team Leader shortly after the case study interviews. 
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nine years in their companies, AM4 was over seven years, AM3, BM3, and EM were 
three to five years, and BM1 and BM4 were one to two years.  
 
As the extent of MAs meeting or not meeting OMs‘ expectations related to specific 
antecedents and characteristics with respect to assisting OMs in the performance of 
their roles, these are discussed under the relevant headings of antecedents and 
characteristics. In role theory, unmet expectations represent role conflicts for those in 
focal roles (the MAs) and these are discussed in sections 7.5.3 and 7.6. The phase two 
findings, based on the alignment above, broadly suggest considerable variation in the 
extent that MAs meet OMs‘ expectations. Notwithstanding some notable exceptions 
and some prevailing constraints, MAs were largely perceived as not meeting OMs‘ 
expectations and thus builds on a stream of literature highlighting this (Hopper, 1980; 
Kaplan, 1984; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; McKinnon and Bruns, 1992; Brignall et al., 
1999). This alignment of roles and expectations permeates the discussion as it 
unfolds, and specifically in section 7.3.2.8 on unmet expectations, but also in section 
7.4.1.5 on MAs‘ characteristics linked to expectations, and in section 7.9 on closing 
and widening the gap on MAs meeting OMs‘ expectations. Thus, there are many 
dimensions of assisting OMs in the performance of their roles in these alignments, 
which will be elaborated upon in the subsequent discussion. 
 
7.3.2.3 General information characteristics and assisting OMs 
In phase two the majority of OMs appeared satisfied with the timeliness of 
information from MAs e.g., AO1 noted that ‗anything you ask from AM1 would be 
done in a very timely, good timely fashion‘ and BO1 commented that ‗we live and die 
by [BM1s‘ project reports] on a weekly basis‘ and the reports were ‗live‘ which if 
they were not would result in ‗decisions that are essentially flawed‘. OMs placed 
much significance on the timeliness of information, which supports the findings of 
other studies (McKinnon and Bruns, 1992; Jazayeri and Hopper, 1999; Mendoza and 
Bescos, 2001; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). This drive for timeliness was further 
observed when AO1, CO, and DO2 suggested that it would be more helpful to have 
interaction around reports or information prior to their issue or presentation in 
meetings. In Company E, EM noted that the management accounts could be ‗three 
weeks after the month end‘ and with such a delay it was not surprising perhaps that 
EO noted that ‗I just file it away‘. However, it appeared that EO had variance analysis 
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discussions with EM at the month end and so there would be nothing new or 
unexpected in the final document.  
 
There were many instances in phase two where reports had been customised to suit 
OMs‘ requirements and expectations e.g., use of trend diagrams, graphs, rankings, 
pivot tables, simplification, commentaries, summaries (with access to detail if 
necessary) and the use of non-financial measures. The latter‘s adoption confirms a 
growing trend in the literature (Eccles, 1991; Clarke, 1992; Drury et al. 1993; Hoque 
and Alam, 1999; Vaivio, 2004). There were two processes that appeared to facilitate 
this, and interaction underpinned both. Firstly, some MAs noted that they specifically 
asked OMs about their information needs and invited comments on information or 
reports that MAs provided to OMs. AM4, as AO4 observed, would ‗go out on the 
floor‘ to understand the users‘ needs. Secondly, some OMs instigated change requests 
to information and reports e.g., CO had suggested that CM add pop-up comment 
boxes to spreadsheet reports [R24] in relation to items that might warrant commenting 
upon. AO3 had requested conversion of detailed reports into graphical format and 
AM3 also noted that the same report now ranked only the top 25 cost items and not all 
items [R6a-b]. These developments would suggest a leaning more towards the 
‗system‘ as opposed to the ‗scope‘ dimension of MASs (Bjornenak and Olson, 1999). 
Such report changes, precipitated and prompted by interaction between the OM and 
the MA, demonstrate how management accounting information acquired greater 
organisational, as opposed to technical, validity (Schultz and Slevin, 1975). These 
findings also have implications for roles of MAs in moving to the model of the 
business partner (see section 7.9), and for how MAs can provide information to OMs 
in a manner that assists them in the performance of their roles. The general 
information characteristics confirm those previously set out in the literature as 
important (AAA, 1974; McKinnon and Bruns, 1992; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). 
 
Few management accounting innovations were present in the manufacturing firms but 
those that were (e.g., the use of NFIs) were linked to MAs having relevant 
interactions with OMs, and the innovation literature strongly supports this (Eccles, 
1991; Gietzmann, 1991; Bhimani and Pigott, 1992, Nulty, 1992; Norris, 1995; 
Anderson, 1995; Friedman and Lyne, 1997). Each firm appeared to have developed 
its own particular ‗scorecard‘ as opposed to those prescribed in the literature (e.g., 
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Kaplan and Norton 1992, 1996; Lynch and Cross, 1995; Neely et al., 2001). When the 
absence of innovations and the dominance of traditional systems (e.g., budgeting, 
standard costing) are considered in light of the very positive perceptions of some 
reports, this would seem to give some weight to the defence of management 
accounting not being in ‗crisis‘ (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). It instead suggests 
management accounting is experiencing change in how it is used and in a broader 
context (Bromwich and Bhimani, 1989). The findings support the literature‘s 
distinction between decision making and control (Emmanuel et al., 1990; Horngren et 
al., 2000; Zimmerman, 1997, 2001; Atkinson et al., 2001) and the next sections 
discusses these separately. 
 
7.3.2.4 Meeting OMs’ control expectations 
In the same vein as phase one (see section 5.3.2.2) all the firms in phase two operated 
periodic forecasting and long range planning systems as well as the annual planning 
system, and the latter tended to receive most attention. OMs expected MAs to 
participate and assist them in the collation and completion of these processes. The 
findings in phase two similarly indicated that short-term, annual budgetary targets had 
a strong impact on the roles of MAs being associated with assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles. Thus, OMs sought assistance from MAs in understanding 
variances to targets and contributing to formulating a response to them (see sections 
6.6 to 6.13). These expectations were dominated by a planning and control feedback 
model (Otley and Berry, 1980; Berry et al., 1995) where OMs sought MAs‘ input to 
both planning, measurement, and variance analyses processes. OMs‘ perceived that 
MAs were generally very effective at contributing to the control aspect of their roles. 
It was noted that MAs were more effective in the budgetary and accounts review 
sessions as opposed to the broader management teams that they might be members of 
which seems intuitive as the former perhaps draws more on the MA‘s accounting 
knowledge, while the latter draws more on the MA‘s business knowledge. 
Shortcomings in control expectations noted by OMs were a disproportionate attention 
to negative variances, improving ‗the controls…around budgets‘ [AO2], some 
variances not analysed, and a reactionary approach. Regarding the latter it was 
somewhat contradictory that AO3 remarked on cost analysis as an ‗after thought‘, 
while also noting different ‗cyclical‘ priorities as ‗at the moment forget the cost, get 
what the customer wants‘. OMs appeared to value analysis and explanations 
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accompanying variances. Many MAs made reference to budgetary control 
expectations being greater or lesser depending on operational conditions or different 
time periods in the annual operating cycle e.g., a priority of dispatching products to 
customers, organisational rapid expansion, or actual performance relative to targets. 
MAs being flexible and having a broader understanding of context was observed by 
OMs as important from a control point of view (see section 7.4.1.2). In management 
control terms, this draws attention to a need for a more dynamic theory of control that 
recognises business priorities as moderating the appropriate emphasis on control at 
different points. This model of flexibility is arguably not congruent with a periodic, 
routine and ‗cybernetic‘ feedback control model (Otley and Berry, 1980). This also 
draws attention to how accounting information and report relevance can fluctuate, 
implying that MAs need to understand the current operational priorities. This creates a 
more dynamic definition of the relevance of management accounting information in 
context and recognises that assisting OMs in the performance of their roles should 
account for this. 
 
A common mechanism through which OMs‘ control and planning expectations were 
addressed was through interaction (see section 6.9) i.e., many MAs met face-to-face 
with OMs to review the operating department or division‘s budgetary performance. 
OMs associated a number of positive control outcomes resulting from interacting with 
MAs that would not be present if only the information was provided (i.e., no 
interaction) e.g., MAs providing ‗direction‘ and having a ‗meaningful discussion‘ 
[DO2]. AO2 and BO3 respectively explained the roles of AM2 and BM3 in assisting 
with their cost management and planning processes as per figure 7.2.  
 
MA / ROLE  INPUTS             PROCESS      OUTCOMES 
AO2  
[Cost 
Management] 
 
 
BO3 
[Planning]  
 
Figure 7.2 – Process map of MAs‘ involvement in cost management and planning 
Identify ‗big cost 
drivers‘ 
‗Brings them to 
the meeting‘ 
‗Works with 
different people‘ 
‗Providing 
necessary 
templates‘ 
‗Directions… 
guidelines… 
timeline‘ 
‗Sanity 
checking… right 
thing‘ 
MAs‘ interacting and business understanding increases 
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Figure 7.2 illustrates how MAs interact at a number of steps in cost management and 
planning processes and the central plank is the MAs interaction, which as it 
progresses facilitates the MA building up a better business understanding. This links 
with business knowledge and interpersonal skills (see sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.3), 
and also to the phase one consequence of MAs being more informed by interacting 
with OMs (see section 5.4.1.3). Although there has been some evidence that OMs rate 
MAs‘ interpersonal skills more so for decision making than for control purposes 
(Feeney and Pierce, 2007) this study suggests that such skills are likely to be as 
important for control purposes. This also strongly supports phase one where it was 
observed that more interaction between MAs and OMs, and MAs understanding the 
business, led to enhanced planning and control (see sections 5.3.1.7 and 5.4.1.2).  
 
The findings also indicate that management control theory needs to attach greater 
significance to the impact of control being deployed by MAs in a more interactive 
(Simons, 1995) and adaptive sense as opposed to focusing on the tools of 
management control. This was clearly demonstrated by BO3 where he observed how 
‗the introduction of the controls would be positively impacted by BM3‘s interpersonal 
style‘, while in contrast DO2 noted that DM2‘s approach to ‗resolving the issue could 
be better‘. Thus, the effectiveness of control can be argued to rest upon not only the 
design or classification of the control itself (Hopwood, 1974; Ouchi, 1979; Hofstede, 
1981; Anthony et al., 1989; Merchant, 1998) but the process of interaction with MAs 
around its introduction.  
 
7.3.2.5 Routine reports and OMs’ control expectations 
The findings provide insights into how routine reports were used by OMs which in 
turn reveals how they related to assisting OMs in the performance of their roles from 
a control perspective. Many of the routine reports presented during the research 
contained actual performance information and budgetary comparative data. 
McKinnon and Bruns (1992) distinguish the nature of information contained in 
different reports as being ‗operating‘, ‗status‘, ‗benchmark comparisons‘, and 
‗reference‘ information (p. 129) which could be aligned to these routine reports in this 
study with ‗operating‘ being the only exception as it referred to the very frequent and 
informally produced operating data.  
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As each company was a subsidiary of a multinational organisation, this influence was 
very evident with respect to some reports that had to be prepared and presented rigidly 
in line with standardised group formats. These reports were not flexible with respect 
to design and were often perceived as of having little or no value to OMs in assisting 
them in the performance of their roles (see section 6.8.5). This also applied to 
templates underpinning the local management accounts as these generally were 
modelled on group reporting requirements. However, there were many routine reports 
that were of significant value to OMs, which are discussed below, and even the 
inflexibly designed management accounts were perceived as having some value to 
OMs. The subsidiary status was largely irrelevant for non-routine reports used to 
support managers‘ decision making as discussed in section 7.3.2.7. 
 
Routine reports were perceived to impact on assisting OMs in the performance of 
their roles in different ways. Many OMs remarked about the value of knowing ‗where 
we are at a point in time‘ [DO2] although noting that they did not always read the 
‗detail‘. What seemed important to OMs with regard to specific routine reports, and 
more generally, included having overall summaries, report accuracy, timeliness, and 
relevance. It was also apparent that some routine reports were more relevant to OMs 
than others. A number of brief, straightforward, graphical, and often non-financial 
reports (e.g., R2, R3, R4, R6, R9, R10, R24, and R25) were noted for their direct 
linkage to KPIs (e.g., productivity, scrap, usage), the feedback and change requests 
that the MAs received from OMs on them, and how OMs sometimes adopted these 
reports in their own departments and reapplied the essence of the report to different 
areas than what the original report was designed for. CO observed how the provision 
of KPI information by CM in the form of one-page graphical reports (that were also 
posted on notice boards around the factory) supported him in his role. DO1 similarly 
remarked about DO1 and R25 which was a management summary report of KPIs. The 
report characteristics noted here go some way towards addressing the critical 
observations of management accounting information in the literature (Johnson and 
Kaplan, 1987; McKinnon and Bruns, 1992) and the growing adoption of non-financial 
measures in management accounting reports is well documented in the literature 
(Drury et al., 1993; Pierce and O‘Dea, 1998; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001).  
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Many of the routine reports appeared to contain more information than the OM 
required as OMs indicated that their approach to using these reports was premeditated 
and time limited e.g., ‗I go down to the bottom right hand corner‘ [CO] and ‗I can 
flick through them in a couple of seconds and see whether they are ok‘ [DO1]. These 
reports and their review can be strongly linked to Simon et al.‘s (1954) observations 
of managers using accounting data for scorekeeping and attention-directing purposes 
with the caveat that OMs do not spend much time doing this and OMs expected MAs 
to do more of the attention-directing. Thus, OMs particularly valued MAs facilitating 
the focusing process for OMs in using these reports (e.g., MA adding variance 
comments, highlighting issues) i.e., ‗identifying areas where there are problems, 
providing useful data, encouraging us to look at these things‘ [AO4], ‗where to focus‘ 
[CO], ‗identify the key drivers‘ [AO2], and ‗key issues‘ and ‗proposed actions‘ 
[DO1]. Focusing was also observed in providing ‗focused information‘ not ‗realms of 
information‘ [DO1]. Routine reports were also recognised for being useful to establish 
‗trend‘ information [AM2, AM3, AM4], ‗to see are there improvements‘ [CO], or as 
DO1 remarked providing ‗a line in the sand‘. What was also revealing about how 
OMs tended to use the routine reports was the quick transition from the ‗quick glance‘ 
[BM1] to the decision implications of the report and ‗trying to look forward rather 
than looking back‘ [DO1]. This process was referred to as the ‗strategic piece‘ [DO2] 
providing the ‗bigger picture‘ [EO] which ‗drives a lot of decisions and actions‘ 
[DO1]. Thus, while these control-oriented reports commenced with an evaluation and 
monitoring of performance against targets, on completion of this the discussion 
shifted to a more decision-oriented use of the reports in addressing the performance 
issues highlighted. These findings suggest that using focusing mechanisms in routine 
reports, in both their brevity of presentation and the highlighting of particular points 
for attention, assists OMs in the performance of their roles. It also draws attention to 
Johnston et al.’s (2002b) notion of ‗good enough accounting‘ as opposed to ‗realms of 
reports‘ [DO1]. 
 
Some routine reports did little to assist OMs in the performance of their roles. These 
reports could be grouped as follows: 
 
1) Reports primarily for head office (e.g., R5, R12, and R29);  
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2) Reports for the MA to gather explanatory information from OMs or for 
verification purposes (e.g., R18, R20, and R21); and 
3) Reports surplus to requirements, overtly historical or redundant (e.g., R17 and 
R28). 
 
BO2 commented on an inventory report (R17) that he had ‗been reporting it to them 
for three years‘ was now ‗discontinued‘ as OMs perceived it as ‗not adding any 
value‘. Some of the routine reports that MAs prepared for OMs were of a detailed 
financial nature and presented in tabular format (e.g., R7, R8, R20, R21, R26, R27, 
R28, R30, and R34a-c) which some OMs commented upon as of little or ‗no interest‘ 
[DO1]. Some routine reports were unhelpful because of ‗terminology‘ [AM3, EO] 
which was more related to head office or the group. A number of OMs and MAs 
views suggested underutilisation of the periodic management accounts. It was 
observed by many MAs that very few questions followed the issuing of some routine 
reports and this was confirmed by some OMs‘ disinterest in detailed financial reports 
behind the management summary page of the management accounts. It was also 
notable that some MAs spent considerable time on preparing the accounts, ‗the first 
two weeks of the month‘ [DO2] even though the OM may ‗spend more time looking 
at the non-routine stuff‘ [DO1]. This particular grouping of reports can be linked to 
the criticism in the literature of overly detailed reports and an excessive orientation 
towards financial reporting for management reporting purposes (Macintosh, 1985; 
Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Innes and Mitchell, 1989; McKinnon and Bruns, 1992; 
Lewis, 1993; Fry et al., 1995; Scapens et al., 1996; Drury and Tayles, 1997; Kaplan 
and Cooper, 1998) and supports the assertion that accountants continue in this 
practice (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998b). These reports, in the context of 
assisting OMs in the performance of their roles, raise serious questions as the 
resources and energies directed towards these ends have little if any benefit to OMs, 
and as noted, reports may be consuming resources in the misplaced belief that 
something of value is being created when that is not the case. Some of these reports 
have some relevance but a critical review of them might address shortcomings in their 
detail and presentation and this raises issues of levels of awareness and understanding 
between the roles of MAs and OMs (see sections 7.3.2.1 and 7.5.3). Furthermore, 
these findings point to scope for further research (see section 8.8). 
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There were some apparent contradictions with regard to some reports. The 
management accounts (R32) in Company B (which originally contained the redundant 
R17 noted above) were perceived as of value by OMs but BM3 could not fathom how 
‗managers are happy with it‘. BM3 put some of R32 together each month and 
concluded that ‗it doesn‘t tell you anything‘. Oddly BM3 suggested changes that 
could sound more like those typically coming from OMs e.g., ‗comments down the 
bottom saying some of the non-financial piece‘ or to have ‗graphs‘ to ‗see trends‘. 
This was somewhat paradoxical as BM3‘s recommendations were generally in line 
with what OMs sought (e.g., inserting commentary, graphical presentation) which 
suggests that OMs did not have much regard for the report (i.e., low usage) or BM3‘s 
perceptions of it, or were unaware of BM3‘s perceptions. BM3 did note that the 
controller had sought the OMs‘ perceptions of the report and they were ‗happy with 
it‘ [BM3]. It might also be that OMs desire to be ‗over-informed‘ as King et al. 
(1991) found but this would seem contrary to the major findings in this study. From a 
role theory perspective, the focal role is predicted as being able to influence the 
expectations of OMs but this example would not strongly support this. As noted, 
some OMs desired MAs to influence them more, and BO3 did seek BM3 to have 
more of an influence on his role. Conversely, the findings also reveal that OMs didn‘t 
realise that MAs produced routine reports that were of value of them e.g., CO noted 
stumbling upon a very useful ‗scrap report‘ by ‗accident‘. Both these cases again 
reflect a weak understanding between MAs and OMs and suggest a need to develop a 
stronger mutual understanding of roles (see sections 7.3.2.1 and 7.5.3).  
 
From a cybernetic control model perspective (Otley and Berry, 1980) these findings 
reveal considerable variation in the characteristics, use, and perceived value of 
different of forms of feedback which would have implications for the resulting 
effectiveness of control. As was noted above some control reports, or dimensions of 
them, may have been presumed by MAs to be providing useful control feedback to 
OMs when this was not the case. In one organisation, Flamholtz (1983) found budgets 
that were largely ignored. Thus, the findings emphasise that it is not just the existence 
of feedback systems that lead to control (Otley and Berry, 1980) but how these 
feedback systems are designed and used. These findings also have ramifications for 
the roles of MAs in moving to the model of the business partner (see section 7.9). 
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7.3.2.6 Meeting OMs’ decision support expectations 
In phase two, one area that OMs identified as an expectations gap was MAs not 
playing a strong enough role in business decision processes (see section 6.12), a 
defining aspect of management accounting (Belkaoui, 1980; Horngren et al., 2000; 
Atkinson et al., 2001) and in the model of the business partner (see section 7.9). OMs 
were seeking more active involvement from MAs in business decision making 
processes, more initiative taking, and a more forceful approach to addressing and 
implementing solutions to performance issues e.g., BO1, DO1, and DO2 noted that 
the MAs aligned with them could go beyond the reporting of performance to assist 
more in the analysis and resolution of issues relating to that performance i.e., taking 
active steps to address issues.  
 
Some MAs were perceived as better meeting OMs‘ decision expectations than others. 
OMs commented very positively about AM1, AM4, and BM3 with respect to: 
‗critique‘, ‗better understanding of the overall business‘ [AO1], having ‗developed a 
template off his own back‘ [AO4], ‗directional guidance‘, ‗suggestions‘, ‗personal 
responsibility‘, and a ‗good ability to a pick up a message that may be technically 
based‘ [BO3], all against a backdrop of very good working relationships. In contrast 
some OMs did not appear to have decision expectations of MAs (e.g., AM3, BO2, 
BO4, and EO) as AO3 noted AM3 ‗hasn‘t actually made any recommendations to 
me‘. MAs were generally perceived as better meeting OMs‘ control expectations than 
their decision expectations. 
 
The findings identify four key aspects to meeting OMs‘ expectations regarding 
decision support. OMs expected MAs to provide appropriate information in the 
context of the decision and to have a sound understanding of the business. Next, OMs 
expected MAs to be able to bring this information and understanding into interactive 
settings where MAs could discuss the financial implications relating to decisions. 
Finally, OMs expected MAs to follow on from these decisions and actively participate 
in their implementation (see sections 6.10 and 6.12). These key themes are illustrated 
and related in figure 7.3: 
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Figure 7.3 – Expectations of MAs‘ involvement in decision support 
 
Figure 7.3 illustrates that the relevant information and business knowledge are 
prerequisites to making a valued contribution to decision making processes and that 
OMs expect MAs to go beyond the decision process towards making a stronger input 
to the resolution of issues. Figure 7.3 also shows that through the interaction of MAs 
in decision making processes it has a positive impact on both the MAs understanding 
of the business and the provision of relevant decision making information which 
therefore leads to an enhanced contribution being made (which links to the detected 
consequence of MAs being more informed in phase one in section 5.4.1.3). This is 
indicated through the numbering system in the diagram. The arrows do not link up 
from the proactive and strong approach box as MAs were not perceived as doing this 
very well. However, it can be easily argued that more involvement of MAs post 
decision making in the resolution phase will likewise impact on the same 1, 2, and 3 
cycle. There are very strong similarities between figure 7.3 and the earlier figure 7.2 
on MA involvement in cost management and planning (see section 7.3.2.4) with their 
mutual emphasis on the MA delivering appropriate control or decision information, 
interacting with OMs and having a business understanding. Collectively the findings 
therefore suggest that effective deployment of interpersonal skills and business 
knowledge by MAs supports OMs in both control and decision processes. There is 
therefore a requirement for MAs to have business understanding and relevant 
information as a precursor to making a valued contribution in interactive management 
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processes. MAs however were perceived as having very good interpersonal skills and 
these skills were emphasised throughout all phases of the research and so it was the 
business understanding that some MAs appeared to be weaker on in decision support 
for OMs. 
 
7.3.2.7 Non-routine reports and OMs’ decision support expectations 
The findings provide insights into how non-routine reports are used by OMs which in 
turn reveals the extent that they relate to assisting OMs in the performance of their 
roles. Non-routine reports have received very little attention in the literature to date 
with the overwhelming focus being on the production of routine reports and the use of 
formal techniques. 
 
A clear distinction emerged from the non-routine reports in the study in terms of their 
relationship to assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. Some non-routine 
reports appeared very relevant to OMs and addressed operational and commercial 
performance issues (e.g., NR1 ‗broken parts‘, NR2 ‗inventory‘, NR3 ‗absenteeism‘, 
NR4 ‗equipment usage‘, NR14 ‗recycling‘, NR15 ‗storage‘, and NR16 ‗customer 
order‘). Some provided more analysis of existing accounting data (e.g., NR8, NR10, 
NR13, and NR17) while others were internal to the finance function (e.g., NR5, NR6, 
NR7, NR9, NR11, and NR12) and so OMs did not receive these. Non-routine reports, 
and specifically those relating to operational and commercial performance issues 
noted above, were distinguished by OMs and MAs from routine reports according to 
number of factors i.e., non-routine reports:   
 
1) Attracted more interest and response from OMs than routine reports as many were 
at the specific request of OMs;  
 
2) Allowed ‗big input into the design‘ versus routine where there was ‗little design 
input‘ [DO2];  
 
3) Prompted OMs to invite MAs into decision making forum to explain them e.g., 
OMs ‗get me to bring them through it‘ [BM3], and were generally associated with 
more interaction between OMs and MAs;  
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4) Were sometimes a precursor for a routine report [R15] or a consequence of a 
routine report (e.g., ‗when performance is going poor‘ [BM3]);  
 
5) Had a ‗strategic‘ [DO1] and ‗going forward‘ [EM] perspective; and  
 
6) Were unstructured and flexibly designed e.g., from ‗a page to a book‘ or ‗hard 
copy or e-mail…SAP copy so they can do their own analysis‘ [AM2].  
 
The use of these non-routine reports by OMs could be considered the outcome of 
Simon et al.‘s (1954) questioning of accounting data for ‗problem-solving‘ purposes. 
Some MAs expressed different preferences regarding working with routine and non-
routine reports and there appeared to be a relationship here between MAs who had a 
strong preference for doing non-routine reports and who also spent considerable time 
doing them and whose OMs spoke very highly of them e.g., AM1 and BM3 (see 
section 7.3.2.2). In contrast for example, BM4 expressed a preference for doing 
routine reports and spent most time producing them, and appeared to have the least 
interaction with the OM. While the roles of MAs varied in formal definition where 
certain roles would involve more non-routine reporting than routine reporting e.g., 
BM3‘s work on forecasting and new production introduction versus EM‘s and BM4‘s 
work on variance analysis, it could be observed that MAs who were most highly rated 
by OMs were quite involved in non-routine reports. Thus, there seems to be some 
alignment between the MAs who most closely meet the expectations of OMs and their 
involvement in non-routine reports in assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
These findings also have implications for roles of MAs in moving to model of the 
business partner (see section 7.9). The findings suggest that some non-routine reports 
can be very relevant to assisting OMs in the performance of their roles, close to their 
decision making processes, and therefore provide scope to address some of the 
commonly cited criticisms made of management accounting information, as noted 
above. 
 
7.3.2.8 OMs’ unmet expectations 
As identified in section 7.3.2.2, certain OMs, although identified by MAs as being 
those OMs most influencing their roles, appeared to have little or no expectations of 
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MAs. MAs that were aligned here in the analysis were BM4 and EM, and to lesser 
extent BM2 and AM3.  
 
A number of explanations for OMs having little or no expectations of these MAs can 
be suggested. The job design or role definition may have precluded these MAs from 
more actively supporting OMs‘ decision processes e.g., responsibility for financial 
accounting (AM3 was a ‗Financial Accountant‘ and EM was a ‗Financial Services 
Manager‘) or responsibility for variance analysis (BM4 was a ‗Cost Analyst‘). BM2 
was heavily involved in cost set-up and reconciliation work. Also the manager (BO2) 
appeared to be the only job title that did not denote managerial status (Planning / 
Business Partner). BO2‘s expectations of BM2 were largely procedural in orientation.  
 
Many of the OMs linked to these MAs did not have high expectations regarding these 
MAs making an input at strategic and commercial levels. Many of the OMs‘ 
expectations related to the information provision in a detached sense or ‗if something 
goes wrong‘ [BO2] or only in the context of periodic budgeting and reporting as an 
‗information flow‘ [EO]. Both BM2 and AM3 appeared to have strong control and 
compliance oriented roles which were driven by SOX, corporate reporting, account 
reconciliations, and setting up and maintaining standard product costs. AO3 stated 
that he was ‗happy‘ with the ‗limited experience‘ with AM3 but ‗the financial 
department kind of runs separate to the business unit‘ and ‗for me it is very vague 
because I don‘t know what exactly [AM3 does] but he is busy, and what he does in 
his office‘. AM3 noted that AO3 ‗wouldn‘t see finance as being of benefit to him‘ as 
you ‗are monitoring him all the time‘. BO2 was pleased with BM2 and ‗the timeliness 
of the item set up and the cost rolling‘ and he was ‗approachable‘. BM2 observed, as 
did other MAs, that OMs only sought them out ‗when something has gone wrong‘ 
thereby suggesting that there was not much on-going and regular involvement. 
 
OMs and MAs both recognised instances where certain interactions were not assisting 
OMs in the performance of their roles. Examples included ‗BM4 looking for more 
clarification‘ [BO4] and OMs ‗explaining why this and that is‘ [EO]. MAs also 
identified the ‗chasing‘ [CM] of information from OMs of little interest to the OMs. 
As a general point of observation, AO4 did not want MAs to be ‗meddling‘ in 
operations but to make a purposeful contribution in cross-functional settings (this also 
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links to section 7.3.2.1 and phase one section 5.2.2.5 and 5.4.3.3). MAs perceived OM 
dissatisfaction around involvement when MAs were ‗coming after them with quite a 
lot‘ [BM4], highlighting ‗SOX…weaknesses‘ [AM3] or poor performance, had weak 
business knowledge, and either being unable to assist OMs in the performance of their 
roles at busy month end periods or being slow to respond. Some of the reports 
discussed in sections 7.3.2.5 and 7.3.2.7 also supported this.  
 
Some of the routine reports also show that MAs were not meeting OMs‘ expectations 
e.g., budgetary control reports that necessitated MAs procuring explanations and 
analysis from OMs included R20 and R21 (BM4) and R28 (EM). Both BM4 and EM 
noted that previously held ‗variance meetings‘ were now ‗few and far between‘ [EO]. 
These control reporting processes can be linked to the feedback element of the 
cybernetic model of control (Otley and Berry, 1980) but would suggest that they had 
little impact on control from the OM‘s perspective. While OMs generally attached 
much value to variance reports, this reinforces the earlier point that some forms of 
routine control feedback had much more significance to assisting OMs in their roles 
than other forms and therefore for control purposes (see section 7.3.2.5). One 
explanation for why some feedback was less important to OMs from a control 
perspective was that OMs were already aware of the feedback, which could be closely 
related to the feedback cycle being too long for some reports. Other explanations 
include that some of these reports were overly detailed, financial, and historic in 
orientation and that they had a relatively weaker relationship to managerial priorities 
and critical performance indicators than other control reports. Linked to their 
professional development and training, McKinnon and Bruns (1992) observe that 
‗many accountants see formal report production as one of their most important jobs‘ 
(p. 218) and this could be attributed to these accountants e.g., BM4 expressed a 
preference for routine reporting. There is also a strong link in the discussion here to 
the findings on reports of little or no value to OMs (see section 6.8.5 on routine 
reports and 6.11.3 on non-routine reports) as these were often related to the MAs 
discussed here. The above noted report activities and general characteristics of these 
roles of MAs can be aligned with the ‗bean-counter‘ roles of MAs as identified in the 
literature (Friedman and Lyne, 1997; Granlund and Lukka, 1998a), which is discussed 
in section 7.9. 
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Another explanation, and noted above as OMs‘ varying levels of awareness of the 
roles of MAs (see section 7.3.2.1), was that sometimes the OMs were uncertain as to 
how the MA might make more of a contribution to their work e.g., ‗I am not really 
sure of what benefit it is‘ [BO4] and ‗you don‘t have to have an accountant to see 
where improvements have to be made‘ [EO]. EO did however value getting an overall 
view of performance and analyses (‗ratios‘) despite it being ‗historical‘. Sometimes 
OMs expressed a desire to understand the roles of MAs better so that opportunities to 
assist OMs in the performance of their roles could be investigated.  
 
The noted unfulfilled expectations of OMs in the sections above all point to conflicts 
as role theory predicts in the non-fulfilment of the expectations of role senders which 
is discussed further in section 7.5.3 and 7.6. It also reinforces some differences 
between the role signals sent and their interpretation or in role theory terms, 
differences between the sent role and the received role (see section 2.4). These 
unfulfilled expectations also present challenges for MAs assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles and adopting the model of the business partner which is 
discussed in section 7.9. 
 
7.3.2.9 MAs’ perceptions of OMs’ expectations 
In phase two, the MAs that were perceived as most meeting the expectations of OMs 
often noted that these OMs had ‗high expectations‘ [AO1] of them. Therefore, the 
more capable the MA, the more expectations the OM had of the MA. This confirmed 
role theory‘s prediction that focal role attributes impact upon role senders‘ 
expectations, as noted in section 7.3.2.1. BM3 noted that ‗their [OMs] expectations at 
times too high‘ and ‗can be sort of unrealistic‘ which was corroborated by BO3 
commenting that BM3 ‗needs to challenge back a small bit to make sure it is not too 
much‘. Sometimes OMs‘ expectations of MAs were aligned with MAs‘ understanding 
of these expectations. AM4 for example stated that ‗their expectations are that you 
produce timely and accurate information and information that is not too complicated 
and comes to the key point quite quickly‘. This was corroborated by AO4 who stated 
that the MA should ‗gather the data, present it in a format that people can quickly zero 
in on what will give best rewards for their efforts‘, and he also commended AM4‘s 
timeliness as ‗he turns it around very quickly‘. 
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In other cases there were differences between OMs‘ expectations and MAs‘ 
perceptions of them. BM1 noted that BO1 ‗kind of thinks well I should just deal with 
him…but my job is…‘ which was interesting as BO1 had commented that BM1 could 
‗be an actual part of my function rather than in finance and then I would be able to use 
him for some of those other value added and various areas‘. DM1 perceived that OMs 
only required him to do the accounts, while DO1 was seeking more change-driving 
action and less of the reporting activity. DM2 perceived OMs‘ expectations as being 
‗to do the accounts properly…to assist in other work that comes up like project work‘ 
but DO2 sought more ‗proactive‘ involvement in the ‗approach to resolving issues‘ 
rather than ‗it is up to the…managers to sort out the issue themselves‘. This study 
would support previous research highlighting perceptual gaps between MAs and OMs 
(Jablonsky et al., 1993; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003).  
 
Sometimes both the OM and MA recognised unmet expectations e.g., BO4 indicated 
that it would be good for BM4 to be more involved in the business and identified 
potential areas that BM4 might be able to assist him in the performance of his roles. 
BM4 noted that ‗they would expect me to be more involved like but I suppose it is 
hard when you are under time constraints, you have a lot of other things to do‘. 
Sometimes expectations were low and perceptions of them were accurate e.g., EO did 
not have many expectations of EM and neither did EM perceive that EO had many 
expectations of him. 
 
MAs perceived that OMs were most pleased with involvement from MAs primarily in 
terms of information provision. OMs were actually most pleased with involvement 
with MAs across a number of dimensions including ‗good accurate data‘ [AO1], 
‗willingness to be involved‘ [AO2], ‗control‘ and ‗transparency‘ [BO1], ‗timeliness‘ 
[BO2], ‗personal responsibility‘ [BO3], ‗very open to sharing information‘ [CO], 
having ‗cop-on‘ [DO1], and ‗quick identification of issues‘ [DO2]. The findings 
suggest that MAs perceptions of OMs‘ expectations were somewhat narrower than 
those of the OMs themselves. In the language of role theory, this suggests that the 
‗sent role‘ is not the same as the ‗received role‘.  
 
MAs identified difficulties in regard to interacting with OMs (see variability of OMs‘ 
expectations as noted in section 7.3.2.1) and many of these, in role theory terms, 
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indicate a difficulty for MAs in interpreting expectations. Although the theory 
suggests that focal role behaviour in turn influences role sender expectations, this 
does not seem to have always occurred e.g., BM3 had failed to alter management‘s 
expectations in regard to a report he perceived of little value (see section 7.3.2.5).  
 
The study identifies a number of factors, as discussed elsewhere, that may impact 
upon the role behaviour of MAs including the OMs‘ expectations, the MA‘s 
disposition towards financial accounting or business partnership, the MA‘s skill set, 
and the vagaries around interacting with OMs. It can be concluded from a holistic 
perspective that the strongest constraint on MA role behaviour was perceived to be 
characteristics such as having a solid understanding of the business, combining this 
understanding with accounting expertise in interactive settings, flexibility, and more 
assertively and proactively pushing for change.  
 
7.3.3 Internal antecedents: other 
Having discussed management as a significant antecedent to the roles of MAs, this 
section discusses the remaining internal antecedents in figure 7.1, namely size, 
structure, culture, technology, business nature and circumstances, location and 
performance management systems. 
 
Size was perceived as a contingent factor in the phase one findings as MAs in larger 
firms were perceived as more ‗institutionalised‘ [FO], ‗regimented‘ [PO], and less 
informed about their business operations and environment than their counterparts in 
medium sized firms. The findings suggest a much stronger definition and 
standardisation of roles in larger firms. This would suggest a distinction in role theory 
in that expectations of role senders regarding highly defined focal roles would be very 
different to those occupying less defined focal roles. In phase two, size was not 
perceived as an antecedent to the roles of MAs in the context of assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles.   
 
Structures were predominantly functional in nature in the firms participating in the 
study with more hierarchy and rigidness being associated with the larger firms. As the 
larger participating firms in phase one were subsidiaries, the local structures tended to 
be quite flat which could be attributed to facilitating greater involvement for MAs as 
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DO2 stated that ‗if it is too hierarchical it would be very much a pure accounting 
function whereas with a fairly flat structure it means that he has an opportunity to 
become involved‘. Structure as an influence was noted as depending ‗on the 
individual‘ and ‗how you use it‘ [BO2] with much emphasis on cross-functionality. In 
phase two, the structures were also functional in design (see section 6.3), and could be 
aligned to a broader hierarchical group structure. All these structures had MAs with 
reporting lines directly into the finance hierarchy and not to OMs, which Hopper 
(1980) classified as a centralised, as opposed to a decentralised, structure. Structure is 
closely related to the physical location as Hopper (1980) defines partial and full 
decentralisation of the roles of MAs in part by where the MA is physically located. 
Location as an antecedent is discussed below. 
 
Culture as an antecedent in phase one varied between smaller family-owned firms and 
subsidiaries of MNEs. The former tended to have more of a culture of finance 
retaining a very tight grip on finances and limited internal accounting information 
disclosure, with the latter being associated more with the cultural value of openness 
(Granlund and Lukka, 1998a). Culture was perceived as a contingent variable in 
implementing controls in that if it is ‗conducive to controls‘ or the ‗opposite‘ it makes 
the accountants‘ roles ‗a lot easier‘ or ‗extremely difficult‘ [AO2]. While most 
cultural dimensions were generally perceived at the organisational level, some 
cultural dimensions were associated with accounting e.g., a cost orientation, long 
working hours or a reluctance to share information. In phase two, culture was not 
perceived as an antecedent to the roles of MAs in regard to assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles. 
 
The findings confirm previous research on technology as a role antecedent (Burns and 
Yazdifar, 2001; Hunton, 2002), which includes the automation of routine transactions 
(Ezzamel et al., 1997; Granlund and Malmi, 2002). The extent to which technology 
released accountants from routine functions (Burns et al., 1996; Scapens and Jazayeri, 
2003; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2007) to devote more time to being involved in 
business processes and decision making was not particularly supported in the 
findings. Some OMs indicated that the introduction of ERP systems had consumed, 
not less, but more of the MA‘s time. In phase two of the study technology was not 
perceived as a big influence and many MAs perceived difficulties with their existing 
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systems whether it was because the IT support function had been outsourced to India 
(Company A) or the actual technical limitations of existing systems. For example the 
systems in Company C and E were non-integrated and generated additional work for 
the MAs. Company D was in the process of rolling out an ERP system and Company 
E was preparing to implement one. The system in Company B was generally 
perceived as unsatisfactory. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that OMs did not perceive 
technology as having much impact on the roles of MAs in relation to assisting them in 
the performance of their roles. Most technology-based interaction with OMs tended to 
be in spreadsheets. 
 
Phase one findings show that the nature of the business or its circumstances had an 
impact on the roles of MAs (e.g., expansion, ownership transfer, start-up phase, 
floatation, liquidity crisis, complexity of business). In phase two, the nature of the 
business was generally not perceived as an antecedent to the roles of MAs in relation 
to assisting OMs in the performance of their roles as the manufacturing contexts were 
more in common than in phase one, and thus the MAs provided information and 
support in this context. However, as noted in section 7.3.2.4 rapid growth in Company 
B and C had previously resulted in OMs focusing less on budgeting systems during 
this expansionary period. 
 
The physical location of MAs was generally not perceived as an important role 
antecedent in phase one, which diverges somewhat from other research (Hopper, 
1980; Granlund and Lukka, 1998a; IMA, 1999). One explanation of this might be that 
in many of the participating firms, the accountants were generally located relatively 
close to, but not in, operations, while the literature has tended to show a broader mix 
of centralised and decentralised structures. Other explanations include the 
convenience of an assortment of communication devices and the frequency of cross-
functional activities. Phase two similarly found that MAs tended to be located 
together in a finance department but in relatively close physical proximity to OMs and 
the factory floor, what Hopper (1980) classified as a ‗centralised‘ structure for MAs. 
However, there was evidence of the MAs being decentralised to some small extent in 
their roles e.g., in Company A, the MAs sat on operating teams in different business 
units (see section 6.3.1) and in Company D the MAs were affiliated with different 
divisions (see section 6.3.4). OMs commented on how these arrangements better 
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assisted them in the performance of their roles, indicating a contingency in this 
context. In Company B some accountants were aligned closely to OMs e.g., the 
‗Project Accountant‘ (BM1) worked very closely with BO1 and unusually the MAs 
did not sit together but were dispersed around the building intermingled with 
personnel from various functions, almost aligned with Hopper‘s (1980) classification 
of ‗partial decentralisation‘ except that MAs were not located with related OMs but in 
a random arrangement. There is a growing body of literature observing the 
decentralising of management accounting roles and the merits of it for OM support 
(Hopper, 1980; Granlund and Lukka, 1998a; IMA, 1999; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). 
There was a sense from some OMs (e.g., BO1 and DO1 in particular) that they would 
prefer to have the MAs based more in the operating setting than they were. Hopper 
(1980) found OMs most satisfied with management accounting information in 
decentralised arrangements i.e., where the MA reported to the OM and was physically 
adjacent to the OM (as opposed to reporting to the OM but adjacent to the FM, or 
reporting to, and adjacent to the FM). In phase two, and phase one, the latter 
centralised arrangement prevailed, which suggests that had either of the other two 
arrangements been in place, perhaps OMs may have had their expectations more fully 
addressed than they were. The findings of this study do indicate that there is merit in 
aligning MAs with specific OMs to better assist OMs in the performance of their 
roles. 
 
7.3.4 Individual antecedents 
The findings in phase one identify the MA themselves as being a considerable 
influence on the design of their own roles, to ‗make a role‘ [GF]. The capacity for 
MAs to shape their own roles was perceived as being associated with their ‗hunger 
for‘ it [HO], attitudes, personalities, initiative and ‗the individual‘s strengths‘ in terms 
of ‗towards accounting‘ or ‗business management‘ [EO]. HF perceived the 
‗personality and focus‘ differences between a financial accountant and a MA so 
strongly that swapping these individuals would mean ‗replacing both‘ in less than ‗six 
months‘. This indicates a contingency in that occupying particular accounting roles 
imply an appropriate matching of pre-existing ‗strengths‘ and ‗personalities‘.  
 
The roles of MAs appear to be more standardised and pre-defined in the subsidiaries 
of MNEs as opposed to those in medium-sized independent firms, making it perhaps 
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more difficult for the MAs to determine their own roles in such settings. This implies 
that the roles of MAs may be contingent upon the size of the firm and whether it is a 
subsidiary or an independently-owned firm. Regarding the latter a recent survey of 
mostly large UK firms uncovered only weak evidence that perceptions of the roles of 
MAs differed between those in MNE subsidiaries and those in independent firms 
(Yazdifar and Tsamenyi, 2005).   
 
In phase two the findings on the influence of the MAs themselves on their own roles 
were mixed.  Some MAs (in Companies C and D) expressed much freedom to 
influence their own roles e.g., ‗brought my own thing to it‘ [CM], ‗I would have a 
huge licence obviously within certain parameters‘ [DO1], and ‗we have a lot of 
freedom‘ [DM2]. In contrast MAs in Companies A, B, and E noted they had ‗very 
limited‘ [AM2] scope to shape their own roles and they were ‗framed‘ as a 
‗management accountant‘ [BM2]. This contrasts with the factor of ‗controllers 
motivation‘ as identified, but not investigated, by Sathe (1982) as affecting controller 
involvement. There are a number of possible explanations for this: firstly, phase one 
procured the views of FMs and not those of the MAs reporting to them, which as 
phase two demonstrates, may be different (see section 7.3.2.1); secondly, phase one 
had a broader set of companies participating in the research and thus a wider mix of 
independently-owned and foreign-owned enterprises with MAs in the former noting 
greater freedom to determine their own roles; and thirdly, although all MAs were 
similarly operating in more ‗defined‘ MNE subsidiary roles, some MAs had exercised 
relatively more influence over their roles than others within these boundaries e.g., 
AO1 noted AM1 ‗wants to develop her role‘ and AO1 had ‗brought AM1 along to a 
lot of meetings‘, AM4‘s initiatives in building business understanding and in 
highlighting overtime issues, and BO3 noted that BM3 ‗is able to influence people to 
actually make sure people buy into these controls…very positive influence‘.  
 
Personal characteristics and interpersonal relations are recognised by role theory as 
impacting upon the expectations of role senders (the OMs) regarding the occupants of 
focal roles (the MAs). The findings in phase one and two lend strong support to 
particular characteristics being sought by role senders for the roles of MAs (e.g., OMs 
identified attributes such as approachability, commercial awareness, team and 
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communication skills, and flexibility) and these are discussed in the following section 
on characteristics (see section 7.4).  
 
Similarly, in regard to the technical and monitoring aspects to the roles of MAs 
certain attributes were identified including being thorough, structured, and having 
strength of character (see sections 5.3.1.5 and 5.3.1.7). Thus, the findings identify 
attributes that relate to expectations placed on the roles of MAs (see further discussion 
in section 7.4.1.5). The findings also suggest that individuals have ‗irreconcilable‘ 
orientations towards the narrower accounting or broader partnering roles, which 
perhaps indicates a difficulty for all accountants moving towards ‗hybrid‘ roles 
(Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, 2007; CIMA, 2009) and suggests that MAs of 
certain orientations might not be best placed to assist OMs in the performance of their 
roles. Hopper (1980) observed that nine (of 12) MAs had an orientation to a ‗service 
role‘ and three MAs had an orientation to a ‗bookkeeper‘ role which would support 
the findings in this study. This also links to contingency theory, as a particular match 
or ‗fit‘ of role attributes is being advocated. Although there are certain matches being 
suggested in the findings, and contingency theory proposes that these matches exist, 
one limitation of the theory is that it assumes inaction in the contingency relationship 
i.e., it suggests that the contingencies that relate to the roles of MAs are beyond the 
influence of the MA themselves. From a management control perspective, OMs had a 
very poor perception of MAs whose purpose of involvement included watching for 
mistakes and merely seeking explanations for variances. Thus, it can be argued that 
the classic cybernetic control model (Otley and Berry, 1980) incorporating feedback 
control may be more or less effective, depending on how the MA facilitates the 
feedback process. 
 
7.3.5 Summary of discussion of antecedents  
The findings highlight a range of antecedents that are associated with the roles of 
MAs. Table 7.1 summarises some of the key findings by antecedent coming from 
phase one, support or otherwise in phase two, and relationship to the literature. 
 
 
 
 
322 
 
Phase one antecedent Phase two Literature comment 
Ownership – more reporting 
in subsidiaries than smaller, 
independent firms. 
Head office impacting MAs 
scope to assist OMs in their 
roles. Impact strong on 
reporting cycles and ambiguous 
requirements.  
Little research and mixed 
results on ownership impact. 
Contingency noted. 
Role ambiguity for MA. 
Formal control model. 
Environmental – more direct 
in independent firms. 
 
Not perceived as affecting 
assisting OMs but created 
awareness of OMs‘ priorities. 
Contingency noted. 
 
Regulation – strong influence 
of SOX in US subsidiaries, 
shifting MA role orientation. 
Confirmed as impacting on 
MAs support for OMs and 
forced interaction not highly 
valued by OMs in these firms. 
Suggests an orientation of 
roles of MAs to policing and 
compliance. Further research 
needed. Contingency noted. 
Management (OMs) – strong 
influence, includes FMs and 
OMs, conditions attached to 
MAs getting involved. 
In-depth analysis of 
expectations of OMs. 
Variability in expectations and 
in MAs meeting these 
expectations including: 
- Control/decision support; 
- Reports/information; 
- Characteristics of MAs; and 
- Interaction. 
Role theory explains meeting/ 
not meeting expectations. 
Contingencies noted. 
Mixed overall evidence on 
addressing criticisms of 
management accounting 
information and traditional 
roles of MAs.  
Emphasis on interaction for 
control and how used. 
Size – large MNEs more 
formalised roles. 
Not perceived as influencing 
assisting OMs. 
Contingency noted. 
Structure – common across 
firms, functional in nature, 
larger more hierarchical. 
Not perceived as influencing 
assisting OMs but some 
alignment of roles. 
See location below for related 
contingency. 
Culture – difference between 
small and large firms. 
Not perceived as influencing 
assisting OMs. 
Contingency noted. 
Technology – mixed results 
on impact on MAs, more 
automation and maintenance. 
Not perceived as influencing 
assisting OMs. 
Literature would suggest more 
influence. 
Business nature and 
circumstances – impacts 
roles. 
Not perceived as influencing 
assisting OMs. 
Limited literature but some 
suggests an antecedent e.g., IT 
systems, accounting and 
management innovations. 
Location – not perceived as 
influencing MAs due to 
physical proximity on site. 
OMs prefer MAs near by and 
OMs prefer alignment of roles 
to business units/functions. 
Supports decentralising of 
roles of MAs. 
Contingency noted. 
Performance management 
systems – influenced roles 
towards company targets.  
Observed as part of OMs 
control expectations (above). 
See expectations above. 
Orientation – strong influence 
- scope for MAs to shape own 
roles more in smaller firms 
and some MAs more suited to 
different accounting roles. 
Roles of MAs very structured in 
some MNE subsidiaries but 
some MAs exercised more 
influence over roles. 
Contingency noted. 
Challenges the notion of 
business partnership as 
straightforward. 
 
Table 7.1 - Summary of antecedents, phase one, phase two, and the literature 
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With respect to gaps in the literature, the identification of a range of contingencies 
related to the roles of MAs provides a more detailed and holistic perspective as much 
of the contingency research has narrowly focused on a very limited number of 
contingency variables. In the in-depth examination of the antecedent of expectations 
of OMs a gap in the literature has been addressed in that there has been very little 
scholarly activity in this area. Furthermore the analysis of management reports in 
relation to these expectations also adds to this gap in a form rarely employed. The 
antecedents also offer some clues as to the contradictions noted in the literature where 
some MAs are seemingly adopting the model of business partnership, while others are 
not, and where the perceptions of FMs and non-financial managers differ. Towards 
understanding these contradictions, the findings indicate the extent to which, and how, 
MAs are meeting OMs‘ expectations, and that there are antecedents that may severely 
constrain the MAs involvement (e.g., head office, SOX, FM, and managerial style and 
preferences). 
 
7.4 Characteristics  
This section of the discussion examines the characteristics associated with the roles of 
MAs which are categorised as individual characteristics, activity characteristics, and 
information characteristics. 
 
7.4.1 Individual characteristics  
The individual characteristics identified in the findings from both data collection 
phases indicate that MAs and OMs attribute particular characteristics as essential and 
others as undesirable in regard to the roles of MAs, thus suggesting contingency 
factors regarding these characteristics. These characteristics have already been 
discussed in the meeting of OMs‘ expectations (see section 7.3.2) and individual 
antecedents (see section 7.3.4). 
 
7.4.1.1 Business knowledge 
Business knowledge was perceived as strongly related to the roles of MAs in both 
phases of the data collection. In phase one, the extent of the MA‘s business 
knowledge was linked to the extent of OM-MA interaction, innovativeness, better 
decision making, and the level of influence MAs have over the business‘s results. In 
support of phase one findings, MAs and OMs in phase two stressed the importance of 
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business knowledge for MAs, and many MAs were perceived as not having an 
adequate understanding of the business. OMs generally desired MAs to improve their 
understanding of the business ‗to be a good support to the business‘ [AO2] and to be 
‗down on the floor‘ [CO]. The literature has noted that MAs have sometimes not 
possessed the understanding of the business desired by OMs (Simon, 1992; Brignall 
et al., 1999; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003). MAs generally recognised these expectations 
and attached importance to acquiring business understanding which has strong 
support in the literature (Kaplan, 1995; IMA, 1996; Burns and Yazdifar, 2001; Burns 
and Baldvinsdottir, 2007).  
 
The need for an ‗intimate‘ [BO1] understanding of the business was emphatically 
stressed by OMs in the context of assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
This appeared to be best developed by the MAs attending operations meetings, getting 
involved in projects and acquiring such knowledge ‗over a period of time‘ [AO1]. 
Acquiring business knowledge was perceived as being directly linked to the MAs 
exposure to the business, to be ‗based in the business, working in the roles in the 
business, to have that understanding‘ [DO1]. AO2 explained how AM2 was providing 
better assistance to him by joining the business unit ‗team‘, and through it AM2 
developed a better business understanding. These findings were corroborated in the 
context that AM1 was nine years in Company A, while AM2 was only 10 months in 
Company A. The linking of business knowledge was discussed earlier in meeting the 
control (see section 7.3.2.4) and decision support (see section 7.3.2.6) expectations of 
OMs. 
 
It was somewhat of a contradiction that AO4 noted AM4 as exceeding his 
expectations of him, particularly in the context of taking such initiative in gaining an 
understanding of the business when AM4 himself remarked that ‗you get a sense that 
you don‘t spend enough time on the floor and that you don‘t know what you‘re 
talking about or you make assumptions that are not correct‘. Perhaps this might be 
explained by AM4‘s impression relating to OMs working ‗on the floor‘ as opposed to 
AO4 who was the Plant Manager. Some MAs did note that less senior operating 
personnel sometimes had a less favourable perception of the roles of MAs. 
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The information provided by MAs, who possessed a sound understanding of the 
business and who deployed their accounting abilities in team processes, was perceived 
as having greater validity in a wider organisational context as the ‗numbers mean 
something‘ [AO1]. Thus, it can be argued that MAs can add more organisational 
validity, as opposed to just technical validity (Schultz and Slevin, 1975; McKowan, 
1998) to the information that they provide in this context. This is also supported by 
more recent research that recognises the effective deployment of accounting 
knowledge in conjunction with an understanding of the business in cross-functional 
and interactive settings (Mouritsen, 1996; Ahrens, 1997; Vaivio, 2004; Vaivio and 
Kokko, 2006). 
 
7.4.1.2 Flexibility 
Flexibility appeared as an important characteristic in phase one and phase two of the 
study. In phase one, flexibility was related to MAs being: more ‗open to things‘ [OO], 
less ‗rigid‘ [PO] around budgeting, less influenced by doing ‗as we‘ve always done‘, 
and being more aware of ‗strategic reasons‘ [GF] for decisions. In phase two, OMs 
similarly did seek MAs having an understanding of ‗a lot of other criteria that might 
overrule the cost element‘ [AO3], to provide flexibility in the deployment of rigid 
budgetary control, and ‗flexibility in reporting‘ [BO1]. As individuals, OMs generally 
perceived MAs as flexible and BO3 observed that ‗sometimes he [BM3] may over 
flex to the detriment of his routine activity‘. BO3 noted that the MAs in Company B 
were adept at flexibly analysing issues by putting ‗boundaries‘ on them, providing 
‗the financial impact‘, as opposed to coming in looking for the cost of it day one‘. 
Some flexibility was also observed in making routine reports more focused, and 
therefore more useful for OMs (see section 7.3.2.4). The phase two findings also 
indicated that OMs had considerably more flexibility in influencing the design of non-
routine reports as opposed to routine reports (see section 7.3.2.6) which suggests 
some scope to bring more flexibility to routine reporting. Pierce and O‘Dea (2003) 
found that MAs did not adequately address flexibility in management accounting 
information provision as regards making it more customised, meaningful, and 
amenable to change. The findings of this study would suggest that some progress has 
been made on flexibility issues but there are still flexibility issues remaining. It must 
also be acknowledged that in MNE subsidiary structures certain accounting reports 
were standardised and therefore less flexible. 
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7.4.1.3 Interpersonal and communication skills 
The findings in phase one and phase two located interpersonal and communication 
skills as central to the roles of MAs which appears to runs counter to the relatively 
low ranking of interpersonal and communication skills in Burns and Yazdifar‘s 
(2001) UK survey. These interpersonal skills have already been discussed above with 
respect to meeting OMs‘ expectations for planning and control (see section 7.3.2.4) 
and for decision making (see section 7.3.2.6). The findings from phase two 
corroborated the importance of interpersonal and communication skills as noted in 
phase one (see section 5.3.1.2). While all the OMs commented in a very positive 
fashion regarding the interpersonal and communication skills of MAs, and MAs 
equally recognised their importance, some MAs were perceived as meeting OMs‘ 
expectations more so than others, and this could be seen by how OMs perceived MAs 
not just having, but using these skills. It was notable how two MAs, BM4 and EM, 
possessed effective interpersonal skills to acquire information from OMs which was 
an interaction not perceived as of benefit to OMs.  
 
AM1 and BM3 stood out particularly in relation to the contribution they made to 
assisting AO1 and BO3 in their roles, a contribution that was observed as a very 
interactive one e.g., AO1 suggested that AM1 was the ‗benchmark‘ that others ‗may 
learn from‘ and commented on ‗a good relationship there, she will critique, ask why 
you are doing that, would you not be better off doing option b or option c‘. Regarding 
BM3, BO3 noted: ‗good linkage, very capable individual‘, ‗good relationship‘, and 
BM3 ‗gives me guidance in terms of actually, directional guidance‘. BO3 could not 
‗get enough of it‘ as regards the very positively perceived decision support from 
BM3.  Both AO1 and BO3 articulated the trust they placed in AM1 and BM3. This 
supports role theory in that both the attributes of the persons in the focal roles and the 
nature of the interpersonal relationship between the role sender and the focal role 
impacts on role expectations. This focus on MAs interacting effectively with OMs is 
supported by recent research that has observed how accounting expertise is 
interactively deployed (Mouritsen, 1996; Ahrens, 1997; Vaivio, 2004; Vaivio and 
Kokko, 2006) where the MA may be referred to as a ‗hybrid accountant‘ (Burns et al., 
1999; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, 2007). The OMs, 
regarding these MAs, commended the demonstrated level of personal interest and 
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responsibility in working with OMs and this disposition has been found in the 
literature to be linked to more involvement of MAs in business decisions (Coad, 
1999). This suggests that as well as possessing good interpersonal skills to assist OMs 
in the performance of their roles, it is also very helpful to have a willingness and 
positive disposition towards interacting with OMs, which perhaps is also related to 
MAs‘ orientations as individual antecedents, as noted in section 7.3.4. 
 
These findings have strong support in both the academic and professional literature 
that emphasises the importance of interpersonal, team, and communication skills 
(Sathe, 1982, 1983; IMA, 1996, 1999; Johnston et al., 2002a; Pierce and O‘Dea, 
2003; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2007). BO3 noted that ‗I use him as a sounding 
board‘ and ‗I would trust his judgement significantly‘. AO1 also expressed the ‗trust‘ 
he placed in working with AM1 ‗but the biggest thing for me is she is a team player‘. 
The literature has indicated that a manager‘s sense of trust in a report or information 
relates to how much it is valued (McKinnon and Bruns, 1992) and trust was perceived 
as key in procuring acceptance from OMs on the contributions that accountants could 
make (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998b). Similarly AO4 acknowledged the huge 
merit of AM4‘s involvement on cross-functional cost reduction projects. BO3 highly 
rated BM3‘s ability in ‗linking the financial impacts to the technical aspects‘ in 
‗discussions‘ thereby bringing together business knowledge and the application of 
accounting abilities in an interactive setting. 
 
7.4.1.4 Unhelpful characteristics 
Phase one findings identified conflicts that resulted between MAs and OMs due to the 
existence of a number of characteristics of the roles of MAs (see section 5.4.3.3) e.g., 
the ‗silly questions‘ [DO] about variances because of poor business knowledge, ‗a 
corporate person, kind of watching the errors‘ [HF], not sharing ‗the same 
perspective‘ [IO], and a ‗controlling, almost interfering influence‘ [LO]. Further it 
was observed by PO and IO that MAs could overly encroach upon operational 
decision making.  
 
In phase two, OMs and MAs identified some similarly unhelpful characteristics 
including poor business knowledge, not participating in operations teams, ‗overly 
hung up on money all the time‘ or ‗not being able to actually distil the key messages 
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from a technically complex situation‘ [BO3]. These characteristics were generally 
recognised by MAs and OMs, and OMs did not particularly attribute these to the 
specific MAs that they were involved with. OMs were however seeking some MAs to 
strengthen their business understanding and involvement (see sections 7.3.2.4 and 
7.3.2.6). These unhelpful characteristics are linked to the role conflict consequences 
for the roles of MAs as discussed in section 7.5.3 and 7.6. 
 
7.4.1.5 Characteristics linked to the meeting of OMs’ expectations  
The roles of MAs in phase two were broadly aligned with the extent to which they 
were meeting OMs‘ expectations (see section 7.3.2.2). As this analysis represents a 
categorisation in overall terms, it should be noted that certain elements of roles may 
appear in one or both of the other two categories. A broad alignment of the extent that 
MAs appeared to be meeting the expectations of OMs, and the associated 
characteristics of these MAs including the observations on management accounting 
information and reports, is presented in Table 7.2. 
 
Meeting or exceeding 
expectations 
Partially meeting expectations Limited or no expectations 
MAs broadly aligned: 
AM1, AM4, BM3 
MAs broadly aligned: 
AM2, BM1, CM, DM1, DM2 
MAs broadly aligned: 
AM3, BM2, BM4, EM 
Associated characteristics Associated characteristics Associated characteristics 
Strong relationship and regular 
interaction 
Good relationship but scope for 
more interaction 
Good relationship but very 
little interaction 
Appropriate presentation and analysis of critical information 
Positive/other variances underplayed 
Chasing variance explanations 
from OMs 
Problem identification and 
proactive response to 
resolution 
Reactive 
Lacking some assertiveness 
Unaware of issues 
Sound business knowledge 
Scope for more knowledge of 
the business 
Lacking business 
understanding 
Flexible Some flexibility 
Timeliness, accuracy, and relevance 
Some information customised 
Redundant reports 
Accounting jargon 
Historical 
Strategic activities 
Mixture of strategic and 
operational 
Error based involvement 
Financial accounting  
Compliance roles 
Involved in a number of cross-
functional activities 
Could be more out in the 
business 
Limited presence in 
operations 
Valued interactive contribution 
More interaction and more  
contribution sought 
Unsure of benefit of 
involvement 
Most OM dependence on MA 
to achieve his/her objectives 
Some OM dependence on MA 
to achieve his/her objectives 
Little OM dependence on MA 
to achieve his/her objectives 
 
Table 7.2 – MAs and the meeting of OMs‘ expectations 
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Table 7.2 indicates that the MAs that appeared to be most meeting the expectations of 
OMs were those who possessed a suite of requisite characteristics and could 
effectively apply these in cross-functional settings and deliver, interpret, and apply 
relevant accounting information in these settings. These alignments also indicate 
contingencies regarding the characteristics of MAs and assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles. 
 
7.4.2 Activity and information characteristics 
The findings from phase one indicate that MAs were involved in a broad range of 
activities (see figure 7.1) and section 5.3.2, which included information provision, 
planning, projects, decision support, and analyses. Some OMs were concerned about 
administration levels, levels of involvement, and the merits of MAs being involved in 
projects. There was more clarity on the roles of MAs as information providers and 
interpreters than in being a full decision ‗partner‘ [AF1, IF] with even less of the latter 
being associated with more junior MAs. From an information perspective (see section 
5.3.3) OMs observed some redundancy and missing information. Phase two largely 
confirmed the findings from phase one, as MAs were involved in a wide range of 
activities and these are listed in detail in appendix I1 and I2. Phase two more 
specifically focused on the extent that MAs‘ involvement in these different activities 
could be related to assisting OMs in the performance of their roles as elaborated upon 
throughout this discussion.  
 
Both phase one findings and phase two findings (see sections 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.10, and 
6.11) noted information characteristics of importance to OMs, although phase two 
examined these in much greater depth and examined specific reports (see sections 
7.3.2.5 and 7.3.2.7). Phase one noted that OMs valued timely, accurate, relevant, 
understandable, and concise information and that management accounting 
information appeared to have some redundancy in its overprovision and underuse, 
while OMs identified missing information. Phase two largely confirmed phase one‘s 
findings in that some of the reports discussed above supported OMs in their roles, 
while others did not do so. 
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7.4.3 Summary of discussion of characteristics 
Phase one of the research identified a range of individual, activity and information 
characteristics associated with the roles of MAs. There was a strong consistency 
across phase one and two with respect to these characteristics (e.g., business 
knowledge, interpersonal skills, flexibility, information support, and project work) 
and these were supported strongly by the literature with respect to their necessity. 
Phase two revealed how MAs possessed and used characteristics and some MAs 
possessed and more effectively used these characteristics than others, culminating in 
an analysis linking expectations and characteristics with particular roles of MAs. 
Theoretically, the desired characteristics represent contingencies attaching to MAs 
effectively assisting OMs in the performance of their roles and from a role theory 
perspective, having and using these characteristics impacted upon the expectations of 
role senders i.e., OMs expected more from MAs who were perceived as possessing 
and effectively using the desired characteristics. In general MAs possessed good 
interpersonal skills and it was business knowledge and the extent of involvement of 
the MA with the OM that was highlighted as an important area for many of the MAs 
to address in their roles. In the context of the existing literature this section on the 
characteristics of MAs reconfirms the importance of previously noted characteristics 
such as business knowledge, flexibility, and interpersonal skills. The characteristics in 
the context of the expectations of OMs (see table 7.2) does aid understanding the 
contradictions surrounding the roles of MAs in the literature as to why some MAs 
appear more aligned with the model of the business partner than others do. 
 
7.5 Consequences 
The findings indicate a number of consequences of the roles of MAs and introduce a 
number of new themes to the limited literature to date in this area. These 
consequences of the roles of MAs are categorised into consequences relating to 
influencing performance, information impact, and role interface.  
 
7.5.1 Influencing performance 
In phase one the MA‘s interaction was generally, but not always, perceived as 
resulting in benefits for the business such as enhanced decision making and improved 
planning and control (see section 5.4.1). Consequences included assisting the 
company to grow and improving performance. From a control perspective, the 
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findings indicate that the more involved the MA is, the greater ‗control there is‘ [FF] 
and ‗implementation‘ is related to ‗how well they interact with the team‘ [AO2]. This 
suggests a challenge to the notion of greater control being associated with a role that 
is more removed from the operational setting and more independent (Simon et al, 
1954; Sathe, 1982; Keating and Jablonsky, 1991). Very recent evidence, although 
limited to the perceptions of controllers, would support this finding (Maas and 
Matějka, 2009).  
 
By MAs having more involvement in the business, they were perceived as having 
developed an enhanced knowledge of the business and ‗you know exactly what‘s 
happening‘ [JF]. This benefit to the MA was also perceived as a benefit to the OM as 
the OM could draw on the MAs‘ financial expertise that was more business informed 
and therefore, more meaningful. Thus, phase one findings indicate that the MA‘s 
interaction made control easier in the sense that the openness between MAs and OMs 
made any questioning less adversarial. Further it enabled the MAs to expand their 
knowledge of the business and develop a more meaningful role. It was also evident 
from phase one that MAs could diagnose control deficiencies, and they could be 
detected much earlier than what would be possible without involvement. This 
supports the notion of ‗before-the-fact or anticipatory control‘ (Sathe, 1982, p. 19). 
 
In phase two OMs explained the extent that antecedents and characteristics associated 
with the roles of MAs related to consequences for assisting OMs in the performance 
of their roles. This encompassed antecedents and characteristics discussed in the 
relevant sections above e.g., expectations (see section 7.3.2), possessing certain 
characteristics (see sections 7.3.2 and 7.4), and providing information in a particular 
way (see section 7.3.2.3 through to section 7.3.2.7). These themes were also reflected 
in the summary table at the end of the last chapter (see section 6.17) under the 
headings of ‗information‘ and ‗interaction‘ which leaves the heading ‗impact‘ to be 
discussed in this section i.e., what actual impact did MAs have on the performance of 
the OMs in their roles? 
 
OMs in general perceived the largest impact of the roles of MAs on their actual 
performance in the context of the provision of timely and user-friendly information 
relevant to decision making and control, which could lead to performance 
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consequences in their roles and for the business. These impacts were very specific to 
OMs‘ functions e.g., projects, productivity, capital, cost reduction, conversion costs, 
standard costs, new products, scrap, and other performance-related areas. Some MAs 
appeared to impact beyond just the provision of information to engage with it 
interactively on management teams, challenge OMs in their decision processes, and 
influence these decisions by giving ‗direction‘ [e.g., AM1 and BM3]. AO4 mentioned 
a very tangible saving in overtime of €100,000 largely attributed to AM4 steering 
managerial attention towards overtime issues, and noted that cross-functional cost 
reduction teams would be ‗rudderless‘ without AM4. Sathe (1982) notes that the 
impact of the accountant‘s interaction with managers could be assessed in the context 
of ‗managerial performance‘ and thus these MAs were noted by OMs as having done 
so. In contrast, some MAs were observed by OMs as having little impact on assisting 
OMs in the performance of their roles (i.e., AM3, BM2, BM4, and EM as identified in 
section 7.3.2.2 and discussed in section 7.3.2.8) as these roles did not relate to OMs 
achieving their objectives. The reasons underpinning these perceptions were as noted 
earlier as: OMs being unsure of how the MA could impact on the performance of their 
roles, OMs being unaware of the available management accounting information and 
MAs retrospectively seeking explanations for variances as opposed to proactively 
planning forward and addressing performance issues. Furthermore, these roles of 
MAs were more oriented to reporting, compliance, procedural, and administrative 
tasks so job design may explain some of the variability here. Other MAs (i.e., AM2, 
BM1, CM, DM1, and DM2) were generally perceived as having a relevant 
information provision impact on OMs‘ decisions but OMs were seeking much 
stronger contributions, both in context (e.g., more in relation to commercial decision 
making and performance issues than in control and reporting) and in person (e.g., 
many OMs mentioned the need for MAs to ‗drive‘ performance or change much more 
strongly). Even AO1 and BO3 (who perceived AM1 and BM3 as meeting their 
expectations) desired AM3 and BM3 to have more influence on their roles. 
 
It should also be noted that there was some link between the MAs impact on the 
performance of OMs in their roles and the ability of OMs to utilise MAs‘ information 
and expertise in their roles. OMs that were paired with MAs such as AM1, BM3, and 
AM4 were OMs that possessed a solid grasp of finance i.e., AO1 formerly worked in 
finance, AO4 was the plant manager, and BO3 had remarked that, if he had to, he 
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could make decisions without BM3‘s input. In the analysis of the user-preparer gaps 
between OMs (users) and MAs (preparers), Pierce and O‘Dea (2003) proposition that 
the matching of a strong MA (linked to ‗strong controllers‘ as termed by Sathe, 1982, 
1983) with a strong manager was most likely to reduce such gaps. In this scenario 
OMs understand and seek out the addressing of their needs, while MAs understand 
such needs. Taking a holistic perspective on these findings suggests that the MAs that 
best meet the expectations of OMs possess a range of characteristics as discussed 
above i.e., meeting OMs‘ expectations was related to MAs possessing an appropriate 
mix of key characteristics (see section 7.4.1.5).  
 
As noted in section 7.3.2.8, MAs had been in the companies for different time periods 
ranging from 7 months to 9 years. There is an argument that the longer the MA is in 
the business that the more potential they have to influence the performance of OMs in 
their roles. This observation has already been made with respect to MAs building up 
an understanding of the business over time e.g., AM1 (see section 7.4.1.1). AO2 also 
lent support to this by noting that AM2: 
 
…is coming from a background where he hasn‘t had exposure to the 
running of the business units. He is there [at operations meetings] 
every week, he is listening to what is happening, he is able to 
comment if he wants and he is hearing what is going on and building 
up a broader understanding.  
 
In the context that AM2 was only in the company 7 months, it can be argued that 
assisting OMs in the performance of their roles has an emergent and temporal 
dimension. However, this is not straightforward as the capacity of MAs to assist OMs 
in the performance of their roles is also related to other factors as outlined earlier e.g., 
orientations in section 7.3.4, individual attributes in section 7.4.1, information and 
report characteristics in sections 7.3.2.3, 7.3.2.5, and 7.3.2.7, job specification in 
section 7.3.2.8, and variability in OMs‘ expectations in section 7.3.2.1. Thus, MAs 
such as DM1 and DM2 who each had been in Company D for 9 years, and AM3 who 
had been in Company A for 5 years were perceived by OMs as needing to play a 
stronger role in assisting them in the performance of their roles. 
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From the earlier discussion of control expectations (see section 7.3.2.4) and routine 
reports (see section 7.3.2.5) and decision support expectations (see section 7.3.2.6) 
and non-routine reports (see section 7.3.2.7) it is apparent that the latter shows the 
greatest scope for MAs to assist OMs in the performance of their roles. OMs 
perceived MAs as meeting many of their control expectations and were satisfied with 
many routine reports (excluding the exceptions and redundancies noted earlier). Some 
non-routine reports had stronger links to OMs in the performance of their roles as 
table 7.3 illustrates as it draws out the comparative report orientations. 
 
Non-routine report orientations Routine report orientations 
Future-oriented Historic or retrospective 
Non-recurring performance decisions facing 
the OM 
Summated, structured, and periodic 
Strategic, long-term impacts e.g., capital 
investments, projects, new products 
Immediate period, cumulative year to date 
or current budget year 
Often produced at the behest of the OM More finance or centrally controlled 
Financial and non-financial measures Some non-financial but more financial and 
tabular in orientation 
OM may spend more time using MA may spend more time producing 
OMs highly interested in report outcomes – 
careful consideration  
Not many queries generated from reports – 
quickly reviewed 
OMs seek interaction with MA around them Variable interaction and sometimes 
interaction is MA-led with queries 
Design flexibility and simplicity Design inflexibility and detail 
 
Table 7.3 – Reports and the performance of OMs in their roles 
 
The stronger linking of non-routine reports than routine reports to OMs in the 
performance of their roles also mirrors the extent to which MAs were meeting OMs‘ 
expectations (e.g., AM1 and BM3 spent a significant proportion of their time on non-
routine reports, while AM3, EM, and BM4 spent little if any time at all). This is not to 
say that routine reports did not contribute to OMs performing their roles – they did, as 
discussed in section 7.3.2.5 and in the findings in section 6.8, by providing 
benchmarked performance, multiple performance indicators, trends and focus points – 
but they appeared to be not as immediately linked to OMs in the performance of their 
roles. In some respects there are parallels here between non-routine and routine 
reports and leading and lagging indicators (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996) as non-
routine or non-programmed decisions (Simon, 1960; Emmanuel and Otley, 1985; 
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Emmanuel et al., 1990) may translate later into performance consequences in routine 
reports. 
 
7.5.2 Information impact  
The consequences also add support to the current strand of literature that shows how 
accounting information is being used through the interaction of accountants in team 
processes (Ahrens, 1997; Vaivio, 2004; Vaivio and Kokko, 2006) and how 
accountants can influence MCSs through their interaction (Simons, 1995).  The 
findings from phase one indicate that with more interaction, the use and quality of 
accounting information increased as well as the value that OMs attached to it as DO 
noted ‗if you had your linkage with the accountant‘. This could also be attributed to 
MAs ‗talking to people and we can see what they want‘ [IF]. The MAs benefited in 
terms of the interaction enabling them to better evaluate incoming management 
information and to appreciate the use of accounting information in a much broader 
organisational domain, as AO2 observed, ‗there are other criteria‘. These findings 
thus address in some way the criticisms of information relevance in the literature 
(Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; McKinnon and Bruns, 1992).  
 
The findings in phase two supported the findings of phase one in linking interaction 
between the MA and OM to enhanced management accounting information provision. 
There were positive impacts on the quality and range of information provided by MAs 
for OMs though interaction, whether it was: 
 
1) MAs enquiring about OMs‘ information requirements (see section 6.6.4);  
2) OMs requesting changes to reports (see section 6.6.5); 
3) MAs disseminating more information (see section 6.6.2); 
4) MAs being aligned to specific business units or functions and therefore producing 
more accurate information (see sections 6.3, 6.6.1, and 6.6.3); 
5) OMs adopting reports for their own functions (see section 6.6.5); or  
6) MAs interacting with information in tune with managerial preferences e.g., by e-
mail or in-person, detail or summary (see section 6.6.4).  
 
The inverse was also true as some MAs commented that when they were not 
interacting with OMs around reports they did not know what value OMs attached to 
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them e.g., ‗if you were to stop reporting on certain things tomorrow would anyone 
notice, I don‘t know‘ [CM]. Interaction was also linked to the demise of certain 
reports (e.g., R17 was discontinued as OMs stated it was not ‗adding any value‘) or 
the discontinuing of interaction around reports where such meetings were not 
perceived as of value to OMs (e.g., BM4 and R20 and variance meetings, EM and 
R28 and R30) where ‗we used to sit down and read these things…waste of time‘ 
[EO]. Thus, phase two shows that the interaction between MAs and OMs can serve to 
regulate management accounting information impact. 
 
However, phase two did not support the notion that more interaction always led to 
accounting information being used more or being of a higher quality as phase one 
suggests. The distinguishing feature here is the nature and purpose of the information 
provided as part of the MA‘s interaction with the OM e.g., some reports were for 
MAs to chase OMs for variance explanations, while others were directly relevant to 
OMs‘ decision making processes. The antecedents and characteristics that have 
consequences for information impact for phase two were presented under the 
antecedents (7.3.2) and characteristics (7.4).  
 
7.5.3 Role interface 
In phase one, FMs and OMs recognised the potential for conflict where MAs 
occupied roles combining the need for objectivity and integrity coupled with business 
involvement (Sathe, 1982). Although Company E seemed to address this potential 
conflict through role segregation, in most firms the conflict was viewed as a necessary 
phenomenon and one that enabled the accountants to be more ‗objective‘, to be 
respected for their work, and to develop better relationships with OMs. Thus, the 
findings challenge the argument that accountants require complete independence for 
effective management control. Being involved in the business appears to strengthen 
the effectiveness of this control, as the accountant has a better organisational 
understanding of where, why, and when control is required and consequently designs 
more ‗workable‘ control systems. As noted under section 7.5.1 on performance 
consequences, positive control outcomes were perceived from the MA interacting 
more. The findings show the combined control and partnership role as most common 
and this lends support to Granlund and Lukka‘s (1998a) and Mouritsen‘s (1996) 
observations of the enlarging roles of MAs and the notion of ‗hybrid‘ roles  (Caglio, 
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2003; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, 2007). However, the findings also suggest that 
the occupiers of such roles require strength of character (see sections 5.3.1.5 and 
5.3.1.7) and become what Sathe (1982) referred to as a ‗strong controller‘.  
 
In phase two this conflict was less perceived by MAs (see section 6.15.3), some of 
whom related it more to their managers‘ level (e.g., financial controller/finance 
director). MAs also recognised that ‗we need to be a bit stronger in getting on to the 
managers‘ [AM1] or be more ‗pushy‘ [DM1], or that MAs were only the 
‗messenger(s)‘ [DM2, EM], or that it wasn‘t an issue and MAs ‗talked it out‘ [CM] 
with OMs. Perhaps closer to phase one perceptions, BO3 noted that it was ‗a valued 
conversation, people challenge one another, it is worth it‘ [BM3]. These perceptions 
suggest that MAs are not aligning with the model of the business partner (see section 
7.9) in the sense that the literature, and phase one findings, suggests that MAs ought 
to experience this conflict in the combined roles of partnering and policing.  
 
There was a perception in phase one that SOX had undesired consequences as HF 
lamented ‗I am very pessimistic about that [MA] role today because of what I see as 
the Sarbanes Oxley environment…more and more controls, controls, controls‘ (see 
section 5.4.3.2). This conflict was very evident in phase two where MAs observed its 
strong influence in US MNE subsidiaries (Companies A and B) (see sections 6.15.2 
and 7.3.1) leading to conflicts for MAs where they noted OMs ‗detest to see me 
coming‘ [AM3], ‗they just don‘t want you there at all‘ [BM4], and BO1 noted that 
‗the paper trails‘ were ‗OTT‘. One consequence of the SOX legislation was to make 
the MAs more removed from operations and that it could adversely affect the 
interaction between MAs and OMs. Further research is required in terms of whether 
the impact of SOX is more of a temporary effect due to its recent implementation. 
Thus, the findings indicate that SOX may be moving the roles of MAs further away 
from the model of the business partner and perhaps a regression to the model of the 
‗bean-counter‘ (Friedman and Lyne, 1997; Granlund and Lukka, 1998a) which is 
discussed further in section 7.9. While some have attributed bean-counter roles to 
corporate accounting functions (Granlund and Lukka, 1998a) this study suggests that 
such roles exist in accounting functions within subsidiaries and business divisions.  
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Other tensions that emerged in the phase one and phase two findings indicate that 
there may be additional role conflicts for the MAs relating to business involvement. In 
phase one, OMs did not seem to always welcome interaction that sought to serve a 
monitoring, information gathering, or interfering function for the MAs (see sections 
5.4.3.3 and 7.4.1.4). Role conflicts were evident from OMs and FMs who noted: a 
preference for a ‗collaborative‘ as opposed to ‗controlling‘ [CO] interaction style for 
MAs, MAs getting too ‗involved‘ [PO] or MAs ‗try to make the whole lot‘ [decision 
themselves] [IO], MAs ‗not fully understanding‘ and OMs being ‗asked a lot of 
questions‘ [DO], MAs who ‗don‘t fit‘ in ‗production management‘ [IO], the MA as a 
monitor for head office ‗watching the slippages…excluded very quickly‘ [HF], and 
the MA who sees involvement as ‗a control thing‘ [LO]. Further, OMs do not 
welcome an excessively ‗penny pinching‘ [IO] approach to budgetary control but 
value a more flexible approach (see section 7.3.2.4). Reference was made to MAs 
who had left their respective organisations and who had not been replaced, with their 
roles being described in terms of preparing reports and being unknown to OMs. Thus, 
the findings extend Sathe‘s (1982) involvement-independence role conflict by adding 
additional conflicts around involvement. 
 
In phase two, there were role conflicts associated with the interactions between the 
OMs and MAs. Building on the phase one finding of the OM not desiring the 
‗corporate‘ and ‗controlling‘ MA, there were role conflicts in phase two for MAs 
observing that managers did not like MAs ‗chasing‘ [CM] for variance and report 
explanations, being unaware of OMs‘ priorities, and ‗being a pain in the tooth‘ as 
BM4 observed about her role in getting ‗on to them to get stuff sorted‘ (see section 
6.9). BO4 and EO noted that they had to explain variances to BM4 and EM. There 
were also role conflicts in phase two for MAs in the noted antecedent of head office 
reporting requirements (see sections 6.15.1 and 7.3.1) as AM1 noted ‗we are being 
torn in two‘ between trying to meet the expectations of the ‗head office‘ and 
‗production‘ with the ‗Plant Manager, the Cost Reduction Manager giving out 
because they are not getting enough support‘. Many conflicts have already been noted 
in the presentation of the phase two findings on the expectations of OMs and how 
MAs sometimes did not meet these expectations, thereby creating role conflicts for 
MAs (e.g., lacking business knowledge, not enough contribution in management 
decision processes, poor active involvement in driving change and in implementing 
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solutions to issues, redundant, historic, or overly detailed financial reports). As can be 
seen, some of these find support in phase one where there were conflicts with MAs 
not adequately understanding the business. The one conflict that did not re-emerge in 
phase two, but was evident in phase one, was the notion of the MA getting overly 
involved or hijacking the decision process. One possible explanation for this might be 
that some more senior MAs exerted more influence over OMs in phase one with MAs 
in phase two being less senior not doing so. As noted above, MAs in phase two did 
observe that they needed to push and challenge OMs more than they did (as did some 
OMs) with the FM taking ‗a lot of the flack‘ [AM1]. FMs in phase one also noted 
they were out interacting with OMs over twice (50% vs. 20%) as much as MAs and 
the MA was ‗operational‘, while the financial controller/director was ‗strategic‘ [DO]. 
 
In phase one it was observed that when MAs interacted more with OMs that there was 
more potential for MAs to challenge OMs than if there was not interaction i.e., ‗not 
such a big deal then to challenge‘ [CF] OMs. CO noted that the interaction worked 
best when MAs were ‗collaborative‘ and acted as ‗watchful overseers‘ leaving ‗SOX 
for control‘. FMs observed ‗better relationships with the managers‘ [IF] and being 
‗there to work with them‘ [PF] through the interaction. It was also noted in phase one 
that a consequence of the interaction was OMs were more open with MAs about 
‗issues and difficulties‘ [HF] and ‗know that they can show you things‘ [AF1]. 
Without the interaction, it was noted that OMs would be ‗hands off‘ and not as 
‗upfront if something goes wrong‘ [CF].  
 
A related consequence in phase one was where there was not much interaction 
between OMs and MAs, was the need sometimes to convince OMs that the 
involvement of MAs may mean that OMs actually achieve better results. In terms of 
attitude to finance, the findings in phase one note the importance of MAs ‗developing 
and being taken seriously‘ [CF] and being ‗recognised‘ as ‗being good at their job‘ 
[AO2]. The findings in phase one indicate that the roles of MAs with respect to 
interacting with OMs may have an emergent quality. Reference was made to role 
development and the importance of reputation and the fact that while MAs desired 
involvement with OMs, OMs may be sceptical of that involvement (Johnston et al., 
2002a; CIMA, 2009). HO noted ‗there would be a perception that when they 
[accountants] do say that they want to get involved, then it‘s more to be a big brother 
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watching‘ and PO observed the effect of ‗putting the spot light on production‘. There 
was evidence that operational issues and projects progressed somewhat before 
interaction with MAs occurred. While the literature has noted the rising demand for 
the financial training of OMs (Keating and Jablonsky, 1990) less emphasis has been 
placed on the need for accountants to inform OMs of the contribution that MAs can 
make to operational processes. There are further implicit links here to Chenhall and 
Langfield-Smith‘s (1998b) argument that greater MA involvement requires an OM-
MA common perspective on the roles of MAs, management backing, and in particular 
to the role selling dimension, an accounting ambassador. It also supports CIMA‘s 
(2009) suggestions of management backing and enhancing relationships over time for 
more MA involvement. An extension of Sathe‘s (1982) work on involvement here is 
to argue that an additional dimension influencing involvement is MAs acting in a role 
selling capacity (see section 5.4.3.6). There was also a perception by MAs and OMs 
of a certain image of MAs not interacting e.g., AO1 noted that AM1 wanted to ‗come 
away from the financial sort of the stereotype of just number crunching and bean-
counter‘ [AO1] and AM4 noted that ‗you get the slagging…bean-counters‘. This 
‗stereotype‘ [AO1] is well documented in the literature (DeCoster and Rhode, 1971; 
Sathe, 1983; Brignall et al., 1999; Friedman and Lyne, 2001) and is further discussed 
in section 7.9. 
 
Phase two findings on OMs‘ awareness and understanding of the roles of MAs (see 
section 6.15.4) and the variability of the OMs‘ expectations discussed above (see 
section 7.3.2.1) have strong parallels to the consequences in phase one where there 
was little interaction between MAs and OMs e.g., OMs with low awareness of the 
roles of MAs also had low expectations of them and received little assistance in the 
performance of their roles or put very simply, higher/lower understanding led to 
higher/lower expectations and more/less consequence for assisting OMs in their roles. 
MAs could perhaps address this by raising their profiles and building OMs‘ 
understanding of how MAs can assist OMs in the performance of their roles (see 
practical recommendations in section 8.7). A further implicit element of this 
dimension was noted in MAs customising the management accounting information 
provided to OMs (see sections 7.3.2.5 and 7.3.2.7).  
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7.5.4 Summary of discussion on consequences 
A range of consequences of the roles of MAs was identified in phase one of the 
research which have received little attention in the literature. It was found that the 
roles of MAs had consequences for performance, information, and interfacing with 
OMs and depending on the interaction, different consequences ensued (e.g., more 
interaction was linked to more control, better decision making, better information 
provided, role conflict and less interaction was linked to the opposite of these and 
OMs being more remote with MAs having to ‗sell‘ their roles more). Phase two 
findings were largely addressed through the discussion of antecedents and 
characteristics above where it was shown that there was variability in the extent that 
MAs meet OMs‘ expectations. The consequences of the roles of MAs for assisting 
OMs in the performance of their roles were also discussed in relation to the themes of 
performance, information, and interfacing. Opposite to phase one, phase two did not 
indicate that more interaction led to similar consequences for assisting OMs in their 
roles e.g., some interaction around reports assisted OMs in their roles, while other 
interaction did not do so but more role conflict was not as strongly linked to 
interaction. Both phases identified the need for some MAs to ‗sell‘ their roles or raise 
their profiles with OMs. The recurring conflicts and ambiguities associated with the 
roles of MAs and assisting OMs in their roles are summarised in the next section.  
 
The findings on consequences of the roles of MAs address a gap in the literature in 
that there is very little research on these. The findings reveal that the involvement of 
MAs had a number of positive outcomes for management control (e.g., performance, 
better information for control and decision making) based on more interaction which 
runs counter to the notion of being independent and removed for effective control 
(Sathe, 1982). Much of the related work on role theory was conducted over 25 years 
ago (Hopper, 1980; Sathe, 1982) and so these findings build on this earlier work by 
highlighting a range of role conflicts and ambiguities for the roles of MAs. 
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7.6 Summary of role conflicts and role ambiguities and the roles of MAs 
As role conflicts and ambiguities in the roles of MAs have emerged in the phase one 
and two of the findings across antecedents, characteristics, and consequences, this 
section provides a brief integration of these themes which includes the non-fulfilment 
of OMs‘ expectations which represents role conflict in role theory (Kahn et al., 1964; 
Katz and Kahn, 1978). Table 7.4 summarises these conflicts and ambiguities. 
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Phase one  Phase two Literature comment 
Conflict in MAs desiring to 
get involved but not desired 
by OMs. OMs‘ discretion: 
‗as they see fit‘ (7.3.2.1). 
Conflict in variability in the expectations 
of OMs e.g., financial acumen, 
managerial styles and preferences 
(7.3.2.1). 
 
Conflict in being involved 
with OMs, while 
maintaining control - 
combined role most 
common (7.5.3). 
Conflict less perceived as attributed more 
to financial controller (7.5.3). 
Phase one supported 
Sathe‘s (1982) ‗strong‘ 
controller but less so in 
phase two – conflict 
attributed to FM level. 
 
 
Conflict in MAs not meeting 
needs of OMs e.g., more 
involvement, too much 
administration, redundant 
and missing information 
(7.4.2). 
Conflict in MAs not meeting OMs‘ 
control expectations e.g., variances, 
budgets, more analysis of performance, 
routine reports (7.3.2.4-5). 
 
 
Hopper (1980) found 
MAs not meeting OM‘s 
expectations regarding 
the MAs‘ involvement 
for the most commonly 
ranked activities.  
Conflict in MAs not meeting OMs‘ 
decision support expectations e.g., more 
contribution in teams, more active 
involvement in resolving issues, moving 
‗beyond the control‘ to the ‗business 
case‘ (7.3.2.6-7). 
Conflict in MA not having 
desired characteristics e.g., 
business knowledge, 
flexibility (7.4.1.4-5). 
Conflict in MAs not meeting OMs‘ 
expectations of MAs having certain 
characteristics e.g., business knowledge, 
stronger engagement (7.4.1.4-5). 
Hopper (1980) did not 
find conflicts regarding 
the MAs‘ characteristics. 
Conflict when MAs got 
excessively involved (7.5.3). 
Conflict not perceived (7.5.3). Hopper (1980) found all 
OMs desired more 
influence by MAs. 
Conflict having to sell the 
roles of MAs to OMs 
(7.5.3). 
Conflict in OMs having little awareness 
or understanding of the roles of MAs 
(7.3.2.1 and 7.5.3). 
 
Conflict in the individual: 
‗tendency… towards 
accounting…partnership‘ 
(7.3.4). 
MAs getting involved or ‗meddling‘ 
where there appeared little benefit to the 
OM (7.3.2.8). 
Hopper (1980) observed 
three of 12 MAs as more 
oriented to ‗book-
keeping‘. 
Conflict in MA‘s approach 
to involvement with OMs 
e.g., ‗control thing‘ (7.5.3). 
Conflict in approach to involvement with 
OMs e.g., chasing variance explanations 
(7.3.2.8 and 7.5.3). 
 
 Conflict in meeting head office needs 
while also trying to assist OMs in the 
performance of their roles (7.3.1). 
Hopper (1980) observed 
conflicts in the primacy 
of reporting duties. 
Conflict in meeting FM requirements 
while also trying to assist OMs in the 
performance of their roles (7.3.2.1). 
Hopper (1980) excluded 
accountants as role 
senders.  
Conflict with SOX compliance 
procedures e.g., signatures, deadlines, 
routines (7.3.1 and 7.5.3). 
 
Ambiguity in head office needs (7.3.1).  
Ambiguity in FM instructions (7.3.2.1).  
 
Table 7.4 – Role conflicts and ambiguities in the roles of MAs 
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As table 7.4 illustrates, the analysis of role conflicts and ambiguities extend the 
limited record of these in the literature. Hopper (1980) found that OMs‘ expectations 
were better met where OMs had MAs adjacent and reporting to them but this was not 
examined in this study as MAs were all located adjacent to, and reporting to, FMs. 
This may perhaps explain some of the OMs‘ unmet expectations noted in this chapter.  
 
7.7 Analysis framework of roles of MAs: phase one 
A tentative framework from phase one is presented in figure 7.4 that draws upon the 
key themes that cuts across much of the findings, namely the interaction that occurs, 
or does not occur, between MAs and OMs. Underpinning the framework are the 
strongly emphasised antecedents of management and the MAs themselves and how 
these antecedents may manifest themselves in different ways. Specifically, some OMs 
appear to require involvement defined in their terms and this may create, as the 
findings suggest, role ambiguity and conflict for the MAs. Figure 7.4 presents a 
diagrammatic interpretation of the findings regarding the involvement of MAs and the 
extent of MAs‘ involvement sought by the OMs. 
 
         High                   Involvement Sought                      Low 
       Contribute 
 
 
Nature of MAs 
Involvement 
 
    
             Control 
 
Figure 7.4 – Matrix of nature of MAs‘ involvement and involvement sought 
 
Although presented as a neat matrix, the involvement parameters and the roles 
associated with them are continuums and not dichotomous points.  The matrix 
illustrates that MAs may face a number of alternative scenarios regarding 
involvement with OMs. 
 
 
 
 
     Engager                      Salesperson 
 
 
 
     Uninvited Guest         Outsider 
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Engager 
As the matrix indicates when a MA contributes positively to business activities and 
OMs seek involvement, the MA may be termed an Engager as the involvement is very 
much welcomed e.g., HO commented about the FM and the business analyst as being 
‗really up for it‘ [i.e., involvement] and GO noted that the controller was ‗always 
available‘ [GO]. When OMs were questioned about their satisfaction with the levels 
of MAs‘ involvement and the current emphasis in the roles of MAs, many indicated 
that they were generally quite happy with the involvement provided by MAs. There is 
also potentially a danger here that MAs may over-engage in that OMs may perceive 
the MAs involvement as beyond that deemed appropriate as PO remarked ‗you have 
to say to them to hold on a second you don‘t need to get that involved‘. Similarly in 
Company I, the factory manager defensively remarked that ‗part of (production 
decisions), yes, but not…some of them try to make the whole lot‘ This suggests that it 
may be important for MAs to determine the appropriate level of involvement that 
does not alienate OMs, or ‗step on other people‘s toes‘ [PO] in which case a MA may 
become an Uninvited Guest.  
 
Uninvited Guest 
If the purpose of the involvement is to gather information, monitor, and control then 
the MA may be termed the Uninvited Guest as such involvement is not welcome and 
will likely result in less future involvement e.g., HF stated that ‗a corporate person, 
kind of watching the errors, watching the slippages, you would be very excluded very 
quickly‘. LO commented about MAs‘ involvement in that if ‗it‘s a control thing, no‘, 
but if it is to ‗contribute and offer an opinion on how to help with the decision, then 
why not‘. The reference to ‗control‘ in this context, and in Figure 7.4, refers to the 
approach that the MA takes to involvement with OMs as opposed to the important 
control aspects to the roles of MAs, as highlighted in the findings (see sections 
5.2.2.8, 5.3.1.5, 5.3.1.7, 5.3.2.2, and 5.4.1.2). This is also important as figure 7.4 is 
not implying that the MA must occupy either a control or partnership role; rather it is 
suggesting that how the MA approaches interacting with OMs with a view to 
supporting, or ‗contributing‘, to managerial decision making and control (see section 
7.9 for further discussion on MAs as business partners). This quadrant implies that 
MAs are involved in business activities, as expected by FMs and OMs, but because 
the nature of that involvement is in conflict with the nature of the involvement being 
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sought, the future involvement of MAs may be curtailed or even stopped. The MA in 
this case, may become an Outsider. 
 
Outsider 
The MA as the Outsider represents a situation where no involvement is sought by 
OMs and the type of involvement, should it be sought, is not welcome or involvement 
had been sought but rejected previously (i.e., Uninvited Guest). IF remarked about a 
MA who had left the company and OMs had subsequently commented: ‗I don‘t 
remember him‘. It could also be argued that this quadrant may represent MAs‘ roles 
that companies no longer seek to fill or have removed MAs from such positions e.g., 
in Company H, a MA that prepared detailed reports was not replaced. This box also 
represents the one where there is the greatest distance between MAs and the OMs. 
BO2 remarked that the head of finance ‗forces involvement‘ (which BF1 seemed to 
do) but could ‗box the department‘ which would accentuate this distance. Thus, it 
may be that this position will have stronger theoretical than empirical foundations.  
 
Salesperson 
When OMs do not seek involvement but the MA is seeking to contribute positively, 
the MA may be termed the Salesperson as the OM does not perhaps appreciate how 
the MA can contribute as AO1 commented: ‗it‘s a very hard sell‘.  Similarly in 
Company I the FM commented how accountants were previously kept away from 
operations but that now the finance team were ‗trying to work with‘ OMs and 
convince them that the MA‘s involvement might lead to them achieving a ‗better 
result‘. CF suggested that ‗it wouldn‘t be obvious to the people first, oh we should 
have management accounting here [on the project]‘ again implying a need for MAs to 
sell the potential contribution that they can make. 
 
It must be noted that this framework is not static; the boundaries are not clear cut, the 
roles may change over time and one MA may possess certain attributes that reflect the 
different profiles at the same time. One example in the study is that some senior FMs 
lamented that the introduction of the SOX legislation may have resulted in MAs now 
regressing to an Outsider role having previously progressed to an Engager role. HF 
remarked: ‗I am very pessimistic about that role today because of what I see as the 
Sarbanes Oxley environment‘. Similarly, a number of interviewees made reference to 
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experiences of MAs that reflected role profile transitions, e.g., becoming an Engager, 
having successfully been a Salesperson through, for example, providing financial 
training and communicating financial material to OMs. A further example is the 
change in financial leadership that influences the style of involvement provided by 
MAs; thus, previous Uninvited Guests or Outsiders might now find they are moving 
towards an Engager role. Finally, a number of structural arrangements were noted in 
the findings that could facilitate role transitions in the grid. Examples were a cultural 
change programme in Company A, the participation of MAs in cross-functional 
project teams evident in many firms, and the assignment of MAs to specific product 
groups or operational units. 
 
7.8 Revisiting the analysis framework of the roles of MAs: phase two 
Revisiting the tentative framework that emerged from phase one resulted in a deeper 
understanding of this framework. An initial analysis of phase two data provided much 
support for the framework. Table 7.5 illustrates the findings from phase two aligned 
to the role profiles of Engager, Salesperson, Outsider, and Uninvited Guest. 
 
Engager     
 MA on cross-functional teams 
 Higher MA capabilities, higher 
expectations  
 OM has financial skills and knowledge 
 OM knows MA has information  
 MAs giving OMs time 
 OMs can relate to information 
 MAs interested in helping  
 OMs trust MA‘s judgement, respect 
 Put boundaries on problems, not costs first 
 
 REPORTS: Ad hoc, strategic, future-
oriented, customised to users need 
Salesperson     
 OM has poor financial skills and knowledge 
 Implementing  controls, SOX, need to bring 
people along, more acceptability 
 OMs not aware of what MAs can do  
 OMs don‘t see MAs getting involved  
 OM priorities – finance lower down on scale 
 OM image of MA – do not ‗add value‘ 
 
 REPORTS: OMs don‘t know of reports, OMs 
don‘t understand reports, reports not focused 
Uninvited Guest     
 Managers‘ styles – form of involvement  
sought varies by OM 
 Involvement cyclical  
 MA has poor business knowledge  
 MA interacting for information gathering 
purposes 
 MA chasing SOX compliance e.g., 
signatures, documentation 
 
 REPORTS: detailed, historic, variance 
explanation, head office requests 
Outsider  
 MA not interacting with OMs 
 Irrelevant information 
 Purely a financial role 
 Variance meetings discontinued 
 
 REPORTS: no reports given to OMs or not 
used e.g., reports for head office, for finance 
 
 
Table 7.5 –Application of phase two findings to phase one template 
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However, following further analysis of phase two data it became apparent that the 
imposed structure of the framework did not always hold up and a more fluid or 
process-oriented perspective appeared to fit better in explaining the findings e.g., the 
MA may be an Engager on a cross-functional cost reduction or capital project but then 
becomes more of an Uninvited Guest at period end when seeking explanations for 
variances or in addressing compliance issues. The MA may be left out of the loop on 
certain operational activities but then by presenting a case for greater involvement 
(Salesperson), he/she may become an Engager. A number of factors were identified to 
support this: 
 
1) Activity – the MA may be involved in head office roles (Outsider/Uninvited 
Guest) or involved in a management or project team (Engager) . 
 
2) Timing – policing at period end (Uninvited Guest) and partnering on a cross-
functional project during the month (Engager).  
 
3) Reports – some routine reports more linked to policing (Outsider/Uninvited 
Guest) while non-routine more linked to partnering activities (Engager). 
 
These multiplicities of roles have some support in the literature. Gibson (2002) found 
alternating controller roles at different times as ‗police officer‘, ‗consultant‘, and 
‗spy/watchdog‘. Mouritsen (1996) also notes the finance functions‘ roles alternating 
between ‗involvement‘ and ‗independence‘ with five major categories of activity 
emerging. The four roles also extend the frequent dichotomy in the literature 
characterising MAs as being ‗business partners‘ or ‗bean-counters‘ with these two 
respectively being most reflected in the Engager and Outsider roles. Thus, the 
Uninvited Guest and Salesperson roles add two other possible classifications. 
 
7.9 MAs as business partners and corporate police: an evaluation 
In phase one, both FMs and OMs were clear on the information provision and 
interpretation role of MAs in a wider organisational context. This lends support to a 
recent finding that Finnish controllers are ‗concerned by the big financial picture‘ 
(Vaivio and Kokko‘s, 2006, p. 70). However, there was much less clarity on the roles 
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of MAs as equal decision makers, or business partners, on management teams (IMA, 
1996, 1999; Siegel et al., 2003a, 2003b; CIMA, 2007, 2009). Sometimes, MAs 
perceived themselves as decision makers but OMs viewed them more in a role that 
involved making suggestions, recommendations, and influencing outcomes (see 
section 5.3.2.1). Thus, there is some ambiguity around the notion of what the business 
partner actually means to MAs and to OMs. It also supports the model of business 
partnership as one that is evolving (Brignall et al., 1999; CIMA, 2007, 2009). A 
number of ambiguities and nuances that emerged around the interaction between the 
MAs and the OMs, while linked to characteristics, are discussed under role interface 
conflicts (see section 7.5.3), which also links to the variability in OMs‘ expectations 
(see section 7.3.2.1), and summarised in section 7.6.  
 
Management control was perceived as an important dimension of the roles of MAs in 
both phases of the study (see sections 5.2.2.8, 5.3.1.5, 5.3.1.7, 5.3.2.2, and 5.4.1.2 in 
phase one and sections 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 in phase two) and it is important to align the 
control aspects of the roles of MAs with the decision support aspects of the roles, 
although MAs were generally perceived as more effective in the former roles. Thus, 
in the model of the business partner as depicted in the findings, the MA is involved in 
supporting managerial decision making and control. Although one company in phase 
one separated control and partnership roles (see section 5.4.3.2) the prevailing roles of 
MAs comprised both control and decision support roles. While the study largely 
presents control and decision support within one individual‘s role, it does indicate a 
number of challenges around MA-OM interactions (see section 7.6) and prerequisite 
skills e.g., ‗strong personality‘ [JF] and ‗independent minded‘ [PF] (see sections 
5.3.1.5, 5.3.1.7, and 5.4.3.2]. 
 
In phase two, the involvement of some MAs in activities of a more strategic nature 
was also noted by OMs e.g., the ‗financial impact of these [capital] projects‘ [AO1], 
‗new product introductions‘ [AO4], ‗direction‘ on ‗new programmes‘ [BO3], capital 
expenditure projects [DO1], and project work [DO2]. There was also a hierarchical 
perspective in that some OMs noted that they got involved with the financial 
controller more so than the MA with regard to strategic initiatives. This scope for 
strategic involvement was also relevant to the level at which the OM was operating at 
e.g., BM3 worked closest with BO3 who was at ‗director‘ level (two levels above 
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BM3), while BO2 was at the same level as BM2. Thus, in the structure within 
Company B, BM3 was linked to a much more senior manager than BM2. AO4 was 
for example linked to the Plant Manager. This raises the question as to why certain 
MAs (in firms with a team of MAs e.g., Companies A and B), while all hierarchically 
on the same level appear to interact with OMs at very different levels and in different 
ways (e.g., tactical versus strategic). Some of the reasoning may relate to the 
prescribed definition of the role but also the knowledge and skills of the MA and their 
ability to deploy these in interacting with OMs. 
 
In phase two, it was found that some OMs had little or no expectations of MAs and 
that these roles involved financial accounting, regulatory compliance, and following 
up with OMs to explain historic variance reports (see section 7.3.2.8). Granlund and 
Lukka (1998a) identify the characteristics of the MA as a ‗bean-counter‘. These 
include a historic orientation, being responsible mainly for the accurate and timely 
production of formal accounting reports, with little understanding of the business or 
awareness of non-financial functions, and being an ‗information collector and 
processor‘ (p. 202) (see also Friedman and Lyne, 1997; Vaivio and Kokko, 2006). 
Some of the characteristics of the MAs noted for AM3, BM2, BM4, and EM could be 
aligned to Granlund and Lukka‘s (1998a) ‗bean-counter‘ depiction which they suggest 
is still relevant for corporate financial departments. However, this was a different 
context here, where these MAs were all operating in geographically dispersed 
subsidiaries and their responsibilities included management accounting tasks.  
 
In phase two all the MAs were found to be spending a considerable proportion of their 
time in the preparation and issuing of management accounting reports (see section 
6.15.1), and the onerous head office reporting influence was discussed as an 
antecedent (see section 7.3.1). However, it was interesting in Company D, in which 
MAs did not appear to have the same corporate reporting demands as in Companies 
A, B, and E, that DO1 desired DM1 to be ‗looking forward and pushing strong to 
make things change‘ but ‗that hasn‘t really been the case, the accountant would be 
more factual reporting than aggressive pushing‘. In contrast DM1 remarked that ‗I 
wonder at times do they think I am just there to do numbers at the end of the month 
and that is about it‘. This apparent contradiction might be explained by DM1‘s 
acknowledgement that he could be more assertive in his roles. There was somewhat of 
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a further contradiction in that DO1 noted that DM1 had more scope as the 
‗accountant‘ to be ‗independent‘ on the ‗management team‘ than he had with those 
reporting to him but DM1 remarked that he found it difficult to be ‗pushy‘ when 
‗working along side them all the time‘. As noted in section 7.5.3, some MAs 
perceived themselves as ‗messengers‘ [DM2, EM] and perceived little conflict in 
interacting with OMs, while maintaining objective independent control. These 
findings would suggest that some MAs are not adopting the model of business 
partnership in two respects: firstly, in not more fully interacting with OMs in 
supporting their decision making processes and, secondly in not more fully 
challenging OMs from a control perspective, but relying more on senior FMs to do 
these. This might also explain why MAs perceived less conflict. Furthermore, it 
implies a finance function more oriented to financial reporting, with little evidence of 
major reductions in transactional and administrative activities (May, 2002). 
 
Overall MAs recognised the reporting burden and the resulting severe pressure on 
their time to assist OMs in the performance of their roles. The literature has long 
associated the preparation of reports with the roles of accountants (Willson and 
Colford, 1991; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992). The considerable involvement of MAs in 
routine and detailed reporting in this study also contrasts sharply with some 
perceptions among MAs of this activity as best not associated with the roles of MAs 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2000).  Although many studies indicate that technology might 
have displaced much of the routine reporting preparation (Brignall et al., 1999; 
Johnston et al., 2002a; Granlund and Malmi, 2002; Caglio, 2003; Scapens et al., 
2003) this was not apparent in this study. It has been noted in the literature that 
accountants whose roles predominantly involve the preparation of reports may face 
declining roles (Cooper, 1996; Pierce, 2001). While phase one found some evidence 
of reporting-oriented roles of MAs becoming redundant (e.g., the MA as an Outsider), 
this seemed more ambiguous in phase two with the extensiveness of reporting duties. 
 
As OMs did expect more active involvement in decisions in their areas and less 
reporting, it could be argued that there is perhaps more of a supply than a demand 
issue in respect of preparing accountants for work (Clarke et al., 1999). Interestingly, 
Sathe (1982) did not detect a relationship between the time devoted to financial 
reporting and the involvement of the controller with OMs. It could be argued that, as 
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one OM observed, the corporate reporting demands have escalated and perhaps 
Sathe‘s (1982) findings do not hold out in current practice.  
 
The findings provide a number of insights into the roles of MAs as supporters to OMs 
in different capacities. A strong literature theme has been the suggested movement of 
the role the of MA from the model of the bean-counter or policing role (Friedman and 
Lyne, 1997; Granlund and Lukka, 1998a; Brignall et al., 1999; Gibson, 2002) to the 
model of the business partner (Hopper, 1980; Jablonsky et al., 1993; Jablonsky and 
Keating, 1998; Burns et al., 1999; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003; CIMA, 2007, 2009). The 
preceding analysis has highlighted how certain MAs appear to meet the expectations 
of MAs in varying degrees. In overall terms the findings indicate that there is a 
broadening of roles of MAs (Granlund and Lukka, 1998a; Byrne and Maher, 2003) 
but only a minority of MAs appear closely aligned to the model of business 
partnership (see sections 7.3.2.2 and 7.4.1.5). Following CIMA‘s (2007) analysis of 
different classifications of the roles of MAs as business partners, the findings suggest 
that some MAs could be classified as ‗expert service‘ (strategic but independent), 
most MAs as ‗financial support‘ (operational involvement), and few if any as ‗finance 
leadership‘ (see section 3.7). The latter as closest to the model of business partnership 
challenge OMs as ‗sparring partners‘ (CIMA, 2007) at strategic levels and are not 
involved in the production of management accounting information. Many of the roles 
in terms of partnering levels and the extent of influence could be aligned to lower 
levels and limited influence (CIMA, 2009). 
 
While Granlund and Lukka (1998a) observe the horizontal alignment of MA roles 
across teams as a partner in decision making processes, and vertically as policing the 
head office or top management requirements, this study provides evidence that many 
MAs operating in manufacturing subsidiary settings are under very strong pressure to 
address the latter before the former.  This in effect implies a shift back towards the 
bean-counter role and away from the anticipated business partner role (IMA, 1996, 
1999, Siegel et al., 2003a, 2003b; Pierce and O‘Dea, 2003; CIMA, 2007). This has 
been exacerbated by the introduction of SOX, a vehicle of enhanced corporate 
regulation and control, and both phases of the research suggest that this has moved 
MAs even further away from the notion of the business partner. While SOX has a 
strong orientation towards financial reporting procedures and activities generally 
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associated with the work of financial accountants, this study found that the roles of 
MAs operating in SOX environments were influenced by these regulations (see 
section 6.15.2). The MAs however appeared to be somewhat negative about the 
influence of SOX on their roles because of its heavy administrative requirements and 
as BM3 observed SOX‘s attention to ‗the cent in a multi-million dollar company‘. 
Somewhat ironically Granlund and Lukka (1998a) present the broadening roles of 
MAs ascending from the narrower (smaller role element) of ‗Historian‘, to 
‗Watchdog‘, to ‗Advisor / Consultant‘ to ‗Member of the Management Team / 
Change Agent‘ (largest role element). The findings of this study imply for MAs in 
company subsidiaries under SOX regulation that this ‗watchdog‘ is a much broader 
component of the roles than the literature suggests (May, 2002; Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2007). 
 
Bringing together some of the previous key findings on the individual characteristics 
of MAs and the provision of management accounting information the following table 
7.6, by way of summary, highlights some of the factors that have been perceived as 
contributing to narrowing or widening the gap between the expectations that OMs 
have of MAs, and MAs meeting these expectations in assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles. It also indicates what factors might assist or limit the MA 
in moving to the model of business partnership. 
 
Closing the gap Widening the gap 
Highlighting what to focus on Information seeking 
Providing commentary and/or further analysis  No commentary or additional analysis provided 
Operational terminology in use Difficult terminology 
Design input Inflexible design 
Information provided reflects solid 
understanding the business  
Information provided reflects little understanding 
of the business  
Linking the technical and the accounting  Unable to relate the technical and the accounting  
Connecting accounting information with actions  Just producing the results  
Actively engaging in the resolution of issues  Leaving OMs to address issues by themselves 
Identifying OMs‘ information needs Not understanding OMs‘ information needs  
Customising information for users‘ requirements Information driven by financial reporting needs 
Bringing accounting expertise with business 
knowledge into interactive operational forums  
Accounting expertise and business knowledge not 
brought into operational forums 
 
Table 7.6 – Closing and widening the expectations gap 
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The wider skill base underpinning the ‗closing the gap‘ column is supported in the 
literature on characteristics linked to the model of the business partner (IMA, 1996, 
IMA, 1999; Johnston et al., 2002a; Vaivio and Kokko, 2006; Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2007; CIMA, 2009). In regard to gaps between ‗user‘ and ‗preparer‘ 
perceptions, Pierce and O‘Dea (2003) propose that different combinations of strong 
and weak MAs, and strong and weak OMs, lead to the narrowing or broadening of 
these gaps. This study similarly identified strong MAs (e.g., AM1 and BM3), 
equivalent to Sathe‘s notion of the ‗strong controller‘, and weak MAs (e.g., BM4 and 
EM). Equally evident was the presence of strong OMs (e.g., AO1, AO4, and BO3) 
and weak OMs (e.g., AO2, AO3, BO4, and EO). While such classification simplifies 
the relative degrees of strength or weakness of MAs and OMs it nevertheless 
illustrates factors pertinent to different types of expectation gaps. What defined 
strength in the MA was sound business knowledge, strong analytical skills that could 
be applied in an interactive setting, with a preparedness to support and challenge 
OMs. What defined strength in the OM was a solid understanding of finance and the 
roles of MAs, an ability to perform independent financial analysis but at the same 
time a strong desire to involve the MA. Weakness for the MA and the OM was very 
much the opposite of these respective strengths. These strengths and weakness could 
be extended to include the variability in the expectations of OMs (see section 7.3.2.1) 
and the expectations of OMs regarding characteristics (see section 7.4.1.5). 
 
7.10 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter commenced with the presentation of a broad but comprehensive 
perspective on the roles of MAs in bringing together the antecedents, characteristics, 
and consequences associated with such roles.  
 
The findings on antecedents show that ownership, environment, regulations, 
management, size, structure, culture, technology, location, performance management 
systems, and individual orientation are associated with the roles of MAs. In 
comparison to the empirical literature there has been limited academic research on 
many of these antecedents in relation to the roles of MAs, and some antecedents were 
found to be less associated with the roles than the literature indicates (e.g., accounting 
innovations, technology), or more associated than the literature indicates (e.g., 
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ownership). Using the contingency theoretical lens, contingent relationships were 
observed in the majority of the antecedents identified. 
 
Antecedents perceived particularly strongly were ownership, management, regulation 
(SOX), and the MA themselves. The influence of head office, SOX in US MNE 
subsidiaries, and the FM were perceived as strongly influencing the roles of MAs. 
The influence of OMs as a strong antecedent was analysed in relation to OMs‘ 
expectations, differing styles, information preferences, and OMs‘ levels of awareness 
of the roles of MAs. The findings show the control and decision support expectations 
of OMs, and the extent to which the 12 MAs were meeting these. While MAs were 
perceived as meeting OMs‘ control expectations more so than OMs‘ decision support 
expectations, the findings indicate the importance of MAs firstly having sound 
business understanding and relevant management accounting information, and 
secondly interacting with these in operational forums.  
 
The examination of management accounting information and routine and non-routine 
reports in the findings has identified relevant useful features of these for control and 
decision support purposes. General report features included accuracy, timeliness, 
aggregation, and customisation of reports to OMs‘ requirements. Routine report 
features included brevity, graphical displays, non-financial measures, and focusing 
mechanisms while non-routine report features included a narrow focus, flexible 
design, future and sometimes strategic orientation, and often being of immediate 
relevance to commercial decisions. It was also apparent that the long standing 
criticisms of management accounting information in the literature can be somewhat 
upheld in view of the many reports identified as partially or not at all assisting OMs in 
the performance of their roles.  
 
Using the management control theoretical lens the findings indicate that control 
theory, building on the work of Simons (1995), ought to focus more on how control 
operates in understanding how MAs facilitate control through their interactions as 
opposed to focusing on the tools of control. The findings also indicate that control 
theory should accommodate more flexibility in view of OMs or business priorities and 
while feedback systems operated as part of the firms‘ control systems there were 
instances where this feedback had little consequence for assisting OMs in their roles. 
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While the literature notes such systems are essential for control (Otley and Berry, 
1980) these findings draw attention to their design and use and show that some have 
consequences for control but others do not. 
 
Drawing on role theory (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978), the analysis of 
OMs‘ expectations revealed that some MAs were meeting these, while others were 
not doing so, thus giving rise to the theory‘s prediction of a consequence of role 
conflict. While there has been limited literature on the consequences of the roles of 
MAs, a number of role conflicts and ambiguities were observed in the findings which 
reveal the presence of many challenges, conditions, and uncertainties around MAs 
assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. These included conflicts in policing 
and business partnership, ambiguities in the expectations of the FM and head office, 
conflicts in trying to meet head office expectations and SOX mandates, while also 
trying to assist OMs, and conflicts around the approach to interacting with OMs (e.g., 
not understanding business, interfering, controlling). The findings support the theory‘s 
predicted influence of the attributes and interpersonal relations of role occupants on 
the expectations placed on such roles e.g., some OMs expected more of some MAs 
with certain characteristics. The findings on role characteristics strongly support 
previous emphasis in the literature (e.g., business knowledge, interpersonal skills, and 
flexibility). 
 
The consequences in the findings suggest that MAs interacting with OMs can lead to 
better planning and control, enhanced information provision, and can impact directly 
on OMs‘ performance. These consequences also reveal that through interaction, MAs: 
have enhanced relationships with OMs, can assess the quality of information, 
appreciate other criteria besides accounting information in a much broader 
organisational context, find it is easier to challenge OMs, and it is more likely that 
OMs will present issues to MAs. In contrast, the findings show that where there is 
little or no interaction, or the kind of interaction that is not desired by OMs, or OMs 
have little awareness of the roles of MAs, that MAs may have to ‗sell‘ their roles. 
 
The findings provide some evidence that the roles of MAs, for certain MAs, are 
broadening to include more of a business partner role model as depicted in the 
literature. However, account must be taken of the many conditions and tensions 
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identified in the findings pertaining to the roles of MAs and the extent to which 
certain MAs appear better able to assist OMs in the performance of their roles through 
their characteristics, interaction, and information. 
 
In summary, the findings represent a more comprehensive picture of antecedents, 
characteristics, and consequences of the roles of MAs than that identified from prior 
research. Contingencies, conflicts, and ambiguities which are associated with the roles 
of MAs in the context of interacting with and assisting OMs in the performance of 
their roles were also highlighted in the findings. The business partnership model 
referred to in the literature is one that seems less straightforward than may have been 
anticipated. The next chapter concludes the study by drawing together the major 
findings and key contributions of the study. 
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8.1 Introduction  
This chapter is the final chapter of the dissertation. It begins by summarising the 
objectives of the study and the key themes from the literature review chapters. The 
next section presents the conclusions of the study in the context of specific gaps in the 
literature, and the three theoretical lenses. The next section outlines the parameters 
framing the interpretation of the research with respect to both the merits and 
limitations placed on such interpretation. Next the practical implications of the 
research are considered, followed by recommendations for future academic research. 
The section following details the contribution of the research to the existing body of 
management accounting knowledge  
 
8.2 Objectives of the study 
This study investigates the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated 
with the roles of MAs in medium and large manufacturing settings. The study is based 
on a number of apparent gaps in the literature including: a poor understanding of such 
roles, inconsistent findings, a dearth of research on consequences in particular, an 
absence of an overall perspective on the roles, and a sustained challenge to the 
relevance of management accounting information to managers. The researcher‘s 
practical experience of working in a number of roles as a MA for a UK-based 
multinational provided a personal motivation for the study, which resonated with 
these literature themes. 
 
The study was conducted in two phases, the first a somewhat inductive suite of in-
depth interviews with 18 FMs and 18 OMs, the second a set of case studies 
investigating the roles of 12 MAs as ‗cases‘ involving 36 interviews and the analysis 
of over 50 management reports. The objectives of phase one (see section 4.4.1) were 
as follows: 
 
1) To investigate the antecedents associated with the roles of MAs.  
 
2) To investigate the characteristics associated with the roles of MAs.  
 
3) To investigate the consequences associated with the roles of MAs. 
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Following the analysis of phase one, the objectives of phase two were determined (see 
section 6.2) as follows: 
 
1) To analyse the extent that antecedents associated with the roles of MAs have 
consequences for assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
 
2) To analyse the extent that characteristics associated with the roles of MAs have 
consequences for assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. 
 
To frame the interpretation of the findings of the study, the theoretical lenses of 
management control theory, contingency theory, and role theory were reviewed in 
chapter two. The extant empirical literature to date on the roles of MAs was reviewed 
in chapter three, which led to the statement of the research problem, phase one 
objectives, and the research design being presented in chapter four. This chapter also 
examined the philosophical debates, methodological strengths and limitations, 
evaluative criteria, qualitative data analysis processes, and operational dimensions of 
the research. Chapter five presented the empirical findings from phase one interviews 
based on the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles 
of MAs emerging from the analysis. Chapter six commenced with the conclusions 
from the analysis of phase one findings in the previous chapter linking into the 
establishment and statement of the objectives of phase two of the study. This chapter 
presented the empirical phase two findings based on the antecedents and 
characteristics associated with the roles of MAs which had consequences for assisting 
OMs in the performance of their roles. The discussion presented in chapter seven 
draws together and interprets the empirical findings presented in the previous two 
findings chapters and reviews these in the context of both the empirical literature 
reviewed in chapter three, and the theoretical literature reviewed in chapter two. In 
this final chapter, the previous work is subsumed into overall conclusions and a 
statement of the study‘s contribution is made. 
 
8.3 Summary of literature review: theoretical lenses 
From a theoretical perspective, chapter two draws on management control theory, 
contingency theory, and role theory as vehicles for building a better understanding of 
the roles of MAs. Management control theory seeks greater insights into the forces 
361 
 
shaping the nature of control in contemporary environments (see section 2.2). The 
theory has begun to accommodate a broader conceptualisation of control in 
organisations but further research is required on characterising this phenomenon, and 
particularly what part the roles of MAs play in this regard. There also appears to be 
little understanding of the consequences of the roles of MAs from a management 
control perspective. Commentators have identified the changing control environment 
within organisations and mandate more research on understanding this, and since 
MAs traditionally play an important part in the deployment of management control in 
organisations, the literature review suggests merit in attempting to expand 
understanding in this field.  
 
Contingency theory suggests that developing an understanding of influences on the 
roles of MAs as contingent factors might lead to the identification of where an 
appropriate ‗fit‘ occurs around such roles and their context (see section 2.3). 
Contingency theory would also predict that characteristics relating to the roles of MAs 
may be contingent factors, where an appropriate matching of these characteristics in 
context might occur. Contingency theory in management accounting has largely 
focused on quantitative analyses of relationships between contingent variables, MCSs 
and organisational outcomes, as opposed to examining the roles of MAs in the context 
of those systems. 
 
Role theory predicts that those occupying roles, MAs, are influenced by the 
expectations of others with respect to those roles (see section 2.4). Role theory also 
identifies the characteristics of those occupying roles as playing a part in the 
outcomes of such roles and in shaping the expectations placed on such roles. As noted 
earlier, relatively little is known of the consequences of the roles of MAs but role 
theory would predict that there may be conflicts and ambiguities associated with the 
roles of MAs with respect to the extent that they meet the expectations of OMs. Role 
theory in management accounting research has remained largely unvisited since the 
early work of Hopper (1980) and Sathe (1982). 
 
8.4 Summary of literature review: empirical research 
The literature review in chapter three presented the contextual and broader 
background of the changing nature of the finance function (see section 3.2 and 3.3) 
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and within this function, the defining of the roles of MAs (see sections 3.4 and 3.5). 
There is a very strong distinction drawn out in the literature between the roles of MAs 
as custodians and mediums of financial accounting and control in organisations, while 
also acting as members of cross-functional, project and management decision making 
teams (see section 3.7). A range of potential antecedents to the roles of MAs are noted 
including management expectations, corporate emphases, MA career paths, having an 
accounting advocate, management backing for innovations, common understandings 
with other functions, and the skills and characteristics of the MAs themselves (see 
section 3.9). The literature indicates mixed evidence regarding the impact of 
management accounting innovations (see section 3.10) and IT innovations such as 
ERP systems (see section 3.9), and firm ownership (see section 3.11). 
 
Chapter three highlighted a number of characteristics that could be linked to the roles 
of MAs drawing on empirical research and some professional observations (see 
section 3.12). Characteristics noted as important to the contemporary roles of MAs 
include business knowledge, interpersonal and communication skills, flexibility, 
physical location, perceptions of the roles and analytical abilities, often linked to the 
model of the MA as a business partner (see section 3.5). Empirical research is 
somewhat contradictory in finding that some MAs apparently possess these 
characteristics, while others do not (see sections 3.7 and 3.12.1). The literature notes 
characteristics linked to the provision of useful management accounting information, 
such as relevance, accuracy, timeliness, orientations (e.g., past/future, financial/non-
financial, summary/detail) and innovations (e.g., new techniques, frameworks) but 
finds evidence that there is scope to improve such provision, and that there is a need 
to understand what roles MAs play in this activity. 
 
There has been sparse research on the consequences of the roles of MAs and the 
limited literature research to date suggests some uncertainty as regards these 
consequences. Thus, there is mixed evidence regarding the relevance of management 
accounting information to OMs, and about MAs moving to the model of the business 
partner underpinning the need to understand the actual consequences of these roles. In 
addition much of the research to date has a normative and professional orientation 
(Scapens et al., 1996; Burns et al., 1996; IMA, 1996; Sheridan, 1997; Jablonsky and 
Keating, 1998; Burns et al., 1999; IMA, 1999; Burns and Yazdifar, 2001; Siegel et 
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al., 2003a, 2003b). The literature does note that there are likely role conflict 
consequences for the roles of MAs in not meeting the expectations of managers 
(Hopper, 1980). There is also mixed evidence on the balancing of roles between 
control and decision support where some argue that more independence can lead to 
better control (Simon et al., 1954; Keating and Jablonsky, 1991) and others show that 
increased involvement can lead to enhanced control (Maas and Matějka, 2009), or that 
there are merits and challenges to the positioning of roles on the involvement-
independence continuum (Sathe, 1982). 
 
8.5 Phase one and two findings and literature gaps 
This section presents a summary of the key findings from phase one and two of the 
study with respect to the objectives for both phases as outlined above. It identifies 
how these findings address, or partially address, gaps and contradictions in the 
existing literature and also draws on the three theoretical lenses. 
 
In a collective sense for these objectives, the study provides a comprehensive picture 
of the roles of MAs as illustrated in figure 7.1 in section 7.2 which addresses a gap in 
the literature in this regard. There is a very limited and fragmented literature on the 
roles of MAs to date (Anthony, 1989; Young, 1996; Chapman, 1997; Chenhall, 2003, 
2007). As this overall perspective on the antecedents, characteristics, and 
consequences associated with the roles of MAs is new to the literature, future research 
might usefully develop on this (see section 8.8). 
 
8.5.1 Antecedents to the roles of MAs in assisting OMs in their roles 
The study provides in-depth evidence of an extensive range of antecedents relating to 
the roles of MAs and in so doing identifies contingent variables relating to these roles. 
This addresses a gap in that contingency theory-based research has usually only 
considered a limited number of factors through quantitative methods (Fisher, 1995, 
1998) and frequently with respect to performance as an outcome variable (Chenhall, 
2003, 2007) as opposed to directly relating contingencies to the individual (the MA) 
which may have implications for performance. Antecedents to the roles of MAs in the 
form of contingencies, most of which are associated with assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles, can be expressed in propositional form as follows: 
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1) The presence or absence of a head office is associated with the scope for MAs to 
assist OMs in the performance of their roles.  
 
2) The presence or absence of a head office is associated with the directness of the 
impact of the environment on the roles of MAs.  
 
3) SOX legislation is associated with the scope for MAs to assist OMs in the 
performance of their roles.  
 
4) Management as an antecedent to the roles of MAs has a number of contingencies 
within it:  
 
a) Managerial style and discretion is associated with the scope for MAs to assist 
OMs in the performance of their roles.  
 
b) The financial abilities of OMs are associated with the scope for MAs to assist 
OMs in the performance of their roles.  
 
c) The OM‘s function is associated with information requirements specific to that 
particular function.  
 
d) The OM‘s awareness and understanding of the roles of MAs is associated with 
the scope for MAs to assist OMs in the performance of their roles.  
 
e) The FM is associated with the scope for MAs to assist OMs in the 
performance of their roles.  
 
5) The larger the organisation the less MAs are informed of their business operations 
and environment.  
 
6) The control roles of MAs are easier if the culture of the organisation is receptive 
to the implementation of controls. 
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7) The more MAs are aligned to assist OMs in specific functions, the better 
assistance OMs receive in the performance of their roles. 
 
8) The individual orientation and characteristics of MAs are associated with the 
scope for MAs to assist OMs in the performance of their roles. 
 
These propositions indicate the associations found in the data of this research and 
represent an initial step in addressing these gaps in the literature. The research to date 
on many of these contingent factors in regard to the roles of MAs has been very 
limited and inconclusive and so in order to further address these issues a wider sample 
examination of some of these contingencies is recommended (see section 8.8). One 
limitation of contingency theory is the presumed acceptance of conditional alignments 
in particular contexts e.g., the roles of MAs are contingent upon some particular 
condition or situation in a particular context but the MAs are unable to alter this 
conditional, matching maximising theoretical principle. Counteracting this limitation, 
and justifying the taking of a multi-theoretical perspective in this study, is the 
examination of role theory (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978). This theory 
seeks to explain the behaviour of roles through the expectations (i.e., an antecedent) 
placed on roles but also accommodating the influence that role occupants may have 
on these expectations through their characteristics and interpersonal relationships.  
 
8.5.2 Role expectations as antecedents and assisting OMs in their roles  
Role theory‘s (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978) prediction of role behaviour 
(of the MAs) being influenced by the expectations of others (the OMs) was strongly 
supported in the findings with evidence showing that management or OMs were 
strong antecedents to the roles of MAs, confirming Hopper (1980) and Sathe (1982). 
The analysis of the expectations of OMs in the context of MAs provides evidence 
with respect to a gap in the literature in this area, and it has been over 25 years since 
Hopper (1980) investigated OMs‘ expectations of MAs. From an expectations 
perspective, this study extends Hopper‘s work in providing an in-depth analysis of the 
specific control and decision support expectations for each OM, and in the detailed 
examination of management reports. This study investigates the expectations of OMs 
as being unique to each OM, and did not seek to establish those common across OMs 
to facilitate quantitative analysis, as in Hopper (1980). Furthermore, in this study all 
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MAs reported into the financial hierarchy and were not adjacent to the OMs that they 
were linked with, while in Hopper‘s (1980) work only four of the 12 MAs were 
centralised. While Hopper (1980) found variation across the alternative structural 
arrangements (e.g., OMs‘ expectations being met more in decentralised arrangements) 
this study found variations in MAs meeting OMs‘ expectations across the same 
structural arrangement. Table 8.1 provides a summary of the control and decision 
support expectations of OMs alongside the associated attributes of reports and 
information, and dimensions of the roles of MAs in these contexts. 
 
Control expectations Control information Control role 
 Jointly prepare plans 
and forecasts 
 Provide performance 
analysis 
 Some variances not 
analysed 
 Flexibility of budgeting 
in context 
 Interaction on 
operations teams 
 Head office imposed report 
templates but some subsidiary 
reports relevant to OMs 
 Attributes: summaries, simple, 
graphical, financial/non-
financial, key indicators, 
timely, accurate  
 Some detailed reports often 
quickly reviewed for overall 
position and trends – attention 
focus helpful 
 Linked to decision making 
 Some reports of little or no 
value to OMs 
 Provides the foundational 
structures e.g., ‗cost 
drivers‘, ‗templates‘ 
 Interaction gives 
understanding of control 
in context  
 Contributing in operations 
meetings 
 Interaction linked to 
variances from budget 
 Interpersonal skills and 
MA-OM interaction 
linked to better control 
outcomes 
Decision expectations Decision information Decision role 
 Business understanding 
 Initiative taking 
 Recommendations 
 Relevant information 
 Stronger approach  to 
addressing issues 
 OM-driven 
 Specificity 
 Non-recurring but may become 
routine 
 Some of high relevance  
 Flexible design 
 Non-financial, future and 
strategic orientation 
 Necessitating interaction 
 Some reports of little value  
 Contribution in operations 
meetings 
 Need business 
understanding and 
relevant information to 
contribute 
 More involvement on the 
floor or in the field 
 Good working 
relationships  
 
Table 8.1 – Summary of expectations, information attributes, and the roles of MAs 
 
Role theory predicts an impact on the role behaviour of the focal role from the role 
expectations of others. The model (see section 2.4) depicting role theory‘s predictions 
focuses on role senders as a collection of individuals, each exerting a direct influence 
on the focal role through each role sender‘s expectations of the focal role. This study 
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has found that that the focal role (i.e., the MA) is influenced, as per the theory, 
directly by a role sender‘s expectations but also indirectly through role sender‘s 
expectations being conveyed through another role sender e.g., the intermediary 
transmission of OMs‘ expectations via the financial controller. The findings support 
role theory‘s distinction between the sent role (expectations from role sender) and the 
received role (the focal role‘s interpretation of these expectations) as there was 
variation in the extent that these were aligned. 
 
Role theory does not adequately account for the influence of the external environment 
on the roles of MAs. This was perceived as influencing the roles of MAs directly in 
smaller and independent manufacturing firms in phase one and indirectly for MAs in 
large subsidiary organisations in phase one and two. The theory was also found to not 
address the impact that role senders‘ (i.e., OMs) understanding and awareness of focal 
roles (i.e., MAs) has on the expectations that they have of those in focal roles. Role 
theory also predicts that focal role occupants can impact upon the expectations of role 
senders that are directed towards the MAs, through the characteristics and inter-
personal relationships of MAs. The findings supported these predictions: 
characteristics and relationships of MAs most meeting OMs‘ expectations appeared to 
relate to OMs‘ expecting more from these MAs (e.g., AO1 and AM1, BO3 and BM3). 
However, this influence was found to be weak with some OMs seeking MAs to exert 
more influence over them and in one case, BM3 was unable to alter OMs‘ 
expectations of a management report. The noted unfulfilled expectations of OMs in 
the study all point to conflicts (see section 8.5.4) as role theory predicts in the non-
fulfilment of the expectations of role senders. It also reinforces some differences 
between the role signals sent and their interpretation or in role theory terms, 
differences between the sent role and the received role. 
 
In investigating sent and received roles, the findings also address a gap in the 
literature in drawing on the perceptions of both accountants and managers. While 
phase one did not link specific MAs with specific OMs some perceptual differences 
were noted e.g., on how flexible MAs were, on the value of their contribution and 
their role in decision making, and on the characteristics and consequences of the roles 
of MAs in a broader context. Phase two notes perceptual differences in relation to 
specific MAs and OMs (see section 7.3.2.9). Perceptions were more similar when 
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expectations were either very high (e.g., BO3 and BM3) or very low (e.g., EO and 
EM) but more adrift between these points. There was a tendency for most MAs to 
define their roles in information provision terms, as ‗messengers‘ [DM2], when OMs 
wished for MAs to be much move actively and assertively involved: ‗part of my 
function‘ [BO1] and ‗based in the business‘ [DO1]. The extent that MAs did not meet 
the expectations of OMs has been discussed previously but it adds to these perceptual 
gaps noted here. In highlighting these gaps, the study supports previous studies 
identifying perceptual gaps between MAs and OMs (Jablonsky et al. 1993; Pierce and 
O‘Dea, 2003) and further research would be merited using this design (see section 
8.8). The extent that MAs meet the expectations of OMs also partially addresses the 
gap in the literature on some of the contradictions regarding the variation in the extent 
that MAs are assisting OMs in their roles.  
 
Sathe‘s (1982) analysis was largely of the expectations of corporate management and 
controllers as impacting on the involvement of controllers and pays less attention to 
the individual characteristics of controllers. These characteristics have been included 
in this study and have been found to relate to the extent that MAs assist OMs in the 
performance of their roles. The findings also challenge Sathe‘s (1983) framework on 
controller roles (involved, independent, split, and strong controller) where the 
independent controller, being more removed from operations, is more appropriate 
where there is greater focus in the organisation on the integrity of control systems and 
financial reporting. The findings of this study indicate some evidence of contexts in 
which more involvement, as opposed to independence, can lead to more effective 
control. This is discussed further in the next section on management control. 
 
8.5.3 Management control and the roles of MAs and assisting OMs 
From a management control theory perspective the findings address a gap in the 
literature regarding understanding control in contemporary contexts (Otley, 1994; 
Scapens et al., 2003). The findings indicate that control theory‘s emphasis on the 
mechanisms of control may have less merit than understanding how control systems 
are used, following the work of Simons (1995) as table 8.1 illustrates that interacting 
was an expected part of the control role for MAs. The recurring themes from this 
study provide evidence suggesting that more effective control may be associated with 
more involvement of MAs with OMs (see sections 5.3.1.5, 5.3.1.7, 5.4.1.2, 6.5, 6.9, 
369 
 
and 7.3.2.4) which questions the previous conclusions in the literature on control 
being associated with being somewhat removed and not involved with OMs (Simon et 
al., 1954; Sathe, 1982; Keating and Jablonsky, 1991; Sutthiwan and Clinton, 2008). 
The findings however find support in Maas and Matějka‘s (2009) very recent findings 
on divisional involvement leading to more control. The specific ways in which more 
involvement of MAs was found to lead to more effective control in the findings 
included: MAs being able to detect control issues at an earlier point in time, MAs 
having more scope to challenge OMs, OMs being more prepared to be more open 
about control issues, MAs by possessing business knowledge could better evaluate 
control in an operational context, MAs designing customised control reports, OMs 
more readily accepting control measures, and a more shared understanding of control 
in the wider context, as IF noted ‗control is easier, everyone understands…there to 
work with them‘. Further research is needed to better understand how the interaction 
between MAs and OMs can lead to control outcomes (see section 8.8). The study does 
support Sathe‘s (1982) notion of the ‗strong controller‘ in the need to possess certain 
characteristics in performing the combined role of control and decision support.  
 
OMs expected some flexibility from MAs in budgetary control systems and an 
understanding of this in a broader business context, which implies the need for a more 
fluid model of control than the more routine form depicted in the cybernetic model 
(Otley and Berry, 1980). The findings also highlight two factors that may explain the 
effectiveness of this model of control. Firstly, it may depend on how the MA engages 
in the control process (e.g., seeking explanations, error checking versus contributing 
to the wider control process). Secondly, the finding that some control reports were of 
little or no value to OMs suggests that control may be presumed to be effective given 
the existence of the feedback mechanisms but are not actually being effective. SOX 
was perceived as a strong antecedent to the roles of MAs in US subsidiary firms, 
which enlarged the control roles of MAs. While SOX appears to have strengthened 
the control environment in the study, it does raises questions regarding its impact on 
achieving organisational objectives, which in control theory terms is the ultimate 
purpose of control (Anthony, 1965; Otley and Berry, 1980; Flamholtz et al., 1985). 
The implications of SOX and its consequences merit further research (see section 
8.8). 
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As there is little literature on the roles of MAs and the consequences of these for 
management control, the findings in this study adds to this gap by indicating that the 
involvement of MAs can lead to consequences for improved performance, better 
planning and control, enhanced information provision and decision making (see 
sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 6.5, and 6.9). This involvement of MAs with OMs was also 
found to lead to a number of conflicts and ambiguities for the roles of MAs with 
implications for assisting OMs in their roles which is discussed in the next section. 
 
8.5.4 Role conflicts and ambiguities for MAs and assisting OMs in their roles 
This research has addressed gaps in the literature on the consequences for the roles of 
MAs through the lens of role theory (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978).  In 
total 14 role conflicts or ambiguities are identified as consequences for the roles of 
MAs (see detailed summary in section 7.6). Many of these add to the literature as 
these conflicts or ambiguities have not been published in previous research e.g., 
conflicts in MAs seeking to assist OMs but being unwelcome, having to sell the roles 
of MAs, conflicts in the MAs‘ approach to involvement, conflicts and ambiguities 
with the FM and head office requirements, while also attempting to assist OMs in 
their roles. While these conflicts and ambiguities relate to MAs, most have 
implications for assisting OMs in their roles. 
 
Where there are similarities to previous studies – i.e., Hopper (1980) and to a lesser 
extent Sathe (1982), who focused more on the corporate controller – the findings were 
not very consistent. This study notes excessive involvement, conflicts regarding the 
characteristics of MAs, and ambiguities and conflicts associated with FMs, all of 
which contrasts with Hopper‘s work. Consistent with Hopper (1980) the expectations 
of OMs remained unfulfilled and reporting duties tended to dominate to the detriment 
of assisting OMs in their roles. Phase one lent support to Sathe‘s (1982) ‗strong 
controller‘ role but phase two did not, with MAs attributing this more to the FM level 
with some MAs recognising that they could be stronger in their roles. Role theory, in 
its exposition of the unmet expectations of OMs as noted earlier, provides a number 
of insights into the roles of MAs in moving to the model of the business partner which 
is discussed next. 
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8.5.5 The roles of MAs and the model of the business partner 
Through the evidence gathered on the extent that MAs were meeting the expectations 
of OMs in the performance of their roles, these findings also partially address the 
contradictions in the existing literature in that some MAs appear to be moving 
towards the model of business partnership, while others do not appear to be doing so. 
Those MAs who were meeting OMs‘ expectations the most could be aligned to 
moving towards the model of business partnership, while those who were not doing 
so, or where OMs had little or no expectations of them, can explain why some of the 
evidence in the literature is contradictory. The ‗case‘ MAs that appeared to most meet 
OMs‘ expectations were AM1, AM4, and BM3 and those that partially meet OMs‘ 
expectations were AM2, BM1, CM, DM1, and DM2, while those MAs who did not 
meet expectations or from whom little was expected were AM3, BM2, BM4, and EM. 
The characteristics associated with these groupings of MAs in the extent that they 
were meeting expectations of OMs was summarised in section 7.4.1.5. The extent that 
each MA assisted each OM in their roles was summarised in section 6.17 across the 
three dimensions of impact, information, and interaction. Thus, with regard to the 
contradictions in the literature on the roles of MAs moving to the model of the 
business partner the findings of this study can explain why such variation might exist 
in previous studies (see section 7.9). In summary, the study concludes that the 
following factors may explain these contradictions: 
 
1) The MA‘s capacity to assist OMs in their roles e.g., head office requirements, 
regulatory compliance (i.e., SOX) and the FM;   
 
2) The individual characteristics of the MA e.g., understanding of the business, 
interpersonal skills, the ability to contribute and challenge members of cross-
functional teams, taking initiative and the MA‘s ‗hunger‘ [HO] and ‗willingness‘ 
[AO2] to get involved; 
 
3) The ability of the MA to provide and interpret relevant and timely information in a 
broader organisational context; 
 
4) The approach the MA takes in interacting with OMs e.g., ‗corporate 
person…watching the errors‘, ‗big brother‘, using the ‗spot light‘, ‗meddling‘ 
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versus being ‗collaborative‘ and there to ‗add value‘, giving ‗directional 
guidance‘, and making ‗suggestions‘;  
 
5) The MA may have a strong disposition towards either financial accounting or 
decision support roles; 
 
6) The understanding that MAs have of the requirements of OMs to assist them in 
their roles, which may be related to the extent of interaction between MAs and 
OMs, and MAs‘ exposure to the wider business operations; 
 
7) The variability in OMs‘ expectations and the MAs‘ ability to adapt to these e.g., 
different levels of awareness of the roles of MAs, different managerial preferences 
regarding interaction with MAs, different expectations regarding the provision of 
information, different levels of financial acumen; and 
 
8) The prescriptions of role definitions and the activities MAs are involved in e.g., 
some MAs were involved in projects, strategic activities, and non-routine reports, 
while others were more involved in operational accounting activities and routine 
reports with each expressing a preference in this regard. 
 
The study supports different classifications of the roles of MAs (see section 3.5. and 
3.7) and that the roles of MAs as business partners is one that is evolving (Brignall et 
al., 1999; CIMA, 2007, 2009). The study also provides a template of the roles of 
MAs, from phase one (see section 7.7), as the Engager, the Uninvited Guest, the 
Outsider, and the Salesperson which marries different approaches MAs take to 
involvement with OMs and variability in OMs seeking involvement. Phase two found 
further support for the template (see section 7.8) but applied a more fluid 
interpretation of the roles of MAs as being less rigidly associated with one particular 
profile as they varied according to activities, timing, and use of reports. These 
analyses add to the literature in broadening the frequently cited dichotomy of MAs as 
‗bean-counters‘ and ‗business partners‘ or titles akin to these depictions (see section 
3.5) to include the Uninvited Guest and Salesperson. It can be concluded from the 
template that the Engager most reflects the model of the business partner in the 
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literature and that the roles of MAs in any other quadrant are not fully assisting OMs 
in the performance of their roles. 
 
8.6 Parameters framing the interpretation of this research  
In the making of any conclusions from research it is imperative to state the parameters 
governing the interpretation of that research. The study has associated merits and 
limitations that are now highlighted. 
 
8.6.1 Merits of the study 
The study has merit in its focus on the roles of MAs and while it recently has been 
receiving more attention in the literature, this literature has produced some 
fragmented, incomplete, and inconsistent results, and little if any theoretical analysis 
of these roles. The model of the business partner for the roles of MAs has continued 
to be mandated in both the professional and academic literature. 
 
The methodological approach adopted in the research has merit in its planning, design 
and operationalisation. While the design was predicated upon appropriate 
investigation of the research objectives, the overarching qualitative approach 
represented a less mainstream design to the quantitative designs that dominate in the 
accounting literature. The merits of the qualitative design for this research included 
the capacity to acquire insights and an in-depth understanding of the roles of MAs in 
the context of their roles in contemporary manufacturing settings. The cross-sectional 
potential, while limited by the qualitative design that trades breadth for depth, offered 
some scope for cross-sectional analysis of roles. In phase one the cross-sectional 
design (Lillis and Mundy, 2005) facilitated the building of a more holistic (Patton, 
1990) picture of the roles of MAs and it also facilitated capturing insights regarding 
noted inconsistencies in the literature. In phase two, the concentrated focus on the 
roles of MAs from the perspective of assisting OMs in the performance of their roles 
was possible by using the case (i.e., the MA) approach. The merit of this approach 
was it permitted the gathering of specific and corroborating data in the form of 
interviews and management reports produced by MAs.  
 
The inclusion of perceptions of OMs in both phases of the research mitigated the 
potential for bias from a one dimensional perspective on the roles of MAs by MAs. In 
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phase two there was a matching effect as MAs were asked to identify those OMs who 
influenced their roles the most. This facilitated a direct comparison and validation of 
perceptions of the actual roles of MAs enacted in organisations. 
 
Some claims can be made regarding the rigour injected into the different phases of the 
research process (see section 4.7.3) which included data management and collection 
‗protocols‘ (Yin, 1994), interview guide design, informed consent for access 
including anonymity arrangements, interview recording, transcription and validation, 
the keeping of a reflective research diary, and a pre-planned and detailed systematic 
approach to qualitative data analysis. There was also some merit in the openness and 
trust that was demonstrated in the provision of extremely sensitive management 
accounting information. The study cannot, and does not, make claims regarding any 
generalising of the results beyond those to whom the data relate but it does attempt to 
generalise to theory (Yin, 1994) in the form of three theoretical lenses in moving from 
the empirical sphere back to the theoretical sphere and to make ‗naturalistic‘ 
generalisations (Stake, 1978; Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
 
8.6.2 Limitations of the study 
This research was conducted within a qualitative mode of enquiry and thus any 
interpretation of its results must be understood within the nature of this approach. 
Thus, the very small sample size taken, and its taking as a convenience sample, 
severely curtails any claims regarding the sample being representative and in no way 
enables the researcher to make any claims regarding the wider population of MAs or 
any statistical inferences in that context. The organisational context of the research is 
the investigation of the roles of MAs in medium and large manufacturing firms and 
thus the findings must be viewed through such a context.  Also the nature of the 
manufacturing firms – largely production-oriented MNE subsidiaries – resulted in 
OMs being primarily from production functions e.g., only three of the 12 MAs in 
phase two were in companies with sales and marketing functions (Company D and E).  
 
While alternative research designs were evaluated and dismissed in favour of a 
qualitative approach, the methods employed with this approach have limitations 
including interviewer bias, reliability of documentation, defining boundaries, ethical 
considerations and claims that such designs are poorly conducted, take considerable 
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time to undertake, and produce copious and inaccessible output (Scapens, 1990; Yin, 
1994). Although these limitations cannot be completely eradicated the researcher 
addressed them in the context of the design rigour documented in chapter four. 
 
Phase two of the study involved interviewing an OM that the MA identified as most 
influencing their roles. It is acknowledged, and confirmed in the findings, that MAs 
were influenced by a number of OMs. Therefore the findings are limited by not 
including all OMs that may influence the roles of MAs. However, as noted in section 
6.4, and detailed in appendix G, many of the OMs that MAs identified as those most 
influencing their roles were not primarily OMs but FMs. Further, it must also be 
recognised that there was some potential for OMs to be reticent in critiquing the roles 
of the MAs linked to them as OMs had working relationships with these OMs. 
However, to counter this limitation the design is based on an established role theory 
methodology and OMs did present some criticisms of the MAs linked to them. 
 
8.7 Practical implications  
Published accounting research has been noted as not being accessible to practitioners. 
Leisenring and Johnson (1994) state that ‗researchers need to do a better job of 
communicating with practitioners‘ (p. 76) and in examining ‗real-world phenomena 
and finding relationships‘ (p. 78) that can be useful for practitioners. With this in 
mind, this section aims to distil the central messages from this research for MAs: 
 
1) Assisting OMs in the performance of their roles was found not to be 
straightforward in this research raising questions therefore on the much-mandated 
move to the business partner model for MAs. There is a need for MAs to be aware 
of the variability in the expectations of OMs which includes different styles, 
different functional information needs, different involvement expectations, 
different approaches to using management accounting information, and different 
levels of financial acumen, and awareness and understanding of the roles of MAs. 
This requires the MA to be highly adaptive and sensitive to these nuances in 
providing assistance to OMs in their roles.  
 
2) The roles of MAs face challenges in providing assistance to OMs in the 
performance of these roles in highly regulated (i.e., SOX) subsidiary 
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environments as the additional regulatory burden appears to have increased the 
MA‘s workload which has displaced some scope for MAs to assist OMs, as firms 
did not recruit additional resources to satisfy these requirements. Further, the 
impact of SOX was perceived negatively by both MAs and OMs. Also, many 
MAs were found to spend considerable time in the preparation of management 
reports, and particularly for MAs in MNE subsidiaries. The roles of MAs were 
mainly oriented towards meeting the requirements of head office, and consumed a 
sizeable portion of the MA‘s time, time that was not being used to directly assist 
OMs in their roles. Both SOX and spending a lot of time on report preparation 
challenge the scope of MAs to assist OMs and the move towards the model of the 
business partner. Thus, there are resource implications associated with these 
requirements. Perhaps innovations in IT (e.g., business intelligence tools (CIMA, 
2008)) might address some of the reporting requirements given that interviewees 
perceived their systems as generally poor.  
 
3) MAs who operate on management decision making teams, and also maintain the 
integrity and objectivity of accounting and control systems require a set of very 
specific characteristics which include: interpersonal and communication skills, a 
strong personality, competence in accounting combined with solid business 
understanding, proactiveness, and flexibility. Some MAs may need to raise their 
profile in organisations as there was evidence in this research that some OMs did 
not understand the roles of MAs, or the potential of these roles to contribute to 
assisting OMs in their roles. These capabilities and skills could be considered in 
the design of management accounting educational curricula and professional 
development.  
 
4) This study has highlighted an extensive range of role conflicts and ambiguities 
that MAs may face in the enacting of their roles, and in moving towards the model 
of the business partner. These conflicts and ambiguities raise questions about the 
MA‘s preparedness to deal with these from a professional perspective – which 
relates to some of the characteristics noted in the preceding paragraph – 
and also in educational settings.   
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5) Management accounting information provision should be evaluated from the 
perspective of its value to OMs. This research has highlighted that some 
information provided is of more value than other information to OMs and that 
there may be some redundancy in the information provided. Information that was 
attributed more value by OMs included that which MAs could discuss 
interactively, on the foundation of the MA‘s business understanding, having 
characteristics such as timeliness, relevance, focus-oriented, flexible design, and a 
user orientation in terms of graphical and simple presentation and commentary. 
The distinction between routine and non-routine reports may have implications for 
the roles of MAs in practice. It was often found that MAs involved in producing 
certain non-routine reports were meeting the decision support expectations of 
OMs, and were aligned more with the model of the business partner, while it was 
more variable for MAs primarily involved in the production of routine reports. 
 
8.8 Future research  
This study investigates the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated 
with the roles of MAs and the extent that antecedents and characteristics have 
consequences for assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. A number of 
recommendations can be made regarding trajectories for future research.  
 
The study produced a comprehensive picture of the roles of MAs, showing the 
antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with these roles and related 
specific antecedents and characteristics to consequences for assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles. As this overall perspective on the roles of MAs is new to 
the literature, further research could examine its applicability across a wider sample of 
manufacturing firms or examine it in the context of the roles of MAs in other sectors 
such as the services sector. The picture taken in this study is also of a static nature so 
any research that could capture longitudinal dimensions of these factors would also be 
of merit.  
 
This research has found that MAs are producing some reports that play an important 
role in assisting the control and decision needs of OMs but also has revealed that MAs 
are producing reports that are detailed beyond requirement or of little or no value to 
OMs. Future research could examine these latter set of reports in organisations to 
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better understand the forces shaping these, the rationale for their existence, and the 
roles of MAs, and OMs, in their context. 
 
OMs have been a central point in the investigation of the roles of MAs as it is the 
expectations of OMs that MAs seek to address. However, considerable variability was 
observed in these expectations whether in regard to information needs, information 
use, or attitudes to involving MAs, which ultimately suggests conflicts and 
ambiguities for MAs moving to the model of business partnership. Research in the 
future could seek further insights into understanding the interfacing between OMs and 
MAs, and the implications for accounting education ought to be considered as trainee 
MAs are likely to encounter these issues. 
 
With the perceptions of MAs and OMs in this study indicating that an increasing 
regulatory environment challenges moving towards the model of the business partner 
for MAs, further research could usefully explore this line of investigation further. The 
SOX legislation is relatively new and so it is perhaps early to be speculating about its 
potential to impact upon the roles of MAs. Perceptions captured in this study are 
sufficient to mandate further research on whether it will have a temporary or 
permanent impact on the roles of MAs, and on determining its impact on the roles of 
MAs in a broader context. 
 
Many firms had not implemented many of the recognised management accounting 
innovations identified in the literature, and only two were about to implement BSCs. 
An interesting area to explore further would be how the associations observed in this 
research relate to the roles of MAs in organisations that have adopted management 
accounting innovations. 
 
The influence of corporate head office on subsidiary firms was identified as 
detrimental to MAs assisting OMs in the performance of their roles because of a 
heavy reporting burden being placed on the MAs. Research could usefully focus on 
the reporting requirements of corporate head offices in view of the apparent cost of 
meeting these i.e., sacrificing assisting OMs in the performance of their roles. Such a 
study would require access to both head office and subsidiaries. 
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The roles of FMs (directors, controllers) were found to strongly influence the roles of 
MAs and thus, research addressing how these managers shape the roles of MAs is 
warranted. This research could examine the roles of FMs from the selection processes 
of MAs for particular roles and the development of these roles as they move from 
junior to more senior roles. A longitudinal design would be appropriate here. 
 
The theoretical lenses used in this study lend themselves to further research on the 
roles of MAs. The findings on management control suggest that theoretical 
development of management control should take more account of how control is 
enacted through the roles of MAs, and seek to further explain how the interaction 
between MAs and OMs can lead to positive control outcomes. The contingency lens 
has identified a number of propositions (see section 8.5.1) that could be examined 
across a wider sample through quantitative analysis, and many of these have already 
been suggested for further research. Role theory has highlighted the extent that MAs 
do not meet the expectations of OMs and associated conflicts and ambiguities for the 
roles of MAs. Given the theory‘s scope to illuminate these concepts and the pivotal 
importance of these to MAs assisting OMs in their roles, further research within this 
theoretical frame could examine the expectations of OMs, and indeed FMs, in respect 
of a greater number of MAs, in different settings and also their characteristics over 
some timeframe. Included in this recommendation, would also be further research on 
the role conflicts and ambiguities that role theory has drawn attention to, with a view 
to understanding their wider prevalence, and the extent that these can be addressed. 
 
8.9 Contribution 
The claims regarding contribution are made in the context of the merits and 
limitations of the study as outlined in section 8.6. The contribution of the study is as 
follows: 
 
1) This research offers a holistic perspective on the roles of MAs in presenting a 
more comprehensive depiction and in-depth analysis of these roles which includes 
the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with the roles of 
MAs (see section 7.2 and figure 7.1) which hitherto fore has not been presented in 
the literature. This, in perhaps a small way, attempts to address the observations 
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that much of management accounting research is fragmented in nature.  
 
2) Using the contingency theoretical lens the study makes a contribution in using a 
qualitative approach to understand a number of contingencies relating to 
antecedents to the roles of MAs. The study shows that contingent variables 
pertinent to the extent that MAs assist OMs in the performance of their roles 
include: the presence of a head office, SOX, the OMs in their styles, discretion, 
financial abilities, functions and awareness and understanding of the roles of 
MAs, the FM, the alignment of MAs to operational functions, and the orientation 
and characteristics of individual MAs.   
 
3) The theoretical lens of role theory facilitated the investigation of the antecedent of 
the expectations of OMs. While confirming the theoretical prediction of the 
impact of expectations on behaviour and bringing similar but somewhat dated 
work into contemporary contexts, the study makes a contribution in its in-depth 
analysis of the control and decision expectations of OMs as regards the 
involvement of MAs, and the information they provide, and the extent that MAs 
are meeting these. This analysis has addressed a gap in the literature in explaining 
some of the contradictory findings on why only some MAs are moving towards 
the model of business partner. The study has highlighted aspects that are not 
adequately addressed in role theory including the intermediary transmission of 
OM expectations through the FM, the impact of the external environment, and 
role sender‘s understanding and awareness of the roles of MAs. The theory has 
also facilitated the garnering of a deeper understanding of the unfulfilled 
expectations of OMs regarding MAs assisting them in the performance of their 
roles, as sent roles were not always in synch with received roles. The study also 
shows that the move to the model of the business partner is not a matter of only 
being driven by managerial expectations as the findings show in support of role 
theory, that the characteristics of the MA and their interpersonal relationships 
impact upon the expectations that OMs have of MAs.  
 
4) From a management control perspective the study contributes to the literature by 
finding greater merit in understanding how the roles of MAs are involved with 
OMs in the deployment of management control as opposed to focusing on the 
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tools of management control. There is very little in the literature on the 
consequences of the roles of MAs, and this study addresses this by providing an 
in-depth analysis of a range of consequences. Contrary to the major thrust of the 
control literature, this study finds that the involvement of MAs may lead to more 
control. The study also makes a contribution to the control literature in indicating 
factors that may moderate the effectiveness of control systems which are 
flexibility, how MAs get involved in the control process, and how, and indeed 
sometimes if, control reports are used. The study has brought some early evidence 
to the literature on the emerging impact of SOX, which warrants further research.
  
5) The role theory lens also highlighted a range of role conflicts and ambiguities for 
the roles of MAs which makes a contribution to the literature in a number of 
respects. Firstly, a number of role conflicts and ambiguities were identified as 
being new to the literature. Secondly, similar studies are somewhat dated and this 
study brings these up to date and while confirming the continued prevalence of 
some conflicts (e.g., unmet expectations, primacy of reporting duties), differences 
emerged regarding excessive involvement, conflicts regarding the characteristics 
of MAs, and conflicts in combining control and decision support roles. Thirdly, 
new conflicts and ambiguities also emerged by including FMs in the study. 
Fourthly, the extensive range of conflicts and ambiguities also address the 
contradiction in the existing literature on the variability in the adoption of the 
model of the business partner as these make such adoption more difficult and 
uncertain. 
 
6) The study makes a contribution to the literature in regard to the roles of MAs 
moving towards the model of business partnership and away from the traditional 
notion of the bean-counter. The ‗case‘ analysis of MAs delineated the extent that 
different MAs were meeting the expectations of OMs and in so doing revealed 
important dimensions of assisting OMs in their roles and in moving towards the 
business partner model. These dimensions relate to constraints on MAs‘ capacity 
to provide decision support and a range of characteristics of MAs and OMs. The 
study also extends the business partner-bean-counter dichotomy by including the 
Uninvited Guest and Salesperson in this analysis.  
 
382 
 
7) The study has made a contribution through its research design in a number of 
respects. In the employment of the qualitative approach, an approach not prevalent 
in the accounting literature (see section 4.3), an in-depth understanding of the 
roles of MAs, and their roles in assisting OMs, was made possible. The inclusion 
of OMs as well as MAs in the study facilitated obtaining a financial and non-
financial perspective, again not common in accounting research. The taking of a 
two-phase qualitative approach makes a contribution to the literature as it 
permitted an analysis of the breadth of factors relevant to the roles of MAs in 
contemporary settings (phase one) and then a deeper investigation of a reduced set 
of these factors (phase two). The adoption of role theory methodology in the 
linking of specific MAs to specific OMs also makes a contribution in the literature 
as it has not been used in a similar way since the work of Hopper (1980), and the 
design in this study has some original features such as including FMs as role 
senders and in taking a more qualitative application of this methodology than in 
previous research.  
 
8) The approaches taken to the analysis of qualitative data in the study also makes a 
contribution to the literature. While both phases were heavily informed by the 
literature on qualitative data analysis, two different approaches were used (see 
section 4.9.3). This enabled the researcher to evaluate the merits and challenges of 
taking a more manual and nuanced approach in phase one with the merits and 
challenges of taking a more software-centric approach in phase two. The 
conclusion from this study is that the decision to use, or not use, such software is 
marginally in favour of using the software-centric approach but it is 
not a clear cut one, and it requires a weighing up of a number of factors.  
 
9) The study makes a contribution to the practice of MAs (see section 8.7). The 
management accounting profession in many countries has been endorsing MAs 
adopting the model of the business partner. This study finds that adopting such a 
model is far from straightforward for many reasons including: the variability in 
the expectations of OMs, the necessity for MAs to possess a range of 
characteristics to adopt this model, and the existence of a range of conflicts and 
ambiguities associated with this model. Only three of the 12 ‗case‘ MAs in the 
findings were most meeting the expectations of OMs. The examination of 
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management reports makes a contribution to practice in that the findings mandate 
an evaluation of the effectiveness of current internal reporting practices.  
 
10) The study makes a contribution in the combined use of three theoretical lenses as 
discussed separately above. This tripartite approach has little if any precedence in 
previously published management accounting research.  
 
11) The investigation of the roles of MAs in this research occurred in Ireland and as 
such is adding to the very limited number of studies in this context. While the 
study does not draw out features of the roles of MAs as culturally distinct in an 
Irish context, it nevertheless involved an under-researched sample of MAs. 
 
8.10 Summary and conclusion 
The study investigated the roles of MAs in manufacturing settings. Phase one 
addressed the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences associated with these 
roles, and phase two addressed the extent that antecedents and characteristics 
associated with the roles of MAs have consequences for assisting OMs in the 
performance of their roles. Both phases employed a qualitative approach, and 
provided a number of insights into the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences 
associated with these roles, and to those factors relevant to assisting OMs in their 
roles. 
 
Through the theoretical lenses of management control, contingency, and role theory 
the findings on the roles of MAs have illuminated: insights into control in 
contemporary settings, contingent relationships between these roles and their 
contexts, and many dimensions of the extent that MAs meet OMs‘ expectations and 
many conflicts and ambiguities around this interface. While each theory has its 
explanatory limitations, combining the use of three lenses somewhat mitigates these 
effects. The study has outlined important ramifications for MAs as practitioners and 
also useful trajectories for future academic research. The subject matter, the roles of 
MAs, is one that is as important as ever in assisting managers in the performance of 
their roles in difficult economic and competitive environments. It is also equally 
important in building the theoretical understanding of these roles in the literature. 
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Thus, the understanding of the roles of MAs represents an important nexus of interest 
to practitioners and to academicians.  
 
What the overall analysis suggests is that the MAs movement to the model of the 
business partner is one fraught with conflicts and ambiguities, is far from assured and 
there are numerous factors relating to the MA, the OM, and external influences that 
may determine the extent of the adoption of this model, and the extent to which MAs 
assist OMs in the performance of their roles. 
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Appendix A: Interview guide for FMs and OMs in phase one  
 
[Discuss purpose of research and broadly discuss present nature of business/industry] 
[Stress that respondents‘ perceptions are being sought and contribution highly valued]  
[Outline confidentiality guarantees and request consent to record interview] 
 
A. Background information  
 
1) What is your job title? 
 
2) What is your position in the organisational hierarchy?  
 
3) Briefly describe three of your key functional responsibilities?   
 
 
4) Company turnover?  
 
5) Number of employees? 
  
 
 
B. Management accounting roles in general 
 
 
1) How would you describe the role of the management accountant?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Where are management accountants most effective at making a contribution? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Do you think there is an appropriate balance or emphasis between the different 
management accounting functions?  
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C. Factors influencing the management accounting role 
 
1) What factors determine the management accountant‘s role in your 
organisation? 
 
 [Probes] 
a. The organisation‘s business environment 
 
b. The organisation‘s ownership structure (self-managed/group company) 
 
c. The organisation‘s top management 
 
d. The organisation‘s middle management 
 
e. The organisation‘s ‗strong‘ managers 
 
f. The organisation‘s size  
 
g. The organisation‘s structure  
 
h. The organisation‘s culture  
 
i. The organisation‘s IT systems  
 
j. The physical location of management accountants  
 
k. The accountant‘s background education and training   
 
 
 
2) Any other factors you can think of?  
 
 
 
3) What factors do you consider most influential?   
 
 
 
D. Characteristics of management accounting roles 
 
1) Describe the characteristics of an effective management accountant 
 
[Probes] 
a. Information provider 
 
b. Information interpreter 
 
c. Decision maker 
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d. Knowledgeable of the business 
 
e. Possess inter-personal skills 
 
f. Is a team player 
 
g. Is flexible 
 
h. Educates non-financial managers in financial matters  
 
 
 
2) What are the most important characteristics of the management accountant?
   
 
 
3) What role does the management accountant play in business decision making 
processes? 
 
[Probes] 
a. What decisions?  
 
b. How involved are management accountants? 
 
c. Would you like management accountants to be more involved? 
 
d. What decisions are accountants not involved in?  
 
 
 
4) What managerial level of decision-making within your function are 
management accountants most involved at?   
 
[Probes] 
a. Strategic / tactical /operational issues  
 
 
 
5) What are the important characteristics of the management accountant from the  
perspective of control?  
 
[Probes] 
a. Independence? 
 
b. Business involvement? 
 
c. Integrity? 
 
d. Analytical/technical skills 
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E. Management control systems and management accounting information 
 
1) How would you describe the management control function (strategy, 
objectives, targets, feedback, rewards) in your organisation?  
 
[Probes] 
a. How do the formal systems operate?  
 
b. What is the process? 
 
c. How are the management accountants involved? 
 
d. How do the informal systems operate 
 
e. Are they effective? 
 
f. Who is responsible for them?  
 
 
2) What control tools or management accounting techniques are most used by 
your function?  
[Probes] 
 
a. How are they used? 
 
b. How are they sourced? 
 
c. How are they least/most effective?  
 
d. Any accounting and control information that you are not satisfied  
with? 
 
 
3) How do you use management accounting and control information?  
 
[Probes] 
a. Used to check past performance?   
 
b. Used for decision making purposes? 
 
c. Used for forecasting purposes? 
 
d. Used for checking effect of previous decisions made? 
 
e. Are some uses more important? 
 
f. How is it used differently by managers in different functions or on 
different functions?  
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F. Consequences of management accounting roles for control  
 
 
1) How does the management accountant‘s involvement in business decision 
making processes affect the operation of management control systems?  
 
[Probes] 
a. Is management control better or worse? Why?  
 
b. Is control more shared? Who does the controlling? 
 
c. How does business involvement affect control? 
 
d. Is the use of management accounting and control information 
different? 
 
e. Are management accounting innovations easier to implement? 
 
f. Is satisfaction with management accounting different? 
 
g. How are functional relationships affected?  
 
 
 
2) Is there a conflict for management accountants in being involved in business 
decisions, while also being responsible for the integrity and independence of 
control systems?  
 
[probes] 
a. Why? 
 
b. How is it managed?  
 
c. Is independence required for control? 
 
 
 
G. Other issues  
 
Is there anything else that you feel is important in relation to the role of management 
accountants and the consequences of such roles? Other issues? 
 
 
 
[Thank you for your time] 
[Reassurance of confidentiality and seek consent for follow-up contact if required] 
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Appendix B: Phase one invitation letter to participate in study    
 
 
Waterford Institute of Technology 
 
 
Academic Research Study of the Finance Function 
 
In regard to the academic study above I would like to meet with relevant personnel in your 
firm. I am presently undertaking doctoral research with Dublin City University and this 
research represents part of that academic research process. I am a faculty member of the 
School of Accounting and Economics of Waterford Institute of Technology  and an associate 
member of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA). Prior to my present 
academic post, I was employed in a number of management-level accounting positions within 
Diageo plc, based in the UK.  
 
The purpose of the research is to gain an understanding of the role of the finance function in 
contemporary firms from the perspective of senior management accountants within the 
finance function and also from the perspective of senior operating managers. A one-page 
summary detailing the aims of the study in more precise terms is provided below.  
 
To gain adequate insights on the subject matter I wish to meet with at least one senior 
financial/management accountant and one operating manager (e.g., in production, marketing 
or sales, logistical functions). Typically a meeting will take less than an hour and will be 
arranged at the most convenient time for those participating. 
 
All information provided will be treated in the strictest of confidences and complete 
anonymity is guaranteed. If you volunteer to participate in the research the findings and 
conclusions of the study will be made available to you.  
 
Your contribution to this research will be immensely valuable to understanding the subject 
matter at hand and will be much appreciated. My telephone number at Waterford Institute of 
Technology is xxx-xxxxxx (mobile xxx-xxxxxxx) and my email address is xxxxx@xxx.xx. 
Thank you for your time in considering this request and I will be in touch within a few days 
of your receipt of this letter. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
______________ 
Sean Byrne ACMA, MBS 
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Academic Research Study of the Finance Function 
 
The overall study aims to build a better understanding of the changing role of the finance 
function in contemporary Irish firms based on the perceptions of those working within the 
finance function and the perceptions of those who work with the finance function. 
 
The three primary objectives of the research are: 
 
1. To understand the attributes of the finance function operating within contemporary 
organisations in Ireland. This entails the identification of the finance function role 
characteristics that are perceived as important and effective. 
 
2. To determine what factors determine the particular shape that the finance function 
takes within contemporary organisations in Ireland. This involves the identification 
of the perceived influences or drivers of the present finance function roles. 
 
3. To explore the consequences of the present finance function attributes in regard to 
the organisation‘s control systems. This objective considers the effects that the 
present finance function roles may be having on the organisation‘s management 
control function such as objective setting, budgets, performance measurement and 
management, and information flows.   
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Appendix C1: Interview guide in phase two: first interview with MAs  
 
Interview guide [Management Accountant 1, focal role] 
 
Date  Interviewee  
Time  Company  
 
[Discuss purpose of research] 
[Stress that respondents’ perceptions are being sought and contribution valued]  
[Outline confidentiality guarantees and request consent to record interview] 
 
 
A. Background information  
 
1) What is your job title? 
 
2) How long have you worked for this firm? 
 
3) How long have you held this position? 
 
4) What qualifications do you hold? 
 
5) Who do report to?  
 
 
B Focal role description  
 
1) Please could you identify the major activities that make up your role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Major factors influencing the management accounting role  
 
1) What do you consider to be the major influences on your role? 
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Themes for discussion 
Head Office 
Management – Financial 
Management – Operating 
Regulation 
Individual 
 
2) For each influence 
 
a. How does this influence operate? Can you give me examples? 
 
 
 
 
b. When is this influence particularly strong and what makes it so? 
 
 
 
 
3) What do you consider most influential? Why? Examples? 
 
 
 
D. Role definition sources  
 
1) How do you know what you are supposed to do in this job? How do you find 
out about your responsibilities? 
 
 
2) How do written documents like job descriptions, policy statements, memos, 
procedures help determine your responsibilities? 
 
 
3) How do objectives determine your responsibilities? 
 
 
4) What influence has your professional training had upon the determination of 
your responsibilities? 
 
5) To what extent have you been able to define this job for yourself-to carve out 
your own area of responsibility, to make major changes in your activities? 
Examples? 
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6) Could you identify and rank the individuals that most influence your role? 
 
Role senders name Role senders position 
1  
2  
3  
4  
 
 
E Involvement nature and expectations  
 
1) How do you feel about interacting with operating managers? 
 
 
 
2) What job activities require you to interact most with operating managers? 
 
 
 
 
 
3) For these activities… 
 
a. What influences the extent of your involvement? Examples? 
 
 
 
b. How would you describe the purpose of your involvement? Examples? 
 
 
 
 
 
4) What do you see as the major consequences of your involvement? Examples? 
 
 
 
 
Themes for discussion 
Decision making and control impact 
Quality, use, and value of accounting 
information  
Role conflicts 
Need to sell the roles of MAs 
 
5) What are your perceptions of operating managers expectations regarding your 
interaction with them  
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6) Anything distinguishing when more/less involvement is sought of you? 
 
 
 
7) When or where is involvement easiest or hardest? Examples? 
 
 
 
8) Do you notice any differences between operating managers regarding 
involvement expectations? 
 
 
9) Have you had to explain to managers that there is merit in having you 
involved? Why?  
 
 
10) Have your ever perceived that your involvement was restricted in any way?  
 
 
 
F Role stress, ambiguity and conflict 
 
Stress 
1) How stressful do you find your job? Examples? 
 
 
 
 
2) What is it in these situations that give rise to high stress? 
 
 
 
3) Do you find the interacting with operating managers stressful? 
 
 
 
 
Ambiguity 
4) Are you ever uncertain about what is expected of you? Examples? 
 
 
 
5) What gives rise to the highest levels of ambiguity? Examples? 
 
 
 
6) Is there ever a lack of clarity about what is expected of you regarding your 
involvement with operating managers? 
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Conflict 
7) Have there ever been occasions when some of the people you work with have 
different views about your role?  
 
a) Can you give me examples when this happens most?  
 
 
 
b) What are high levels associated with? 
 
 
 
8) Has anyone ever wanted you to do things differently? 
 
a) Can you give me examples of when this happens most? 
 
 
 
9) Have you experienced conflict by performing a MA role, while also being 
involved in business activities with operating managers 
 
a) Can you give me examples of when this happens most? 
 
 
 
b) What are high levels associated with? 
 
 
 
 
 
G MA role characteristics 
 
1) What characteristics do you think a person should have to be good at your job? 
 
 
 
 
 
2) What characteristics might lead one to do poorly in your job? 
 
 
 
 
3) Do you have any traits that make you particularly suited to this job? 
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4) Do you feel you have any traits that lead you to not being well-suited to this job? 
 
 
5) What characteristics do you feel are key to your role? Why? 
 
 
 
Themes for discussion 
Business knowledge 
Inter-personal and communication skills 
Flexibility 
Personal qualities 
Information provider and interpreter 
Decision supporter 
 
 
I. Other issues  
 
Is there anything that you perceive as important in relation what influences your role, 
the characteristics of it or the consequences of it for management control? 
 
 
 
 
[Thank you for your time] [Reassurance of confidentiality]   
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Appendix C2: Interview guide in phase two: with OMs and about MAs 
 
Date  Interviewee  
Time  Company   
 
[Discuss purpose of research] 
[Stress that respondents’ perceptions are being sought and contribution highly valued]  
[Outline confidentiality guarantees and request consent to record interview] 
 
A. Background information  
 
1) What is your job title?  
 
2) Could you briefly tell me what you have to do in this job? 
 
3) How long have you been in this job? 
 
4) How long have you been in the company? 
 
 
B. Role perceptions  
 
1) What are your perceptions of the [MA’s name] role? 
 
2) What would you perceive as the major influences on that role? 
 
PROMPT BOX 
Head office 
Management 
Regulatory 
Individual  
 
Ask for examples of where stated influences are strongest 
 
 
C. Interaction  
 
1) How often do you talk with him/her? 
 
2) Regardless of how often you talk with each other, how often do you and [the MA’s 
name] see each other? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
426 
 
 
 
D. Involvement nature and expectations  
 
Regarding activities that involve you with [the MA’s name]… 
 
Activities identified by MA Other involvement activities 
  
  
  
 
1) What expectations have you of [the MA’s name] for involvement in this activity? 
 
 
 
2) What actual involvement does [the MA’s name] provide? Purpose? 
 
 
 
 
3) What influences the extent to which you involve [the MA’s name] in this activity? 
 
 
4) Nearly everyone has some things he/she would want people he/she works with to 
do differently. Would you like [the MA’s name] to engage in this activity exactly 
the way he/she does now, or would you like him/her to do it in any way 
differently than he/she does now?  
 
 
 
a. If so how? 
 
 
b. Have you tried to get him/her to change? Effect? 
 
 
 
5) Would you seek more or less involvement from [the MA’s name]? 
 
a. If no, why not? 
 
b. If yes, why so? 
 
 
6) To what extent does [the MA’s name] need to convince you that there is merit in 
having him/her involved? 
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7) What do you see as the major consequences of [the MA’s name] involvement? 
Examples? 
 
PROMPT BOX 
Decision making and control 
Better information 
Role conflicts 
Need to sell the role of MAs 
 
8) Where is the greatest mismatch between the expected and actual involvement? 
Please explain why this is so? 
 
 
9) What makes you most pleased with [the MA’s name] involvement with you? 
 
 
 
10) What makes you least pleased with [the MA’s name] involvement with you? 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Influence of manager over MA 
 
1) Suppose you were to make a recommendation or a request to [the MA’s name], to 
what extent would he/she pay serious attention to you? 
 
2) How do you regard your influence over what the MA does? Would you say it is 
too little, too much or about right? 
 
 
 
 
F. Influence of MA over manager 
 
1) Suppose he/she were to make a request or recommendation to yourself. To what 
extent would you pay serious attention to it? 
 
2) How do you regard the amount of influence the MA has over you? Is it too much, 
too little or about right? 
 
 
G. Role conflict  
 
Many positions in industry require that a person have not only certain technical skills 
and experience, but also certain personality characteristics or particular talents. 
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1) Thinking of [the MA’s name] job, what sort of personal characteristics do you feel 
a person ought to have to be good at that job? 
 
  
  
  
 
2) What sort of personal characteristics might lead a person to do poorly in that job? 
 
  
  
  
 
(For each attribute identified in 1 and 2, the following questions were asked) 
 
3) To what extent do you feel [the MA’s name] has this characteristic? 
 
 
 
4) Do you think he/she has any other traits that make him/her suited to the job? 
 
 
5) Has he/she any other traits that lead him/her not being suited to the job? 
 
 
 
 
H. Management accounting information and reports 
 
1) Management accounting information?  
 
a. What types of management information do you have a preference for?  
 
b. What pleases you least and most regarding the management accounting 
information you receive?  
 
c. How much time do you devote using routine versus non-routine reports?
  
d. How are they used – similarities/differences?  
 
2) Do you have a routine report to hand that comes from the management 
accountant 
 
Regarding this report: 
 
a. What are your general impressions of it? 
 
b. How do you interact with the management accountant in regard to this 
report? 
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c. When is this report most suitable? What circumstances? 
 
d. What influence do you have in the design of this report? 
 
e. Can you change this report? 
i. When was the report last changed? 
ii. Who requested the changes? 
 
f. What do you do with this report? 
 
g. What impact does the report have? 
 
3) Do you have a non-routine report to hand that comes from the management 
accountant 
 
Regarding this report: 
 
h. What are your general impressions of it? 
 
i. How do you interact with the management accountant in regard to this 
report? 
 
j. When is this report most suitable? What circumstances? 
 
k. What influence do you have in the design of this report? 
 
l. Can you change this report? 
i. When was the report last changed? 
ii. Who requested the changes? 
 
m. What do you do with this report? 
 
n. What impact does the report have? 
 
 
I. Management control systems 
 
1) How would you describe the systems in this company that steer management 
behaviour and performance towards the achievement of company goals: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) What incentives are there to achieve these goals? 
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3) How dependent are you on working with others in achieving your objectives? 
 
 
 
a) If dependent, how are individual objectives pursued in an inter-dependent, 
team-based approach to work? 
 
 
b) How do you reconcile strategic / corporate objectives, departmental and 
individual objectives? 
 
 
4) What role does [the MA’s name] play in assisting you achieve your objectives? 
 
 
 
5) How has [the MA’s name] impacted on the way the organisation is controlled? 
Examples? 
 
 
6) What do you think are the major implications of the [the MA’s name] role in terms 
of the quality of control in the business? 
 
 
 
 
 
J. Other issues  
 
Is there anything else that you feel is important in relation to the role of management 
accountants and the consequences of such roles for management control? 
 
 
 
[Thank you for your time] [Reassurance of confidentiality] [Inform respondents that they will be kept 
in the loop as the research progresses and will have access to findings/conclusions] 
[Source: Partly adapted from Hopper, 1980; Kahn et al. 1964] 
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Appendix C3: Interview guide in phase two: second interview with MAs 
 
Date  Interviewee  
Time  Company  
 
 [Outline confidentiality guarantees and request consent to record the meeting] 
 
 
A. Perceptions of management reports and interaction 
 
1) Routine versus non-routine reports?  
 
a) Types of information associated with more involvement? Why?  
 
b) Which reports require you to interact most with managers and why?   
 
c) How much time do you devote to routine versus non-routine reports?  
 
d) Do you have a preference for routine or non-routine reports?  
   
e) How are they used – similarities/differences?   
 
 
B. Routine reports 
 
Taking an example of a routine report…. 
 
1) What part do you play in the production of this report? 
 
2) What are your general impressions of this report? 
 
3) Does this report influence your role? 
 
4) What characteristics are suited / unsuited to one using these documents? 
a. To what extent do you have these characteristics  
 
5) What are the consequences of this report for your role?  
 
6) Who designed this report? 
a. Have you changed this report? Why? 
b. What influence do you have in the design of this report? 
c. Have you received comments from the report recipients regarding this 
report? 
 
7) What is this report most suitable for? What circumstances? 
 
8) How do you interact with operating managers in regard to this report? 
 
9) What do you do with this report? 
a. Distribute it 
b. Present and discuss it in person 
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10) What impact do you perceive the report as having? 
 
11) When has this report been received well and not very well? 
 
12) With hindsight what could have been done better with this report? 
 
13) How many of these type reports do you do? 
 
 
 
C. Non-routine reports 
 
Taking an example of a routine report…. 
 
1) What part do you play in the production of this report? 
 
2) What are your general impressions of this report? 
 
3) Does this report influence your role? 
 
4) What characteristics are suited / unsuited to one using these documents? 
a. To what extent do you have these characteristics  
 
5) What are the consequences of this report for your role?  
 
6) Who designed this report? 
a. Have you changed this report? Why? 
b. What influence do you have in the design of this report? 
c. Have you received comments from the report recipients regarding this 
report? 
 
7) What is this report most suitable for? What circumstances? 
 
8) How do you interact with operating managers in regard to this report? 
 
9) What do you do with this report? 
a. Distribute it 
b. Present and discuss it in person 
 
10) What impact do you perceive the report as having? 
 
11) When has this report been received well and not very well? 
 
12) With hindsight what could have been done better with this report? 
 
13) How many of these type reports do you do? 
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D. Procedural documents and the MA role 
 
1) What procedures or documents largely affect your role? 
 
2) What influence do these documents have on your role 
 
3) What are the consequences of these documents regarding your role? 
 
4) How do these documents affect any interaction with operating managers? 
a) Positive impact? 
b) Negative impact? 
 
 
E. Follow-up questions from phase one interview 
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F. Involvement influences, characteristics and consequences 
 
1) How do operating managers mostly impact on your role?  
 
2) What do you like most and least about interacting with managers? 
 
3) What determines how much involvement managers seek from you? 
 
4) What determines how much involvement you provide to managers? 
 
5) What role influences bring you closer to supporting managers? 
 
6) What role influences distances you from supporting managers? 
 
7) What characteristics bring you closer to supporting managers? 
 
8) What characteristics distance you from supporting managers? 
 
9) What are managers most pleased with regarding your involvement with them? 
 
10) What are managers least pleased with regarding your involvement with them? 
 
11) Are there aspects to your role that you perceive managers like the most? 
a) What influences this aspect of the role? 
b) What characteristics do you associate with this element of your role? 
c) What are the consequences of this element of the role? 
 
12) Are there aspects to your role that you perceive managers like the least? 
a) What influences this aspect of the role? 
b) What characteristics do you associate with this element of your role? 
c) What are the consequences of this element of the role? 
 
13) What promotes or helps you get more involved with managers in the business? 
 
14) What are the barriers to you getting involved with managers in the business? 
 
15) How do you see the management accounting role developing in the future? 
 
G. Other issues  
 
Is there anything that you perceive as important in relation what influences your role, 
the characteristics of it or the consequences of it for management control? 
 
 
 
 
 
[Thank you for your time] [Reassurance of confidentiality]   
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Phase One Analysis Grids 
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Appendix D1: Section of analysis grid on antecedents (FMs with OMs) 
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Appendix D2: Section of grid on characteristics (FMs with OMs) 
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Appendix D3: Section of grid on consequences (FMs with OMs) 
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Appendix D4: Section of grid on antecedents (OMs only) 
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Phase Two NVivo7® Analyses   
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Appendix E1: Listing of NVivo® free nodes created early in process  
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Appendix E2: Listing of NVivo® tree nodes created later in process  
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Appendix E3: Working with models 
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Appendix E4: List of memos and queries 
 
 
 
 
 
445 
 
Appendix E5: Research log excerpts 
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Phase Two Analysis Tables 
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Appendix F1: Initial summary themes table for AM1 and AO1 
 
MA Antecedents Characteristics Consequences 
AM1 
and 
AO1 
 Big - problems in 
production 
 Big - direction she will 
get from the financial 
controller (S) 
 Strength – well it is 
production, that gives is 
our profit, all starts there, 
costs…HO/Mgrs tug of 
war, diff wants, drop for 
Europe 
 Strength – fin calendar 
and m/e – won‘t get near 
AMA1, AOP, Strategic 
planning (S) 
 Mgt - production 
problems, scrap, stock,  
freight, quality, business 
unit, reports, projects, 
cost reduction, lab prod, 
tension HO and BU/GM  
 Mgt – FC priority (S) 
 HO - have to drop 
everything 
 HO – loyalties to fin rep, 
no of reps doubled (S) 
 Education – basics from 
practice 
 Environment-cost  
 Job spec-start 
 Professional training-
basics 
 FC/Ops /Ops/Ops 
 Cost focus 
 Culture – needed 
yesterday 
 Fin Mgr – first, delegate, 
trust us more 
 Fin Mgr – takes priority, 
major influence (S) 
 Own influence – not 
great extent, what mgrs 
want 
 Doc – job doc before, 
look at old stuff, spec at 
start, changed slightly 
 Loc – last office on 
block, away from 
everyone (S) 
 Rep – hit budget  
 
MGT EXPECTATIONS 
 Ad hoc 
E  – access to AMA1 on 
a timely basis   
A  - get commitment, 
INDIVIDUAL 
 Committed  
 Disorganised 
 Get on with people  
 Like numbers  
 More involvement  
 
 Accuracy (S) 
 Business knowledge (S) 
 Effective (S) 
 Interaction(S) 
 Interested (S) 
 Interpersonal (the 
benchmark) (S) 
 Open (S) 
 Could push more 
 Reactive, mgr instigates 
(S) 
 Trustworthy (S) 
 Respected (S) 
 Respects confidentiality 
(S) 
 Good working 
relationship (S) 
 Team player (S) 
 Wants to learn (S) 
 
REPORTS 
 60/40 R/NR 
 Prefer NR if not busy 
 R may ignore some 
months 
 NR more interaction 
 R: Capital expenditure 
report – spend 
 NR: Broken Mould – 
savings 
 Things going good don‘t 
hear 
 Mgrs go first to where 
relationship built up 
 You dislike/like –  don‘t 
have info, too busy / 
getting non-financial 
information, big picture 
 Like – the info, 
inventory, capital, 
improvements brought in 
 Dislike – spend control, 
take time to get back 
 Barrier – time, theirs, our 
 Production and 
outsourcing decisions 
 more information to 
everybody… given to 
the management to 
help them make 
decisions 
 we are more aware of 
what is going on so 
when we look at our P 
and L… 
 If we weren‘t so 
involved a lot of the 
costs would go crazy 
 Ambiguity – fixing 
problems, 
 Ambiguity – FC, set 
task and then find out it 
was sorted last week, 
no prioritising,  
 Ambiguity –  budget 8 
changes before head 
office happy, it is the 
environment, market, 
company, many 
changes 
 Ambiguity – inventory 
problem, they put it 
off, too many involved 
 Conflict do diff – FC 
analyse things diff e.g., 
was margin, now  cost, 
HO vs. Ops, cut costs 
vs. more cost 
 Conflict HO – caught 
between HO and Ops, 
HO priority, drop 
everything 
 Conflict diff role views 
– asked to do things, or 
not asked, whose spec? 
 Conflict – other 
department‘s  
information  wrong 
Stress – year-end, 
month-end 
 Stress – head officer 
requests, calls, local 
head office tension 
 Stress interaction– 
European  managers, 
not what they want to 
hear, know internal 
managers-easier, stress 
the whole time with 
Europe 
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pushes out, m/e first, has 
to queue(A) 
 Cost reduction projects 
E – financial benefit, 
payback, prioritise, 
investment/return, have 
for next meeting 
A – done in good timely 
fashion 
 E – inventory, accurate 
and timely info, 
forecasting remainder 
A – tracks actual, puts 
pieces together, does a 
very good job 
 Financial metrics 
(reviews) 
E – collects info, timely, 
with comments for plant 
mgr, I am responsible for 
some 
A – puts data together 
and will come to me 
looking for commentary 
on it  
E – maintenance budget, 
big, miss-coding, now 
just budgetary control 
A – weekly meeting with 
AMA1 and meets 
maintenance manager 1 
or 2 as well, it is very 
good 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Stress m/e – now 12 
Tues, I only notice a lot 
of things at month end 
but no time to check 
 Stress most – m/e and 
budget 
 Stress – SAP std 
upload y/e, budget not 
finalised til end Nov 
 Stress – diff projects 
time to time, need to 
work on quickly 
 Stress much - 
sometimes 
 Conflict do differently 
– green no enquiry, 
information prior to 
meeting, should 
accountant work for 
ops? (S) 
 Yes (early detection) 
(S) 
 have a good 
relationship there, she 
will critique, ask why 
you are doing that 
(easier to challenge) 
(S) 
 No information, poor 
decisions (S) 
 timely reporting of 
external metrics (S) 
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Appendix F2: Views of OMs about influence on roles 
 
 Managers’ views 
MA Amount of MA 
influence on OM 
OM pays attention 
to MAs’ 
recommendations 
Amount of OM 
influence on MA 
MA pays attention 
to OMs’ 
recommendations 
1 
(AM1) 
Little bit more Ok, may ignore at 
times, v busy 
About right Take it very 
seriously 
2 
(AM2) 
About right Pay attention, cost 
big issue 
Fine, he is 
responsive  
He would, up front 
if time a problem 
3 
(AM3) 
Grand, happy Hypothetical, all 
cost, hit budget, 
other criteria 
Not much 
influence but 
needs met 
Delighted when 
asked about costs 
4 
(AM4) 
About right, puts 
it to us 
Would and have 
done 
About right Close attention to 
it 
5 
(BM1) 
About right Reasonable Not enough, more 
value add 
Quite a lot of 
attention 
6 
(BM2) 
About right If made sense, 
consider, discuss 
About right Think he does 
7 
(BM3) 
Bordering too 
little 
Very high, trust 
judgement 
About right but 
needs to challenge 
back 
High 
8 
(BM4) 
Too little Not enough, quiet, 
poor reaction 
Need to explore, 
could help 
High, very 
conscientious 
9 (CM) Do with little 
more 
Attempt to address 
reasonable requests 
Cross dept but 
about right 
Very open to it 
10 
(DM1) 
About right 50/50 but if work 
straight away 
About right 50/50 personal, 
work, would be 
done 
11 
(DM2) 
About right Address it but 
maybe not all 
speedily 
Bordering too 
little 
Would adequately 
address it 
12 
(EM) 
About right yes About right but 
not influence, info 
flow 
Take it seriously 
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Appendix F3: Views of OMs about MAs doing things differently 
 
Management 
Accountant 
Role  
Influencer  
Managers’ quotes regarding doing things 
differently 
Operations 
Accountant  
(Site A) 
AM1 
 
Supply Chain 
Manager 
AO1 
 
…if you are red there is a huge steward‘s enquiry. 
So for green I would like to have the same 
 
…if we had that information prior to that (cost 
reduction meeting) we could get some of the work 
done prior to the meeting but it is only a very 
small thing. 
 
AMA1 works exclusively for the financial 
controller right, should you have an operations 
accountant that works for the Business Unit 
Manager and the Supply Chain Manager and the 
Maintenance Manager and the Engineering 
Manager, yes, I don‘t know 
 
Operations 
Accountant 
(Site A) 
AM2 
 
 
Operations  
Manager 
AO2 
 
  
I would like AMA2 him to take a more active role 
in cost, a more active role in leading cost reduction 
 
Happy enough with that (review meetings), like it 
is a lot better than it used to be and it was poor 
enough 
 
Financial Accountant 
(Site A) 
AM3 
 
 
Business Unit 
Manager 
AO3 
 
…in some ways it (reviewing costs) is only done 
as an after thought or when the pressure is off. It 
is…there is nobody kind of resourced to focus on 
it 
Financial Accountant 
(Site B) 
AM4 
 
Plant Manager 
AO4 
 
 
I would have to say no I think he has done exactly 
as I say he took the initiative of going out and 
seeing the process which I have never seen 
Capital Projects 
Accountant 
BM1 
Project  
Manager 
BO1 
I think that the key for us always is the flexibility 
of systems…I think it is more what the finance 
function and what they can and can‘t do at times 
and that is a small bit frustrating at times but I 
mean that is the regulatory environment….you 
have got to row with it   
 
Management 
Accountant 
BM2 
 
 
 
 
Planning & 
Business 
Partner 
BO2 
he is good at his job but sometimes he is a little bit 
quiet, he could be a little bit more I suppose not 
forceful in his opinions but kind of stand up and 
say look lads I think this is how it should be 
Planning  
Accountant  
BM3 
Production 
Director 
BO3 
I think he is an extremely capable individual and 
he probably just needs a little bit more confidence 
in his ability to actually, to go after opportunities 
to influence  
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Just flag to me, push back to me and say look 
BSMA3 what you are asking me to do here is just 
too much… 
  
Financial Accountant  
BM4 
 
Packaging 
Production 
Manager 
BO4 
…would be good for the lads to understand the 
processes more… 
 
Because to be honest I don‘t know enough only 
through the queries that I am getting from 
BMA4…what do you do all day BMA4? 
 
Financial 
Accountant 
CM 
Operations 
Director 
CO 
I think it is constantly improving. I would say that 
they are doing it but they were not sharing it in the 
past because they were not asked for it, the 
previous operations, well there was no operations 
director before I came, the previous production 
managers I don‘t think…didn‘t…didn‘t have the 
same perspective 
 
Supply Chain 
Management 
Accountant 
DM1 
Commercial 
Manager 
Supply Chain 
DO1 
the capex is fine, it is a pain the…for everybody 
and people always complain about it 
 
Again more aggressive in looking for change, 
savings and all that 
Management 
Accountant –
Branches /  
Trading division 
DM2 
Commercial 
Manager  
DO2 
I would say one shortcoming with DMA2 is if 
maybe he was more people…if he was…he 
probably maybe annoys some people, maybe that 
is a personality thing and that is probably the 
shortcoming… it is maybe in terms of leadership, 
can raise the issue and often times the execution of 
or coming up the result he might be able to present 
that better maybe often times 
 
Budget - No he probably annoys us all in…and I 
would say...to meet deadlines 
 
Projects - No, actually he would be quite good at 
that 
Financial Services 
Manager 
EM 
Production 
Manager 
EO 
Use more user friendly jargon, some of the stuff 
that is…see he understands, I can confuse the 
living crap out of him like he can confuse me like 
if started talking, I normally try and break it down 
and make it simple but sometimes it doesn‘t work 
because when you are coming from an area that 
you totally understand what you are talking about 
it can be very difficult to put it into layman‘s terms 
likewise he is trashing out all the figures 
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Appendix G: Summary of managers influencing the roles of MAs 
 
MA 1
st
 influencer 2
nd
 influencer 3
rd
 influencer 4
th
 influencer 
AM1 Financial 
Controller 
Supply Chain and 
Maintenance 
Manager 
Business Unit 
Manager 
Operations Director 
AM2 Financial 
Controller 
Operations 
Manager 
IT Manager Head Office 
AM3 Internal Control 
Manager (Head 
Office) 
Financial 
Controller 
Business Unit 
Manager 
Accounting 
Practices 
AM4 Financial 
Controller 
Head Office Plant Manager  
BM1 Project 
Manager 
Management 
Accounting Team 
Leader 
Financial 
Controller 
 
 
BM2 Management 
Accounting 
Team Leader 
Financial 
Controller 
 
Planning / 
Business Partner 
Inventory 
Managers 
BM3 Financial 
Controller 
 
Management 
Accounting Team 
Leader 
Production 
Director 
Technical Support 
Manager 
BM4 Management 
Accounting 
Team Leader 
Financial 
Controller 
 
Packaging and 
Production 
Manager 
Production Director 
CM Finance Director 
 
Head Office Managing 
Director# 
Operations 
Manager 
DM1 Commercial 
Manager, 
Supply Chain 
Financial 
Controller 
 
Production 
Manager 
Development 
Manager 
DM2 Financial 
Controller 
Direct Reports(2) Commercial 
Manager, Region 
Sales Managers 
EM General Manager 
Operations 
(Financial 
Controller) 
Sales Director* Technical Services 
Manager 
Production 
Manager 
 
#This influencer was equated with the first influencer as CM noted that ‗the 
MD…doesn‘t actually come to me that often with queries, he would tend to go to the 
financial controller‘ and ‗so I might not necessarily know that the query is coming 
from [the MD]‘. 
 
*Sales Director in Company E declined interview request 
Note: Managers identified with bold text in the shaded box represent the OMs 
interviewed in the study, and with the exception of the Sales Director in Company E, 
also represented the OM that the MA identified as most influencing the MA. 
454 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix H 
 
Phase Two Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
455 
 
Appendix H1: Phase two listing and description of routine reports 
 
MA Ref. Report Description 
AM1 R1 Analysis of capital projects spend -  
Listing and analysis of capital project budgets, commitments and 
expenditure. 
 
AM2 R2 Labour productivity - actual productivity against our budget 
productivity. 
 
 R3 Output per employee vs. budget - output per employee versus plan. 
 
 R4 a-b  Operating supplies from stores - top 25 operating supplies by value and 
by volume.  
 
 R5 Manufacturing cost summary - head office cost of goods sold analysis 
versus plan and forecast with variance commentary. 
 
AM3 R6 a-b Operating supplies from stores - top 25 operating supplies by value and 
by volume.  
 
 R7 Department cost centre report - budgetary cost centre report for AO3, 
actual versus budget year-to-date by item listing. 
 
AM4 R8 Department cost centre report - budgetary cost centre report on  
maintenance, actual versus budget year-to-date and last year. 
 
 R9 Analysis of electricity cost - analysis of electricity costs between price 
and usage. 
 
 R10 Analysis of gas cost - analysis of gas costs between price and usage. 
 
 R11 Inventory report - inventory value report versus plan for major 
inventory categories. 
 
 R12 On-time delivery report - on-time delivery performance, part of a 
weekly scorecard, key metric…others included parts per million, 
overdues, cost of poor quality with issues and action comments. 
 
 R13 Conversion cost report - site conversion costs (productivity) vs. 
forecast. 
 
 R14 Overtime analysis - analysis of direct and indirect overtime.  
 
 R15 Expense tooling report - monthly analysis of tooling costs. 
 
BM1 R16 Project commitment report - analysis of project spend by quarter vs. 
budget, last year, invoiced, total committed and uncommitted. 
 
BM2 R17 Inventory report - summary of value and units of major inventory 
categories. 
 
 R18 Sales report - listing of customers, quantities, prices…(for internal 
group and head office use). 
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BM3 R19 Spending performance vs. forecast - monthly spend broken out into 
different programmes…against our last forecast. 
 
BM4 R20 Work orders variance analysis – batch variances - yield, mix, burden, 
method.  
 
 R21 Purchase price variance analysis - product analysis of purchase price 
variance.  
 
CM R22a-b Inventory report - analysis of inventory categories versus budget in 
units and values. 
 
 R23 Department cost centre report - cost centre budget report for 
departmental managers, month and year-to-date. 
 
 R24a-b Scrap report(s) - analysis of scrap in units and values and KPI graph. 
 
DM1 R25 Performance indicators - KPIs for production sites A and B.  
 
DM2 R26 Gross margin reports - analysis of gross margin for the month and year 
to date for product categories versus budget and last year. 
 
 R27 Adjusted net profit - analysis of profit adjustments across business 
units.  
 
EM R28 Quarterly report - management report containing financial, 
management and business unit performance information and 
commentary. 
 
 R29 Flash report - forecast of the month‘s performance for head office by 
20
th
 of month. 
 
 R30 Management accounts – monthly profit and loss, balance sheet, cash 
flow, commentary, and comparatives. 
 
 
Co. Provider Ref. Report Description 
A General 
Manager 
R31 Plant performance on 18 critical indicators (mostly non-financial) 
for head office versus the annual plan. 
 
B Team 
Leader 
 
R32 Management accounts for site operations. 
B Team 
Leader 
R33 32 KPIs versus target with traffic light status indicator for each 
metric and certain metrics ‗bonusable‘.  
 
D DO1 R34 
a-c 
Three sets of management accounts for different business units – 
profit and loss, and expense analysis.  
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Appendix H2: Phase two listing and description of non-routine reports 
 
MA Ref. Report Description 
AM1 NR1 Analysis of broken parts/cost savings - analysis of all costs associated 
with a particular scrap item to quantify the savings on it. 
 
AM2 NR2 Inventory reconciliation and material usage analysis - detailed 
reconciliation of inventory and usage analysis with summaries and 
commentaries across business units. 
 
 NR3 Absenteeism and floats – analysis of absenteeism and floats. 
 
 NR4 Personal protective equipment usage - cost per employee of protective 
equipment following introduction of restricted access. 
 
AM4 NR5 Overhead absorption rates - calculation of fixed and variable overhead 
absorption rates for labour and machining. 
 
 NR6 Analysis of standard costs - listing of product items and analysis of 
change in standards i.e., new year‘s standards vs. last year‘s standards. 
 
BM1 NR7 Forecast depreciation analysis - analysis of movements between budget 
years. 
 
 NR8 Analysis of purchase orders - analysis of project purchase order 
amendments. 
 
BM2 NR9 Release of a revaluation calculation - calculation of a stock revaluation 
by item. 
 
 NR10 Costing of new products - calculation of standard costs of new products. 
 
BM3 NR11 Overhead allocation methodology for batches - allocation for business 
units. 
 
CM NR12 Inventory adjustments - analysis of adjustments to inventory. 
 
 NR13 Budget analysis - listing of individual items in prior budgetary spend. 
 
 NR14 Recycling project report - analysis of recycling cost saving 
opportunities. 
 
DM1 NR15 Storage proposal - analysis of proposal for an alternative storage facility. 
  
 NR16 Customer order proposal - analysis of order and fixed and variable costs. 
 
EM NR17 Analysis of debtors balances - list of debtors‘ credit limits and monthly 
balances. 
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Appendix I1: Major activities making up the roles of MAs 
 
MA Major activities  MA Major activities  
 
AM1 
 
 
 All the costings of all the 
parts 
 Budget process 
 Capital projects 
 Maintain the asset register 
 Projects 
 Cost reduction 
 Control of inventory 
 Month end 
 Ad hoc stuff 
BM3  Budgeting and forecasting 
 Cost centre reviews 
 New product plans – what-if 
scenarios 
AM2  Month end 
 Budget 
 Forecasts  
 Standard costs 
 Project work 
BM4  Standard costing 
 Tolling 
 Month end 
 Inventory 
 Variances 
 Work orders 
AM3  Statutory reporting 
 Internal controls 
 Monthly reconciliations 
 Payroll 
 External links 
 Business unit manager  
 Budgets 
 Costing  
 Reporting  
 Cost reduction 
CM  Month end 
 Weekly reports 
 Banking 
 Asset registers 
 Cost control 
 Capital projects 
 Enquiries from the States 
AM4  Month end 
 Costs 
 Cost reduction 
 Standard costing 
 Improving systems  
 Projects 
 SOX 
DM1  Doing accounts and reporting 
 Presenting them to various 
management teams 
 Cut costs  
 IT development 
BM1  Asset register maintenance 
 Capital project management 
 SOX  
DM2  Report accurately the accounts 
 Advise…better informed 
decisions  
 Project work 
 Ad hoc 
BM2  Tracking inventory 
 Reconciliations 
 Sales and cost of sales 
 Project work 
EM  Monthly management accounts 
 Statutory accounts 
 Internal audit 
 Budget 
 Overseeing debtors, creditors  
 Signing checks  
 Reviewing the work 
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Appendix I2: Activities associated with interaction between MAs and OMs 
 
MA Activities identified by MA Activities identified by OM 
AM1 
 
 
 Cost reduction projects 
 Capital projects 
 Head office reporting 
 Maintenance 
 Cost reduction projects 
 Inventory 
 Financial Metrics 
 Variance analysis 
 Materials 
 Maintenance 
 Ad hoc 
AM2  Operations meetings 
 Individual meeting with manager 
 Cost reduction projects 
 As per MA 
AM3  Working with AO3 on pricing and 
budgets 
 SOX working with all managers 
 Budgeting 
AM4  Cost reduction teams 
 Setting standards 
 New product development 
 Cost reduction teams 
 Product development 
 
BM1  Engineers -individual projects  
 Project creation, close and 
maintenance 
 Individual project reporting 
 Reporting and forecasting on a 
monthly basis 
BM2  Inventory 
 Reconcile the sales, cost of sales, 
our standards 
 Inventory 
 Sales (inter-site), new items set-up, 
cost rollings 
BM3  Long range plans, budgets and 
forecasts 
 Cost centre reviews 
 New programmes coming on line 
 As per MA 
BM4  Work order yields and methods 
 Put on different teams say… … 
Material Review Board 
 Production meetings 
 As per MA 
CM  Costs…every month….against 
budget 
 Stock…weekly review 
 The KPIs, so scrap, inventory, 
freight in, freight out costs 
 Project costing 
DM1  Capital expenditure procedures 
 Annual business plans 
 Meetings 
 Monthly accounts first 
 Capital expenditure  
 Annual business plan 
 Meetings: both accounts 
and…managers meetings 
DM2  Accounts…meeting the sales 
people 
 Projects 
 Monthly review of accounts 
 The budget and then the business 
plan 
EM  Production variance analysis 
 Sales reports with price and volume 
and mix and customers 
 Formal quarterly meetings…other 
months…in the office with them 
 Variances 
 Annual budget and then there is the 
five year plan 
 
 
 
 
